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CONTENTS

A Letter From the Editor

Welcome to the 2017 edition of *Sigma.* This journal is a showcase of the scholarship produced by students in Brigham Young University's Political Science and International and Area Studies Departments. This journal represents hundreds of hours spent carefully investigating, analyzing, and reporting about significant issues in our world, yielding findings that we believe deserve an outlet beyond the university classroom. Accordingly, we present them for you to examine as an inquisitive reader.

As an undergraduate journal, *Sigma* has a message: Students need not wait for postgraduate study to contribute to the global storehouse of knowledge. Within this issue, you will find answers to a variety of questions, touching subjects as varied as domestic violence, congressional productivity in the U.S., and child labor in sub-Saharan Africa. Many of these papers also have implications for public policy in arenas such as improving foster care and increasing voter turnout. The fresh—yet carefully vetted—perspectives these authors present merit your close attention.

I wish to express my appreciation to the hard-working authors, editing staff, and professors who have assisted in polishing and preparing these papers for publication. I also wish to thank you as the reader for engaging with this emerging scholarship. I sincerely believe this journal will prove worthy of your time and intellectual engagement. As you read, you will surely find these voices both interesting and deserving of further dissemination.

Sincerely,

Reed Rasband
Editor-in-Chief

To Vote or Not to Vote: The Effect of Using All-Mail Election on Probability of Voting

Rehtaeh Beers

Introduction

Arend Lijphart (1997) said, "Voting is less unequal than other forms of participations but it is far from unbiased." While democracy is considered to be a form of government for the people and by the people, holding true to this reputation requires that some measure of the citizenry's opinion guide elections and decisions in government. The most common way to measure the opinions within the citizenry is through the voting process. Thus, it is understandable that in democracies voter abstention is generally considered to result in a less representative government. To address the issue of voter abstention, governments have implemented various changes in the voting system in attempts to increase the number of people that vote. One change that some governments have implemented is the all-mail election.

All-mail elections are rare within the United States. Currently, only Oregon, Washington, and Colorado use mail-in ballots. Alaska will join that list during the 2018 midterm election as they adopt an all-mail ballot mode of voting (Maxwell 2016). Mail-in ballots are proven to be more cost-effective than traditional voting, allowing for the replacement of millions of dollars' worth of ballot boxes with scanners and printers (Hamilton 1988). Most importantly, however, mail-in ballots may increase voter turnout. My research examines the effect of all-mail elections on voter turnout to determine if the all-mail ballot format increases the likelihood of citizens voting.

To research the efficiency of mail-in ballots as a means of increasing voter turnout, I use the 2010–2014 CCES Panel Study. Using multiple years of data allows comparison of voter turnout over multiple election cycles and contrast between all-mail and regular election cycles. I find that mail-in ballots in general increase voter turnout. Thus, I submit the adoption of all-mail elections to be a potential method for increasing voter turnout.

Literature

In most states, an eligible voter may request an absentee or mail-in ballot to avoid having to vote in person on Election Day. In states, such as Oregon, with an all-mail system, all registered voters receive a mail ballot that they may mail back or drop in a ballot drop-box. The difference between these modes of mail voting is drastic. Requested mail ballots may require explanation and preemptive registration just to receive the ballot. If a voter does not request a mail-in ballot, the voter must obtain transportation to his or her voting location and potentially wait in a line before voting. In contrast, all-mail election ballots require no more effort than original registration; the ballot comes automatically and all one must do is complete it. Citizens participating in mail voting systems find them to be more convenient, as evidenced by a January 1996 Oregon survey that found 79 percent of respondents said voting by mail was more convenient than voting in person (Traugott 1996). Due to the convenience, increased turnout is expected among those voters who are already willing to register (Karp and Banducci 2000). In addition to reduced demands on the citizen, the amount of time and effort required on the part of the state (that must manage many voting centers on Election Day) is significantly reduced, thus decreasing the cost of holding elections.

Because it is possible that part of the electorate is more easily reached by mail, it is likely that a state can increase its response rate for the midterm and presidential elections by expanding voting through mail-in ballots (Karp and Banducci 2000). Supporters of all-mail elections argue the mail-in ballot elections will decrease the difficulty of voting and will result in a higher voter participation among registered voters. Although voter registration itself may not increase with an all-mail system so long as the voter registration process remains the same, the percentage of registered voters who are willing to participate in voting may increase with the cost of voting down.

These arguments stem from theoretical models that focus on the collective and individual costs and benefits of voting (Piven and Cloward 1988; Teixeira 1992; Southwell 2000; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). The theoretical work on the cost of voting appears sound, though it is difficult to test exactly how much mail-in ballots lower the cost of voting for individuals. The lower cost and greater convenience of voting should result in a higher probability of the average individual doing so. Research specifically focused on non-candidate races suggests that all-mail elections increase turnout (Hamilton, 1988; Jeffe and Jeffe, 1990; Magleby, 1987; Mutch, 1992; Rosenfeld, 1995; Southwell, 2000). Therefore, it is likely that all-mail elections may increase turnout and civic engagement during non-presidential election years when there may be less social incentive to vote.

Midterm elections, or any election held in a period when the president is not up for reelection, have a reputation for lower voter turnout. One possible reason for reduced turnout is that the amount of competition between parties is lower and campaign expenditures are generally reduced (Dawson and Zinser, 1976; Hinckley,

1981; Jacobson, 1980). However, the mobilizing efforts of congressional candidates and the degree of competition for congressional seats can greatly influence midterm voter turnout (Gilliam 1985). These findings and speculation on the reasons for reduced turnout during midterm elections recommend that citizens need encouragement to vote during midterm years because they have less information given to them about the election in the form of campaigning and mobilization efforts. Sears and Valentino assert that political events and campaigns serve as catalysts for decision making and opinion gathering (1997). Because there are large differences in midterm and presidential elections regarding how much candidates campaign and how much the public pays attention, it is important to analyze these differences, particularly because the people candidates reach out to in these elections are slightly different demographically (1997). During midterm elections when campaign advertising occurs less, it follows that people need encouragement to vote during this time. What better encouragement than a ballot in the mailbox?

Southwell and Burchett are highly cited for their research on the effects of voting by mail on voter turnout. They report that in 2000 Oregon's new system increased turnout by ten percentage points compared to past elections (2000). Gerber, Huber, and Hill (2013), who are also frequently cited on voter turnout, found that in the state of Washington the all-mail elections reform of 2011 increased participation by five percentage points. These results implicate that all-mail elections decrease the cost of voting.

Gronke (2012) and Gerber, Huber, and Hill (2013) argue that turnout may increase in all-mail elections where voters were already registered but may have opted not to vote due to decreased public incentive. The social pressure, media attention, and easily accessible information that are all part of presidential elections but less prevalent during midterm elections may influence the decreased voter turnout during midterm elections. Herein is where mail-in ballots may play a significant role in reversing this trend; if a ballot comes in the mail, it may remind the citizen to vote and provide an easy and less burdensome method of doing so.

Southwell and Burchett's (2000) positive appraisals of all-mail elections are countered by Gronke and Miller, who find that a consistent impact of all-mail elections increasing voter turnout only occurs in special elections (2012, 987). However, Gronke and Miller fail to statistically interact presidential or midterm election years when they interact mail-in ballots with special and primary elections (2012, 986), an interaction that I think is highly necessary for determining when mail-in ballots increased turnout. Gronke and Miller also include turnout in primary elections as part of their turnout analysis and, though controlled for, these elections are significantly different from general elections (2012, 988–91). U.S. primary elections use various formats that are often quite different from general elections, and in some areas, primaries have notably lower turnout due to location, the number of people affiliated with the party, required party registration, and other restricting factors. Such elections should be analyzed completely separately from general turnout estimations.

I hypothesize that all-mail elections will increase voter turnout in midterm elections but have no effect during presidential elections. Individuals who turn out to vote during presidential elections will be more likely to vote during midterm elections due to the ballot arriving in the mailbox and the reduced cost of voting by mail.

Data and Methods

I analyzed the CCES Panel Study for 2010–2014 elections. The CCES was a study conducted in the U.S. beginning in 2006 when a consortium of thirty-nine universities joined forces to create the first large-scale academic survey project that specifically examines midterm congressional elections. The study has since produced national sample surveys of 50,000 or more respondents in each federal election. The panel survey I used was coordinated by Professors Stephen Ansolabehere of Harvard University and Brian Schaffner of the University of Massachusetts and was conducted over the Internet by YouGov (Harvard.edu). The sampling method for this panel study is matched random sampling, which has been validated in published studies (Schaffner and Ansolabehere 2015).

This panel survey best fits my study, because the panel data presents a validated vote status for the individuals who were surveyed. Other data sets only show the intent to vote or self-reported voting status. My concern with self-reported voting status is that citizens tend to over-report their vote (Bernstein, Chadha and Montjoy 2001). To avoid inaccuracy in my results due to over-reported voting, I decided to use the CCES panel survey. The CCES panel survey includes hundreds of variables on numerous subjects allowing for a well-controlled statistical model. It collects data on the individual level, allowing for unique analysis of voting behaviors.

A key concern that affects panel data's validity is panel attrition, or the dropping out of respondents in the study over time. Those who collected the data accounted for this issue by starting with a much larger base of panelists. By the conclusion of the panel study, there were still over 15,000 respondents (Schaffner and Ansolabehere 2015). Another concern that arises with panel studies is panel conditioning. Panel conditioning is defined as panel respondents changing their answers to questions on the survey because of repeated interviewing. Schaffner and Ansolabehere assert that little can be done to avoid conditioning, so they accounted for its effects by designing their study in a way that would allow them to detect conditioning and make the necessary adjustments when reporting their results (2015).

My primary method of analysis is a multilevel statistical logistic model. My models includes the 2010, 2012, and 2014 elections years, regressing all-mail election periods and an interaction of mail-in ballots with midterm elections on the binary variable of a validated vote. The logistic model is the best way to examine turnout because of the binary dependent variable.

The dependent variable is validated voter turnout, defined as whether an individual voted in the given election cycle. Because I wish to examine whether all-mail elections have altered the likelihood of citizens turning out to vote, it is necessary

to use a variable that measures voting behavior as the dependent variable. The surveyed individuals' voting behavior or turnout will allow for the examination of changes in the numbers of people over time that turn out to vote relative to other states. I use the variables on individual turnout, given in the CCES data that have been checked against the voting file, to verify which individuals voted. This reduces the amount of error in my measurements and conclusions (Bernstein, Chadha and Montjoy 2001). Many other surveys have collected data on voters, but they have not checked the turnout against the voter file, which allows a self-reporting social desirability error in the data. The reliability of the CCES data allows us to reduce this form of error.

It is also important to control for the two separate types of elections—midterm and presidential elections—as they tend to have generally different turnout as explained above. Because midterm elections often see less campaign advertising and media attention and take a less prominent role in the minds of the citizens, it is possible that motivations for voting in midterm elections differ from those in presidential elections, and it is important to control for the type of election in an analysis of all-mail elections.

Ideology is also an important measure of voting behavior because it is often found to be a predictor of political behavior. Large party systems depress voter turnout, especially in states and countries in which one ideology dominates the political system, as this often results in some individuals deciding not to vote, because they find it pointless due to their affiliation to one side or the other (Brockington 2004; Crepaz 1990). For the analysis, I use a scale of very liberal to very conservative. To control for other primary factors that are known to affect voter turnout, I use the following variables: education level (ranging from no high school to graduate school), age, income, gender, and race (Rolfe 2012; Brockington 2004).

Age and education are other factors that help predict an individual's likelihood to vote. These factors are the two that will most accurately predict voter turnout (Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1980). The older a person is, and the more education he or she has received, the more likely he or she is to vote (Cassel 2004). Income is also considered as a related predictor of turnout, particularly in low salience elections. Rolfe theorizes that this is the case, because the education and income of the individuals is an indicator of social proximity to the candidates (Rolfe 2012, 176). Income can have a significant effect on a person's decision to vote as well due to the relevance of items voted on to those with larger incomes that may own assets that make them more interested in the outcome of the vote (Avery and Peffley 2005).

It is frequently hypothesized that as age increases, individuals are much more likely to vote. There is a consensus in the political science field that the relationship between age and turnout is nonlinear. Most frequently it is thought that a quadratic of age is necessary for a turnout model because the incentives to vote increase as one grows older. For example, maintaining governmental supplements for retirement is

an additional incentive for older persons to vote. Eventually, however, once an individual reaches a very old age, there are no further increasing incentives to vote. When individuals are set in their habits, there is an anticipated stabilizing in the probability of their voting, leaving a curvilinear relationship that should be measured by the log of age. For a validated vote model, a log of age yields significant estimates and is a considered a better measure (Cassel 2004; Bhatti, Hansen, and Wass 2012). When I analyzed a logistic regression with the log of age, I found it was statistically significant. When I ran the model with age squared, it removed the significance of many important variables, including its own.

Gender can also affect voter turnout, and it was historically a grand predictor of voter turnout (Merriam and Gosnell 1924). It is still used as an instrument of prediction in some models. Rolfe asserts that females may express a firmer conviction that money is a more important mode of political participation, and females tend to vote less a minor amount of the time (2012, 138).

I found that race was not a statistically significant predictor in my analysis. The effect of race on voter turnout cannot be measured, because I control for all things that stay stable across time and for things that do not change from midterm election to midterm election. These controls for dummied-out variables incorporated the effect of race, because race does not change across time. Because of the stability of race, it should not matter that I cannot measure the effect of race on the decision to vote, as long as we are aware that the effect is already controlled for. If I were to include the variable, it would skew my results, so I left it out of my analysis. To find survey question wording see Appendix A.

Multilevel data is structured in such a way that it contains several units of analysis, all nested within one another. There are two primary approaches to multilevel data. A dummy variable model or fixed effect model is a highly popular method for addressing multilevel data. Dummied-out subgroups are used to absorb the variation between the groups (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). This allows for a reduction in bias from uncalculated factors; essentially, it drastically reduces omitted variable bias. The complication with this method is that the dummied-out subgroups fully absorb the effects and prevent a measurement of the effects of the absorbed factors. If I wish to measure the effect of a factor that changes across natural grouping but does not change from observation time to observation time, I am unable to do so when including the dummied-out factor.

To measure the effect of factors that change across my subgroups of state, county, and observations of an individual at different times, I will dummy out these variables. By doing so, I can control for omitted factors that strongly affect an individual's probability of voting (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). Culture and other factors that vary from state to state and county to county are omitted factors from my analysis if the dummied-out variables are not included. Yet, the common dummying out process prevents the measurement of other important factors that

are being absorbed by the process. Thus, I use a less traditional method that is gaining traction in political science research as it allows for the measurement of the factors yet also allows me to control for such factors as state and county culture or individual factors.

I used an approach to modeling multilevel data that includes the subgroup-level predictors in the analysis. However, instead of absorbing the effect, this approach allows me to calculate individual factors such as the effects of mail-in ballots. I nest the effects of the different subgrouping into a hierarchical logistic model with the three levels of state, county, and individual ID of the respondents to the survey. The nested model allows me to control for the different cultural and subgroup effects nested within each other. This would make a positive difference in unknown situations, such as if a county in a state with strict voter registration laws that tend to reduce turnout held a "get out the vote effort" that was not otherwise accounted for in my analysis.

Findings and Implications

Table 1 presents a summary of the probability of voting models fitted to the data, factoring in the effects of random unpredicted changes in individuals within counties. It also controls for factors that change between counties in natural clustering within states. All the models were fitted using deletion of missing data. For further analysis and diagnostics of my models in Table 1 see Appendix B.

My analysis implicates that all-mail elections do affect turnout. In Table 1, I use a model that does not control for whether it is a midterm election year, and I find that the all-mail elections significantly increase the probability of an individual voting. In Models 2 and 3, I look at the factor of the effect of midterm election years and its effect on voting turnout when all-mail elections are used. The relationship between mid-term elections is expectedly significant on the probability of turnout in a given election. Thus, I find that all-mail elections do not significantly increase the probability of an individual voting in presidential elections, but as common theory suggests, all-mail ballot elections do increase the probability of voting during midterm elections.

In Model 2, I included a variable that absorbs the effect of changes across all entities over time. Unfortunately, this variable is perfectly correlated with the midterm elections year predictions of a presidential election, because there is only one presidential election in my model, thus it removes the time fixed effect for 2012. It is important to include 2012 in my model due to the many changes in the country between the midterm and presidential election years. Because the controls are perfectly collinear, they are still being controlled for by the midterm election variable, but because they are collinear I cannot properly predict the effect of all-mail elections with confidence, as I analyzed in Model 3.

Model 3 does not include the time fixed effect to prevent issues with perfect collinearity. It shows a similar set of results as Model 2, but it shows a slightly weaker relationship with the probability of voting. Otherwise, the models are quite similar.

Table 1: All-Mail Elections Regressed on Whether Individual Voted
Logistic Regression; Dependent Variable: Validated Voted

VARIABLES	(1) Voted	(2) Voted	(3) Voted
All-Mail Elections	1.189***	0.161	-0.0342
	(0.182)	(0.212)	(0.205)
Midterm Election year	-	-0.368***	-0.0846**
		(0.0398)	(0.0332)
All-Mail Elections * Midterm Election	-	2.196***	1.953***
		(0.243)	(0.239)
Log Age	1.312***	1.325***	1.062***
	(0.0797)	(0.0805)	(0.0714)
Education Level	0.333***	0.335***	0.291***
	(0.0822)	(0.0830)	(0.0764)
Education-squared	-0.0329***	-0.0331***	-0.0305***
	(0.0105)	(0.0106)	(0.0098)
Female	-0.156***	-0.158***	-0.132***
	(0.0369)	(0.0372)	(0.0342)
Income	0.0346***	0.0348***	0.0524***
	(0.0055)	(0.0056)	(0.0051)
Very Liberal	0.150**	0.149**	0.149**
	(0.0644)	(0.0649)	(0.0602)
Liberal	0.265***	0.266***	0.253***
	(0.0523)	(0.0527)	(0.0492)
Moderate	0.161***	0.160***	0.145***
	(0.0482)	(0.0486)	(0.0452)
Conservative	0.281***	0.285***	0.273***
	(0.0574)	(0.0579)	(0.0537)
Very Conservative	-0.784***	-0.800***	-0.715***
	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.0984)
Constant	-4.883***	-5.307***	-4.300***
	(0.381)	(0.388)	(0.350)
Time Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	23,867	23,867	23,867

Source: CCES 2010-2014.

Standard errors in parentheses. *** P<0.01, ** P<0.05

The year 2012 excluded from model 2 due to perfect collinearity with a midterm election year.

Coeffects are displayed as logged odds. For full models see Appendix B. Unlisted controls are: religion; church attendance; and variance between states, counties, and individuals.

In Model 3, I found an approximate 18 percent increase in the probability of an individual voting during the midterm election. This increase was muted during all-mail elections in Model 1. There is a high probability that part of this effect is due to the newness of the mail mode of voting in Oregon and Washington.

The results provide evidence that there is indeed an increase in voter turnout when all-mail elections are implemented. My results do implicate that the new mode of voting does not generally increase turnout but rather increases the probability of individuals who are already likely to vote in presidential elections. However, the probability of an individual voting increased drastically when all-mail elections were implemented. With panel data respondents being interviewed year after year, those who do not respond may be choosing not to do so, because they feel guilty about not voting. Yet, that does not reduce the validity of my analysis, because the individuals who vote are still those who would usually vote, and those that are influenced by the all-mail elections should still be equally influenced, because a small survey that is unlikely to alter years of habit (Bernstein, Chadha and Montjoy, 2001).

Overall, my results implicate that implementing all-mail elections, at least during midterm elections and potentially special elections as recommended by past literature, will increase voter turnout for midterm elections. My analysis also recommends that there is no negative effect during presidential elections. Because I only look at the one presidential election, more study and analysis is needed to determine the effect of mail-in ballots on presidential election years. But per both my data and Southwell, Burchett (2000), Gronke and Miller (2012), and Gerber, Huber, and Hill (2013), there appears to be no negative effect of mail-in ballots on election turnout in any year. This result is almost more important than the increased turnout during midterm election years because of the reduced election costs in states that hold mail-in ballots. Elections are expensive, and any major reductions in cost can go toward other programs, such as "get out the vote" programs. The reduction in cost of elections alone is reason enough to move to all-mail elections voting systems. The increase in midterm election turnout is also highly beneficial for increasing political participation.

Conclusion

All-mail elections are rare within the U.S. with just three states using them. Yet despite their limited use, all-mail elections appear to result in an increase in the probability of an individual voting during midterm elections. The CCES's collection of data over time, which I used in my study, allowed for a new type of analysis on the effects of all-mail elections on voter turnout. Most work done on all-mail elections uses special elections or aggregate data, thus not allowing for a study of the individual aspects that affect the probabilities of a person turning out to vote in an all-mail ballot state. The individual level data allowed for a vast number of specialized multivariate regression controls that would have been impractical on other forms of data. Because there are large differences in the amount of campaigning and the amount of attention paid between midterm and presidential elections, it is important to look at the difference between these elections, because the people being reached out to are slightly different demographically (Gilliam 1997). And because the people are different, it is important to control for the type of election with this manner of analysis.

It appears that the probability of an individual voting in a midterm election when there is an all-mail election is higher than if there is a normal in-person election style. I cannot be certain of the exact cause of this result, but it appears that it may pertain to increasing the convenience of voting during election years when the elections are not prominent media topics. It may be that receiving a ballot in the mail provides already-registered voters an extra push to do research and cast their votes. Doing further testing could enable us to determine if those who are already registered have a higher tendency to vote during midterms with all-mail elections as opposed to those registered in other states who do not have all-mail elections. If my theory is correct, this would show an increased turnout in those voters who are already willing to register.

To determine the exact effects of all-mail elections over time will require a significant amount of additional research. A better form of analysis to determine the true effect of all-mail elections of voter turnout would consist of collecting data over time from each state individually and analyzing each collection of data individually as time progresses. In other words, individualized voting records would be necessary along with some minor demographical information. There is a possibility that the effect of all-mail elections on increased turnout during midterm elections would decrease back to original levels, stabilize, or even continue to increase for a time. To determine these effects for states such as Washington, the turnout in the state needs to be followed over time for a more extended period of time.

APPENDIX A
Survey Question Wording
Religion
"What is your present religion, if any?"
    1 Protestant
    2 Roman Catholic
    3 Mormon
    4 Eastern or Greek Orthodox
    5 Jewish
    6 Muslim
    7 Buddhist
    8 Hindu
    9 Atheist
    10 Agnostic
    11 Nothing in particular
    12 Something else

Education
"What is the highest level of education you have completed?"
    1 No HS
    2 High school graduate

3 Some college
4 2-year
5 4-year
6 Post-grad

Income
"Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?"
1 Less than $10,000
2 $10,000–19,999
3 $20,000–29,999
4 $30,000–39,999
5 $40,000–49,999
6 $50,000–59,999
7 $60,000–69,999
8 $70,000–79,999
9 $80,000–99,999
10 $100,000–119,999
11 $120,000–149,999
12 $150,000–199,999
13 $200,000–249,999
14 $250,000–349,999
15 $350,000–499,999
16 $500,000 or more
17 $150,000 or more
18 $250,000 or more

Age
"In what year were you born?"
　　Open response. This variable was recoded to age by subtracting the birth year they list from the year the survey was taken.

Gender
"What is your current gender?"
0 Male
1 Female

Race
"What racial or ethnic group best describes you?"
1 White
2 Black
3 Hispanic
4 Asian
5 Native American

6 Mixed
7 Other
8 Middle Eastern

Ideology
"Thinking about politics these days, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?"

1 Very liberal
2 Liberal
3 Moderate
4 Conservative
5 Very Conservative
6 Not sure

Church Attendance
"Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?"

6 More than once a week
5 Once a week
4 Once or twice a month
3 A few times a year
2 Seldom
1 Don't know
0 Never

APPENDIX B

Full Table 1
All-Mail Elections Regressed on Whether Individual Voted
Logistic Regression
Dependent Variable: Validated Voted

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Voted	Voted	Voted
All-Mail Elections	1.189***	0.161	-0.0342
	(0.182)	(0.212)	(0.205)
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Education-squared	-0.0329***	-0.0331***	-0.0305***
	(0.0105)	(0.0106)	(0.00977)

Female	-0.156***	-0.158***	-0.132***
	(0.0369)	(0.0372)	(0.0342)
Income	0.0346***	0.0348***	0.0524***
	(0.00553)	(0.00558)	(0.00510)
Very Liberal	0.150**	0.149**	0.149**
	(0.0644)	(0.0649)	(0.0602)
Liberal	0.265***	0.266***	0.253***
	(0.0523)	(0.0527)	(0.0492)
Moderate	0.161***	0.160***	0.145***
	(0.0482)	(0.0486)	(0.0452)
Conservative	0.281***	0.285***	0.273***
	(0.0574)	(0.0579)	(0.0537)
Very Conservative	-0.784***	-0.800***	-0.715***
	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.0984)
Church Attendance	-0.0497***	-0.0505***	-0.0475***
	(0.0123)	(0.0124)	(0.0115)
Protestant	-0.0455	-0.0470	-0.0286
	(0.0589)	(0.0594)	(0.0554)
Roman Catholic	-0.0648	-0.0657	-0.0565
	(0.0635)	(0.0640)	(0.0595)
Mormon	-0.154	-0.146	-0.152
	(0.163)	(0.164)	(0.152)
Orthodox	-0.379	-0.387	-0.365
	(0.260)	(0.263)	(0.243)
Jewish	-0.00813	-0.00701	-0.00661
	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.0991)
Muslim	-1.484***	-1.529***	-1.421***
	(0.410)	(0.415)	(0.382)
Buddhist	0.105	0.110	0.109
	(0.207)	(0.209)	(0.194)
Hindu	-0.767	-0.808	-0.679
	(0.743)	(0.757)	(0.698)
Atheist	-0.661***	-0.663***	-0.702***
	(0.0839)	(0.0847)	(0.0787)
Agnostic	0.126	0.127	0.111
	(0.0839)	(0.0845)	(0.0793)
Other	0.0206	0.0270	0.0461
	(0.0961)	(0.0969)	(0.0911)
Constant	-4.883***	-5.307***	-4.300***
	(0.381)	(0.388)	(0.350)
Time Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	No
Variance of Between	0.335***	0.339***	0.311***
States	(0.0755)	(0.0763)	(0.0696)

Variance of Between	0.0499***	0.0516***	0.0452***
Counties	(0.0164)	(0.0169)	(0.0144)
Variance of Between	0.512***	0.543***	0.242***
Individuals	(0.0695)	(0.0710)	(0.0552)
Observations	23,867	23,867	23,867

I tested for multicollinearity using the variance inflation factor. I found that the variance inflation factor was quite low with a mean of 2.34. This means there is some slight multicollinearity in the model but not enough to warrant concern. The slight multicollinearity is likely due to the number of binary variables that I include in the models.

There do not appear to be any major outliers in the data. Using Cook's distance, a useful tool for identifying outliers in the model, I found no values over one in my Cook's distance and no values that make a dramatic jump in their values.

Table 2
The BIC and AIC for Models in Table 1

Model	Observations	ll (model)	Deg. Freedom	AIC	BIC
Model 1	23,867	-13467.09	29	26992.19	27229.51
Model 2	23,867	-13460.55	29	26979.1	27213.43
Model 3	23,867	-13680.02	27	27113.1	27311.08

Table 2 lists the Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for the models in Table 1. Despite the perfect collinearity of two of the variables in Model 2 the AIC and BIC both went down. This signifies that the controlling for of midterm years is sufficient even if it omits one of the basic controls for time. For Model 3, the AIC and BIC increase to be larger than the AIC and BIC for both other models. This evidences that change over time do influence the model in an important manner. Nevertheless, both reproduce nearly the same implications that all-mail elections increase turnout during midterm years. This implies that although the estimation in Model 2 is likely closer to the true effect, the effect remains the same.

Because the model including time fixed effects was a better estimate, I attempted to include time as a cross-nested effect. This allowed it to differ across all the different subgroups and control for the effect of factors that change across time but not between entities while looking at the effects of midterm elections. The time cross-nested effect model failed to run in Stata, the statistical program I used, due to the amount of data included and complexity of the model. The model appeared to be possible, but my computer crashed after 5 hours of running the model through an error code. In all other attempts to run the model, Stata crashed, preventing me from completing the calculations. If a cross-nested variable of time were to be included, the program R would need to be used to simplify the calculations.

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The Effect of Making Election Day a Holiday: An Original Survey and a Case Study of French Presidential Elections Applied to the U.S. Voting System

Caitlyn Bradfield and Paul Johnson

Introduction

Voter turnout in the U.S. has lagged behind other developed democracies for decades. Exactly what causes this discrepancy has been an issue of debate. Ironically, "voters [in the United States] are more politically aware and involved than citizens in any other democracy, yet the levels of voter turnout are consistently far below the democratic average" (Powell 1986, 17).

We theorize that voter turnout is largely dependent on the ability and relative ease that voters have to vote, typically related to time and responsibility constraints. To assess this hypothesis and predict the effect of introducing a national election holiday on voter turnout, we conduct a case study comparing two relatively similar democracies: the U.S. and the French Republic. In developed democracies, eligible voter turnout averages around 80% in general elections (Ibid., 17). However, elections in the U.S. present a different story as turnout is much lower, often averaging around 50% of all eligible adults (Gans 2012) and 75% of all registered, eligible adults (IDEA 2016). In the 2012 election, registered voter turnout reached a low of 67% of eligible adults. In order to maximize voter turnout, we theorize that designating Election Day in the U.S. a national holiday would rapidly increase voter turnout in the U.S. by minimizing possible obstacles that voters face on Election Day.

Voter turnout among registered American voters averaged 75.16% of all registered voters between 2002 and 2012.[1] Existing research suggests that turnout in America is encouraged by a unique set of "political attitudes" that, if possessed by other democracies, would increase their turnout (Powell 1986, 18). However, while this benefit exists, "institutional factors" and difficult registration laws dramatically reduce turnout among American voters (Ibid.). Indeed, additional research suggests

that voter turnout among democracies is a result of political institutions and electoral law (Jackman 1987, 405). While many countries schedule Election Day on a weekend or create a national holiday for elections, the U.S. has designated the Tuesday after the first Monday in November as Election Day.

We hypothesize that the day on which general elections are held in the U.S. serves as a barrier and reduces voter turnout among working class Americans who are already registered to vote. While polls are generally open 7:00 a.m.–7:00 p.m., many working adults who are eligible to vote face long commutes to work or may work longer hours than the average American. In addition, voters with families may struggle to find time to wait in line. Reports indicate that average wait times vary dramatically state to state, with wait times averaging two minutes in Vermont and nearly 40 minutes in Florida (Ansolabere and Schaffner 2012). It is estimated that 500,000–700,000 votes are lost due to voters being deterred by long lines (Stewart and Ansolabehere 2013). Most of these long lines are caused by workers getting in line to vote before or after work. We believe wait times would be reduced with the implementation of our hypothesis, as it would open up more hours of the day in which workers could potentially vote.

Literature Review

According to the U.S. Census Bureau in 2014, individuals cited a variety of reasons for failing to vote. Nearly 30% of voters who failed to vote in 2014 cited being "too busy" to cast their vote, followed by 16% being "not interested." In that same year, 11% of voters did not vote due to illness whereas 10% did not vote due to being out of town. Among the many other reasons to skip an election were: "forgot to vote," "disliked candidates/issues," "registration problems," "inconvenient polling place," and "transportation issues" (United States Census Bureau 2014). We theorize that most of these reasons could be reasonably resolved with the implementation of our hypothesis and will hereafter explore in more depth why we believe a national holiday for Election Day would not increase the number of voters who miss due to being out of town.

Anthony Downs, in his influential research about the costs of voting, found that "where voting is costly, individuals will consider both how much they care about the outcome and the likelihood that their vote will influence the outcome (be pivotal)." Downs' theory was later developed into a model, which outlines expected behavior by voters, as $R = (B* P) - C + D$. Essentially, the cost of voting (C) must be outweighed by the potential outcomes from voting (the positive benefit of voting and the probability of the vote making a difference multiplied by the gain of the preferred outcome).

Indeed, conventional wisdom suggests inherent costs in voting. Voting is time intensive and may conflict with other "demands and preferences" (Stein and Vonnahme 2008, 487). For working Americans, poll-voting times may be inconvenient, especially in cases where commutes to work are required (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003, Dyck and Gimpel 2005, Gimpel, Dyck, and Shaw 2006). Most polls are open

between 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. A significant portion of Americans annually fail to vote due to time constraints.

In addition, voters who must wait for extended periods of time in order to vote are dramatically less likely to vote, and Stewart and Ansolabehere predict that 500,000–700,000 votes are lost due to lines at polls (2013). The number of votes lost due to avoidable situations is often a politicized debate. In the 2016 Arizona democratic primary, voters in Maricopa County were forced to wait hours in line to vote since Maricopa County "only had one polling site for every 21,000 voters" (Rayman, O'Dell, and Cano 2016). Many voters are unable to devote large amounts of time per day to spend at polls and are forced away by long lines when other priorities require attention. We argue that resolving the many issues surrounding voting in the U.S. is an ethical issue and thus of utmost importance.

As such, it is sufficiently evident that voters are deterred for a variety of reasons. Most prevalent among all, however, are reasons relating to time management and inconvenience. As the data illustrates, voters in America often face a conflict of interest on Election Day between managing important personal affairs and their civic responsibilities.

Countries apply a variety of approaches in order to combat low voter turnout rates. In Australia, for instance, voter turnout nears 100 percent. It is worth noting that Australia's Election Day occurs on a Saturday and is mandatory (Australian Electoral Commission 2017). However, research shows that mandatory turnout laws are "not necessary for high levels of participation" (Hirczy 1994). Evidence of this is visible in France. Turnout in France averaged 81.37 percent in the years 2002–12 without mandatory voting laws (Table A1). France schedules elections on weekends to minimize the possibility that voters may be unable to vote due to various time and responsibility constraints.

France and Australia are not alone in their efforts. Germany, New Zealand, and other countries either vote on a weekend or designate Election Day as a national holiday (Federal Returning Officer 2017, Electoral Commission of New Zealand 2017). While many countries vote on a weekend, we hypothesize that establishing Election Day as a national holiday will be more beneficial to voter turnout as it would solve many of the issues that voters cite for failing to vote without requiring a constitutional amendment. Martin Wattenberg succinctly summarized the benefit that this would have toward Americans when he said, "This would send a strong signal about the importance our country attaches to voting" (1998).

Case Study: France
Why France?

The idea that making Election Day a national holiday would increase registered voter turnout is the result of a case study comparing the U.S. and France. We believe that the only significant difference between these countries in relation to voter turnout is the day of the week on which Election Day is held. This is the principal reason

we have chosen to compare France and the United States. Because there is no work or other weekday responsibilities, voters turn out at higher rates, averaging 81 percent over the last three general elections.[2] We believe that a national holiday Election Day would simulate this type of result in the U.S. and even increase it as people are less likely to be out of town on a Tuesday than on a Sunday.

France and the U.S. as Most Similar Cases

We intend to show that France and the U.S. are similar in all election-relevant ways except for a particularly critical difference: Election Day. France and the U.S. have been used as most similar cases in previous research on governmental structure and political involvement, thus laying the foundation for a study on elections (Holtz-Bacha, Kaid, and Johnston 1994, Conley 2007). In literature by Holtz-Bacha, Kaid, and Johnston, it was concluded that "there are definite shared cultural and political values that give rise to similar electoral strategies" between the France and the U.S. (1994).

We find that France and the U.S. are comparable in terms of government structure. Previous research shows that the two exclusively possess an explicit presidential government (Jackman 1987, 413). Both countries have executive branches independent of the parliamentary branch, unlike other comparable countries (Jackman 1987, 413). The term lengths for the president of France and the U.S. are similar, at five and four years respectively. In fact, the executives in the U.S. and France are nearly identical, even down to the veto powers and way the cabinet systems operate (Conley 2007).

Economically, the two countries are also relatively similar. GDP per capita in the U.S. averages $54,000, whereas GDP per capita in France is $43,000 (Find the Data 2016). France and the U.S. also share many demographic similarities. While the two countries are inherently different, we find evidence to suggest that the demographics and political institutions are comparable, as do scholars in previous studies.

Voting procedures in France mandate that elections be held on Sunday in order to maximize voter turnout. France averaged about 81.34 percent turnout in between 2002–12, which is comparable to averages for other developed democracies (IDEA). France's weekend Election Day is comparable to a holiday, since both provide traditionally non-work days for voters to cast ballots. We expect that a national Election Day holiday will increase voter turnout to levels that are consistent with and perhaps even higher than other developed democracies as more individuals will be granted time off.

We choose to compare voter turnout using turnout percentage of registered voters from 2002–12. Using the percentage of registered voters instead of the traditional VAP (voting age population) measure eliminates "not registered" as a reason that people do not vote and allows us to focus on day-of inconveniences. In addition, it minimizes the disproportional effect that immigration may have on voter turnout. This is particularly important today as France and the U.S. have large numbers of non-eligible adults (either due to their criminal or immigration status), which may distort the VAP ratings. We used data from IDEA[3] to examine the executive election turnout in both countries in each election occurring in this time frame.

Over the last decade, with the exception of the year 2004, the America has seen a decrease in voter turnout. We suspect the exception in 2004 was a result of great American patriotism that followed the 9/11 terror attacks and the war in Iraq. However, qualifying 2004 as an outlier, the general trend indicates voter participation has declined, according to IDEA (2016).

We suspect that the National Voting Act of 1993 influenced the number of eligible voters who became registered voters, at a lagged rate, since voter registration became as simple as checking a box at the DMV. France has automatic voter registration at age 18, thus the registered voting age population is very high. We believe that these countries are increasingly comparable as the United States' National Voting Act of 1993 increased the percentage of the voting age population that are registered to vote. Of note is the idea that registration is voluntary in the United States. Theoretically, voter turnout in the U.S. among registered voters should even be higher than turnout in France since American citizens must be politically interested enough to register.

We hypothesize that the large difference in turnout in executive elections is a result of the day of week that each country chooses to hold elections. In France, elections are held on Sunday and in the U.S. they are held on Tuesday. We believe that Sunday elections make voting more accessible to the general population than a midweek election. Moving Election Day to a Sunday in the U.S. would require a constitutional amendment, which is not the most feasible of plans. We propose instead that an Election Day holiday be instituted, as it is similar to holding elections on a weekend and would be more likely to be instituted by Congress.

There are several additional advantages to making Election Day a holiday over moving it to a weekend. First, Tuesday has been Election Day in the United States since 1845 and has become an ingrained part of American tradition. Second, a Tuesday Election Day minimizes the number of people that would fail to vote due to travels, as they would need to be in town for work on Monday and Wednesday. Failing to vote is easier if Election Day is on a weekend when many voters have more time off and choose to travel. We found that 19 percent of those that did not vote in a recent election failed to do so because they were "out of town." This number would only increase if we gave greater ability for travel on Election Day. While a holiday Election Day would fail to solve the problem of many workers who travel for extended periods of time for business, it would not increase the likelihood of travel among other citizens significantly.

Methodology
Survey: Why Registered Voters Fail to Vote[4]

To provide quantitative support for our hypothesis, we conducted a case study administered through Brigham Young University's Research Project in American Politics class. The survey included a variety of questions from students performing research. Our specific questions will address three topics: reasons an individual did not vote in previous elections, useful methods to make voting easier, and an opinion question on making Election Day a national holiday. The survey questions follow:

Figure 1[5, 6]

There are a variety of reasons people do not vote in Presidential elections. In fact, only 53% of eligible voters made it out to the 2012 Presidential election. Please rank the following reasons that have previously prevented *you* from voting in an election. (Rank: 1 being the biggest reason *you* have been unable to vote).

- Work or too busy

- Family demands

- Not enough time or long lines

- My district is not competitive; my vote does not count

- Out of town or not a registered voter

- Illness or disability

- Forgetting to vote

- Other

Figure 2

Would making election day a national holiday solve the problem of
"${q://QID33/ChoiceGroup/ChoiceWithLowestValue}"?

◯ Yes

◯ No

Figure 3

Law-makers have created certain measures to make voting easier. Which of these measure would make you more likely to vote? (Select all that apply).

☐ Same-day voter registration

☐ Absentee ballots

☐ Making election day a national holiday

☐ Vote centers

☐ Moving election day to a weekend

☐ Mail-in voting

☐ Early voting

☐ Absentee ballots that do not require a reason

Respondents were also asked a variety of demographic questions and whether or not making Election Day a national holiday would resolve the main deterrents that kept them from voting in a recent election. This survey was administered via MTurk.

We hypothesize that these questions will provide information showing that voters fail to vote primarily due to inconveniences such as commuting or work hours. Just as Sunday voting removes most obstacles and inconveniences, we hypothesize that a national holiday would have a similar effect. These questions, in addition to demographic questions, allow us to run a logit model in order to predict what effect making Election Day a national holiday would have on those who did not vote for a variety of reasons. The dependent variable in the question is, "Would making Election Day a national holiday solve the problem of x" and the independent variable of interest is the reason people failed to vote.

Results

To analyze the survey responses, we ran a logit model.[7] The model contained the variables of interest (work/too busy, familial demands, not enough time/long lines, forgetting to vote) ranked as a first response. The model shows the predictive margins and the resulting percent change. Using this model, we also analyzed specific groups of respondents by race, income, ideology, and by whether they lived in a rural area.

We find that respondents who cited the variables of interest as the number one reason they do not vote would be able to vote if Election Day was a national holiday.

Table 1: Logit Model: Would making an Election Day a Holiday solve the problem?
Pseudo R2 = .223

Reasons failed to vote	=0	=1	Expected change (in percentage)
Work/too busy	.35	.85	50%
Family demands	.52	.78	26%
Not enough time/long lines	.50	.86	36%
Forgetting to vote	.51	.78	27%

This logit was run with controls. These reasons indicate a voters first reason they did not vote. To see the full output see Table A2 in the appendix.

Discussion

Our findings give credence to our hypothesis that voter turnout would be increased through eliminating barriers to voting in a way similar to what France has done. In addition, the quantitative results of our survey corroborate our hypothesis.

Main Findings

We uncover several interesting statistics through our survey. The graph below visually displays the general predicted effect of a making Election Day a national holiday on voter turnout among those who ranked one of the variables of interest as first. We would see significant increases in voter turnout among those respondents that cited our variables of interest as the primary reason they fail to vote.

For individuals who failed to vote in a previous election due to work or being too busy, we found that creating a national holiday for Election Day would increase voter turnout by 50%. For those that did not vote due to familial demands, we expect voter turnout to increase by 26%. A significant portion of respondents did not vote due to not having enough time or lines being too long. We estimate that voter turnout for these individuals will increase by 36%. Lastly, we found that voter turnout will increase by 27% for those who "forgot to vote" in a recent election. With at least a 25% increase per variable, these findings are significant. All of these findings were consistent with data derived from the 2010 Census.

A brief analysis of the data set suggests that about 50% of our sample selected one of our variables of interest (work/too busy, familial demands, not enough time/long lines, and forgetting to vote) as the first or second reason they were

Figure 4: Predicted Effect of a National Holiday for Election Day on Voter Turnout

—Work —Familial Demands —Not Enough Time —Forgetting to Vote

likely to have failed to vote. Extrapolated to the general population, if we were to address the problem that 50% of non-voting Americans faced in 2012, we would have seen an increase in turnout by registered voters from about 67% to about 83%. That translates to just under 32,000,000 additional votes. This increase would put American voter turnout on par with, and even above, the average turnout rate for most developed democracies. While not every person in that group would choose to vote, there could reasonably be an increase by 16,000,000 votes given a registered voter turnout of 67% in 2012.

The Effect on Subgroups

We explored different subgroups of the population that tend to have lower voter turnout and the reasons that they cite (United States Census Bureau 2014). We ran the logit model and included a condition at the end that would reflect the subgroup of interest, then ran the predictive margins for each subgroup. The results of the predictive margins are below in Table 2. We chose each of these subgroups for theoretical reasons that we will explain below.

BLACK RESPONDENTS

Based on census data and established literature we recognize that racial minorities turn out at lower rates than white voters. We found that in each of the relevant reasons respondents fail to vote that turnout among black voters may be increased by up to 34 percent.

Table 2: Break-down by Subgroup

Race	Reason failed to vote	= 0	= 1	Expected change (in percent increase)
Black	*Work/too busy*	.50	.70	20%
	Familial demands	.57	.88	31%
	Not enough time/long lines	.53	.87	34%
	Forgetting to vote	.57	.74	17%
Income				
<$10,000	*Work/too busy*	.30	.80	50%
$100,000-$250,000	*Work/too busy*	.37	.92	55%
Ideology				
Moderate	*Work/too busy*	.27	.79	52%
	Not enough time/long lines	.37	.75	38%
	Forgetting to vote	.38	.83	45%

"=0" and "=1" indicate the predicted margins for each subgroup and for the specified reason the respondent failed to vote.

We suspect that the actual effect is higher. Many people can easily cite multiple reasons they do not vote, so solving only the "not enough time/long lines" problem may not have elicited a positive response for our dependent variable. Since many people selected one of the variables of interest as both the first and second reason they do not vote we believe that instituting an Election Day national holiday would solve many of the problems that black voters may face.

We also recognize that it is possible black citizens just choose not to vote at comparative levels, a problem our solution cannot solve. Even if this is the case, 34 percent of respondents claimed a national holiday would give them incentive to turn out when they fail to vote due to a lack of time or long lines. We hypothesize that this would substantially impact the percentage of registered black voters that make it to the polls on Election Day.

This is especially important because racial minorities are egregiously underrepresented on Election Day. Increasing black voter turnout during a presidential election has important implications for more accurately representing the demographic makeup of the United States.[8]

LOW-INCOME RESPONDENTS

A main reason cited by low income individuals that they did not vote was "work/too busy." Traditionally, low-income individuals are too focused on making ends meet to worry about who will be the president in two months. This conundrum is well explained by Theory of the Calculus of Voting which states that voters must balance civic engagement with their other priorities (Farber 2010). Correspondingly, "work/too busy" was met with the most positive response among low-income registered voters. We observe a 50 percent increase in potential voter turnout among low-income individuals who cite work or too busy as the primary reason they were unable to vote.

HIGH-INCOME RESPONDENTS

Again drawing on the census data, we observe that the primary reason high-income individuals failed to vote was "work" (United States Census Bureau 2010). We believe this is because of the work ethic among high-income voters. This voting bloc typically prioritizes work over voting, so even though they are probably able to incur the cost of voting, the benefit of voting does not adequately compensate for the high cost of taking time off of work (Ibid.). We predict that eliminating this cost would potentially increase turnout a full 55 percent among high-income voters who fail to vote due to "work/too busy."

MODERATE RESPONDENTS

Literature consistently claims that moderates are the least likely group to vote, which leads to polarized candidates and polarized political leaders. Furthermore, it is intuitive that moderates also claim a higher cost to vote than ideologues because moderates tend to be less invested in politics.

We expect that removing the costs of voting will improve turnout for moderates as we found it would for Black voters. We find impressive results with moderates who claimed "not enough time/long lines" as the primary reason they failed to vote achieving a potential increase of 38 percent. Those who cited "work/too busy" would potentially see turnout increase by up to 52 percent.

Of particular interest are moderates who cited "forgetting to vote." Moderates are probably the most likely group to forget about Election Day. Creating a national holiday would make it very difficult to forget. Indeed, we could see an increase of up to 45 percent among this group of moderates.

Placebo Tests

For our final placebo test, we ran the second logit model again and included a variable that, according to our theoretical framework, would not be correlated to making Election Day a national holiday. If this variable was statistically insignificant, then we could be sure respondents were not just claiming making Election Day a national holiday would be helpful independent of reasons they failed to vote. We found the test variable to be statistically insignificant with a p-value of over 0.6. Thus, our results have both statistical and substantive significance.

The first variable, "illness or disability" should not be affected by making Election Day a national holiday. Changing the status of Election Day is unrelated to health, and thus the ill would still fail to vote. Correspondingly, we found not only were the results insignificant at the .05 level, but were they significant there would be an inverse relationship with a coefficient of -0.134 (standard error of 0.324) meaning that making Election Day a national holiday would yield no effect on the "ill or disabled" respondents.

Limitations

While the results that we found proved to be both statistically and substantively significant, the study is not without its weaknesses. Our research is limited to a compar-

Table 3: Placebo Test

Variable	Coef	Std Er
Illness or disability (First Response)	-.134	.324
Work/too busy (First Response)	.719*	.197
Family demands (First Response)	.744†	.370
Not enough time/long lines (First Response)	.655†	.324
Forgetting to vote (First Response)	.533‡	.315
Income	.098	.078
Rural/urban	.006	.107
Region	-.041	.059
Education	.051	.063
Ethnicity	.025	.079
Age	-.018	.007
Gender	-.199	.163
Ideology	-.167	.046
Constant	.821	.549

* is significant at the .01 level, †is significant at the .05 level and the ‡ is significant at the .1 level

ison of only one other country: France. This poses several problems. First, the U.S. and France are not identical. There may be some truths about French voters that cause them to turnout at higher rates than voters in the U.S. for which we are unable to observe or control. However, these risks will always be inherent in a case study. We minimize these risks by choosing a country that is most similar to the United States. Further, we will take note of additional factors we discover that might result in higher voter turnout.

Additionally, there may be problems with our survey. First, we are only asking three questions. We combat this problem by being as specific as possible in the questions that we do ask. There are also many options for respondents to choose from in the questions; we worry that excessive options will distract respondents from accurately answering the question. However, given our limits on how many questions we are allowed to ask, we believe these specific questions are our best option.

While we do not have the resources necessary to mount a full-scale experiment in which we make Election Day a holiday in a small sample of U.S. precincts, our study yielded limited, yet important, results. Internal validity is a limitation of particular concern. Since Election Day has been on a Tuesday, we have no empirical evidence to which we can compare our results. External validity is also a concern. Case studies have poor external validity, but we combat this by using survey questions which will bridge the gap and make our results more externally valid.

Despite these limitations, we believe that our findings have implications for future research. We suggest future research expand our findings through looking at all countries that have made voting day either a weekend or a national holiday. Our findings, for the time being, can create a stepping stone for future research and can work to persuade law-makers to consider the potential impact that making Election Day a national holiday could have on increasing voter turnout.

Conclusion

Abraham Lincoln once taught that a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the Earth." However, voting trends indicate that Americans are much less involved in the political process than citizens of most developed democracies. If a government "by the people" is so important to American political thought, then working to resolve the issue of America's dismal turnout is of utmost importance.

Many have suggested reasons as to why voting is important. MassVote, an organization dedicated to improving voter turnout levels in the United States, has called voting "the cornerstone of democracy" (MassVote 2016). Research suggests that elected officials are most responsive to likely voters (White, Nathan, and Faller 2014), thus implying that elected officials in a democratic republic must have high turnout levels to accurately represent the will of the people. From a moral perspective, one might argue that those with the ability to vote have a responsibility to do so in order to exert their inherent right to influence government and policy.

Little work has been done to suggest ways to remedy the problem of low voter turnout in America. Unlike other measures instituted to increase turnout, making Election Day a national holiday decreases the associated cost of voting and would be relatively easy to accomplish. Implementing the simple creation of a national holiday for Election Day would improve turnout dramatically.

In our effort to determine the effect that a national holiday might have on voter turnout, we conducted a case study and an original survey to provide statistical support to our hypothesis. We found strong evidence suggesting that designating election day as a national holiday will have both statistically and substantively significant results. Indeed, if low voter turnout in the U.S. is cause for concern, which we believe it must be, then the solution should be to create a national holiday for Election Day. Our findings confirm that doing so will minimize many of the largest barriers to voting.

NOTES

1. See Table A1.
2. See Table A1.
3. See table A1 for results.
4. Our study focused on turnout of registered voters in the U.S. and in France in order to minimize the disproportional and negative impact that non-registered adults may have on voter turnout. We eliminated respondents from the survey that were not registered to vote.
5. We grouped "out of town" and "not a registered voter" into the same category because both of these reasons cannot be solved by making Election Day a national holiday. We limited the respondents' options to prevent them from becoming bored with or tired of the survey so some of the categories were groups together with other "like" categories.
6. In order to ensure respondent honesty, we asked an additional question to survey respondents. The question reads similarly to that in Figure 1, but this time asking specifically why respondents thought their neighbors failed to vote in a recent election. The question reads, "There are a variety of reasons people do not vote in Presidential elections. In fact, only 53 pecent of eligible voters made it out to the 2012 Presidential election. What are some reasons *your neighbors* are unable to make it to a polling location on Election Day? (Rank: 1

being biggest reason my neighbors are unable to make it to a polling place)." We added this additional question to gauge whether or not respondents answered accurately the question in Figure 1 honestly under the assumption that people answer for their neighbors as they would themselves. Further, we omitted an "I always vote" option to ensure honest answers and avoid any unintended biases. Someone who truly believed they had never missed an election could choose "other." We found no statistical difference in any of the answers except "other." See Figure A5 for visual.

7. See Table 1.
8. We believe it is important to note that Congress would correspondingly become more representative as ballots do not only ask for voters' preferred presidential candidate. This is not the focus of the paper; however, we suspect that overall representation (at all levels of government up for election) would become much more demographically representative.

APPENDIX

Table A1: Voting in France vs. Voting in the United States

France-Executive Elections 2002–2012					
Year	Total Votes Cast	Registered Voters		Percent Registered Voters who voted	
2012	37,016,309	46,066,307		80.35	
2007	37,342,004	44,472,733		83.97	
2002	32,832,295	41,191,169		79.71	
	107,190,608	131,730,209	81.37*		81.34**

| United States-Executive Elections 2002–2012					
Year	Total Votes Cast	Registered Voters		Percent Registered Voters who voted	
2012	129,085,403	193,653,908		66.66	
2008	133,944,538	190,461,401		70.33	
2004	125,736,000	142,070,000		88.5	
	388,765,941	526,185,309	73.88*		75.16**

*This number was achieved by adding the total votes cast in each election to the total number of voters registered in each election. We considered using this method to control for population size from year to year but found the difference between this measure and the other to be similar enough to use the other, as this is how it is more commonly calculated in literature. **This is the average voter turnout over the three elections we observe in each country. These are the numbers we use in our discussion.

Table A2: Logit Model: Would making an Election Day a holiday solve the problem?
Pseudo R2 = .223

Variable	Coef	Std Er
Work/too busy (First Response)	2.57*	.220
Family demands (First Response)	1.58*	.358
Not enough time/long lines (First Response)	2.25*	.355
Forgetting to vote (First Response)	1.67*	.314
Income	.058	.088
Rural/urban	.069	.120
Region	-.057	.066
Education	.068	.071
Ethnicity	.069	.089
Age	-.015	.008
Gender	.050	.182
Ideology	-.068	.051
Constant	-1.19	.617

* Significant at the .01 level. Controls included.

Figure A5: Reasons Respondents or Respondent's Neighbors Failed to Vote

Reasons Voters Failed to Vote

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A Peculiar People: Split-Ticket Voting among Latter-Day Saint Millennials

Sarah Curry and Cassidy Hansen

For the first time in fifty years, Utah was a competitive state in the presidential election. Moreover, there was a viable third party candidate in Utah. Mid-October polling saw a three-way statistical tie between Republican Donald Trump, Democrat Hillary Clinton, and Independent Evan McMullin (Y2 Analytics 2016). Although voters in other states behaved in new or unexpected ways, 2016 was a particularly odd year for Utah voters. As demonstrated by their voting behavior, Utah's voting population is unique in two ways.

First, 60 percent of Utah's population are members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; members are referred to as Latter-day Saints or LDS. The percent of Latter-day Saints in Utah is more than double that of Idaho, which contains the second-largest proportion of Latter-day Saints at 24 percent (Newport 2014). Second, Utah is the youngest state in the nation with a median age of 30.7, approximately seven years younger than the national median age (Jacobsen 2016). The large number of young people living in Utah presents an interesting case for the study of millennial behavior. As a result, the 2016 election provided a unique opportunity to examine the behavior of young adults, especially those whose culture is characterized by Latter-day Saint beliefs and millennial characteristics.

Millennials are defined as individuals who were born from 1982 through 2004 and come of age in the first 20 years of the new millennium (Bump 2014). They are both racially and ethnically diverse—millennial adults are projected to be 44 percent non-white in 2020 (Madland 2009). Millennials are tech-savvy, less trusting of news media, and less religious (Fingerhut 2016). They also tend to be more socially liberal, even if conservative or Republican. For example, 61 percent of Republican millennials support the legalization of same-sex marriage (Kiley 2014). While Latter-day Saints

in Utah tend to vote Republican candidates into state, local, and national offices, it is possible that Latter-day Saint millennials were less likely to vote for the Republican presidential nominee in 2016. With data from the 2016 Utah Colleges Exit Poll, we seek to discover if LDS millennials' split-ticket voting differed from non-millennials' split-ticket voting and if active LDS millennials deviated from the Republican-supporting norm in the presidential race more than inactive LDS millennials.

Party Ambivalence, Split-Ticket Voting, and LDS Millennials

Political science literature suggests there are two types of split-ticket voters—those who are "indifferent" and those who are "motivated." An *indifferent* voter "makes his selections among the candidates on a capricious, quasi-random basis," while a voter who is *motivated* is likely to "experience some conflict in preparing his voting act" (Campbell and Miller, 1957). Voluntary associations and "schools of democracy" can help politically motivate and mobilize engaged citizens (Fung 2003). Such schools of democracy are associations where members "gain experience with dissimilar others" in small-scale learning environments that create a "disposition to cooperate" and encourage members to participate in activities that help create overarching identities (van Ingen and van der Meer, 2015). Based on this definition, the Church could be considered a school of democracy. Latter-day Saints are placed in small congregations called "wards." As with school districts, membership in a church ward is determined by residence within a geographic area rather than preferential factors. These members associate with each other during religious services and participate in service activities that require cooperation.

During religious worship, activities, and socializing within ward units, Latter-day Saints gain and share knowledge that has the potential to influence political behavior. In their work on heuristics and political information, Arthur Lupia and Matthew McCubbins find that knowledge is primarily gained in two distinct ways: personal experience and what others say, write, or do. These sources allow individuals to get just enough information for accurately reasoned choices. Lupia and McCubbins suggest that, when considering political candidates, information gathering is too costly for most voters—essentially, many simply ask: "Will this candidate pursue my interests?" (2000). Since churches are often a place where people share similar values and interests, learning about the political decisions of other churchgoers can help those within the congregation to make similar choices. These hours of socialization can have a large impact on political choices, even if political topics are not explicitly discussed.

Why is there such power in religion? Kenneth Wald explains: "As voluntary associations of individuals bound by strong affective and regular social interaction, churches constitute genuine communities that are well suited to the transmission and maintenance of group norms" (1988). While not all Latter-day Saints are conservative, there is a correlation between religious activity and conservative political beliefs (Wald 1988).[1] A 2010 study found that nationally 77 percent of self-identified Latter-day Saints attend religious services at least once a week, and 69 percent reported

having "high religious commitment." Conversely, only 30 percent of all respondents reported high religious commitment (Pew Research). It is then no surprise that Latter-day Saints are the most conservative major religious group in America, with approximately 59 percent identifying as conservative and only 8 percent identifying as liberal (Newport 2010).

The beliefs of a religion themselves can also be powerful conservatizing factors. Kenneth Wald et al. conducted a survey on the connections between theological conservatism and political beliefs. Wald et al. found that those who belong to churches with stronger traditional or fundamentalist beliefs were more likely to be politically conservative (1988). When assessing Latter-day Saint beliefs, members would score highly on their measures of theological conservatism (with the exception of viewing the Bible as the literal word of God). Additionally, Latter-day Saints' emphasis on family relationships and total commitment to faith lends itself to theological conservatism. This often leads to social conservatism among Latter-day Saints on issues such as abortion, homosexual marriage, and assisted suicide.

In spite of the conservative tendencies of its members, it is important to note that The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is politically neutral in terms of candidates or political parties. The Church encourages its members to become informed about the issues and candidates presented during any and all elections. Prior to each major election, members are told that "principles compatible with the gospel may be found in various political parties, and members should seek candidates who best embody those principles" (Mormon News 2016).

Although the Church does not encourage membership in specific political parties, church leaders have spoken out on various issues, encouraging member engagement on important topics. In the 2016 election, leaders asked members to vote against assisted suicide and recreational marijuana and members followed suit (Mormon Newsroom). Their mobilization was influenced by the hierarchal system within The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, where members hold Church leaders in high regard. This deference is consistent with the findings of Lupia and McCubbins, who argue that institutions can provide a substitute for political knowledge (2000). The Church has also released various statements on immigration and refugee issues that are less traditionally conservative. These include a statement against Donald Trump's proposed ban on refugees during the election and a statement in favor of resident status for illegal immigrants in the U.S. (Mormon Newsroom).

Most active LDS millennials have both participated in and contributed to this school of democracy. As teenagers, these individuals spent three hours in church services on Sunday, several hours each week in a high school scripture study program, and an hour on a weekday evening for a youth group activity. The significant time spent each week interacting with other Latter-day Saint youth and adults not only distilled theological beliefs but created a platform for social cues that LDS millennials recently were—or still are—a part of.

LDS millennials also derive political information from media sources. Political scientists Diana Mutz and Byron Reeve researched the impact of televised incivility on trust in government. They conducted a lab experiment in which participants were shown a fictional televised debate for a congressional race. In one debate, the candidates were civil and polite, avoiding interruptions and agreeing with one another. In the other debate, the fictional candidates were impolite and even hostile. Each participant viewed one of these debates in a simulated living room and was questioned about their attitudes toward the candidates and government in general. The researchers discovered that individuals who viewed the debate with incivility became less trusting of government and political figures (a phenomenon which they defined as videomalaise). Mutz and Reeves argue this observed increase in distrust was due to violations of social norms in the intimate setting of one's home (2005).

Mutz and Reeves' research is particularly interesting when considering LDS millennials, as 61 percent of LDS millennials in Utah reported preparing for the election by watching the presidential debates. The 2016 election cycle saw presidential debates reach a new level of viciousness—culminating with one candidate threatening the other candidate with incarceration. LDS millennials also followed the election using different media sources; 57 percent of LDS millennials in Utah prepared for the election using social media and 73 percent turned to television, newspaper, radio, and web sites for election news. They engaged with these sources at similar rates to LDS non-millennials. Elizabeth Matto, director of the Youth Political Participation Program at the Eagleton Institute of Politics explains: "Often referred to as 'digital natives,' one of the [Millennial] generation's strengths is its proficiency in its use of technology and new media" (Rutgers 2016).

These sources not only increase exposure to the socially unacceptable behavior, but provide an even more intimate form of viewing the content—phone screens. For example, it is likely these millennials viewed the leaked Trump tape in its entirety on a cell phone rather than a television. Mutz and Reeves would argue that this increase of viewing intimacy would heighten videomalaise against not only Donald Trump but against all candidates involved in the race. It is possible that Latter-day Saints would be more sensitive to this kind of rhetoric and feel a strong negative reaction to hostility.

Thus, LDS millennials likely appear to be motivated voters due to their participation in a well-established school of democracy. Additionally, it would not be surprising to see active Latter-day Saints split-ticket vote as they face conflict in determining which candidates reflect their own values, as derived from both their school of democracy and from their consumed media. Split-ticket voting was particularly likely as some statements by the Church align more strongly with millennial trends and contributed to the frustration LDS millennials had with the Republican-nominated candidate in 2016. "Such cross-pressured voters are attracted to each party by one set of opinions and repelled by another which leads to conflict within the individual" (van Ingen and van der Meer, 2015).

Theory

We expect active LDS millennials to generally be more conservative than millennials nationally due to their engagement with a conservative religion. However, some generational values may moderate the group's conservative tendency. For example, millennials are significantly more racially diverse than older Americans in the Mountain West Region. This is consistent among Utah LDS millennials, who contain twice the number of minority members than older generations of Church members. Utah LDS millennials also match millennials nationally on some policy issues, as they possess a more positive perception of Muslims and have progressive opinions on immigration and refugee resettlement (Teixeira 2016). Specifically, 69 percent of LDS millennials in Utah favor the next president proposing a path to citizenship, 58 percent favor the state of Utah accepting Syrian refugees, and 52 percent believe that Muslims living in the U.S. should not be scrutinized more intensely than other groups, according to data from the Utah Colleges Exit Poll. LDS millennials also tend to be more accepting of homosexuality than older LDS generations (Campbell et al. 2014).

Unlike millennials nationally, Mountain West millennials are more Republican than Democratic. However, Mountain West millennials parallel millennials nationally, as both groups are less Republican than their respective older generations. Interestingly, LDS millennials also reflect this trend and are less Republican than their older counterparts (Teixeira 2016). Only a quarter of LDS millennials surveyed in the UCEP identified as strong Republicans, in contrast to the 35 percent of LDS non-millennials who identified as such. A third of LDS millennials identified as Democrats or Independents, with another 25 percent identifying as "Independent-leaning Republican." This is particularly noteworthy, given the research of previous scholars, which found that young Latter-day Saints were increasingly Republican (Campbell et al. 2014). However, LDS millennials are not more Democratic than older LDS generations, as approximately 5 percent of both LDS millennials and non-millennials identify as strong or not so strong Democrats.

In 2016, active LDS millennials were cross-pressured. Their liberal generational values of diversity and tolerance were challenged by Donald Trump's aggressive rhetoric, yet they also felt the conservative influences of their faith. Indeed, the Church's statements on immigration and refugees were more moderate than Donald Trump but not as liberal as Hillary Clinton. As previously discussed, videomalaise (triggered by viewing politicians exhibit socially unacceptable behavior on television or other media) may have also played a role in this cross-pressure. We believe that while all may experience videomalaise, active Latter-day Saints have cultural expectations for the behavior of authority figures. Their religious convictions may make them more sensitive to videomalaise, creating a difficulty with trusting political figures who use shocking rhetoric. In 2016, the Republican candidate—who would normally win Utah without question—not only interacted poorly with his opponent at the presidential debates but brashly insulted women, journalists, disabled individu-

als, Muslims, veterans, and Hispanics. We expect active LDS millennials to respond to these pressures by voting for a third-party candidate at a higher rate than Latter-day Saints of other generations.

Additionally, the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement estimates only 8 percent of millennial voters nationally picked a third-party or write-in candidate (Sutter 2016). As inactive LDS millennials moderate the influence of religion through their disengagement, we expect inactive LDS millennials to behave as millennials nationally, rather than their active non-millennial counterparts.

Methods

The Utah Colleges Exit Poll (UCEP) has a stratified multi-state design where counties and parts of counties operate as stratum. In 2016, the UCEP used a "dual frame multi-mode strategy for a second election cycle" (Cannon et. al 2015). Specific themes studied in the 2016 Utah Colleges Exit Poll included immigration, candidate attribute assessment, voting experience, and other relevant measures. Data entry was completed by students remotely and after the election. Sample weights within "the traditional polling place Election Day procedure were implemented on the data" (Cannon et. al 2015). The response rate for 2016 was approximately 54.43 percent, totaling to 21,681 respondents.

We utilized several items from the UCEP. Vote choice in the presidential, senatorial, congressional, and gubernatorial races allowed us to craft a straight ticket variable. These were self-reported and presented by congressional district. We then looked at political affiliation, which was measured on a seven point scale. We collapsed the "independent-leaning" groups into the partisan equivalents, as we found they behave as partisans rather than pure independents. To create a demographic model, we used self-reported responses to questions on age, religion, and religious activity. From the data, we created an LDS millennial variable. Additionally, we looked at the influence of various issue positions and perceptions of candidate attributes on split-ticket voting.

Analysis

To begin analyzing LDS millennial voters, we considered how the group voted by self-ascribed party affiliation and religious activity in an attempt to identify the presence of split-ticket voting in this group, with particular interest in votes cast for presidential candidates. This was followed by an overall look at split-ticket voting to understand the positions or candidates that led LDS millennials to split their voting tickets. We paid special attention to split-ticket voters who voted for multiple candidates in opposition to their self-identified party, as well as those who split their voting for a political office other than that of president. We then used a regression model to examine the impact of age, religious activity, and other control variables on the likelihood of split-ticket voting. Additionally, we examined the potential influence of videomalaise and policy positions on split-ticket voting. Finally, we examined Evan McMullin's relationship with LDS millennial voters in 2016.

We define split-ticket voting as casting a vote for a candidate outside one's self-reported party affiliation. We created a scale for the number of split-ticket votes for top-ticket races, ranging from zero to four. Races considered were the presidential, senatorial, congressional, and gubernatorial races. A partisan strength scale was also created, with independent-leaners as one and strong partisans as three.[2]

Presidential Vote by LDS Millennial Members

We find that third-party candidate Evan McMullin had a presence in all party and nonparty segments of LDS millennials. The most divided group to vote for McMullin were Republicans. Approximately 45 percent of LDS millennial Republicans voted for McMullin, while 52 percent of these Republicans voted for Donald Trump. This confirms our hypothesis that LDS millennials did stray from their party in the presidential race.

Figure One: LDS Millennial Vote by Party Affiliation

Additionally, we found that religious activity mattered not only for split-ticket voting in general but for voting for a third-party candidate in the presidential race—as demonstrated in Figure 2. When religious activity among LDS millennials decreases, support for the two major party candidates increases. The opposite is true for third-party candidate Evan McMullin; we find support for McMullin increases as religious activity increases, with 45 percent of the "very active" LDS millennials casting a vote for him. Just about 12 percent of "not at all active" LDS millennials reported voting for McMullin. This difference is stark, but inactive LDS millennials still behaved differently than millennials nationally—approximately 25 percent of inactive LDS mil-

lennials reported voting for a third party or write-in candidate while only 8 percent of millennials did the same nationally (Sutter 2016).

It is interesting to note that a similar phenomenon occurs for non-millennial Latter-day Saints with support for Evan McMullin and Hillary Clinton (see Figure 3).

**Figure Two: Presidential Vote by Activity for LDS Millennials**

**Figure Three: Presidential Vote by Activity for LDS Non-Millennials**

However, non-millennial Latter-day Saints' support for McMullin was lower than LDS millennials, even among the very active. Donald Trump support was consistent across all levels of religious activity. This leads us to believe that there was some conservative cultural pressure on active non-millennial Latter-day Saints but not to the same degree as their millennial counterparts. We attribute this to the generational values millennials hold and the entrenched partisanship that older individuals had to reconcile (more unsuccessfully) with voting for a third-party candidate.

Split-Ticket Voting and LDS Millennials

As hypothesized, Republican LDS millennials split-ticket voted the most in the presidential race. Figure 4 shows that when Republican LDS millennials voted once outside of their self-identified party, it mostly occurred in the presidential race. Additionally, as the number of total votes outside the party increased, the likelihood an LDS millennial voted for Trump decreased. This difference in the presidential race is significant, as most single race, split-ticket voters vote Republican in the other races anywhere from 67–70 percent, while they only voted for Trump 10 percent of the time. Interestingly, split-ticket voting LDS millennial Republicans were also more likely to vote outside of their party in the congressional races than the senatorial and gubernatorial races when they split-ticketed two or more times.

Figure Four: Republican LDS Millennial Split-Ticket Voting

	Presidential Vote	Senate Vote	House Vote	Governor Vote
One Outside Party Vote	0.0988	0.7029	0.6718	0.6841
Two Outside Party Votes	0.0293	0.1627	0.0809	0.1296
Three Outside Party Votes	0.0186	0.025	0.0117	0.0284

On the other hand, LDS millennial Democrats who split-ticket voted once did not favor split-ticketing for a certain race—meaning if a person were to vote outside their party for one race, it would be just as likely for them to split-ticket for the congressional race as it would be for the presidential race. Unlike LDS millennial Republicans, LDS millennial Democrats were more likely to split-ticket vote in the senatorial and gubernatorial races than the presidential and congressional races. This could indicate a dislike for Misty Snow (D) as a candidate or that they favored Gary Herbert (R) more than Mike Weinholtz (D).

Regression analysis demonstrates that LDS millennials were more likely to split-ticket vote in any race and that this effect is statistically significant. However, it appears that minority status was a larger indicator of split-ticket voting. Unsurprisingly, increased partisanship resulted in decreased split-ticketing. Activity in the Church was not a significant indicator of split-ticket voting in general. We tested whether a more liberal policy position (such as support for a pathway to citizenship for illegal immigrants) would influence split-ticket voting, but such positions were not substantive indicators for Utahns.

With regard to videomalaise, we constructed an index of self-reported media use detailing the amount of media consumed by respondents in preparation for

Figure Five: Democrat LDS Millennial Split-Ticket Voting

	Presidential Vote	Senate Vote	House Vote	Governor Vote
One Outside Party Vote	0.3618	0.2947	0.3379	0.3204
Two Outside Party Votes	0.2044	0.1239	0.206	0.1491
Three Outside Party Votes	0.1243	0.0247	0.0549	0.0193

LDS Millennials and Split-Ticket Voting
Table 1
Regression Model
Dependent variable: *Split Ticket Voting in 2016 Election*

Regressor:	(1)	(2)	(3)
LDS Millennial	0.102**	0.166**	0.129**
	(0.020)	(0.039)	(0.392)
Active in LDS Church	0.010	0.025	0.026
	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.039)
Non-white	0.287**	0.278**	0.160**
	(0.033)	(0.065)	(0.067)
Female	0.094**	0.485	0.074*
	(0.018)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Education	0.026**	0.014	-0.047*
	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Partisan Strength	-0.696**	-0.698**	-0.717**
	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Path to Citizenship	—	—	0.053*
			(0.025)
Media Use	—	-0.137**	—
		(0.018)	
Intercept	2.376**	2.469**	2.28**
	(0.056)	(0.111)	(0.117)
Regression Summary Statistics			
R^2	0.3039	0.3308	0.3168
Pseudo R^2	0.3037	0.3295	0.3154
N	14,709	3693	3550

Notes: Dependent variable is number of votes cast outside of one's declared party from zero to four. Independent-leaners are considered to be weak partisans. Pure independents are not included in the model. Standard errors are given in parentheses under estimated coefficients. Coefficients are significant at the ^10%, *5%, **1% significance level.

the election. Social media, online or television news, and viewing the presidential debates were all considered. It appears that there was some influence on split-ticket voting but not in the direction we would expect. Those who spent more time engaged in media use were more likely to vote party line—and this effect was also statistically significant.[3]

We tested this further in a probit model to determine if LDS millennials were more likely to split-ticket at all. We created a simple measure of whether a respondent voted straight-ticket. We discovered that LDS millennials were 10 percent more likely to split-ticket vote than older Latter-day Saints. This is an important consideration, as partisan strength has about the same influence on split-ticketing as age. Activity in the Church resulted in a 5 percent increase in the likelihood of split-ticket voting. This means that "very active" Latter-day Saints are 15 percent more likely to split-ticket vote than their "not at all active" peers.

Evan McMullin and LDS Millennials

We also wanted to determine if the "McMullin Effect" was felt more strongly among millennials than the older generations. We ran another probit model, with the

LDS Millennials and Split-Ticket Voting
Table 2
Probit Model
Dependent variable: *Any split-ticket vote cast in 2016 Election*

	(1)
Regressor:	
LDS Millennial	0.100**
	(0.016)
Active in LDS Church	0.047**
	(0.008)
Non-white	0.023
	(0.026)
Female	0.033**
	(0.044)
Education	0.043**
	(0.008)
Partisan Strength	-0.119**
	(0.005)
Media Use	-0.018**
	(0.021)
Intercept	0.417**
	(0.131)
Regression Summary Statistics	
LR chi²	913.89**
Pseudo R²	0.1689
N	4085

Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable at least one vote cast outside declared party or not. Pure Independents are included. Delta-method standard errors are given in parentheses under estimated coefficients. Coefficients are significant at the ^10%, *5%, **1% significance level.

dependent variable as a vote cast or not cast for Evan McMullin. Again, LDS millennials were 10 percent more likely to cast a ballot for McMullin than non-millennials. Moreover, we see that activity in the Church leads to an astounding 12 percent change in likelihood in voting for the third-party candidate. This implies that "very active" Latter-day Saints were 36 percent more likely to cast a vote for McMullin than other Utahns. Both of these effects are larger than other demographics such as race, education, gender, and even partisan strength.

Implications

The rates at which LDS millennials, especially Republicans, split-ticket voted for a third-party presidential candidate suggest they were dissatisfied with both major party candidates and were looking to vote for someone who shared their values. It's not surprising to see these young, very active Republicans vote for McMullin, not only because he is a Latter-day Saint but also because of his more liberal policy on immigration and his statements against anti-Islamic rhetoric. Additionally, at just forty years old, McMullin is nearly a millennial himself.

McMullin continues to claim he is starting a new Conservative movement to protect American ideals without the stigmas of any political party. In an interview by Brigham Young University student paper *The Universe*, McMullin said about his movement:

LDS Millennials and Split-Ticket Voting
Table 3
Probit Model
Dependent variable: *Vote cast for Evan McMullin in 2016 Election*

Regressor:	(1)
LDS Millennial	0.104** (0.007)
Active in LDS Church	0.123** (0.005)
Non-white	-0.064** (0.013)
Female	0.042** (0.007)
Education	0.035** (0.004)
Partisan Strength	-0.064** (0.009)
Intercept	0.670** (0.234)
Regression Summary Statistics	
LR chi²	1363.34**
Pseudo R²	0.0666
N	16,393

Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable vote cast for Evan McMullin in 2016 or not. Videolmalaise and support for a pathway to citizenship were tested in the model without significant influence. Delta-method standard errors are given in parentheses under estimated coefficients. Coefficients are significant at the ^10%, *5%, **1% significance level.

> Real leadership not only says what you're against, but real leadership will stand up and say what you're for and then fight for that thing. That's what we're doing. We need leaders of courage who are principled and who will stand up for us and core American ideals.

However, the LDS millennial vote in the 2016 election doesn't necessarily mean LDS millennials will continue to split-ticket vote for third-party candidates or follow McMullin's new Conservative movement; rather, LDS young adults may just agree with McMullin on the danger President Trump could pose to the United States. The third-party candidate wrote in his *New York Times* Op-Ed:

> We cannot allow Mr. Trump to normalize the idea that he is the ultimate arbiter of our rights. Those who can will need to speak out boldly and suffer possible retaliation. Others will need to offer hands of kindness and friendship across the traditional political divide, as well as to those who may become targets because of who they are or what they believe.

If President Trump runs again in 2020 and the Democratic candidate does not appeal to Utah LDS millennials, we may see the same pattern of third-party, split-ticket voting. To understand how this group votes in a "normal" election, we need to complete time series data analysis from past elections.

From a research perspective, these results pose more questions. For example, were LDS millennials socialized differently at church than other generations? Does the rhetoric of former Church President Gordon B. Hinckley carry different political cues than that of former President Spencer W. Kimball? Is there a trend in the Church that reflects the changing social attitudes of the U.S. at large? These questions would provide a deeper look into the ideology of LDS millennials by defining what it means to be one.

Conclusion

In summary, we discover that Latter-day Saint millennials did in fact behave differently than older LDS generations. Split-ticket voting for all races was more common among LDS millennials than older Latter-day Saints. Additionally, we see that activity in the LDS faith matters—active LDS millennials voted in significantly larger numbers for McMullin, while inactive LDS millennials behaved more like millennials nationally. Even so, inactive Latter-day Saint millennials voted more like their active counterparts than we expected. The large effect of age and religious activity on vote choice was the key finding. Latter-day Saint politics in Utah are changing, and the future of major parties in the state depends on adapting to these changes.

NOTES

1. Also, while researchers typically define religious involvement or commitment as "religious engagement" or "religiosity," Latter-day Saints use the term "activity." Members are referred to as being active or inactive, rather than practicing or non-practicing. We use the vernacular of the population being studied, as those terms were used on the KBYU–Utah Colleges Exit Poll from which we received our data.
2. There was not a significant difference between Democrats and Republicans in this regard.
3. Interactions between videomalaise and LDS millennial status and religious activity were tested with no significant findings.

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Foster Care Privatization: How an Increasingly Popular Public Policy Leads to Increased Levels of Abuse and Neglect

Mandi Eatough

Foster care in the U.S. is largely influenced by federal and state legislation. Since 1996, legislation establishing privatized foster care has become increasingly popular (Lee 2008). As levels of privatization increase nationwide, it is important to understand the impact this has on the daily lives of hundreds of thousands of children around the country. The movement toward privatizing foster care is generally attributed to the improvement in economic efficiency of case management by contracted child placement agencies (Hansen and Hansen 2006). However, the economic benefit afforded to states by privatizing foster care has been considered independently from the quality of care received by children in the system by child welfare reports and scholars alike. Studies relaying failed attempts at foster care privatization, such as Unruh and Hodgkin's (2004) evaluation of Kansas' failed privatization system in the early 2000s, regularly refer to economic problems with the specific program. However, studies such as Blackstone, Buck, and Hakim's (2004) evaluation of privatized foster care praise economic benefits based on agency placement efficiency as a reason for foster care privatization. These studies do not evaluate the quality of care provided to children in the system alongside the economic evaluations of the programs.

Since the popularization of privatized foster care in the late 1990s, foster care advocates have claimed that in contracted child placement situations the quality of placements are compromised in favor of more efficient placements (Mangold 1999). However, the research proving or disproving this claim is minimal. Research has indicated that while foster care privatization efforts have made promises to deliver a more efficient and effective social care structure, this is not the case. Instead, we observe increases in system-wide abuse and neglect in foster homes, with the system becoming increasingly irresponsive to the needs of vulnerable children in the

system (Carey 2008). In 2008, the national advocacy organization Children's Rights examined privatization efforts in six states: Kansas, Florida, Missouri, Ohio, Michigan, and Maine. They found that privatization initiatives in these states did little, if anything, to increase placement efficiency and found that there were significant gaps in services provided to children in foster care in crisis (Lustbader 2008).

This research analyzes how changes in legislation related to the privatization of foster care throughout the U.S. affect the quality of care children in the system receive as well as how immediately changes in foster care privatization legislation directly affect the lives of foster children. I have focused this research specifically on how differences between state foster care privatization levels influence the incidences of abuse and neglect. Many evaluations of privatized foster care indicate that there is a potential for privatized foster placement systems to lead to a greater incidence of unfit placements of children (Chilman 1948; Petr and Johnson 1999). However, no research has focused on a statistical analysis of the relationship between levels of privatization and unfit placements. It is vitally important that legislators understand the effects foster care privatization has on the lives of hundreds of thousands of children throughout the United States. Because of foster care reporting laws enacted in the early 1990s as part of the Social Security Act of 1994, data is available to determine whether or not foster care privatization is leading to increases in the incidence of abuse and neglect. The Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) collects information on all foster care placements and adoptions within the U.S. through the Administration for Children and Families (Children's Bureau 2012a). It is not enough to discuss these consequences theoretically when the information necessary to evaluate these policies is available to analyze the issue further.

Data

Since 1994, Section 479 of Title IV-E of the Social Security Act has required that all agencies handling foster care or adoptions through the state report detailed information about foster care and adoptive placements (Children's Bureau 2012b). This data, as collected by AFCARS, is the most comprehensive set of information about children in foster care in the United States. These datasets include information on all children in foster care each year in fifty-two locations: the fifty states as well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia (all of which are further referred to as states). The AFCARS datasets include placement and removal information for every child as well as demographic information about each of the children. Because of safety concerns for children in the foster care system, the AFCARS datasets are only available to investigators for the purposes of statistical research and reporting (NDACAN 2016b).

Theoretical Framework

The privatization of government services has been largely attributed to the efficiency and economic benefits these privatizations have provided in the past (Duggan 2004). However, scholars studying privatization of government programs have dis-

covered that this behavior often leads to accountability problems within bureaucratic systems. In a 2011 study of practices in privatized foster care agencies, it was determined that market-based competition caused by foster care privatization produced shifts in foster care policies. While this is not inherently an issue, a major concern outlined in this study was the potential for creating programs that affect vulnerable populations that cut costs by cutting corners. Based on this study, the vulnerability of children in the foster care system outweighs the potential for cost benefits coming from privatization in favor of stronger levels of accountability within the foster care system (Bouche and Volden 2011). Unfortunately, the ideals outlined in this study do not represent reality.

Privatized foster care in the U.S. is favored by legislators because of its economic and service efficiency (Mangold 1999). However, differences between the care children receive in privatized and non-privatized placement systems are rarely considered when legislative decisions are being made. In a survey of 150 foster care social workers in the Midwest, it was found that there are significant differences between workers at privatized and non-privatized agencies. Social workers working in non-privatized agencies were found to value emotionally supportive parenting and sociocultural influences on child welfare as important when making case decisions almost twice as much as their privatized counterparts. Workers at privatized agencies valued placement efficiency and received higher salaries than their non-privatized counterparts for similar hours of work (Hollingsworth et al. 2010). These differences in the attitudes of social workers when considering placements directly influence the quality and type of placement children placed through their agency receive.

A qualitative study conducted by Humphery, Turnbull, and Turnbull (2006) examined the perceptions of privatized foster care among foster parents, foster service providers, and judges in Kansas (the first state to fully privatize foster care). Many participants indicated that they believed the privatization of foster care directly led to less appropriate placements for children in the system. One foster care service provider indicated they observed that children were being placed in foster homes more quickly than they had been before privatization, but those homes were often unfit for the children who were placed. Another foster care service provider explained that they believed that the caseload levels at privatized foster care agencies are too high. They claimed that these high caseloads for workers promoted faster placements with lower levels of scrutiny. Another case worker indicated that they believed their agency valued efficient and inexpensive placement of children in their cases.

Given this theoretical framework surrounding foster care privatization, I hypothesize that privatized foster care placement agencies will favor less expensive case goals such as a reunion with parents, placements with other relatives, or emancipation over more expensive case goals such as adoption or long-term foster care. For reference, adoptions from foster care generally cost the government between $1,000 and $5,000 and the cost per child in foster care is between $7,000 and $10,000 per year.

Both of these costs vary by state (Fixsen 2011). Comparatively, a reunion with parents or placements with other relatives are essentially free for the government.

Several studies have shown that even when information is collected about the satisfaction of foster children and foster parents about placement systems, the input from these groups is rarely considered when making claims about the effectiveness of foster care privatization. As early as the 1970s, researchers have been acknowledging the importance of child and parental satisfaction measurements in determining foster care legislation. Bush, Gordon, and LeBailly (1977) expressed concerns that the measurements being used to determine the effectiveness of foster care did not consider the satisfaction of the children receiving the service. They found that foster children largely expressed concerns about being placed in homes where they felt they were not wanted. Kapp and Propp (2002) argued that the viewpoints of parents with children in foster care are regularly ignored when considering successes in foster care legislation. Tilbury, Osmond, and Crawford (2010) examined efforts made to understand the perspectives of children in welfare services. They claim that an effort to understand these perspectives is one of the most important tools child welfare service providers have to improve their work.

In fully privatized systems, all children are placed by contracted child placement agencies. However, many states have partially privatized systems, which means that children in the same state, or even county, will be placed by both privatized and non-privatized agencies. Which agency a child's case is handled by should be based on agent proximity and availability at the time a child enters the system ("Foster" 2016). However, it would be reasonable to question if, in partially privatized systems, more difficult cases are given to one type of agency, because they are better fit to handle the case. Proponents of privatization claim that privatized placement agencies handle even the most difficult foster care cases more efficiently (Carey 2008). It has also been shown at length that children with behavioral problems are more susceptible to abuse within the foster care system (Goldman 2003). If difficult cases are more likely to be placed with privatized agencies, there is a concern that the privatization of placements is subject to selection bias where children more likely to experience neglect or abuse are handled by privatized agencies when available. To ensure that the results of these analyses are not based on this selection bias, I have compared the proportion of difficult cases seen in both privatized and non-privatized placements. Difficult cases may be indicated by a total number of home removals greater than the national average of three or listed home removal reasons related to a child's behavior. The proportion of cases with these indicators are shown in Table 1.

The largest difference in these indicators is the proportion of children who have more than three total home removals, where non-privatized placements see this in 25.08 percent of cases and privatized placements see this in 19.78 percent of cases. Because we actually see a smaller proportion of privatized placements involving difficult cases, this selection bias, if it exists, is likely to go to the opposite way than

theorized, with problem cases being assigned to non-privatized placement agencies in partially privatized systems. This means if this selection bias exists the results of this analysis are weakened by the bias, meaning there is no concern for interference.

Table 1. Distribution of Difficult Cases and Placement Type

Difficult Case Indicator	Non-Privatized Placements	Privatized Placements	Difference
Total Number of Removals Greater Than 3	25.08%	19.78%	-5.3%
Child Removal for Child's Behavior	15.81%	14.49%	-1.4%
Child Removal for Child's Alcohol Use	1.06%	1.07%	0.01%
Child Removal for Child's Drug Use	2.99%	3.54%	0.55%

This research is based heavily in the theoretical increase in unfit foster care placements when a state privatizes its foster care system. This theory considers the favorability of low cost placements by privatized foster care placement agencies to be a significant disadvantage to children in foster care. I will consider three effects of privatization on the quality of care received by foster children: 1) how privatization affects the goals of child placements within the system, 2) how increases in foster care privatization affect the risk of abuse and neglect of children in the system, and 3) how immediately changes in foster care legislation begin to affect the type and quality of placements in the system. To evaluate these effects, this study consists of three hypotheses related to foster care privatization and the quality of placements foster children receive while in the system:

1) Privatized placement agencies will favor case goals that make placements efficient and less costly.
2) Increased levels of privatization will lead to an increase of unfit placements in the form of an increased risk of abuse and neglect for children in that system.
3) Changes in foster care legislation will have an immediate effect on the privatization level and quality of placements received by children in the foster care system.

In order to test the hypotheses outlined above, three analyses have been conducted using the AFCARS datasets. The first analysis is a set of multinomial logistic models of both placement case goals and system removals based on whether or not the placement was privatized. This analysis aims to support the hypothesis that privatized placement agencies will favor case goals that make placements efficient and less costly. The second analysis is a set of proportional hazard models depicting the risk of abuse and neglect in foster homes over time based on level of privatization in a foster care system. This analysis aims to support the hypothesis that increased levels of privatization will lead to an increase of unfit placements in the form of an increased risk of abuse and neglect for children in that system. The final analysis is a set of time series models for each state based on levels of privatization and abuse inci-

dence. In this final analysis, foster care privatization policy information was collected from the Reason Foundations' annual privatization reports to allow for a testing of potential breaks in the time series models based on foster care privatization legislation ("Annual" 2016).

While the three analyses are different in what is being studied, some discussions related to potential controls and biases hold across each analysis. The AFCARS dataset provides some demographic information about children in foster care, but the majority of the information is focused on the child's placement or removal from a foster home. The three major demographic covariates in the dataset were indicative of gender, race, and age. To determine if these demographic factors appear to impact the probability of an unfit placement, based on whether a child was removed for either abuse or neglect, a simple logistic regression was run (results shown in Appendix, Table 1). While there were slight changes in the probability of a child being placed in an unfit home, the changes were not substantive enough to indicate a real-world change.[1]

Analysis 1: Placement Case Goals and System Removals Based on Privatization

Theory suggests that contracted child placement agencies are more likely to favor placements that cost less and are more efficient. I consider the case goals of child placements between 2000 and 2014 to analyze the type of placements favored by both privatized and non-privatized placement agencies. The AFCARS dataset includes a variable indicating the case goal of a child for each of their placements. A case goal is indicative of how the placement agency believes the child will be removed from the foster care system. This variable indicates one of seven goals: reunion with parents, placement with other relatives, adoption, long-term foster care, emancipation, guardianship to a non-relative, or no case goal.

To begin this analysis, foster care case goals for more than fourteen million child placements between 2000 and 2014 were broken down based on whether the placements were privatized, as seen in Figure 1. In this raw data break down, each 1 percent change in the distribution of case goals is representative of a change of more than 15,000 case goals. While it appears that the relative frequency of case goals is similar between privatized and non-privatized foster care placements, the distribution indicates two major shifts. The first shift is a 4 percent decrease in adoptive case goals from 23 percent to 19 percent when moving from non-privatized to privatized placements. The second shift is a 5 percent increase in a case having no case goal from 8 percent to 13 percent. The decrease in adoption case goals among privatized placements supports the hypothesis that privatized placement agencies will disfavor more expensive case goals. However, the increase in the number of placements without case goals does not. Children in the foster care system without a case goal are essentially trapped in the system until they are given a means of exiting the system. As discussed later in this research, the longer children remain within the system, the greater their risk for abuse and neglect becomes.

Figure 1. Case Goals for Foster Care Placements by Privatization

Non-Privatized Placements   Privatized Placements

Because the number of privatized and non-privatized placements are not equal, these direct case goal distribution comparisons indicate but do not prove an actual difference in the probability of any given case goal. To more accurately determine these differences, a multinomial logistic regression model was used to calculate the odds of a child having each case goal based on whether the placement was privatized or not, as seen in Table 2. The base case goal used in this model is a reunion with parents, because this is the most common case goal for both privatized and non-privatized placements.

Based on the theoretical hypothesis, there is an expectation of an increase in the odds of less expensive placements, such as a placement with other relatives or emancipation, and a decrease in the odds of more expensive placement options, such as adoption or long-term foster care. This model confirms this hypothesis. Considering less expensive case goal options, when a case is privatized, the odds a placement will have a case goal of placement with other relatives is increased

Table 2. Odds for Case Goals by Placement Type

Case Goals	Change in Odds When Privatized
Live with Other Relatives	24.97%
	(0.0040)
Adoption	-19.19%
	(0.0014)
Long-Term Foster Care	-20.10%
	(0.0023)
Emancipation	12.44%
	(0.0032)
Guardianship	-12.86%
	(0.0031)
No Case Goal	62.71%
	(0.0036)

Standard Errors in Parentheses | All results from this model are statistically significant at the 99% level.

by nearly 25 percent, and the odds a placement will have a case goal of emancipation is increased by over 12 percent. This indicates an increase in the favor of less expensive case goals by privatized placement agencies when compared to those of non-privatized placements.

Considering the more costly case goal options, when a case is privatized, the odds of a placement having a case goal of adoption decrease by over 19 percent, and the odds of a placement having a case goal of long-term foster care decrease by over 20 percent. This indicates a decrease in the favor of expensive case goals by privatized placement agencies when compared to non-privatized placements. In addition to our hypothesis-based analysis, we again see that foster child placements with no case goals experience a drastic increase when in privatized systems, with the odds of a child not having a case goal having increased by more than 62 percent. This indicates that there is a significant concern that children in privatized placements have no way of getting out of the system. While the increase in placements without case goals goes against the hypothesis that privatized placement agencies prefer case goals that lead to non-costly exits from the system in a timely manner, it suggests that children in privatized placement systems are more likely to become trapped in the system.

While case goals are hypothetically indicative of actual removals from the system, they are not equivalent to actual case outcomes. To determine if case goals are actually representative of the way children in privatized and non-privatized placements leave the foster care system, I have specifically examined the discharges of children from the foster care system. The AFCARS datasets provide information about each discharge from the system as a variable coded to represent one of eight discharge types: reunion with parents, placement with other relatives, adoption, emancipation, guardianship to a non-relative, transfer to another agency, child runaway, and the death of a child. The raw data distribution based on privatization can be seen in Figure 2.

When comparing the raw data distribution of actual placement outcomes, represented in this research by discharges from the system, we see that there appear to be significant decreases in the percentage of children in privatized placements that are adopted and emancipated compared to the percentage of children with these case goals in privatized placements. We also see that there appears to be an increase in the percentage of children who are placed with relatives or have a non-relative given guardianship when compared to the percentage of children with these case goals in privatized placements. These increases in non-costly placement outcomes seen in privatized placements compared to non-privatized placements support the hypothesis that privatized placement agencies will favor case goals that make placements efficient and less costly.

As was true with the case goal analysis, the number of children in non-privatized and privatized placements who are discharged from the foster care system are unequal. This means it cannot be claimed that these direct system discharge distribu-

Figure 2. Discharges from Foster Care by Privatization

REASONS FOR DISCHARGE FROM FOSTER CARE
(PERCENTAGES)

NON-PRIVATIZED PLACEMENT
- Reunified With Parent, 51.73
- Living with Relative, 7.88
- Adoption, 21.36
- Emancipation, 9.64
- Guardianship, 5.96
- Transfer to Another Agency, 2.14
- Runaway, 1.12
- Death, 0.16

PRIVATIZED PLACEMENT
- Reunified With Parent, 55.39
- Living with Relative, 11.02
- Adoption, 14.64
- Emancipation, 8.66
- Guardianship, 6.19
- Transfer to Another Agency, 2.31
- Runaway, 1.62
- Death, 0.18

tion comparisons show an actual difference in the probability of any given type of system discharge. The number of children removed from the system is not equivalent to the number of children in the system, meaning that some children are unrepresented in the system discharge data, making direct distribution comparisons between case goal and system discharge distributions even more unreliable. To determine these differences more accurately, a multinomial logistic regression model was used to calculate the relative risk ratios of system discharges based on whether the placement was privatized or not, as seen in Table 3. The base discharge type used in this model is a reunion with parents because this is the most common type of discharge for both privatized and non-privatized placements. In addition to the relative risks, Table 3 also includes a percentage change indicating the similarity between the odds of discharge types and the case goals that directly correlate with four of the discharge types. This percentage change is representative of the relationship between a child's privatized placement having one of these four case goals and that child being discharged with that case goal.

Table 3. Relative Risks for System Discharge by Placement Type

Discharge Type	Change in Odds	Relation to Case Goals
Live with Other Relatives	30.75%	5.78%
Adoption	-36.00%	-16.81%
Emancipation	-16.15%	-28.59%
Guardianship	-2.99%	9.87%
Transfer to Another Agency	0.93%**	N/A
Runaway	35.02%	N/A
Death of Child	0.36%**	N/A

**Not Statistically Significant | All Other results from this model are statistically significant at the 99% level.

Based on the theoretical hypothesis and the results of the analysis of case goals, we expect to see a decrease in system discharges that cost more, such as adoption, and an increase in system discharges that are less expensive, such as placements with other relatives or emancipation. Looking at adoption, we see that there is a significant decrease in the odds of a child in privatized placement being adopted, with the odds decreasing by 36 percent compared to children in non-privatized placements. When this is compared to the odds of adoption being a case goal, we see more than a 16 percent decrease in the actual odds of adoption from privatized placements when compared to the odds of privatized placements listing adoption as a case goal. Children in privatized placements have increased odds of being placed with relatives other than their parents. The odds of a child in privatized placement being discharged from the system to a placement with a relative are 30 percent greater than for children in non-privatized placements, a 5 percent increase when compared to the odds of placement with a relative being the case goal of a child in a privatized placement. There is an increase in the likelihood that a child in a privatized placement has guardianship given to a non-relative. There is nearly a 10 percent increase in the odds of a non-relative receiving guardianship being the actual discharge type of a privatized placement compared to the odds of a privatized placement listing this as a case goal. These results confirm the hypothesis that privatized placement companies prefer less costly system discharges.

By specifically analyzing discharges from the foster care system, we see there is a 35 percent increase in the odds of a child in a privatized placement running away than a child in a non-privatized placement. According to studies of foster care runaways, the majority of children who run from a foster home run because of an unfit placement situation combined with a distrust in the foster care system. This distrust is often caused by a continuous pattern of unfit placements (Nesmith 2006). The increase in runaways seen in privatized placements supports the second hypothesis of this study: privatized placements lead to increased levels of abuse and neglect.

Given this analysis, we see that children in privatized placement systems are less likely to have case goals and system discharges that cost more and that privatized placements are more likely to put children in homes without a well-developed case plan. Proponents of privatization efforts have often claimed that the goal of privatization is to increase adoption rates (Hansen and Hansen 2006). This analysis indicates that the results of privatization are the opposite. Children in privatized placements are significantly less likely to have case goals of adoption and are even less likely to actually be adopted. We also saw that children in privatized placements have an increased risk of being runaways, something that is associated with unfit placements. Whether privatization actually increases the likelihood of a child being placed in an unfit home is unclear based on this analysis. The next section examines the relationship between privatization and levels of abuse and neglect.

Analysis 2: Risk Levels of Abuse and Neglect Based on Privatization

To begin this analysis, the incidence of abuse and neglect for more than fourteen million child placements between 2000 and 2014 were broken down into four groups: neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, and abandonment. This breakdown was based on whether the placements were privatized as seen in Figure 3 (an extended version of this graph including additional abuse and neglect covariates is available in the Appendix, Figure 2). Physical and sexual abuse are representative of abuse incidence, while neglect and abandonment are representative of neglect incidence. As with the raw data breakdowns in the first analysis, each one percent change in incidence of abuse or neglect is representative of a change of over 15,000 cases. This breakdown shows that for the four basic categories of neglect and abuse, the percentage of removals attributed to these factors appear to be similar regardless of placement privatization, with the largest difference being a 4.36 percent greater incidence of physical abuse in privatized placements than in non-privatized placements. However, because of the significance of even a 1 percent difference in abuse incidence, this data indicates that for each of the four groups, abuse and neglect have a higher incidence rate in privatized placements than in non-privatized placements.

Figure 3. Incidence of Abuse and Neglect by Privatization

Existing theory suggests that the likelihood of abuse and neglect in foster homes increases the longer a child has been in the system (Goldman et al. 2003). In order to calculate the differences in the risk of abuse and neglect over time given three levels of privatization, I used a series of proportional hazard models focused around the risks of the four grouped incidences of abuse and neglect. The three levels of privatization are based on the Alliance for Children and Families' definition of foster care

privatization levels, where a system with at least 25 percent privatized placements is considered small-scale privatization, a system with at least 50 percent privatized placements is considered large-scale privatization, and a system with 100 percent privatized placements is full system privatization (Jones 2011).[2] The annual risk changes based on level of privatization of each of these models can be seen in Table 4 (an extended version of this table including additional abuse and neglect models as well as the hazard ratios of each model can be found in the Appendix, Table 2).

Table 4. Annual Risk Changes in Abuse and Neglect by Privatization

| Model	Risk Change for Small-Scale Privatization	Risk Change for Large-Scale Privatization	Risk Change for Full System Privatization
Physical Abuse	.24%	.48%	.97%
Sexual Abuse	.16%	.33%	.66%
Neglect	.23%	.47%	.95%
Abandonment	.25%	.51%	1.01%

All results are statistically significant at the 99% Level.

The results of the proportional hazards models indicate that risk increases over time for all four covariates and that increases in the level of privatization also lead to increases in the risk of abuse and neglect. While these risk changes may seem insignificant, when they are considered over the potential eighteen years a child may spend in foster care, the increases in risk become more substantial. Figure 5 shows the cumulative hazards of physical abuse and sexual abuse, while Figure 6 shows the cumulative hazards of neglect and abandonment, both for foster care children based on the system of privatization in their state. Cumulative hazards are indicative of the risk of an event occurring given that it has not happened yet (cumulative hazards for additional abuse and neglect covariates are available in the Appendix, Figure 2). Because the average time a child spends in foster care is two years and the longest period of time a child spends in foster care is eighteen years, my analysis will focus on these two periods.

Abuse

When considering physical abuse, we see that at two years in foster care the increase in risk of physical abuse between a child in a state with no privatization and a state with system-wide privatization is about 20 percent. When comparing children in foster care their entire lives, a child in a state with system-wide privatization has a risk of physical abuse that is about 50 percent greater than a child in a state with no privatization. When considering sexual abuse, after two years in foster care the increased risk of sexual abuse in a state with system-wide privatization compared to a state with no privatization is about a 0.5 percent increase, but when considering an eighteen-year period in foster care, the risk increases by about 10 percent. Because the incidence of physical abuse in the foster care system as a whole is much greater than

Figure 5. Cumulative Hazards of Physical and Sexual Abuse

Risk of Physical Abuse Over Time


Risk of Sexual Abuse Over Time

Figure 6. Cumulative Hazards of Neglect and Abandonment

Risk of Neglect Over Time

Risk of Abandonment Over Time

the incidence of sexual abuse, it is expected that the general risk and increased risks of physical abuse are much larger than those of sexual abuse.

Neglect

When considering neglect, we see that after two years in foster care the majority of children will have been removed from at least one foster home for neglect, regardless of whether the system is privatized or not. However, at eighteen years in the system, we see that instances of neglect will likely increase from three to four when comparing children in non-privatized and fully privatized systems. When considering abandonment, we see that at two years in foster care the difference in the risk of abandonment between a child in a state with system-wide privatization and a state with no privatization is about a 0.7 percent increase. At eighteen years, this difference increases significantly to a 20 percent increase in the likelihood of abandonment. Looking back at the neglect proportional hazards model in Figure 6, we see that the risk of neglect in the system is generally high. Neglect is generally used in foster care placement removal reporting as a catch-all term for any form of neglectful or abusive situation that cannot be explained by a more specific form of neglect or abuse. Because of this, neglect is the most commonly listed reason for a removal from a foster care placement. Alternatively, the risk of abandonment is generally low and is the least commonly listed reason for removal from a foster care placement.

In each of these proportional hazards models, it was found that children in privatized systems experience higher risks of all abusive and neglectful placement situations and that these risks increase for all children over time regardless of level of privatization. This analysis confirms existing qualitative analyses of foster care privatization, which indicate that the emphasis privatized foster care placement agencies put on efficiency within the system compromises the quality of placements children in privatized systems receive.

Analysis 3: Actual Changes Caused by Public Policy

In my first and second analyses, I have shown that foster care privatization directly influences the type and quality of placements within the foster care system. Foster care privatization, regardless of the level, is generally enacted through state legislation. These legislations provide guidelines for the implementation of foster care privatization over both short term (1–2 year) and long term (3–5 year) time periods.

To determine if privatization legislation has an immediate effect on the levels of privatization and incidence of abuse within the state, I used eighty-six individual time-series models—two for each state with a change in privatization through legislation 2000–14.

These models were used to determine if the year the privatization legislation was enacted showed a break in privatization or abuse incidence. If we see a break in either privatization or abuse incidence at the time the legislation was passed, we assume that there was an immediate effect in the foster care system based on the legislation.

**Figure 7. Observed Immediate Changes in Foster Care Privatization
and Abuse Incidence Based on Privatization Policies**

When we see breaks in both privatization and abuse incidence, we assume that the immediate effect in the system was more significant than those with just one break. Figure 7 shows whether each state experienced an immediate effect, in the form of a break, from a change in foster care privatization legislation, and if so which effect was observed. In nine states (Indiana, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) there was no privatization legislation passed within the period being studied. In twenty-four of the remaining forty-thee states the privatization legislation appeared to have no immediate effect on privatization or abuse incidence, leaving nineteen states with an apparent immediate effect on the foster care system.

The states with breaks in the time series models indicating an immediate shift in privatization levels are California, Connecticut, Delaware, The District of Columbia, Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. The states with breaks in the time series models indicating an immediate shift in abuse incidence are Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, and Virginia. The five states with breaks in both privatization and abuse incidence are Connecticut, Delaware, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia.

The plots of the time series models for the five states with both privatization and abuse incidence breaks are visualized in Figure 8. It appears that the shifts caused by breaks in privatization are much larger than the shifts seen at breaks in abuse inci-

dence. In three of these states, Connecticut, Delaware, and Texas, there is an immediate decrease in the level of privatization, while in Oklahoma and Virginia there is an immediate increase in the level of privatization. The changes in abuse incidence, while difficult to see, follow the direction of the increase or decrease in privatization. This correlation relationship further supports the theory that privatization legislation leads to changes in the incidence of abuse.

Figure 8. Time Series Plots and Breaks
Changes in Privatization and Abuse Over Time

Vertical Reference Lines Indicate Break Year

Given that in about half of the states where foster care privatization legislation was passed between 2000 and 2014 there was an immediate break in either levels of privatization or the incidence of abuse within the state, we can verify the hypothesis that foster care legislation directly influences the lives of children in the foster care system. It is highly unlikely that in nineteen individual observations in different states and in different years there would be a structural break in privatization and abuse that was unrelated to the corresponding changes in foster care policies in the states. Each time a state's foster care legislation is changed, it has the potential to immediately affect the lives of thousands of foster children.

Discussion

Through three separate analyses, this paper has shown that the privatization of foster care directly affects the type and quality of care children in the foster care system receive. All three of the expected outcomes based on current qualitative theory surrounding foster care privatization were verified in this research.

In the first analysis, it was shown that privatized placement agencies favor case goals that make placements efficient and less expensive. Most notably, a significant

decrease is seen in the probability of a child being adopted from a privatized foster care placement when compared to placements by non-privatized agencies. The first analysis also indicated that children placed by privatized foster care agencies are more likely to be placed without a specific case goal. When children are placed without a case goal, the agency has no plan in place for a removal from the system, increasing the length of time children spend in the system. As seen in the second analysis, the longer children remain in foster care, the greater their risk of being placed in abusive homes.

The second analysis showed that increased levels of privatization lead to an increase of unfit placements in the form of an increased risk of abuse and neglect of children. Significant differences are seen between the risks of abuse and neglect the longer children have been in the foster care system, with the greatest differences seen when children remain in the system for eighteen years.

The third analysis showed that changes in foster care legislation have the potential to cause an immediate effect on the privatization level and quality of placements received by children in the foster care system. Privatization legislation did not indicate an immediate change in the privatization level or incidence of abuse in every state. However, the immediate changes seen in half the states with major privatization legislation changes indicate that privatization legislation does have a direct and immediate influence on the lives of children in the foster care system.

It is important to realize the limitations of this analysis. While the AFCARS datasets provide information for all foster children in every state within the system each year, the identification information for each of these children is fairly limited. This demographic information is limited to basic differences, such as race, gender, and age. Existing theories about foster care abuse suggest that the economic situation a child lived in prior to their entry into the foster care system, as well as the economic situation of a foster family, may indicate the likelihood of a child exiting the system quickly. Poorer children are staying in the system for significantly longer periods of time than children from affluent families. Children placed with poorer families are also staying in the system for longer periods but in the poor home for a shorter period (Hansen and Hansen 2006). As shown in the second analysis, the longer a child remains in the system, the greater their risk of abuse and neglect becomes. These analyses could be improved with an inclusion of economic information about children pre- and post-placement.

Conclusions

This research shows the significant negative influence an increasingly popular form of public policy has on the lives of children within the foster care system. Legislators, social workers, and citizens alike should consider the findings of this research as a substantial sign that foster care privatization, as it currently functions in the U.S., should not be the standard for which we strive. In 2015, more than 650,000 children spent time in foster care. With the number of children in foster care on the rise, it is important that we consider the real-world impact that this study represents (AFCARS

2015). The increases in the risk of abuse and neglect when privatized child placement agencies are placing children as shown in this research are based on real levels of abuse and neglect within the U.S. foster care system for fourteen years.

This research also has significant implications on research about adoption within the United States. Adoption is often considered the best-case scenario for children in the foster care system in the U.S. who have no possibility of returning to their biological parents (Cowan 2004). In an analysis of several studies regarding the benefits of adoption for children in foster care, it was found that children who are adopted ultimately have better outcomes than those who remain in the system or those who are returned to their biological parents. This is believed to be because of the positive influence adoption has on the enhancement of the emotional and intellectual potential of children (Hoksbergen 1999). Those involved in the promotion of adoption both within and outside of the U.S. foster care system may benefit from understanding the significant differences seen in this paper between privatized and non-privatized child placements.

I hope this analysis may be used as a stepping stone for additional research of the effect of foster care privatization on the lives of foster children. Public policy related to underrepresented groups such as foster children is often studied from a purely legislative standpoint without consideration of how the polices may have consequences that are generally unseen without analysis. If privatization is to remain the goal of U.S. foster care, it must be improved upon. Foster care is a system that is meant to keep children from being in unsafe and unhealthy environments. It is up to legislators deciding how the system will be run to ensure that children are not being moved from one abusive situation to another.

APPENDIX
Theoretical Framework

Table 1. Logistic Regression of Abusive Placement on Demographic Variables

VARIABLES	Abusive Placement
Female	0.209***
	(0.00240)
Black	0.0178***
	(0.00278)
American Indian	0.0896***
	(0.00806)
Asian	0.0368***
	(0.0139)
Pacific islander	0.490***
	(0.0260)
Mixed Race	0.113***
	(0.00544)
Unknown Race	-0.0215***
	(0.00426)
Age	0.000131***
	(4.34e-07)
Constant	-1.466***
	(0.00761)

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

ANALYSIS ONE

Figure 1. Extended Data Breakdown by Privatization
Incidence of Abuse and Neglect in Foster Care (Percentages) - Extended

Table 2. Extended Multinomial Logit Results by Privatization Level

Model	Hazard Ratio	Risk Change for Small-Scale Privatization	Risk Change for Large-Scale Privatization	Risk Change for Full System Privatization
Physical Abuse	1.009791	.24%	.48%	.97%
Sexual Abuse	1.006618	.16%	.33%	.66%
Neglect	1.009544	.23%	.47%	.95%
Parental Alcohol Abuse	1.007942	.19%	.39%	.79%
Parental Drug Abuse	1.009717	.24%	.48%	.97%
Parental Incarcera-tion	1.007197	.17%	.36%	.72%
Abandonment	1.010141	.25%	.51%	1.01%
Inadequate Housing	1.00981	.24%	.49%	.98%

ANALYSIS TWO

Figure 2. Cumulative Hazards of Additional Abuse and Neglect Indicators by Privatization Level
Risk of Parental Alcohol Abuse Over Time

Risk of Parental Drug Abuse Over Time

Risk of Parental Jailing Over Time

Risk of Inadequate Housing Over Time

Figure legend:
No Privatization — Small-Scale Privatization
Large-Scale Privatization — System-Wide Privatization

NOTES

1. The multinomial logit models in analysis one and the cumulative hazard models in analysis two were conducted including the gender, race, and age controls. There was no substantive or statistical difference between models run with and without these controls. Akaike and Bayesian information criterion indicated that the models run without had similar model fit, but a greater model simplicity. For this reason, the controls were removed for the analysis.

2. These Cox proportional hazards models were also run using a binary variable indicating whether or not a placement was privatized. The results were substantively and statistically similar to those seen between system-wide privatizing and systems with no privatization. The models based on privatization levels were favored because of their indication that being in a privatized system increases one's risk of privatization, regardless of whether a specific placement was conducted by a privatized placement company.

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Moldova: To Be or Not to Be
Establishing a National Identity Before and After Independence: 1989–1993

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> The difference between a nation and a nationality is clear, but it is not always observed. Likeness between members is the essence of nationality, but the members of a nation may be very different. A nation may be composed of many nationalities . . .
>
> —Louis D. Brandeis (1915)

This difference is all too clear in the former Soviet satellite of Moldova. In 1989, Moldova had a population of 4,335,360 (Демоскоп Weekly 2013), with a variety of nationalities living within its borders that threatened to divide the state. Moldovans were the largest ethnic group, accounting for roughly 65 percent of the population. Ukrainians (13.8 percent), Russians (13 percent), Gaguaz (3.5 percent), and Romanians (0.06 percent) were just a few of the other ethnic minorities (Демоскоп Weekly 2013). While other former Soviet states dealt relatively effectively with a variety of ethnic minorities within their borders, this issue tore at the very foundation of Moldova's national identity, exacerbating tensions between groups vying for control over what Moldova would become. From what language was to be spoken to the national anthem, Moldovans struggled both pre- and post-independence to develop a strong sense of distinct national identity. Some groups pressed for unification with Romania, a neighboring state with strong historical and cultural ties to Moldova, while others asserted Moldova was uniquely its own country. Not to be left out, others desired to maintain ties to the former Soviet Union. This paper will examine the struggle Moldovans underwent in deciding whether to strengthen ties with the former Soviet Union, to return to old Romanian ties, or to create their own independent nation. Additional insights into the depth of this issue can be learned by comparing Moldova

to the Baltic States. The Baltic region avoided a similar identity crisis in part through its fortune of having strong ties with Western Europe, which motivated and enabled the Baltic region to depart from the former Soviet Union economically, politically, and culturally. The Baltic States also lacked the same type of ties that Moldova had with Romania before the Soviet era. Moldova's misfortune may have been avoided had it had similar ties to pro-independence Western states as the Baltic region experienced rather than its mixed history of ties with Russia and Romania.

A Brief History

From the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, the Moldovan landscape had frequently been the subject of dispute and war between rival powers, such as the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Bessarabia, a region widely encompassed by what is currently Moldova and part of Ukraine, was annexed by tsarist Russia in 1812. In 1918, Bessarabia declared its independence from Russia, though not before undergoing years of intensive Russification. At the time, Bessarabia's parliament called for unification with neighboring Romania, a move recognized by the 1920 Treaty of Paris. The Bolsheviks who had just come to power in Russia, however, did not support the action. Just four years later, the land east of the Dniester River was founded as the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. During this time period, "Soviet Moldovan historiography downplayed any historical ties to Romania and exaggerated Bessarabia's Slavic ties" (Kuzio 2002). The USSR focused on differentiating Moldovans from Romanians, and although during World War II a Nazi attack against the Soviets enabled a Romanian puppet regime to be established in the Moldova Soviet Socialist Republic, it was quickly ousted when the USSR reclaimed control shortly before the war came to an end. During the Soviet era, Moldova had essentially only one political party: the Communist Party of Moldova (CPM). During the 1960s, when the party began to move away from bilingualism, Moldovan intellectual elites protested this dilution of their ethnicity but were met with harsh retaliation (Kulik 2005). In the late 1960s and into the 1970s, Moldovan students formed "an illegal anti-Soviet political organization" to infiltrate the CPM and Soviet institutions in order to introduce policies that better fit the republic, but the movement was essentially brought to a halt when its leader, Soltoianu, was taken into custody, sent into exile, and locked in correction camps for nearly two decades (Kulik 2005). Soviet authorities employed various means and organizations, including the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD—later renamed the Committee for State Security, or KGB), to accentuate the differences between Romanians and Moldovans. One method involved physically removing citizens who supported ties with Romania, labeling them the "enemies of the people" (Bugai 1999). Pan-Romanian supporters were persecuted and deprived of their right to vote, bringing about a loss of social benefits such as rationing (Bugai 1999). The USSR enforced the use of Cyrillic script rather than Romania's Latin script. Reference to the "Romanian" language was strictly prohibited; the USSR espoused the language as being

"Moldovan" (King 2000). Greater opportunities and privileges were given to the Russian speakers in Moldova, including access to better social services, careers, and educational opportunities (Jenkins 1997).

Mikhail Gorbachev's introduction of *glasnost* or "openness" brought about a resurrection of Moldovan nationalism in the late 1980s, as it "provoked an open debate about the country's language issue and alphabet issue, the cultural and political underpinnings of which gave the first impulse to Moldova's struggle for independence and emancipation from the USSR" (Brezianu 2010). This era and its reforms under *perestroika*, namely the introduction of the Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet in each republic, allowed for the formation of the Popular Front of Moldova (FPM), a "Moldovan" (but truly pro-Romanian) independence movement that took control of parliament from the communists and brought about changes that would take even greater effect after independence was acquired (Fedor 1995).

Independence: Further Separation from the Soviet Union

On 27 August 1991, Moldova declared its independence from the Soviet Union, but this new-found freedom did not come easily or provide stability. After gaining autonomy, Moldova was immediately faced with the need to reconstruct its post-Soviet economy, mediate internal conflicts, and create political institutions that would incorporate and defend the state's many ethnic minorities (Rossi 2011). That same month, the Communist Party was formally banned from Moldova, though some former communist members continued to be involved in politics by joining other successor organizations that were established in September through the "Law on Parties and Other Socio-Political Organizations" that provided for a multiparty system (Kulik 2005). However, these parties, along with parliament on a whole, were not particularly politically powerful and were wracked with internal fragmentation and inexperience (Kulik 2005). There was also a divide in the populace on the meaning of independence between "large segments of the minority and titular ethnic groups, which supported the preservation of the Soviet Union . . . [and] a substantial portion of the titular groups' political and cultural elite, which saw unification with Romania as the ultimate goal of Moldova's political transformation" (Lavorschi 2012). Having ties to both the Soviet Union and Romania, Moldova's independence movement triggered a game of tug-of-war as varying factions within the government vied for influence and control over Moldova (Lavorschi 2012). One observer explained the basis of this struggle as follows:

> Unlike the other constituents of the Soviet Union, Moldova was the only union republic whose majority population was culturally bound to a nation-state across the border and therefore the potential object of irredentism, a situation that simply replayed within the socialist camp an older confrontation between the Romanian kingdom and the Russian empire. For this reason, the Moldovans have long been the object of intense nation-building projects, designed either to

convince them of their separateness from the Romanians or, when under Romanian rule, to convince them that their purported separateness was a fiction of Russian propaganda. . . . (King 2000)

Given their history of being subjected to intense nation-building projects, it is not surprising that Moldovans struggled to establish their national identity upon gaining independence.

Further Division: Moldovanism versus Romanianism

Due to Moldova's weak national identity, citizens struggled to choose between supporting Moldovanism or Romanianism. While there was support of ties to the former Soviet Union, these were prevalent only among small groups of Russian nationalists that lived in the country and will be discussed later. Even during the Soviet era, the two larger movements created deep divides "throughout the 30s, [as] the MASSR administrative and intellectual elites [became] the battleground of an increasingly fierce fight, both symbolically and administratively, between two camps . . . who got their names from their respective positions on the issue of the national language of the Republic" (Negura 2012). The third camp that advocated for the maintenance of the Soviet system will be discussed in greater detail with the issue of Transnistrian independence (Kulik 2005). Each of these three groups established its own center: Bucharest for Romanianists, Chisinau (the capital of Moldova) for Moldovanists, and Moscow for Soviet/Russian supporters.

Moldovanism developed greater support amongst the communists, ethnic Moldovan peasants, and minority groups (Iglesias 2013). Romanianism, on the other hand, had its roots in the late 1980s *glasnost* period and was most widely supported by the educated and urban elites. Romanianists were supporters of the Moldovan Populist Front (Fedor 1995). Fundamental issues—culture, language, religion, and history—divided Moldovanists from Romanianists. Moldovanism argued that these elements were unique and distinctly separate from Romanian culture, language, religion, and history. Indeed, after years of Soviet Union reassurances that the two states were in fact different, such claims seemed to be completely legitimate to this group of citizens. On the other hand, Romanianism promoted greater independence from the Soviet structure and sought reunification with Romania. It emphasized the numerous similarities between the two cultures, including their Orthodox religions and similar languages, viewing any differences as slight variations of the same Romanian history and culture (Lavorschi 2012). While Moldovanism promoted its own distinct "Moldovan" language, Romanianism advocated for one that was essentially identical to the speech and text in Romania.

By 1990, before gaining independence, the pro-Romanianism Popular Front had secured 27 percent of the seats in the Supreme Soviet and, allied with reformist communists, was able to push its own policies regarding national identity and language. The Popular Front garnered great support both in the capital and in the

regions of Moldova dominated by ethnic Romanians (Fedor 1995). Though reunification with Romania was not favored by all, the cultural intelligentsia was "cut off from the 80 percent of the population living in rural areas who maintain a parochial, local identity," which allowed these elites to push policies that did not always reflect the larger population's desires (Kuzio 2002). Moreover, with considerable control over parliament and government, the Popular Front succeeded in creating a more pro-Romanian identity by adopting a national language, flag, and anthem strikingly similar to Romania's, as well as celebrating national holidays that focused on ties with Romania and a rejection of the Soviet Union.

The Push toward Romania: Language

The pro-Romanian Popular Front's success in promoting the reinstatement of "national symbols of our people" after the government's adoption of the "On State Sovereignty and Our Right to the Future" re-established Romanian as the official language of Moldova (Eagles 2014). Latin script replaced Cyrillic and names that had been "Russified" were changed back to their previous forms. During the Soviet Union's reign Romanian had been replaced by Russian in practically all facets of public life, but the new language law was quickly accepted throughout most of the country, except for the Transnistrian and Gagauz regions inhabited by Russian and Turkish minorities respectively (Chinn 1993). At the time of this change, Romanians composed less than half of Chisinau, the capital. More than 12 percent considered Russian to be their native language and 75 percent spoke Russian; however, only 11 percent of Russians in the city said they could proficiently speak Romanian (Guboglo 1990). Ethnic Russians feared this movement away from their Russian heritage, leading, in part, to the Transnistrian crisis that followed shortly after independence.

The Flag

Not only did this new policy of promoting the "symbols of our people" make Moldovan the sole official state language, but it also brought about the adoption of a new flag. The flag of Moldova, created in 1990, includes a coat of arms that resembles the Romanian coat of arms, depicting a golden eagle clutching in its beak an Orthodox Christian cross. Additionally, the Moldovan flag is based on Romanian national colors—blue, yellow, and red—and the back of the flag does not feature the coat of

Moldovan Flag   Romanian Flag and Coat of Arms

arms, making it even more similar to the Romanian flag itself. As the Romanian flag was modified from its Soviet precursor through the elimination of the communist emblem from its center as a symbol of its ousting of the Soviet regime, the new Moldovan flag also rejected communism and the Soviet regime and accepted its Romanian heritage (Eagles 2014).

National Anthem

Another symbol of "our people" that the Popular Front adopted was the national anthem *Deșteaptă-te, române!*, which is also the national anthem of Romania. From 1917 to 1918 and then again from 1991 until 1994, Andrei Mureşanu's patriotic song written during Romania's revolution of 1848 was used in Moldova despite the implicit references it makes to being Romanian:

> Wake up, Romanian, from your deadly sleep
> Into which you've been sunk by the barbaric tyrants
> Now, or never, your fate renew,
> To which your enemies will bow.
>
> (National Anthems Atom 2016)

Following decades of rule under the Soviet Union, the words of this anthem promote independence from the "barbaric tyrants"—the Communist Party and Soviet system. The pro-Romanian movement did not care for subtleties concerning its alliance with Romania and rejection of the USSR.

Holidays

Adopting Romanian holidays and ending commemoration of certain Soviet holidays helped forge a new national consciousness. A few of these holidays included the "Anniversary of the October Revolution (November 7), Constitution Day (October 7), Soviet Army Day (February 23), Komsomol Day (May 29), Pioneers' Day (May 19) and Militia Day (November 10)" (Bîrlădeanu 2013). New holidays that celebrated ties to Romania and independence, such as Language Day (August 31) as well as Independence Day (August 27), were then initiated, and religious holidays that had not been included during the Soviet era, including Easter and Christmas, were observed once more (Ibid.). Some Soviet holidays remained, including Women's Day (March 8), Labor Day (May 1), as well as Victory Day (May 9), but these were instead portrayed as Moldovan holidays (Ibid.).

Breakaway Regions: Resisting Romanianism

Parts of the country strongly objected to these policies. As mentioned, there existed in Moldova a third movement separate from Moldovanism and Romanianism: those who were pro-Russia. In 1988, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Russians, and other Russian-speaking minorities in Moldova formed the Yedinstvo-Unitatea Intermovement in response to the republic's attempts to move away from the Russian language (Fedor 1995). Primarily based in Transnistria, the Yedinstvo party advocated "the pre-

1990 status quo" of having Russian as the state's primary language (Fedor 1995). The debate over the official state language instilled fear throughout the Russian-speaking populace, and while the Popular Front held rallies and gathered over one million signatures to support the proposed law change, Russians, Gagauzis, Ukrainians, and other ethnic minorities viewed this as a serious threat, some of them choosing to flee rather than face the economic and social effects of the language law:

> Moldavia's politicians are moving as fast as they can to divest themselves of all things Russian. The old Bessarabian part of Moldavia is fast becoming a de facto little Romania and Russian-speakers, the "uninvited guests" as officials call them, are being shown the door. Virtually all non-Romanian-speakers will have to pass language tests by 1995 or lose their jobs. In several firms, testing has already begun. Skilled Russians, Ukrainians and others are leaving. (*Economist* 1991)

The language law enacted in 1989 did, however, provide some accommodations for Russian, guaranteeing its protection and use in communicating with other Soviet republics as well as in interethnic communications within the republic (King 2000). The Gagauzi language was also guaranteed protection, and classes were offered to help those who did not speak Moldovan to enable them to pass language tests required for state employment (King 2000). Despite these provisions, the language law served as the catalyst for the two secessionist movements in Transnistria and Gagauz (Chinn 1993). Russians and other minority groups went on strike in response to the language change and the potential unification with Romania the new law foreshadowed. During this time, the Yedinstvo party gained support in the Moldovan Supreme Soviet in 1990 and in local elections, giving it control over local and *raion* (regional) Transnistrian governments. Closely allied with the Yedinstvo party, the Gagauz Halki (Gagauz People) was another influential minority political party. Gagauz Halki won support in local government positions throughout five *raione* and declared its sovereignty in 1990 (Fedor 1995). On 3 September 1990, Transnistrian leaders also declared their separation from Moldova and claimed that they had established the "Trans-Dniester Soviet Socialist Republic" of the USSR (Jackson 2003). The Soviet government, and later the Russian government, provided aid to this breakaway group.

Fear of coerced cultural assimilation with Romania and disagreement with the newly established leaders motivated Transnistrian and Gagauzi groups respectively to press for secession (Iglesias 2013). While the first struggle was resolved diplomatically through the granting of autonomous status to the Gaguaz, the latter struggle with the Transnistrian movement formed into a bloody civil war by 1992. The Russian army assisted the Transnistria region to gain de facto independence, and today there still remain Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria. At the time of the conflict, this issue of Transnistrian independence further polarized the debate between the three major movements: pro-Moldova, pro-Romania, and pro-Russia factions.

The Fall of the Popular Front: A Move toward Moldovan Independence

A national survey conducted prior to the 1994 elections indicated that a majority of Moldovans favored Chisinau as its national center rather than Bucharest or Moscow. The pro-Romania Popular Front had lost support by early 1993 due to internal quarrels and disputes, which resulted in the party's fragmentation into numerous opposing factions (Fedor 1995). Parliamentary elections held on 27 February 1994, produced majority support for the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova with fifty-six of the 104 seats and with twenty-eight seats for the Yedinstvo-Socialist Bloc (Fedor 1995). Pro-Romanian parties, the Congress of Peasants and the Christian Democratic Popular Front, the main factions of the former Popular Front, garnered only twenty seats combined (Fedor 1995).

The new government served as a mediator between the ethnic Slavs and the ethnic Romanians and enacted more moderate laws throughout the country. Problems such as the secessionist movement in Transnistria were faced with new optimism "without a majority of Popular Front extreme nationalists in Parliament" (Fedor 1995). Changes in the "symbols of our people" included a new national anthem, Limbanoastră, which reflected separation from Romania. Devoid of implicit references to Romanians, the song, written in 1917, a year before Bessarabia united with Romania, hails "a *people* suddenly awaken from the sleep of death" (*National Anthems Atom* 2016). Moldova experienced another "awakening" from death as it shifted away from a pro-Romania stance to one more temperate and suited to the needs of its people. On 27 August 1994, a new constitution granted Transnistria and the Gaguaz Republic significant autonomy but still upheld Moldova's sovereignty and identity (Fedor 1995). Gagauz, for example, did not have territorial autonomy but was allowed cultural, economic, and administrative independence and could elect a regional legislative assembly that chose a "guvernator" to serve as a member in the Moldovan government (Fedor 1995). Conflict with Transnistria continued until 1992. Following the three-month Moldova-Transnistria War from March until June, a multilateral peacekeeping force helped resolve the conflict, ultimately granting Transnistria de facto independence (Jackson 2003).

In the end, the Popular Front lost support not only because its policies served as a catalyst for secession movements within the country, further polarizing public opinion, but also because the pro-Romania movement caused Moldovans to grow "suspicious of and hostile towards" possible unification with Romania (Jackson 2003). Additionally, Romania had little economic support to offer Moldova (Jackson 2003). The possibility of reunification had brought increased ethnic conflicts, and Romania's slow efforts to democratize appeared a potential threat to Moldova's own political future (Jackson 2003). Moldovans had not only ousted the Popular Front, but on 6 March 1994, they produced a referendum decisively rejecting unification with Romania (Jackson 2003).

Formation of National Identity in Other Former Soviet States

Unlike Moldova, some former Soviet states, such as the Baltic States, quickly and easily established national identities after gaining independence—though no transi-

tion from the Soviet era for the former satellites can truly be labeled quick or easy. Although Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia also had ethnic Russian minorities within their borders, their treatment of Russians enabled them to overcome secessionist movements like the Transnistria conflict in Moldova. These countries also had connections to non-Russian states prior to the Soviet occupation—as Moldova did with Romania—and these strong historical, geographic, and cultural ties to Western Europe enabled them to quickly break away from the former Soviet Union and establish independent national identities. Yet, despite these strong ties with Western Europe, they did not experience the same push for unification with any of these countries, including Germany, as each of the Baltic States had previously declared its independence in 1918, before the Soviet occupation. Moldova's past showed that before becoming part of the USSR, the state had united with Romania, thus upon independence in 1991 many felt that this union should be restored.

With strong German heritages that caused them to view Slavs as a lesser race, the Baltic States more successfully resisted Russification efforts than many other Soviet republics as they both feared and detested Russia and the Soviet Union (Kurth 1999). Their close proximity to Scandinavian and Western states provided them examples of nationalist movements during the nineteenth century. In particular, during the 1980s, the "political integration of the Baltic republics into the Soviet Union was seriously challenged, as the influences emanating from the Polish social experiment proved to be a catalyst for nationalist activities" (Panagoitou 2001). Moldova's close proximity with Romania provided it with momentum for reunification. The Baltic's favorable geographic location also facilitated the establishment of economic and political ties with countries other than Russia at the end of the twentieth century (Panagoitou 2001). In comparison, Romania's poor economy and its struggle with democratization threatened Moldova's own chances for economic and political success were the two to unite, making the decision of reunification an even more difficult choice.

Within the Baltics, not only was Latin script used instead of Cyrillic, the languages also differed significantly from Russian, making ethnic Russians less likely to learn these languages. Additionally, while the Soviet Union focused on reconstruction after WWII, particularly after having regained the Baltics from Germany, which had taken control of it temporarily from 1941 until 1945, the lack of resources for developing the Russian language in the Baltics meant that for a time schools were conducted in the native languages of these countries, "but an additional year was added to secondary school time scale to provide extra time for Russian-language acquisition," further enabling the Baltics to retain their sense of national identity (Grenoble 2003). Moldova's Russification process did not face the same obstacle and was able to take deeper roots in the country. On the whole, the strong influence of Western Europe and the weak ties to the Soviet Union and Russia provided clear direction for the Baltics following independence.

To aid in the process of turning West, Estonia and Latvia adopted restrictive citizenship and language laws. Lithuania, however, like many other former Soviet states, granted citizenship to essentially everyone living within its borders as it had a mere 10 percent of its population consisting of Slavs, while Estonia had roughly 35 percent and Latvia around 39 percent (Thompson 2012). Estonia granted citizenship only to people who lived in the country prior to 1940—before the USSR took control of the state—ensuring that a large majority of Russians did not qualify for citizenship. If a person had moved to Estonia or Latvia after 1940, they were required to pass a language test and had to have lived in the country for several years (Thompson 2012). Both the Estonian and Latvian languages are significantly different from Russian, which made passing the language test a difficult feat, especially for the Russians who, prior to Estonian and Latvian independence, had not been required to learn the native language of these countries. Moldova's citizenship law, on the other hand, granted citizenship to those who desired it if they had been "residing permanently on the territory of the republic [before June 23, 1990] and had there a permanent place of work or other legal source of existence" (Gasca 2012). Moldova's more inclusive legislature benefited and empowered its minority groups.

In the Baltics, non-citizens were denied many jobs, including service in the military, teaching positions, and work within private industries. Judicial proceedings were done in the native languages of these countries, and only citizens could vote in national elections, which denied Russians from joining parties to change this law (Thompson 2012). Estonia and Latvia effectively disenfranchised their Russian minorities through these laws. Unlike the situation in Moldova where the Gaguaz and Transnistria regions gained power in government to push for their independence and effect politics, ethnic Russians became second-class citizens in these Baltic States and held essentially no power to bring about more favorable political reforms. The language laws that had accommodated Russian speakers in Moldova were non-existent in the Baltics, further allowing Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to keep pro-Russian groups from having legitimacy or gaining political leverage. By more thoroughly suppressing their ethnic Russian minorities, the Baltics avoided their own Transnistrian movements.

Conclusion

Moldova's historical entanglement with Romania and Russia even before the Soviet era made independence a more difficult process than it was for states such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which found more support from the West to value independence and nationalism. Overall, as soon as the Baltics gained independence, elites pursued a policy of "regional revival," including the use of their native languages in schools, for citizenship laws, employment, and access to the government and services (Laitin 1991). Additionally, these countries adopted symbols of their national culture through the celebration of historic holidays, national media, the changing of city and street names from Russian to native names, and independence movements, such as Lithuania's Sajudis

movement that sprung up in 1988–89 (Laitin 1991). These policies reversed the changes that had been implemented during the Soviet era and resembled Moldovan policies of promoting "symbols of our people" and favoring the native language over Russian speakers. The Baltics, however, were more drastic in their policies and also moved further away from the Russian sphere of influence by establishing new currencies in order to avoid reliance on the Russian ruble and refusing to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), unlike Moldova, which joined in December 1991. Moldova's decision to join the CIS gave Russia political and economic leverage over the state, an additional advantage for ethnic Russian minorities.

While Moldova erased certain Soviet holidays from their calendars, the Baltics did so as well but went even further by celebrating their national independence days from the year 1918, thereby relegating the Soviet period as an unfortunate anomaly in their histories of being independent states. Indeed, unlike Moldova, these states implemented extremely harsh anti-Russian policies and chose to turn to the West quickly and decisively. These decisions allowed them to reestablish their unique national identities separate from Russia and without secessionist movements, despite the fact that Estonia and Latvia both had larger populations of Slavs than Moldova did upon independence (though the large populations of ethnic Russians helped to increase their fears and, therefore, the harshness of their policies toward the minority group). Additionally, unlike Romania, the Baltics' western neighbors did not seek for unification with the states but rather supported their desires to become integrated with Western Europe. The Baltics' strong German heritage that viewed Slavs as a lesser people made choosing to cleanse themselves of ties to Russia an easy choice. Moldova's former ties to both Romania and the Soviet Union made deciding upon a national identity a more difficult process. While some–particularly Russian-speaking minorities–in the country wanted to maintain ties with Russia, others sought to establish a unique Moldovan identity while yet others pushed for reunification with Romania. The pro-Romanian movement gained some support during the early years leading up to independence and for a time afterward, but it eventually exacerbated tensions among the pro-Russia and pro-Moldova movements, leading to abandonment of hope for the reunification process.

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Power, Prestige, and Intimate Partner Violence

Kennan Howlett

Introduction

Today's American women have the capability to be more independent from men than ever before. A cursory glance at U.S. society suggests that this transition to self-reliance has been relatively smooth. For example, women have consistently earned more bachelor's degrees than men since 1982 (Perry 2013, Francis 2016) and nine out of ten men claim to be comfortable with women earning more than them (Dunlop 2009). This cultural shift has empowered women to seek opportunities outside of the home and take on new roles within society. Women are accepted as confident, competent leaders who make substantial contributions to the U.S. work force.

However, significant cultural lag persists beneath the glossy veneer of gender equality. The displacement of long-held social norms has left a hole where traditional principles once dictated gender roles. Cultural acceptance and embracement of women who "do it all" diminish the labels that once defined masculinity. Men are left in limbo as the identity of provider, breadwinner, and head of household are swept aside by the contemporary woman. This can lead to the phenomenon known as insecure masculinity.

Insecure masculinity also goes by the names of fragile masculinity and machismo in literature. The sense of fragility and insecurity arises in men who believe that masculinity is a rigid quality, and it occurs when a man feels emasculated—experiencing a loss of manliness and power. Men with feelings of insecurity may not appear any less masculine to people around them; a man needs only to believe that others see him as less masculine than traditional standards mandate to experience insecure masculinity. Such an individual's sense of self is based on how he thinks others perceive him.

Men experiencing insecure masculinity have diverse reactions ranging from social withdrawal to overt acts of defiance. In extreme cases, intimate partner violence may be used against women as a method to regain men's masculinity. Intimate partner violence refers to physical, sexual, or psychological aggression against an intimate partner. Men engage in this violence as a method of maintaining power and control over their partner. There are many reasons men act violently toward their wife or girlfriend; this paper specifically explores whether the female partner of a relationship is more likely to experience intimate partner violence if she has a more prestigious position through income, education, or occupation. I hypothesize that having a more prestigious position triggers insecure masculinity, which is displayed through the perpetration of intimate partner violence.

I used the Violence and Threats of Violence against Women in the United States 1994–1996 survey data for my analysis. This data was collected by Schulman, Ronca, Bucuvalas Inc. using a national random digit dialing sample of U.S. homes. Eight thousand women gave responses to questions regarding various forms of abuse they experienced. Examples include whether a woman's partner tries to provoke arguments, tries to limit the respondent's contact to their friends and family, and whether the partner shouts or swears at her. I used multivariable regressions to analyze how a woman's difference in earnings from her partner and difference in education level affect her likelihood of experiencing intimate partner violence.

I found that women earning more than their partner is an important indicator of intimate partner violence. For every additional $1,000 a woman makes over her partner, she is .08 percent more likely to experience intimate partner violence. This suggests that social and cultural shifts associated with the gender identity of men are necessary to readjust to the progressive nature of women's gender roles. Social institutions should focus on creating new, healthy identities for boys and men. If cultural values can change to reflect a compatible man of today for the woman of today, the rate of intimate partner violence will drop. Less violence will be a reflection of the confident men and women that create contemporary society.

Theoretical Framework
The Fluid Roles of Women Today

Modernization has increased the number of acceptable positions that women can hold in society. Gender equality in social institutions, though not perfect, has vastly improved over the last few decades. In their book *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris outline why postindustrial societies have experienced changes in gender roles. They argue that a revolution in the labor force, improvement in educational opportunities, and changes in the modern family all contribute to the convergence of gender roles (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

Shifts in the labor force have been occurring since World War II (Henslin 2015, 306). The first major change was an increase in female labor-force life cycle. This

means women keep their jobs much longer than they did in the past, even after they have children. The number of women in the workforce also presented an interesting trend: it grew 2.6 percent annually between 1950 and 2000 (Toossi 2005). Although this share is expected to slow in future years, it is projected to continue growing until at least 2050 when women will make up approximately 48 percent of the workforce (Toossi 2005). A final labor force shift is the increase in female employment to previously male-dominated jobs (Henslin 2015, 306). This has occurred mainly because of educational opportunities granted to women.

Fifty-seven percent of bachelor's degrees and 60 percent of master's degrees are earned by women (United States Census Bureau 2013). Women today do not shy away from taking math, science, and business courses in high school, and many have switched from traditionally female majors, such as childhood development and elementary education, to previously male-dominated majors, such as finance and health care (Henslin 2015, 307). These trends have changed the dynamics of family life. As women gain higher qualifications in school they also aspire to a life outside of the household.

One of the most significant changes in the modern family is that most women expect to have greater economic responsibility in their families than in the past. Along with this trend, fathers are increasingly contributing to childcare and housework duties (Pignataro 2014, 259). With both heads of the household assuming balanced responsibilities, women are better equipped to maintain employment outside the home. The stay-at-home expectation for mothers in committed relationships is dwindling. Women who are married or in a committed relationship and are in the labor force have created a transition from male dominated single-earning homes to dual-earning homes. These changes are positive harbingers for gender equality on the women's side of the issue. However, change in one area of life often signals change in another.

The Less Fluid Position of Men

Many men are comfortable with the cultural shifts occurring within society. However, most social change has permitted progression for women but left men's roles undefined. The traditional family values that once dictated gender roles particularly strains men as they struggle to find a new identity in society. There are new stereotypes about the women who "do it all" but no name for the men whose positions have also changed, usually toward more time spent with family and shared responsibilities in the home. A major roadblock to liberation in men's roles is the "personal and societal pressure . . . to prove their masculinity" (Coontz 2013). This leads to the question of masculinity and how prevailing stereotypes about manhood apply to societal changes.

Traditional Masculinity is Today's Masculinity

The social construction of the male identity is complex. Unlike women, who allow nature to determine entrance into womanhood, men often feel they must prove

their worthiness to enter the realm of manhood. In their paper "Precarious Manhood," Vandello, Bosson, Cohen, Burnaford and Weaver find that manhood status is not easily gained, and it is easy to lose even after it has been achieved. Rather than receiving the encouragement and empowerment that women are increasingly granted in their new societal roles, men are still expected to be macho men's men and not part-time homemakers. This is a conclusion that Victor Seidler reaches in his book *Unreasonable Men: Masculinity and Social Theory*. He argues that the "fear of the loss of identity along with the loss of power" urges many men to "hold themselves together through public presentations of boldness and strength" (Seidler 1994). Society maintains the rigid necessity for men to prove their manhood—it is something earned, not gained through age (Vandello et. al 2008, Pleck 1981).

The sociologist Charles Cooley developed the concept of the "looking glass self," which posits that a person's sense of self depends on how that person believes others view them (Cooley 1922). Applying this theory to masculinity, we could say that a man's sense of masculinity is based on how he believes others think about his masculinity as opposed to how others actually do think about him. This means that men who believe others see them as weak or not manly enough are insecure in their masculinity. Some men feel their manhood is in question when they do not fit certain gender stereotypes. For example, the hyper-masculine man is considered aggressive, independent, unemotional, and competitive. He has many romantic relationships, is skilled in business, and is ambitious (Franklin 1984, 5). Masculinity is also tied to respect. In their research on masculine gender roles Santana, Raj, Decker, La Marche, and Silverman found that 76 percent of their sample, college-aged young men, agreed with the statement: "It is essential for a man to get respect from others," and 83 percent agreed with the statement: "A man always deserves the respect of his wife and children" (Santana et.al 2006). The expectations of men in this group were that they personally be physically tough and not "act like a woman."

Part of acting "like a man," in the traditional sense, means that the male partner is either the sole or primary income earner of the household. Stefan Liebig, Carsten Sauer, and Jurgen Schupp authored a paper titled "The Justice of Earnings in Dual-earner Households," in which they find that if a female partner contributes more than 50 percent of the household income, the male partner feels there is higher injustice in his own income. This is because the justice in their personal income is measured against men's ability to conform to traditional gender roles (Liebig, Sauer, and Schupp 2012). The threat posed to an insecure man earning less than his female partner can necessitate action to rebalance power in his relationship.

In her study of gender roles, Mirra Komarovsky found that a strong norm persists that husbands should have a superior position occupationally and a higher level of education. Her study also suggests that equality of achievement is still unsatisfactory for traditional males; they need to know they rank above their female partner (Komarovsky 1973, 881). This type of man often uses his role in the family to empha-

size his masculine identity (Atkinson 2005), meaning the man is the breadwinner, the disciplinarian, and the head of the household.

Self-perception of masculinity is so important that some men who feel their masculinity is threatened are compelled to demonstrate their manhood through action. They must prove that they do not have stereotypically feminine tendencies and characteristics, such as being passive, compassionate, or weak (Franklin 1984, 4). In this sense, manhood is considered to be fragile. Recent studies have suggested a phenomenon termed "insecure" or "precarious" masculinity to describe the need to demonstrate manliness.

Researchers predict that manhood is most readily proved through physical aggression (Bosson, Vandello, Burnaford, Weaver, and Wasti 2009). Men often employ aggression as a face-saving technique to restore a positive impression of masculinity (Archer 1994) or as a way of averting threats to a man's honor (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, and Schwarz 1996). Sports, fighting, and forms of abuse can be used to prove that a man is dominant.

Dominance in the Home

Abuse is about gaining power and control over another person, and that person is usually a member of the perpetrator's household. While anybody can be a victim of intimate partner violence, most victims are women (domesticviolence.org 2016, Caralis and Musialowski 1997) and its prevalence is widespread (Garcia et al. 2006).

Men engage in abusive behaviors for a number of reasons; one theory is that men feel the need to reclaim their masculinity. By showing an intimate partner who is "boss," some men feel they have proved their masculinity through their ability to control someone close to them. A man with traditional gender role ideologies is more likely to use intimate partner violence (Santana et. al 2006), and this may be especially true if he does not provide enough or any economic support for his family (Atkinson 2005).

Regaining a sense of honor in the face of perceived shame is the goal of insecure intimate violence perpetrators. In the case of income discrepancy, the shame comes from feeling less than the partner, and violence serves to correct that imbalance. If a man is under-employed or un-employed while his wife works, his dependency on her paycheck is viewed as a humiliating reminder of his own shortcomings. Karen Pyke described marriages with a working woman as suffering "a scarce economy of gratitude because of the husband's sense of failure stemming from his chronic unemployment, low pay, low occupational status, a menial job, and/or sense that he is working below his potential" (1994, 77). In his book the *Abusive Personality*, Donald Dutton found that abusive men are easily threatened, jealous, and fearful (Dutton 2007). This means that a man who already has an abusive personality is more likely to be triggered by his partner earning more than himself.

Hypothesis

I propose that the employment of a female partner can have an emasculating effect on men that causes them to be insecure. Female employment, particularly

when the female's salary is greater than her male partner, results in a higher likelihood of intimate partner violence (Belen, Vives, Otero, Muntaner 2015). Challenging a man's manhood compels him to demonstrate his power and control through action (Eisler and Skidmore 1987, Pleck 1981); in this instance, through intimate partner violence.

Data

This sample is drawn from the 1996 Violence and Threats of Violence against Women and Men in the United States survey. The survey was designed by the Center for Policy Research and performed by interviewers at Schulman, Ronca, Bucuvalas Inc. This data source was chosen for being the most comprehensive study on violence against women available. The survey was specifically created to better understand patterns of violence against women, especially regarding intimate partner violence and rape. It is a good representation of the U.S. female population and had a 72.1 percent participation rate with a 97 percent completion rate.

The survey was conducted in either English or Spanish, depending on the respondent's preference, from November 1995 to May 1996. The subject pool included 8,000 women eighteen years and older in the United States. Respondents were chosen through a random digit dialing of telephone households. Nonresidential and nonworking numbers were screened out of the sample. When more than one eligible respondent was within a household, the person with the most recent birthday was selected to participate in the survey.

Participants were asked a series of questions regarding violence, rape, and stalking they experienced throughout their lifetime. For this paper, I use demographic data and data regarding intimate partner violence with a current partner. (see Appendix for exact wording of survey questions and response options.)

Data Limitations

There are a number of obstacles in using this dataset. Predominantly, respondents were not overtly asked whether they had been physically abused by their current partner. This is perplexing, as other sections of the survey ask whether the respondent was ever "pushed, slapped, or hit" by an adult during their childhood or by a stranger in adulthood. Unfortunately, no comparable question was asked during the intimate partner violence section. Regardless of this oversight, there are enough alternative indicators for intimate partner violence that this missing information will not impair the analysis.

Another shortcoming of this dataset is that the study relies on data describing working women, but there are likely fewer participants who work outside the home due to the survey's design. Women who work are less likely to be home to answer the phone. It is also unknown whether the women's partners are male or female and heterosexual relationships may be generalized when same-sex relationships are represented in the data.

Finally, the age of the datatset limits the validity of applying these findings to today's world as general culture is increasingly progressive and accepting of women's heightened roles in society. Despite this, I believe the essential nature of home life has not changed in the last twenty years, and this data is adequate for the purposes of the study.

Methods

I performed two multivariable analyses to determine the relationship between women having a more prestigious position than men and intimate partner violence. For the first analysis, I regressed the indicators for intimate partner violence on the difference in the men's and women's incomes. The second analysis regressed the indicators for intimate partner violence on the difference in education. Income and employment are good signals of societal prestige, which places value on money, education, and occupational status. By using the difference between the men's and women's levels of prestige as my independent variables, we can observe how a woman's higher position in society makes the man more prone to engage in intimate partner violence.

To perform the first regression, I subtracted the partner's earnings from the respondent's. This reduced the number of observations available for analysis due to missing data. I ended up using 3,627 observations. Response options about income offered amounts in ranges rather than specific numbers. Therefore, to examine the difference between men's and women's incomes, I averaged the highest and lowest number in each range. Although this weakens the precision in analyzing the results, general trends should still hold.

Indicators for intimate partner violence were chosen from yes/no questions asked about the respondent's partner, because they suggest a pattern of power and control within the relationship.

Table 1: Questions Used as Intimate Partner Violence Indicators

I would like to read you some statements that some women have used to describe their husbands/partners. Thinking about your current husband/partner would you say he . . .

1	Shouts or swears at you?
2	Frightens you?
3	Prevents you from knowing about or having access to the family income even when you ask?
4	Prevents you from working outside the home?
5	Is jealous or possessive?
6	Tries to provoke arguments?
7	Tries to limit your contact with family or friends?
8	Insists on knowing who you are with at all times?
9	Calls you names or puts you down in front of others?
10	Makes you feel inadequate?

If any one of these questions were answered positively, I consider that person to have experienced intimate partner violence. The control variable "abused as a child" was similarly constructed. See Table 4 in the appendix for further reference.

The Center for Disease Control (CDC) lists four types of intimate partner violence: physical, sexual, stalking, and psychological. Any of these four is considered part of the consistent definition the CDC maintains as intimate partner violence (CDC 2016). Due to the nature of the questions asked on this survey, intimate partner violence is measured through the experience of psychological aggression. Behaviors that fall under this category include jealous and controlling behaviors, as well as threats, intimidation, forced isolation, and verbal attacks (Pittman 2012). Psychological abuse may be considered "violent" despite leaving no physical mark of damage in the same way that one can do editorial violence to a text—an act of distortion or unjustified alteration has occurred. Similarly, those experiencing psychological violence suffer from distortions of reality and an alteration of thinking. In their research on the psychological effects of partner abuse, Denise Hines and Kathleen Malley-Morrison found that partners who have been psychologically abused have higher rates of PTSD and are more likely to become dependent on drugs and alcohol (Hines and Malley-Morrison 2001). Thus, I feel comfortable including psychological abuse under the umbrella term "intimate partner violence."

Table 2: Education Level Numerical Assignments
What is the highest level of education you have completed?

No School	0
1st-8th grade	1
Some high school	2
HS graduate	3
Some college	4
4 year college degree	5
Post graduate	6

I performed the second regression by assigning each categorical level of education a value between 0 through 6 for each member in a partnership as seen above. The male partner's number was then subtracted from the female partner's number. This difference in educations was then regressed on the presence of intimate partner violence and the other control variables.

Ideally, educational difference would be in number of years of schooling rather than the difference between assigned categories. The main concern is that each level does not correspond to an equal jump in number of years in school. Going from one to two, there could be a ten-year difference or a one-year difference. However, considering the restrictions of this dataset, this is the most effective method for the regression. I believe the analysis will present at least a crude idea of the relationship between the difference in education and experiencing intimate partner violence.

Results

Findings Model 1: Difference in Income

The results seen on Table 3 show there is a positive relationship between a woman out-earning her partner and experiencing intimate partner violence. For every additional $1,000 a woman makes over her partner, she is 0.08 percent more likely to be a victim of abuse. Considering more women attain higher education, thereby leading them to better occupational positions, this finding is significant. With better positions, they are likely to make more money than their partners who may have more unstable positions due to lower qualifications.

To put this into perspective, consider two women, a primary care worker and a lawyer. If both of their husbands are unemployed, the lawyer is 7.5 percent more likely to experience intimate partner violence based on the median incomes for each profession.

Table 3: OLS Regression Results for IPV on Income and Educational Differences

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value
Income Difference	8.12e-07	0.010*	--	--
Education Difference	--	--	8.66e-05	0.322
Number of years married	-0.0004	0.003*	-0.0004	0.003*
Experience abuse as a child	0.1761	0.000*	0.1751	0.000*
Married	0.3029	0.044*	0.3094	0.125
Divorced	-0.0314	0.561	-0.0263	0.855
Widowed	-0.056	0.672	-0.0534	0.777
Separated	-0.0039	0.977	--	--
Common Law Marriage	0.5228	0.005*	0.5248	0.023*

Findings Model 2: Difference in Education

I did not find a significant relationship between the difference in education and intimate partner violence. This may be because the level of education is a more ambiguous means of determining social standing. It has also been suggested that being well educated is seen as less masculine or less necessary for men, as they still require fewer qualifications than women for equal positions (Henslin 2015, 309). The method used to determine the difference in education was also crude and possibly impaired gaining real results from the data. Different results might be attained if the difference between the numbers of years of education is used rather than the levels of education.

Other Variables

Also significant in this data is whether subjects experienced abuse as a child. This is not surprising, as the cycle of abuse traps individuals into patterns of either victimization or perpetration. It is the most significant indicator for experiencing abuse as an adult. This analysis indicates that if you experienced abuse as a child there is a 17.8 percent chance that you will be abused as an adult by your intimate partner. I

suspect this number would be even higher if my analysis were expanded to include previous marriages and cohabitation partners.

Both marriage status and the number of years spent as a married couple are significant as well, with the likelihood of abuse rising over time. This demonstrates that abuse is more common when a relationship is established, and it is more difficult for one of the partners to leave.

Demographic variables were also controlled for but none were significant. This is not surprising, as despite popular stereotypes, intimate partner violence permeates all races, socioeconomic backgrounds, and employment statuses.

Discussion and Conclusion
Men's Turn for Change

One in four women will experience intimate partner violence in her lifetime. This is a tragedy in itself, but more concerning is the fact that changes in women's social position may cause the amount of intimate partner violence to increase. The annual growth rate of women in the labor force is 2.6 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012). My findings suggest that the more money a woman earns over her partner, the more likely she is to experience intimate partner violence. As women increasingly earn higher wages and occupy more prestigious positions in society, adjustments must be made to fit the new dynamics of relationships. Specifically, social and cultural shifts associated with the gender identity of men are necessary to keep up with the progressive nature of women's gender roles.

Studies show that men who are less concerned with masculinity are happier (Coontz 2013). Men who share responsibilities with housework and childcare are much less likely to get a divorce and are more likely to feel socially connected (Sigle-Rushton 2010). Coincidentally, this allows men to feel more confident and more secure in their identity. This identity may be a father, housekeeper, husband, or simply a man.

It took time for women to reach the position they are in today, where women's value outside of the home is recognized. The transformation to complete equality is still far away. Men are on the path to equality as well, where their value inside the home will be recognized—by men themselves. Breaking down masculine stereotypes is difficult but definitely possible. Opportunities opened up for women as they gained educational rights and lost feminine expectations. Perhaps a similar method might help men lose masculine expectations. Destigmatizing boys' involvement in emotionally expressive activities such as art, choir, and drama classes presents one possibility. Boys who engage in such activities actually become more engaged in school and are encouraged to attend college (Coontz 2013). This could help reverse the growing gender disparity in men's and women's college enrollment and keep men mindful of their emotional needs.

Over time, cultural values will change to reflect a compatible man of today for the woman of today. As this change comes, I am hopeful that the rate of intimate partner violence will drop.

Suggestions for Further Research

Future research should further investigate how differences in prestige trigger insecure masculinity and affect intimate partner violence. A numerical value, rather than categorical information, should be gathered on the educational attainment of men and women in couples. An analysis using more precise numbers would provide interesting findings. I also think it would be useful to look at employment status (full-time, part-time, searching for job, unemployed, etc.) and how it can affect intimate partner violence. These future analyses should use the most recent data gathered from the 2015 Violence and Threats of Violence against Women and Men in the United States survey.

APPENDIX

Table 4: Intimate Partner Violence Indicators
Thinking about your current husband / partner would you say he . . .

1	Shouts or swears at you?
2	Frightens you?
3	Prevents you from access to knowing about or having access to family income?
4	Prevents you from working outside the home?
5	Is jealous or possessive?
6	Tries to provoke arguments?
7	Tries to limit your contact with family and friends?
8	Insists on knowing who you are with at all times?
9	Calls you names in front of others?
10	Makes you feel inadequate?

Survey Questions Included in Regression Analysis

How old are you?
    Range of 1–96
How many children under 18 years of age live in this household?
    Range of 0–97

Including income from all sources, such as work, child support, AFDC, how much income did you personally receive in 1995 before taxes? Stop me when I get to the category that applies. Was it
    Less than $5,000?
    $5,000 to $10,000?
    $10,000 to $15,000?
    $15,000 to $20,000?
    $20,000 to $25,000?
    $25,000 to $35,000?
    $35,000 to $50,000?
    $50,000 to $80,000?
    $80,000 to $100,000?
    Over $100,000?
    Don't know
    Refused / Missing

Are you currently
    Employed full-time?
    Employed part-time?
    In the military?
    Unemployed and looking for work?
    Retired and not working?
    A student?
    A homemaker?
    Something else?
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

What is the highest level of education you have completed?
    No schooling
    1st–8th grade
    Some high school
    High school graduate
    Some college
    4-Year College degree
    Postgraduate
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Which of the following categories best describes your racial background?
    White?
    Black or African-American?
    Asian or Pacific Islander?
    American Indian or Alaskan Native?
    Mixed race?
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Are you of Hispanic origin?
    Yes
    No
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Now I'd like to ask you some questions about your current and past relationships.

Are you currently
    Married?
    Common-law relationship
    Divorced
    Separated
    Widowed
    Single and never married
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Is he/she (spouse) of Hispanic origin?
    Yes
    No

Don't know

Refused/Missing

Including income from all sources, how much income did your current husband/partner personally receive in 1995 before taxes? Please stop me when I get to the right category. Was it

Less than $5,000?

$5,000 to $10,000?

$10,000 to $15,000?

$15,000 to $20,000?

$20,000 to $25,000?

$25,000 to $35,000?

$35,000 to $50,000?

$50,000 to $80,000?

$80,000 to $100,000?

Over $100,000?

Don't know

Refused/Missing

Answered Only if Resopondent is Married

How long have you been married?

Range is 0–97

How old is he?

Range is 1–97

How would you describe your husband/partner's current employment situation? Is he

Employed full-time?

Employed part-time?

In the military?

Unemployed and looking for work?

Retired and not working?

A student?

A homemaker?

Something else?

Don't know

Refused/Missing

What is the highest level of education he had completed?

No schooling

1st–8th grade

Some high school

High school graduate

Some college

4-Year College degree

Postgraduate

Don't know

Refused/Missing

Which of the following categories best describes his/her racial background?
    White?
    Black or African-American?
    Asian or Pacific Islander?
    American Indian or Alaskan Native?
    Mixed race?
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

I would like to read you some statements that some women have used to describe their husbands/partners. Thinking about your current husband/ partner would you say he

Shouts or swears at you?
    Yes
    No
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Frightens you?
    Yes
    No
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Prevents you from knowing about or having access to the family income even when you ask?
    Yes
    No
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Prevents you from working outside the home?
    Yes
    No
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Is jealous or possessive?
    Yes
    No
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Tries to provoke arguments?
    Yes
    No
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Tries to limit your contact with family or friends?
    Yes
    No
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Insists on knowing who you are with at all times?
    Yes
    No
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Calls you names or puts you down in front of others?
    Yes
    No
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Makes you feel inadequate?
    Yes
    No
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Now I'm going to ask you some questions about physical violence you may have experienced as a child. Aside from any incidents already mentioned, when you were a child did any parent, step-parent or guardian ever

Throw something at you that could hurt you?
    Yes
    No
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Push, grab or shove you?
    Yes
    No
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Choke or attempt to drown you?
    Yes
    No
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Hit you with some object?
    Yes
    No
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Beat you up?
    Yes
    No
    Don't know
    Refused/Missing

Threaten you with a gun?
    Yes
    No

Don't know

Refused/Missing

Threaten you with a knife or other weapon besides a gun?

Yes

No

Don't know

Refused/Missing

Use a gun on you?

Yes

No

Don't know

Refused/Missing

Use a knife or other weapon on you besides a gun?

Yes

No

Don't know

Refused/Missing

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Trade Openness and Child Labor in Sub-Saharan Africa

Lexie Prier

Introduction

In many impoverished countries, children face dangerous, difficult, or exploitative work conditions. Child labor can deny children their basic needs, be harmful to their health, or stand in the way of their education and childhood. UNICEF estimates 246 million children are engaged in child labor worldwide, with nearly 70 percent working in hazardous conditions (UNICEF). The worst forms of child labor include slavery, drug trafficking, use in armed conflict, prostitution, pornography, or any work that "is likely to harm the health, safety, or morals of children" (ILO 1999).

Child labor is especially prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, the region with the highest incidence of child labor. In the region, more than one in five children is engaged in child labor, and 10.4 percent of children are engaged in hazardous work (Desilver 2013). While child labor is declining throughout the world, sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing the slowest and least consistent improvements (ILO 2009). This is likely due to the region's poverty and inconsistent economic growth. Since 1990, sub-Saharan Africa has made the least progress toward reducing extreme poverty among all developing regions (Simmons 2009). Around 41 percent of the people in sub-Saharan Africa are living on less than $1.25 a day, a percentage more than twice as high as any other region (Ibid.). The region also lags behind in health indicators, primary education enrollment, and GDP per capita (Ibid.). Rim Salah of UNICEF calls poverty "a major and ubiquitous causal factor" contributing to child labor rates in sub-Saharan Africa (2001).

Increasing trade openness is a potential way to reduce poverty and decrease child labor in sub-Saharan Africa by stimulating economic growth. Generally, scholars agree that a country's trade openness influences child labor rates, though the direction of the relationship is debated. Trade openness may incite developing countries to

keep labor costs low, which may lead to more child labor (Palley 2002; Collingsworth, Goold, and Harvey 1994). On the other hand, greater trade openness may stimulate development and reduce poverty, eliminating the need for child labor (Shelbourne 2001; Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005; Neumayer and de Soysa 2005).

In this paper, I explore the reasoning of these conflicting theories on trade and child labor and provide empirical evidence on the issue in sub-Saharan Africa. How does trade openness influence child labor in sub-Saharan Africa? In an analysis of thirty-eight sub-Saharan African countries, I find a statistically significant and negative correlation between child labor rates and trade openness. This suggests child labor may decrease in countries pursuing more open trade policies. Through this analysis, I provide insight concerning the relationship between trade and the wellbeing of children in regions like sub-Saharan Africa where child labor is especially widespread.

Review of Existing Literature

Scholars have given child labor substantial theoretical attention. The ILO explains, "One of the primary reasons why policy-makers worry about child labor is the knowledge that its consequences can extend well beyond childhood" (2013, 27). Child labor can hurt educational achievement, decrease future earnings, and increase the likelihood of wage work as a young adult (Heady 2003; Gunnarsson, Orazem, and Sanchez 2006; Emerson and Souza 2003; Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti 2009).

Case studies and quantitative work indicate poverty is the main factor pushing parents to send children prematurely into the workforce (Blunch and Verner 2000; Ray and Lancaster 2003). Child labor is often a desperate attempt to supplement a family's income in order to survive (Grootaert and Kanbur 1995). Poverty may also limit children's educational prospects and push them into the workforce for lack of better opportunity (Canagarajah and Coulombe 1997).

Maconachie and Hilson specifically study child miners in small-scale mining communities in Sierra Leone (2016). Through qualitative analysis of fieldwork in a gold-extracting Kono village, they determine that child participation in the rural economies of Sierra Leone generates needed household income and allows children to earn money needed for school attendance. One interviewed child explains the role of poverty in their decision to work in a gold mine:

> Life is very hard here. My father was a carpenter, but he can't work because he injured himself. My sisters are too small to come to the mine. We do not have a farm so the money I earn with my mother mining gold is important for the family. My father doesn't like us being here, but without the income from mining, life would be very difficult. It is my duty to help the family (143).

A twelve-year-old girl explains how gold mining is necessary for her education:

> If I am not able to learn, I will not be able to get a job and I will suffer. Gold mining is paying for my school. I want to be a nurse, and mining is providing me with the means of getting an education and pursuing a better life (143).

Basu and Van describe child leisure or nonwork as a luxury good: "A poor household cannot afford to consume this good but it does so as soon as the household income rises sufficiently" (1998, 415). Throughout child labor literature, poverty persists as a fundamental factor forcing children into exploitative or difficult work environments. Even in cases where parents view child leisure as ideal, poverty can lead to desperate situations and a struggle for survival where the benefits of child labor outweigh the costs.

Though poverty may be the main determinant of child labor, trade openness on the national level may influence poverty and parents' incentives to send their children to work. As previously mentioned, the direction of the relationship between trade openness and child labor is debated and scholars offer theoretical explanations on both sides.

Skeptics of trade argue that such practices lead to a "race to the bottom," where child labor standards deteriorate as developing countries face competitive pressure to keep wages low (Palley 2002). Foreign investors are drawn to markets with large supplies of cheap, unskilled labor. Developing countries may include more children in their labor market as they increase their trade to keep their unskilled labor comparative advantage (Collingsworth, Goold, and Harvey 1994).

Though there remain many trade skeptics, most of the empirical evidence on the subject points to a negative relationship between trade openness and child labor (Shelbourne 2001; Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005). Edmonds and Pavcnik find in a cross-country analysis that countries trading more have less child labor (2004). Similarly, Neumayer and de Soysa find that countries with more trade openness or that have a higher stock of foreign direct investment have a lower incidence of child labor (2005, 43). Cigno et al. also use cross-country data to find that trade reduces child labor and argue that countries with a largely uneducated workforce should seek for more opportunities to participate in globalization (2002). This empirical evidence leads to a theory contrasting that of the "race to the bottom." Trade has the ability to reduce poverty by jumpstarting economic growth, creating jobs, reducing prices, and helping countries create new technologies (The Center for Global Development). These positive consequences of trade may improve families' quality of life and annual income, potentially eliminating the need or temptation to send their children to work.

Although most current evidence finds trade reduces child labor, my research will further resolve the theoretical debate surrounding this issue. Moreover, most of the empirical studies done in this area are over ten years old. Trade as a share of GDP has increased from 60.53 percent in 2005 to 62.19 percent in 2013 among the least developed countries (Ortiz-Ospina and Roser 2016). These changes in trade levels may introduce new and interesting results. Further, changes over the past decade in technology, economic growth, and globalization make updated analysis necessary for understanding child labor trends. My current analysis utilizing newer trade data will contribute significantly to the outdated literature in the area.

My focus on sub-Saharan Africa provides a unique perspective on trade and child labor. Most of the research on this relationship is done at a global level. As previously discussed, sub-Saharan Africa has the highest incidence of child labor in the world. A specific study of the sub-Saharan Africa region will generate new knowledge about how these factors are working in areas where child labor is especially prevalent.

Hypothesis: Trade Openness Decreases Child Labor in Sub-Saharan Africa

In line with the theory and evidence provided by previous empirical research in this area, I expect trade openness will lead to less child labor in my specific study of sub-Saharan African countries. Trade is necessary for economic development, as it allows for labor specialization in areas where a country has comparative advantage. This leads to greater productivity and a more efficient allocation of resources. As a result, freer trade generates jobs, encourages competition, and stimulates overall economic development and growth in the long run. I expect these growth benefits will trickle down to families in sub-Saharan Africa, increasing adult incomes and minimizing poverty. Thus, I expect that trade openness will decrease child labor and that this effect will largely come because of the effect trade openness has on GDP per capita.

Methods and Findings

Data

Not all child workers are engaged in work that is harmful to them. In many communities in sub-Saharan Africa, children participate in non-exploitative forms of work as an important part of the family and community structure. Keilland and Tovo explain, "[in sub-Saharan Africa,] going to farm is evoked with a mix of pain and longing . . . [and] is a joint struggle for survival, giving a strong feeling of belonging and strengthening group solidarity . . . in some places . . . [it] is a lifestyle and an important part of what it means to be a family" (2006, 26).

Some work may be considered beneficial and non-exploitative, and as a result, choosing a clear definition of child labor is important for my analysis. UNICEF uses the term "child laborer" to specifically refer to children working at too young an age or involved in hazardous activities that may compromise their physical, mental, social, or educational development (UNICEF 2016). For my quantitative analysis, I use a dataset compiled by UNICEF reporting the percentage of children aged five to fourteen engaged in child labor by country. UNICEF's standard indicator for child labor includes children aged five to eleven engaged in at least one hour of economic work or twenty-eight hours of unpaid household services per week and children aged twelve to fourteen engaged in at least fourteen hours of economic work or twenty-eight hours of unpaid household services per week (Ibid.).

The UNICEF child labor dataset is composed of several national survey results, including the UNICEF-supported Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) and the ILO-supported Statistical Information and Monitoring Programme on Child Labour (SIMPOC) surveys. Also utilized are some self-reported national labor statistics by

countries that include child labor estimates. This dataset was the most comprehensive and applicable source available for this paper. However, it is limited in some ways that may influence the statistical analysis. Because the data comes from multiple sources with slight variances in measures of child labor, some of the estimates may not be perfectly comparable. The data also reports only the most recent survey results on child labor, so estimates between countries range from 2004 to 2015. This also makes statistical comparisons more difficult. Despite these imperfections, I believe this dataset is the best available measure of child labor rates across sub-Saharan Africa and possible influences on statistical analysis results will be minimal.

As a measure of trade openness, I use World Bank data reporting each country's sum of imports and exports as a percent of GDP. Because this data reports the sum, rather than difference, of imports and exports, this percentage has the potential to exceed 100 percent. I calculated this variable as an average of the five years before the child labor rate was reported in the UNICEF data. For example, in Nigeria the child labor rate in the UNICEF data comes from a 2011 survey, so the trade openness variable for Nigeria represents an average of the trade openness reported from 2007 to 2011. I believe this method will help minimize the issue of variance in child labor report dates.

In addition to my main independent and dependent variable, I compiled World Bank data on several control variables for use in my analysis. These include economic factors such as GDP per capita, urban population as a percent of total population, annual percent GDP growth, and unemployment. I calculated each of these variables as an average of the five years before the child labor rate report to better observe how trade openness influences child labor. I also gathered data on education factors including the duration of each country's compulsory education (number of years that children are legally obliged to attend school) and school enrollment. Due to limited data, I only use the value of these variables from the year of each country's child labor rate report. Based on the previous work done in this area and my theoretical framework, I believe all of these socioeconomic variables likely have some influence over child labor rates in the region. Controlling for these variables limits the variation within my sample of sub-Saharan African countries and better isolates the relationship between trade openness and child labor.

Summary Statistics

My analysis covers thirty-eight sub-Saharan African countries. Table 1 and Graphs 1 and 2 report summary statistics for child labor and trade openness within the sample and illustrate the spread of the data. Table 1 also highlights the severity of child labor and the extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. The sample child labor mean of 24.58 percent of children engaged in child labor is remarkably larger than ILO estimates for other regions (9.3 percent in Asia and the Pacific, 8.8 percent in Latin America, and 8.4 percent in the Middle East and North Africa). The average GDP per capita within the sample is $1,250 compared to estimates of $9,337.19 in East Asia and the Pacific, $8,370.71 in Latin America, and $7,342.26 in the Middle East and North

Africa (World Bank 2016a). This sample mean is shocking compared to the United States' estimated GDP per capita of $55,836.80 (Ibid.). These summary statistics are important in understanding the breadth and magnitude of child labor and poverty in this region. Among both developed and developing regions, the sub-Saharan African countries within this sample experience, on average, some of the highest incidences of child labor and the lowest GDP per capita.

Graph 3 is a scatter plot depicting the correlation of child labor rates and trade openness in my sample. Though the scatter plot presents no definite correlation, there is a slight negative pattern in the data that may indicate a significant relationship once other factors are controlled. This visual also reveals possible outliers within the data. Both Equatorial Guinea and Liberia have unusually high trade openness averages within the

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Main Variables, Generated in Stata

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Child Labor (percent)	38	24.58	9.88	5	47
Trade Openness (percent)	37	90.37	72.16	27.64	436.57
GDP per capita (US$)	38	1250.42	1796.078	167.7367	10002.34
Trade Openness	37	90.3734	72.15896	27.63893	436.5723

### Graph 1: Distribution of Child Labor Rates in Sample, Generated in Stata

Graph 2: Distribution of Trade Openness in Sample, Generated in Stata

Graph 3: Child Labor Rates Compared to
Trade Openness in Sample, Generated in Stata

Relationship Between Child Labor Rates and Trade Openness in Sub-Saharan African Countries

sample. Equatorial Guinea has an average of 436.57 percent while Liberia has an aver-
age of 244.26 percent. Though they do not follow the typical trend, I chose not to remove
these countries, because I did not have strong theoretical justification to do so.

Similarly, Graph 4 plots the GDP per capita and trade openness of each country
in the dataset. This graph gives no visible relationship between these factors. Once
again, Equatorial Guinea and Liberia stand out as potential outliers that I have chosen
to still include in the further analysis. The lack of trend in the plotted points indi-
cates there is likely not a significant correlation between GDP per capita and trade
openness. However, statistical analysis controlling for other factors in the following
subsections will give more specific estimates of the relationships between child labor,
GDP per capita, and trade openness depicted in Graphs 3 and 4.

Graph 4: GDP Per Capita Compared to Trade Openness in Sample, Generated in *Stata*

Relationship Between GDP per capita and Trade Openness in Sub-Saharan Africa

Child Labor and Trade Openness

Using an OLS regression model and mediation analysis, I tested my hypoth-
esis regarding child labor and trade openness in sub-Saharan Africa. My mediation
analysis seeks to show that trade openness raises GDP, and a higher GDP in turn
decreases child labor. Table 2 reports my findings. Model 2 compares trade openness
to child labor and is the main model I use to test my hypotheses. Model 2 controls for
economic factors likely working in the relationship between trade openness and child
labor—GDP per capita, urban population, and GDP growth. Model 3 includes more

controls on education and unemployment, but the data for these variables is limited and incomplete. I chose to focus my analysis on Model 2, because the data is more comprehensive and better suited for drawing conclusions.

The regression output for Model 2 indicates that with every 50 percent increase in trade openness, child labor decreases by 2.6 percent. This correlation is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Considering the spread of the trade openness data for the sample shown in Table 1 and Graph 2, a 50 percent increase in trade openness is appropriate for this interpretation.

Table 2: Regression Results Comparing Child Labor Rates to Trade Openness

VARIABLES	(1) Child Labor (percent)	(2) Child Labor (percent)	(3) Child Labor (percent)
Trade openness	-0.0177	-0.0529**	-0.0473
(percent)	(0.0205)	(0.0251)	(0.145)
GDP per capita		-0.00200	-0.00539**
		(0.00130)	(0.00185)
Urban population		-0.0442	0.163
		(0.144)	(0.239)
GDP growth		0.425**	0.433
		(0.165)	(0.922)
Compulsory school-ing age (years)			-0.247
			(1.813)
Unemployment (percent)			-0.296
			(0.423)
Enrollment (percent)			0.0231
			(0.110)
Constant	26.11***	30.99***	26.86
	(2.634)	(4.188)	(21.89)
Observations	37	37	19
R-squared	0.016	0.291	0.436

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Trade Openness and GDP Per Capita

Using a second OLS regression model, I tested my second hypothesis regarding the effect of trade openness on GDP per capita. The results are reported in Table 3. Once again, Model 2 is the main model I will use for my interpretations. Contrary to my prediction, Model 2 indicates no significant relationship between GDP per capita and trade openness. Furthermore, the estimates in Model 1 and Model 3 offer mixed results for the direction of the relationship and neither is statistically significant. Overall, Table 2 indicates that there is not a statistically significant relationship between trade openness and GDP per capita within the sample.

Table 3: Regression Results Comparing GDP Per Capita to Trade Openness

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Trade Openness	Trade Openness	Trade Openness
	(percent)	(percent)	(percent)
GDP per capita	.001	-.001	-.001
	(.0026)	(.006)	(.005)
Urban population		.625	-.375
		(.664)	(.3766)
GDP growth		5.820	-1.546
		(1.086)	(1.572)
Compulsory schooling age (years)			3.039
			(3.112)
Unemployment (percent)			2.643
			(.729)
Enrollment (percent)			.329
			(.300)
Constant	88.746	31.730	14.672
	(13.901)	(21.783)	(55.671)
Observations	37	37	19
R-squared	0.001	0.397	0.418

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Discussion of Statistical Results

My mediation analysis of sub-Saharan Africa reveals interesting relationships and offers mixed results. While trade openness is associated with decreases in child labor, mediation analysis does not support that this correlation operates through changes in GDP per capita. Additionally, overall GDP growth is not significantly correlated with increased GDP per capita. One theoretical explanation for this may be that GDP growth does not trickle down to the individuals within the country, at least in the short run. Thus, barriers preventing impoverished communities from benefiting from increased GDP may also prevent some connections between trade openness, GDP, and child labor. Previous theoretical and quantitative work does show a significant relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction (Kuznets 1955; Roemer and Gugerty 1997). However, my data and analysis is limited in measuring changes in GDP per capita over longer periods of time. If I had the resources to compile more data and better measure changes in each of my variables, my results would be more accurate and possibly in line with the previous theory and research.

According to my estimates, overall GDP growth may actually increase child labor. This unusual result may also be due to my limited ability to measure impact over time. Overall GDP growth may increase child labor in the short run as the benefits of child labor for a family in terms of wages increase as a result of growth. Families may send their children to work during periods of growth in the short-run to take advantage of

the increased returns. However, after a time, families may remove their children from work if the parents' incomes increase enough to securely sustain the family.

These unexpected results and possible theoretical explanations warrant further study. Though I find evidence supporting my initial hypothesis, my mediation analysis fails to link this correlation with GDP. A more comprehensive view of child labor, trade, and GDP over time may lead to more conclusive results.

Conclusions and Limitations

Though my statistical results are limited and do not confirm causation, they do provide insight on the direction and scope of the correlation between these two variables. Furthermore, the true relationship between trade openness and child labor is better isolated because of the included control variables. The estimated decrease in child labor may seem substantively small, but if causation exists, more substantial increases in trade openness could make a large impact decreasing the 59 million child laborers in sub-Saharan Africa (ILO).

My analysis faces several limitations and challenges. Due to missing data on child labor rates for many sub-Saharan African countries, I only study countries where the data is available. This could bias my estimates if the countries with available data are systematically different than those where data is unavailable. Since I did not collect the data myself, I cannot verify the quality of the World Bank's and UNICEF's initial data collection process. However, if there are errors, I expect them to be minimal and inconsequential in my analysis. In terms of my regression analysis, it is also difficult to isolate the relationship between trade openness and child labor due to various factors influencing both variables. However, by including control variables in my analysis, I attempt to minimize these effects. Overall, I believe my quantitative approach still provides strong and interesting evidence regarding the negative relationship between trade openness and child labor in sub-Saharan Africa.

Data collection in this area should continue and improve. Further qualitative work among child workers in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in sectors where produced goods are highly exported from the region, may help connect the dots on the relationship between trade openness and child labor. More comprehensive and standardized quantitative data for child labor rates in the region would also lead to more accurate measures of the relationship between these two factors. Higher quality data may be the key to understanding how trade policy interacts with child labor in sub-Saharan Africa and may lead to effective policy solutions in the future.

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Electoral Competitiveness and Legislative Productivity

Soren J. Schmidt and Matthew B. Young

Background

On 10 October 2016, the two major-party candidates for U.S. Representative of Utah's 4th Congressional district held a publicly televised debate. Incumbent Mia Love represented the Republican Party, and challenger Doug Owens was the Democratic nominee. During that debate, Representative Love made seven references to legislation she had supported during her last term. When asked what she would do to make higher education affordable, for example, her response focused on her legislative accomplishments, repeating twice that "I have introduced three bills to do that" (C-SPAN 2016). Her choice of emphasis reflected her efficient legislative record: In the previous term (her first), Representative Love secured committee consideration for 72 percent of the bills she introduced in the House (Library of Congress 2016).

Just two days later, another debate was held—this time between the two major-party candidates for U.S. Senator from Utah. Republican incumbent Mike Lee faced Misty Snow, the Democratic challenger. Despite having been a member of Congress for four years longer than Representative Love, Senator Lee only referred to two pieces of legislation during the debate. When he was asked about how to make higher education affordable, Senator Lee opted to respond in broader terms, repeating three times the phrase "government should not be in the business of [making money from student loans]" without referring to any specific bills (C-SPAN 2016). The difference in rhetorical strategy also reflected Senator Lee's legislative record: Only 26 percent of the bills he introduced had reached committee hearing during his first term (Library of Congress 2016).

What might account for the difference in legislative records and subsequent rhetorical choices? The incumbents had much in common: Both were freshmen in Con-

gress, represented similar constituencies, belonged to the same party, shared basic ideological views, and were running election at the same time. There is, however, one particularly salient disparity—the competitiveness of the candidates' districts. In 2010, Senator Lee won the general election by a margin of 28.8 percent (New York Times 2010). Representative Love, on the other hand, had edged out her 2014 opponent by only 3.2 percent (New York Times 2014).

Our research indicates that the observed differences between Senator Lee and Representative Love are not isolated incidents but rather a reflection of general patterns in actual legislative productivity. Legislators in competitive districts are overall much more effective at moving bills through the legislative process. We combine public election data with Volden and Wiseman's measures of legislator effectiveness to create a unique panel dataset including each member of the House of Representatives, 1976–2014 (2009). We find that an absence of electoral competition results in a 13 percent drop in overall legislative productivity. This effect is robust across a variety of parameters and applies to all levels of legislator seniority. Furthermore, the difference appears to be almost entirely the result of changes in the production of substantive and significant legislation.

Theoretical Framework
Existing scholarship

Several theories comprise the framework for our research. The first is a mainstay of political science—the electoral connection (Mayhew 1974). If politicians are indeed single-mindedly focused on reelection, we can understand the reasoning behind their choices of how to meet that objective by studying the factors that affect their behavior. Mayhew suggests that advertising, credit claiming, and position taking are the primary methods of achieving the reelection goal (1974). Fenno expands the list of possible goals to also include obtaining legislative power and developing good public policy (1978). Fenno notes, however, that members of Congress consciously develop a "home style"—a strategy for dealing with their constituents to gain their trust—that varies widely by district and elected official (1978). The variations in both constituencies and legislative behavior are essential to our ability to identify relationships between aspects of each. In this paper, we focus specifically on variation in electoral competitiveness and legislative productivity.

The study of the effects of congressional electoral competition on various types of legislator behavior dates back over a half century, beginning with MacRae postulating a causal relationship between competitiveness and representation (1952). The "marginality hypothesis," as it came to be known, posits that competitive districts make legislators more responsive to constituents' preferences in an effort to minimize the risk of losing the next election (Fiorina 1973).

However, recent evidence for the marginality hypothesis has been mixed. Groseclose, modeling elections in which one candidate has a slight valence advantage, found that the advantaged—and more electorally secure—candidate chooses a more moderate position than the disadvantaged one (2001). Similarly, Gulati analyzed a decade of U.S.

Senate roll call votes and concluded that senators in competitive states are actually *less* responsive to the ideological center of their state than are those senators facing little or no competition (2004). One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that elected officials at risk of losing an election are choosing to "mobilize" their partisan supporters rather than "moderating" their own positions. This behavior is most understandable in elections where the strongest challenger is likely to appear in a primary, rather than a general, election (Harbridge and Malhotra 2011).

There has also been significant positive evidence in favor of the marginality hypothesis. For example, Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan note that the more legislators vote along party lines, the lower their vote share, which incentivizes responsiveness among marginal legislators (2002). Griffin's research, which employs both cross-sectional and fixed-effects data of district vote shares and voting patterns across thirty years, confirmed that members of the House of Representatives facing additional electoral pressure do tend to be more responsive to constituent preferences in their roll call votes (2006).

Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding marginality, there is relatively clear documentation of other changes in elected official decision-making due to district competitiveness. Crisp, Kanthak, and Leijonhufvud found that legislators' decisions about which coalitions to form—as measured by bill co-sponsorships—were affected by electoral competition (2004). In their written communications with constituents, electorally safe legislators claim credit for nonparticularized benefits, while their marginal counterparts focused on particularized benefits (Yiannakis 1982). Similarly, and more recently, Grimmer's study of home-style choices noted that marginal representatives emphasize specific appropriations, while safe legislators build their strategy around generalized position taking (2013). These findings lend credence to the broader notion both that legislators alter their behavior in response to the competitiveness of the elections they face and that they consider cultivating an image of productivity to be an important part of that response.

However, legislators have limited time and resources and must make decisions about how to allocate them (Butler, Karpowitz, and Pope 2012). Combined, the electoral connection and the pressures of marginality predict that legislators faced with competition will choose to allocate their time and resources to improve their odds of reelection. The electoral vulnerability felt by legislators should alter not only their rhetoric and communication with constituents but also their actual behavior. In other words, we should observe that legislators in more competitive districts tend to exhibit behaviors that attempt to maximize their vote share. Here we face a theoretical dilemma—it is unclear exactly which behavior legislators choose to focus on. Two basic options are available to legislators seeking reelection: legislative production and constituent service (Oliver, Ha, and Callen 2012).

On the one hand, legislators facing tough competition might intensify their efforts to produce meaningful legislation in order to impress their district. In other

professions, employees facing impending layoffs have an extra incentive to work hard and demonstrate results to their superiors in order to retain their employment (Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton 2013). Members of the House of Representative face potential layoffs—in the form of elections—every two years. If the "job" of legislators is understood to be the advancement of a particular policy agenda, then it follows that those who feel most vulnerable to a challenger might put forth additional effort at proving their competency. There appears to be some evidence for this hypothesis: Provided that they are members of the majority party, marginal members of Congress obtain more spending for their districts (Lazarus 2009).

On the other hand, legislative productivity has an opportunity cost. Another reelection strategy available to legislators is to focus on constituent services (Oliver, Ha, and Callen 2012). Some evidence supports the claim that legislators believe that constituent service is generally the more efficient option for obtaining additional votes in a competitive election (Butler, Karpowitz, and Pope 2012; Carey et al. 2006).

Volden and Wiseman's brief examination of electoral competition and legislative productivity found a quadratic relationship between the two, with productivity low for competitive districts, high for moderately safe districts, and low again for very safe districts (2014). They posit that "at-risk members might devote their efforts to activities other than legislative productivity . . . while somewhat safer members focus their attentions on becoming effective lawmakers. However, members from very safe electoral districts may feel less pressure to advance legislative agendas."

Our Contribution

The objective of our research is to adjudicate between these competing theories of resource allocation. We believe that a predominantly rhetorical analysis of "credit claiming" by elected officials about their lawmaking accomplishments puts the electoral cart before the horse; it necessarily presupposes that the legislators have something for which to claim credit (e.g., Mayhew 1974, Fenno 1978, Grimmer 2013). It is difficult for a legislator to effectively tout productivity as a justification for reelection if that legislator was not in fact productive while in office. In contrast, the more legislative goods that a legislator produces, the greater the opportunity to claim credit and court the favor of the people who ultimately make the electoral difference: political activists, voters, and donors (Stein and Bickers 1994). Consequently, our focus on legislative productivity seeks to test the fundamental assumptions underlying most of the previous work on the subject. Additionally, it allows us to generate much more substantive implications about legislator behavior.

What makes a legislator succeed at lawmaking? The process of lawmaking is a long and difficult one; legislators must formulate and introduce bills, present and defend them before committees, build effective coalitions, and ultimately garner enough votes to enact the law. Discovering what enables a legislator to succeed at each step of the process is crucial to our understanding of government functionality, and a great deal of scholarship has been devoted to its investigation (Volden and Wiseman 2009).

Crain investigates how state institutional factors can play a role in determining productivity (1979). For example, he finds states that have longer sessions, meet more frequently, and have smaller, more professional legislatures, have greater legislative output. In other words, productivity depends (at least in part) on institutional rules. However, Miguel and Snyder find that individual-level factors, such as candidate tenure and personal lawmaking abilities, can lead to greater legislative productivity, regardless of institutional rules (2006). Similarly, Cox and Terry used new panel data to find additional empirical support for Mayhew's assertions that seniority, being a member of the majority party, and leadership positon all boost a legislator's productivity (2008; 1991, 1995). Anzia and Berry even found that legislator sex matters: congresswomen consistently outperform their male counterparts in legislating (2011). Building on these studies, we focus on the individual-level factor of district competitiveness while also controlling for institutional variation.

As noted, there is extensive research on the effects of electoral competition on legislator behavior and the causes of legislative productivity considered separately. However, only recently have Dropp and Peskowitz and Volden and Wiseman have attempted to trace connections between the two, and both have indicated the need for additional study (2012; 2014). The former found that Texas state legislators facing less competition were slightly more likely to author bills but found null effects on coauthoring, sponsoring, and cosponsoring. However, the constraints of having cross-sectional data for only one state and the lack of statistical significance limit their findings to being only "suggestive" and "speculative." The latter study, while utilizing a far richer dataset and more robust methodology, was skeptical of its findings, noting 1) the possibility of other causal mechanisms at play, 2) previous findings that were "preliminary and conflicting," and 3) that the combination of their results with other contradictory ones meant "much more work is needed in this area."

Our approach builds upon this previous work by making methodological alterations that we believe produce more accurate and reliable results. The key differences in our approach are detailed in the following section. Our study includes the rich set of legislator productivity data used by Volden and Wiseman but introduces an improved measure of electoral competitiveness (2009, 2014). This allows us to make inferences using forty years' worth of information. Additionally, we break down the measure of productivity to find new results about the specifics of legislators' reactions to varying levels of competition.

Data and Measurements
Measuring Competitiveness

We employ district presidential vote share to operationalize electoral competition. The connection between vote share and competitiveness is complex and imperfect, but it is the closest approximation available (Ferejohn 1977; Ansolabehere, Brady, and Fiorina 1992). In studies of Congress, the district's vote share in the previous congressional election is typically used (Ferejohn 1977; Bartels 1991; Kuklinski 1977; MacRae 1952).

However, in our case, using the results of congressional elections when also considering legislative productivity runs a large risk of endogeneity. For non-freshman legislators, the previous election's results were likely affected by their behavior in office, including their productivity (Griffin 2006). This is a central flaw of Volden and Wiseman's analysis, which uses the legislator's own vote share as a measure of competition (2009, 2014). Given that a legislator could gain a higher vote share by being more productive, this is susceptible to problems of reverse and mutual causality.

Consequently, we opt to use the district vote share of the most recent presidential election to the legislator's session, which is much more likely to be exogenous to legislative productivity. The main limitation of this measure is that it sacrifices some proximity to the candidate and election of interest. Principally, it cannot account for the individual characteristics of the incumbents, challengers, salient issues, or other unique factors that distinguish the competitiveness of the district's congressional election from that of the presidential election. Nonetheless, it is better to accept these limitations than risk simultaneity, and we follow the methods of others who have chosen to do so (Griffin 2006; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Gulati 2004; Sullivan and Uslaner 1978). Furthermore, we have other measures—fixed effects and control variables in our models—that we can use to

Figure 1: Competitiveness Validity Check

account for those differences. Figure 1 displays the relationship between presidential vote share and legislator own-district vote share. Though imperfect, the two measures are highly correlated, validating our use of presidential vote share as an exogenous proxy.

The U.S. Census Bureau provided the best data on presidential election vote share at the district, state, and national level. We collected the presidential election results beginning in the year 1976, normalized them to a two-party vote share for comparability across time, and then interpolated those party vote shares for midterm years.

Measuring Productivity

The power of Congress is its ability to create and amend laws. Accordingly, we define legislative effectiveness (or productivity—we use the terms interchangeably) as the ability of a legislator to advance bills through the legislative process (Volden and Wiseman 2009). Though simple, this definition is the result of decades of scholarship on measuring the efficacy of legislators and legislatures. Mayhew focused primarily on landmark legislation (1991). Howell et al. find that adding ordinary and minor enactments to landmark legislation as their own separate groups makes for a more accurate measurement (2000). Cox and Terry were the first to employ panel data in a study of legislative productivity, and they summarize the three ways in which legislative success has typically been measured:

> The best-known measures of legislative success are: (1) members' "entrepreneurial activity," as measured by how many bills they sponsor and co-sponsor (e.g., Garand and Burke 2006; Wawro 2000); (2) members' "batting averages," defined as the proportion of the bills they sponsor that are passed (e.g., Matthews 1960; Moore and Thomas 1991); and (3) members' "productivity," defined as the number of bills each legislator is able to pass (e.g., Frantzich 1979).

We employ a measure that captures legislator activity in each of those areas and at every step of the process—the Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES) developed by Volden and Wiseman (2009). Using the LES enables us to capture legislator productivity at every step of the process. The LES is calculated based on a legislator's bills that 1) are introduced, 2) receive action in committee, 3) receive action beyond committee, 4) pass the House, 5) become a law. Furthermore, because not all bills require equal effort or skill to be advanced in the legislative process, their significance is categorized as substantive and significant, substantive, or commemorative/symbolic, and each is weighted accordingly.[1] Statistical and graphical summaries of the LES and its logged measure, LnLES, are provided in Table 1 and Figures 2–3.

Table 1: LES Descriptive Statistics

| Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
LES	9,260	0.998	1.582	0	18.686
LnLES	9,260	0.528	0.505	0	2.980

Figure 2: LES Histogram


Figure 3: LnLES Histogram

Central Results

Model 1

In Model 1, we regress the logged LES of each member of the House of Representatives from 1976–2013 on the corresponding presidential election's own-party vote share in their districts.[2] This simple regression serves as a base to compare the more complex models and allows us to chart a locally estimated relationship between district competitiveness and legislative productivity in Figure 4. The trend line shows that as presidential party vote share increases, legislative productivity falls. This drop is most precipitous as the observations move beyond the most competitive districts (those near a 50 percent vote share) to safer electoral conditions (above 70 percent vote share). Overall, legislative productivity falls by over 40 percent across that range. In short, it appears that legislators from less competitive districts also tend to be less productive. Our other models affirm this conclusion.

Figure 4: Lowess Plot

All Observations

Models 2 through 5

We employ Models 2 through 5 to test the influence of electoral competitiveness on legislative productivity across a wide variety of parameters. The results largely confirm that there is a real relationship between the two variables.

To isolate the effects of district competition, in Models 4, 5, and 6 we include Volden and Wiseman's control variables for other possible causes of productivity, such as seniority, party membership, leadership positions, committee memberships, party majority, ideology, and gender (2009). These controls attempt to encompass the different personal, institutional, and party influences that could affect productivity (Fenno 1978; Mezey 1978; Wiseman and Wright 2008; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Krehbiel 1993; Snyder and Groseclose 2000). Additionally, we include the state unemployment rate as a proxy for overall constituency welfare and happiness (Clark 2003).

To control for intrinsic differences between legislators and across time, we include fixed effects variables for each legislator in Models 2 and 5. Fixed effects hold constant characteristics that vary between legislators but remain relatively stable in individuals over time, such as personality, ambition, expertise, and "innate ability" (Volden and Wiseman 2009). Using this within-legislator design allows for a more apples-to-apples comparison by controlling for unmeasurable differences that could otherwise bias our estimates. However, given that most representatives do not remain in office for more than a few terms, it is difficult to find enough variation in their district competitiveness and legislative productivity to make any statistically significant conclusions. It does, however, provide an opportunity to give some confirmation of the results we see in our other models.

Models 3 and 6 are also fixed-effects regressions but at the level of the state. We include fixed effects for states and years, which control for unobserved differences both between each state (e.g., regional culture) and over time (e.g., national mood). Given the disparities between representatives and districts within each state, this limits somewhat the generalizability of the estimates but produces more variation and consequently more precise estimates. We use Model 6 to predict the productivity of legislators at various levels of electoral competition.

Table 2 displays the regression outputs of all our models. Importantly, the negative relationship between district competitiveness and legislative effectiveness persists across all statistically significant results, spanning a wide variety of parameters. Further, despite the inclusion of a large number of control variables and fixed effects, the relationship is statistically significant in all but one regression. This consistency is strong evidence that we have identified a real effect. We believe that the lack of statistical significance in Model 5 is due largely to the fact that the legislator-specific fixed effects limit the variation to only a few observations per legislator. Notably, the coefficient of Model 5 is not statistically significantly different from that of Model 6, which is the model that we prefer.

Table 2: Regression Models

Variable	Logged Legislative Effectiveness Score					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Pres. Party Vote Share	-0.424***	-0.315***	-0.509***	-0.103*	0.0192	-0.128**
	(0.0759)	(0.102)	(0.0781)	(0.0533)	(0.0847)	(0.0567)
DW-NOMINATE				-0.116***	-0.0807	-0.125***
				(0.0355)	(0.133)	(0.0453)
Democrat				-0.164***	(Omitted)	-0.155***
				(0.0310)		(0.0371)
Female				0.0382**	(Omitted)	-0.00473
				(0.0183)		(0.0186)
Seniority				0.0217***	-0.00585	0.0218***
				(0.00209)	(0.00834)	(0.00191)
Speaker				-0.215**	-0.0867	-0.210**
				(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.0959)
Committee chair				0.784***	0.743***	0.759***
				(0.0450)	(0.0486)	(0.0453)
Subcommittee chair				0.346***	0.318***	0.341***
				(0.0199)	(0.0245)	(0.0191)
Power committee				-0.0596***	-0.0216	-0.0561***
				(0.0155)	(0.0191)	(0.0149)
Budget committee				-0.0147	-0.00502	-0.0136
				(0.0169)	(0.0192)	(0.0158)
Majority leader				0.168***	0.163***	0.147***
				(0.0453)	(0.0484)	(0.0452)
Minority leader				-0.0566**	-0.0630*	-0.0563**
				(0.0240)	(0.0323)	(0.0242)
In majority party				0.213***	0.248***	0.229***
				(0.0139)	(0.0184)	(0.0135)
State Unemployment rate					-0.00282	-0.00164
					(0.00558)	(0.00440)
Constant	0.766***	0.192***	0.772***	0.330***	0.0147	0.312***
	(0.0443)	(0.0693)	(0.0492)	(0.0378)	(0.0767)	(0.0556)
Legislator fixed effects	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Year fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
State fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	9,226	9,226	9,226	9,165	8,289	8,289
Adjusted R2	0.00947	0.378	0.0443	0.445	0.598	0.478

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Model 6

We ultimately prefer Model 6 for various reasons. First, it includes the variables that we believe to be theoretically justified—both the individual-level controls explored in previous scholarship and the fixed effects we employ to account for varia-

tion across entities and over time. The choice of states rather than legislators as the fixed entities retains sufficient variation for precise estimates while still preserving a large degree of accuracy. Given the large number of external and often unmeasurable factors that can influence a legislator's success in any given election, the model's goodness-of-fit is impressive. Finally, the other included regression coefficients are all in the expected direction, further bolstering our confidence in its accuracy.

The most salient features of Model 6's results are the direction and magnitude of the beta coefficient on the presidential party vote share, our measure of electoral competitiveness. In contradiction to the findings of both Dropp and Peskowitz and Volden and Wiseman, our data indicate that electoral competition has a positive, linear relationship with legislative productivity (2012; 2014). Model 6 estimates that, all else equal, legislators in perfectly uncompetitive districts (100 percent own-party vote share in the last presidential election) are 13 percent less productive than legislators in perfectly competitive districts (0 percent own-party vote share in the last presidential election). More realistically, a legislator from a district that voted 68 percent for her party in the past presidential election (one standard deviation from the mean) is predicted to produce 3 percent less legislation than a legislator from a district that only gave 45 percent of the vote (one standard deviation below the mean) to the candidate's party in the last presidential election. As explained in the following section, while this drop may appear substantively trivial, it masks a much larger change in production of more important legislation. The central implication of this finding is that legislators in competitive districts do not seem to sacrifice their legislative activities in order to focus on constituent services. Instead, they appear to intensify their efforts at advancing their legislative agenda.

The theoretical question we originally posed was whether legislators under electoral pressure sacrifice their legislative productivity to focus on constituent services or other reelection strategies. Our findings are clear evidence that they do not. It seems likely that, like employees in other professions, legislators who perceive their seat to be in jeopardy respond by attempting to prove their competency to their constituents through the production of legislative goods. Our data do not tell us whether this comes at the expense of constituent services or other support-building activities, and so it is possible (and seems likely to us) that legislators in competitive districts increase their efforts in a wide variety of ways. What is clear, though, is that legislators in safe districts are much less productive than their colleagues facing tough competition. In the next section, we explore what that difference in productivity might look like in more concrete terms.

Additional Findings

Our central finding led us to ask two additional questions. First, does electoral competitiveness affect all measures of legislative productivity equally? And second, is the effect of competitiveness constant across various levels of legislator seniority?

Subgroups of Legislative Productivity Measures

Having modeled the impact of district competitiveness on the Legislative Effectiveness Score generally, we next employ Model 6 to estimate the competition's effects on its component parts. This subgroup analysis allows us to tease out heterogeneous effects in our estimates and identify which measures of productivity legislators choose to focus on when facing electoral pressure.

Table 3 shows competitiveness has the greatest effects on production of substantive and significant legislation.[3] The table breaks down the Legislative Effectiveness score into its three component parts. Using the specifications of Model 6, we estimated the beta coefficients of the presidential party vote share on each individual measure. Notably, the only type of legislative activity that seems to be affected by competition is that related to substantive and significant bills. In other words, legislators seem to respond to the threat of reelection loss by directing their efforts at producing the most meaningful types of legislation.

Substantive and significant bills allow legislators to claim credit from political activists and donors in the hopes of not only boosting their image generally but also raising more money (Stein and Bickers 1994). Interest groups and private entities care a great deal about substantive and significant legislation, because they often have large impacts on their industries. For example, the substantive and significant bills mentioned in the 2010 Congressional Quarterly Almanac involved the extension of Bush-era tax cuts, doctor's Medicare pay cuts, and oil-drilling regulations, each of which had far-reaching implications for powerful institutions and organizations (CQ Almanac 2010). Thus, because receiving and spending more money boosts vote share, especially for incumbents, legislators might believe that focusing on substantive and significant legislation will merit larger donations, making for a more secure reelection (Erikson and Palfrey 2000).

In any case, the results of Table 3 have far-reaching implications. One positive sign is that legislators seem to respond to electoral pressure as we hope they would—by producing meaningful legislative goods instead of a slew of private favors or commemorative bills. However, competitiveness cuts both ways—legislators in safe districts exhibit drastic drops in their production of substantive and significant legislation. And this response is remarkably powerful; our model estimates that, all else equal, legislators in perfectly uncompetitive districts produce 32 percent fewer bills that become law. Even when predicting differences between otherwise equal legislators from districts with vote shares one standard deviation below the mean versus one standard deviation above it, the model still forecasts that the legislator from the more competitive district will produce more than 7 percent substantive and significant legislation than his or her counterpart.

Seniority Effects

Our second auxiliary question was whether the effect of electoral competitiveness on legislative productivity varies across levels of seniority—in other words,

Table 3: Subgroup Analysis

Variable	Logged LES component parts		
	(7) Substantive and Significant Legislating	(8) Significant Legislating	(9) Commemorative Legislating
Pres. Party Vote Share	**-0.319*****	**-0.194**	**0.0686**
	(0.104)	(0.143)	(0.116)
DW-Nominate	-0.130*	-0.0196	-0.249***
	(0.0737)	(0.110)	(0.0766)
Democrat	-0.111*	-0.171*	-0.128*
	(0.0625)	(0.0911)	(0.0663)
Female	-0.00366	0.120***	-0.0637*
	(0.0292)	(0.0458)	(0.0381)
Seniority	0.0399***	0.0312***	0.00238
	(0.00356)	(0.00447)	(0.00366)
Speaker	0.0616	-1.064***	-0.117
	(0.241)	(0.224)	(0.137)
Committee chair	1.346***	0.525***	0.0174
	(0.0809)	(0.0682)	(0.0507)
Subcommittee chair	0.710***	0.290***	0.00606
	(0.0401)	(0.0345)	(0.0287)
Power committee	0.0104	-0.0849**	-0.0658**
	(0.0273)	(0.0422)	(0.0273)
Budget committee	0.00750	0.0310	-0.0301
	(0.0327)	(0.0372)	(0.0347)
Majority leader	0.349***	-0.0251	-0.0264
	(0.0955)	(0.0860)	(0.0885)
Minority leader	-0.0390	-0.0971	0.0744
	(0.0384)	(0.0729)	(0.0638)
In majority party	0.310***	0.190***	0.0434*
	(0.0240)	(0.0306)	(0.0257)
State unemployment rate	-0.00501	-0.00175	-0.00247
	(0.00887)	(0.00960)	(0.00863)
Constant	0.342***	3.010***	1.160***
	(0.105)	(0.136)	(0.121)
Legislator fixed effects	No	No	No
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,289	8,289	8,289
Adjusted R2	0.440	0.603	0.102

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Seniority Effects

VARIABLES	Logged Legislative Effectiveness Score	
	(10)	(11)
DW-Nominate Score	-0.125***	-0.129***
	(0.0453)	(0.0455)
Party Pres. Vote Share	-0.144*	-0.133**
	(0.0786)	(0.0621)
1.firstterm		-0.0734
		(0.0500)
0b.firstterm#co.partypres		0
		(0)
1.firstterm#c.partypres		0.00378
		(0.0868)
Democrat	-0.155***	-0.158***
	(0.0371)	(0.0372)
Female	-0.00451	-0.00453
	(0.0186)	(0.0186)
Seniority	0.0202**	0.0192***
	(0.00790)	(0.00206)
Speaker	-0.211**	-0.208**
	(0.0958)	(0.0965)
Committee chair	0.759***	0.763***
	(0.0457)	(0.0455)
Subcommittee chair	0.341***	0.331***
	(0.0191)	(0.0190)
Power committee	-0.0560***	-0.0638***
	(0.0149)	(0.0151)
Budget committee	-0.0136	-0.0173
	(0.0158)	(0.0158)
Majority leader	0.148***	0.139***
	(0.0452)	(0.0453)
Minority leader	-0.0565**	-0.0607**
	(0.0242)	(0.0240)
In majority party	0.228***	0.234***
	(0.0137)	(0.0135)
State unemployment rate	-0.00164	-0.00151
	(0.00440)	(0.00437)
c.partypres#c.seniority	0.00277	
	(0.0128)	
Constant	0.321***	0.342***
	(0.0643)	(0.0577)
Observations	8,289	8,289
Adjusted R2	0.478	0.480

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

whether lawmakers respond to competition by increasing productivity in equal measure throughout their tenure in office. Our data indicate that they do. Table 4 displays the results of two additional models, both of which used the specifications of Model 6 with slight alterations. Model 10 interacts the independent variables of party presidential vote share with legislator seniority, and Model 11 interacts party presidential vote share with a dummy variable indicating whether or not the legislator is a freshman. Neither model found statistically significant effects for the interaction terms, indicating that legislator responses to electoral competition are relatively consistent, no matter how long they have been in office. Figure 5 provides visual confirmation—the drop persists regardless of seniority.

Figure 5: Lowess Plots by Seniority

Limitations

Some empirical and theoretical limitations of our findings deserve mentioning. First, it is difficult to discern whether the increased productivity observed for legislators in competitive districts is solely a function of them choosing to work harder or whether party leaders are simply favoring the agenda of threatened members in order to prevent them from losing their seats. We think it is likely that both the extra

individual effort and the extra help from party leaders occurs. To our knowledge there is no data that could help us ascertain exactly how much of each occurs. Perhaps more qualitative research, such as legislator interviews, would provide some sort of assessment along those lines. For the purposes of our work here, however, the most important point is that productivity clearly varies by electoral competitiveness; we leave the identification of internal mechanisms to future studies.

Second, it is important to note that our measure of district competitiveness does not account for the threat of primary election challengers. This would have been true even if we had used own-election vote share instead of presidential-election data. Consequently, we cannot control for the electoral pressure that some legislators might feel from possible primary challengers even when their district decidedly favors their party. The data would likely be difficult to obtain, but it seems possible that future research could replicate our methods with primary-election results in addition to general-election information, which would strengthen the generalizability of the conclusions. However, we do not believe it likely that doing so would find dramatically different results from what we have observed here.

Conclusion

Given the relative scarcity of research connecting electoral competitiveness and legislative productivity, our study has begun to fill an important gap in the scholarly literature. We have leveraged a new, rich combination of data to test theories of legislators' behavioral responses to electoral vulnerability, finding effects on productivity that are remarkable both in their refutation of previous findings and in the magnitude of their implications. These findings are critical to our understanding of legislative outcomes.

The good news of our results is that legislators respond to electoral incentives to perform the duties of the offices to which they were elected. This indicates that elections are at least somewhat successful at holding them accountable to voters and donors for their productivity (or, at the very least, legislators believe that voters and donors will react to their productivity—either way, the outcome is the same).

The bad news is that *un*competitive elections have the same power to affect productivity. As soon as legislators feel they are safe from challengers, their productivity drops off sharply—most dramatically in their production of substantive and significant legislation. Given the general decline in electoral competitiveness over the last several decades (Streb 2015), this finding has disturbing implications for the overall effectiveness of the House of Representatives as a legislative body. Indeed, Congress' productivity in recent sessions has been the lowest in modern history (Ornstein et al. 2014).

Perhaps, then, it is not so difficult to explain the disparate priorities of Senator Lee and Representative Love in both their debate rhetoric and legislative behavior. One of them simply faced much less electoral competition than the other and was consequently much less motivated to focus on legislative productivity. This individual comparison has implications for Congressional productivity in the aggregate. Our

results suggest that one method to encourage the accountability necessary to incentivize productivity would be to increase the competitiveness of elections. In other words, our democracy would likely benefit from healthier competition.

NOTES

1. From Volden and Wiseman 2009: "A bill is deemed substantive and significant if it had been the subject of an end-of-the-year write-up in the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*. A bill was deemed commemorative if it satisfied any one of several criteria, such as providing for a renaming, commemoration, private relief of an individual, and the like. Finally, all other bills, and any erstwhile "commemorative" bills that were also the subject of a CQ Almanac write-up were classified as substantive."

2. In our regression models, we log-transform the LES scores, which helps the data to better fit the assumption of normal distribution needed for regression analysis. Additionally, all models are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. However, we do not use any transformations in the charts in order to better display substantive effects. In any case, the differences between the two models are small.

3. See note 2 for qualifications of substantive and significant legislation.

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United States Public Opinion and the War in Iraq: Understanding Polling Trends through Discourse Analysis

Sam Williams

Introduction

War is often thought to be a cause-and-effect dichotomy. Rather than taking a holistic view of war through examination of short-term fluctuations against macro-level trends, historians often instead define armed conflict by a singular, decisive event and the differing responses and ramifications which stem from it. It is tempting, then, to do the same with public opinion about war: If the nature and ultimate result of a conflict stems from a collection of individual pivotal events, it is natural to think there would also be critical shifts in public opinion corresponding to these decisive events. U.S. military campaigns that are both long enough and significant enough to measure general military, political, and social trends against public opinion over an extended period of time are rare. As a result, the relationship between public opinion shifts and the factors that cause them is still not fully developed. The protracted military involvement of the U.S. in Iraq beginning in the early 2000s provides a valuable case study to examine. The wealth of opinion data and news coverage surrounding the Iraq conflict offers a unique opportunity to consider whether events or patterns truly led to public opinion decline. More generally, the comparative study of public opinion trends and war-related events may illuminate fundamental relationships between the two. If previously unexplored relationships are found to be significant in the context of the Iraq War, this exercise can help explain public opinion behavior during other wars.

An initial review of this relationship, however, suggests an intriguing gap in the research. Although numerous studies have been conducted attributing declines in public opinion during the Iraq War to traditional causes, such as mounting casualties or dissatisfaction over the war's length, these trends do not seem to align with the

periods of most significant public opinion dips observed in the data. While these factors undoubtedly contribute, especially to long-term public opinion trends, it seems there are still unstudied factors affecting public opinion in a significant way. Public opinion data from the Iraq War, which are visualized and explained in greater detail later in this study, shows that the most significant drop in public opinion—between fifteen to twenty-five percentage points across a variety of related survey questions—occurred almost immediately after the start of the war. During no other period do all surveys display a decline as significant in terms of magnitude during such a short period of time. Again, traditional methods of explaining public opinion shifts seem insufficient for explaining this drastic and immediate drop.

Therefore, the nuance and complexity of public opinion requires testing new variables using new methods. The role of the media during war, for example, has been studied thoroughly, both with regard to the Iraq War and in other U.S. military conflicts. What is missing in current scholarship, however, is extensive discursive analysis of media coverage surrounding the Iraq War. Using front page headlines and articles from the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal* from the first six months of the war—the time period that the polls show the most drastic drop in public support—I find that drastically changing discursive strategies during this period perpetuating increasingly negative views of the war correlate with the equally drastic public opinion decline over this same time. Though media discourse is likely not the sole explanation for the drastic public opinion decline at the beginning of the war, this study nevertheless productively adds nuance to the conversation on this issue.

The rest of this paper will be organized as follows: I begin by outlining traditional variables and how they explain drops in public opinion during times of war. I then show how these traditional variables are insufficient in explaining the drastic decline in public opinion during the first six months of the conflict in Iraq. Finally, in an attempt to more fully understand the puzzling public opinion drop beyond the scope of traditional explanations, I introduce an additional variable—discourse analysis in mainstream media—and test it against public opinion data from the first six months of the Iraq War. I conclude with the benefits and limitations of using discourse analysis to add further nuance to this complicated phenomenon.

Literature Review

Explaining variations in public opinion during periods of military conflict has been thoroughly explored, both in the context of the U.S.–Iraq War and in historical U.S. military conflicts. Adam Berinsky, who has written extensively on the subject, outlines the important but often understated relationship between public opinion and foreign policy formation (2009). Berinsky argues that the effect of public opinion on wartime foreign policy is not unique but rather a natural continuation of the relationship between public opinion and domestic policy during times of peace. Furthermore, he argues that public opinion support closely matches the opinions of political elites. When elites are unified in support of a military conflict, the public will

support the venture (2007). In a different study conducted with James Druckman, Berinsky further argues that public support for the Iraq War, and war in general, is most closely tied to initial support for military action and a belief in the overall success of the war (2007). As my later analysis will show, in the context of the Iraq War, these explanations of public opinion support are incomplete.

Meanwhile, Holsti argues that decline in public support for American involvement in the region stemmed from growing public frustration with the protracted nature of the conflict (2011). Gartner uses empirical evidence to support the idea that U.S. casualties, what he calls "the most salient cost of conflict," are a significant determinant of decreased support in the Iraq War (2008). When casualties in the war are viewed on a macro scale, they appear to correlate negatively with public opinion, as Gartner would expect. The first year of the Iraq War saw the greatest number of casualties and the most drastic declines in public opinion. A more in-depth study of casualty numbers, however, shows that this negative correlation is weaker than it appears. When comparing casualty rates and public opinion on a monthly level, the relationship between the two becomes muddled. I will elaborate on the validity of casualties and their effect on public opinion in the Iraq War later in my analysis.

This relationship has also been tested for other military conflicts. Richard Eichenberg's research analyzes twenty-two military conflicts and determines that public opinion is most directly linked to the objective of the military operation as well as the risks of the operation, the likelihood of victory, and the number of casualties (2005). Eichenberg's risk analysis is tied to considerations of casualties. He finds that the U.S. public is more likely to support risky military endeavors, such as air strikes, and less likely to support actions that could lead to significant loss of life, such as large-scale occupation. In the case of the Iraq War, Eichenberg's risk assessment may help explain why public opinion decreased generally once it became apparent that a high-risk occupation was underway, but it provides less clarity when attempting to explain precise and drastic drops in public opinion or why initial support for military intervention was so high. Hagopian's study on the Vietnam War concludes that public opinion declines were determined more by unmet expectations and a loss of confidence in military and political leaders rather than the heavy losses incurred during the Tet Offensive as many believe (2008). This may be true of the Iraq War as well, given that, as we will see later, the relationship between casualties and public opinion fluctuations is not as strong as we might expect. Mueller draws parallels between the Iraq, Vietnam, and Korean Wars and argues that precipitous casualties were the main cause of public disenchantment in all three conflicts (2005).

The scholarship focusing specifically on the relationship between media coverage of war and public opinion is expansive and relevant. Kamalipour and Entman both focus on the media's portrayal of power with regard to the Iraq War and the subsequent effects on public opinion (2004; 2004). Dimitrova and Stromback compares coverage of the Iraq War in differing newspapers and attempts to connect content with greater public opinion trends (2005).

Background

The U.S. entered Iraq on a wave of public support. Due perhaps in part to grow-ing U.S. public fear and disdain for the Arab-Muslim world in the wake of the events of September 11, compounded by the fear that Saddam Hussein possessed nuclear weapons, Bush's decision to engage Iraq militarily was supported wholeheartedly at home. Most polls show public approval of the Iraq War above 70 percent in March of 2003, the month the U.S. invaded (Gallup 2017). As we will see, this support dropped rapidly in the months immediately following invasion and subsequent occupation and continued to drop gradually but consistently in the coming years and months.

Do you oppose or favor the U.S. war with Iraq?

	2003 Mar 22-23	2003 Apr 5-6	2003 Apr 10	2003 Apr 22-23	2003 Oct 24-26	2004 Nov 19-21	2005 Mar 18-20	2005 Jun 16-19	2006 Feb 9-12	2007 Jan 15-18
Favor	72	70	72	71	54	48	47	39	40	36
Oppose	25	27	22	26	43	46	47	59	56	61

Source: "Iraq," Gallup, www.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx.

See Appendix for additional graphical representations of the data presented in this section.

U.S. military policy is usually reactive rather than preventative. Conflicts are often framed as a response to a dangerous aggressor, a check on an imminent threat, or an intervention on behalf of a weaker, oppressed nation. This justification, coupled with rally-around-the-flag, pro-America rhetoric, means that support for these con-flicts is initially high and widespread.

Accordingly, the high public approval rating Bush received as he led the U.S. into Iraq was not a unique phenomenon. Nor is it uncommon to see declines in public support of military conflict as war becomes increasingly prolonged. In Korea and Vietnam, high starting levels of public support consistently dropped as the length of the conflict extended (Newport and Carroll 2005). What makes Iraq unique, as I will discuss later in greater detail, is the drastic drop in public support for the war immediately after it began. In this way, the Iraq War differs from its more historical counterparts. In Vietnam, for example, public support dropped more gradually, especially during the opening months of the conflict (Hagopian 2008). The fact that the Iraq War differs from traditional trends in wartime public opinion adds increased merit to a study of public opinion in this context.

Methodology

Identifying and analyzing the relationship between shifts in public support and the potential causes of these shifts requires a thorough analysis of the public opinion data. For this analysis, I limited my survey data to the Gallup and Pew polls—the two most authoritative national polls in the United States. Both polling organizations typically use landline- and cellphone-conducted surveying of a randomly assigned, representative national sample for their public opinion polls (Gallup 2017; Pew Research Center 2017). Survey results typically included sample sizes over one thousand. I defined a significant shift in public opinion to be an increase or decrease of at least twenty percentage points over a maximum of six months. These criteria were chosen to account for the fact that public opinion polls are released only monthly and sometimes even more infrequently. Thus, changes in public opinion are approximated over a period of a month. Rather than looking at long-term trends, however, I am interested in periods of public opinion changes over a more condensed timeframe, which is why I still limited the time frame to six months.

Upon selecting and establishing my data and methods, I studied the opinion surveys holistically—from the start of the war in 2003 to present—to see apparent shifts in public opinion during this time. Since public opinion data is readily available, I chose to include data from the beginning of the war to the present day. Using the entirety of the data rather than a smaller sample will permit me to compare short-term fluctuations against long-term trends. Because this study seeks to understand opinions about the Iraq War in their most general form, I limited my analysis of public opinion data to survey responses that most broadly captured general sentiments surrounding the war. For example, I used response data from questions such as "In general, how would you say things are going in Iraq?" or "Do you favor or oppose the U.S. war in Iraq?" but avoided more specific measurements of public opinion such as "Do you think increasing the number of U.S. troops in Iraq is making things better or worse?" (Gallup 2017). While questions such as the latter do measure public support for the war indirectly, they do so through the lens of a more precise issue, making it harder to use the responses to measure general support and trends over time.

The aggregate data from the two national polls on general public opinion questions, perhaps surprisingly, only shows one significant shift in public opinion based on my operational definitions. This significant shift starts almost immediately after the commencement of the war and lasts approximately six to eight months. A Gallup poll taken 22–23 March 2003—just three days after the United States' official invasion of Iraq—showed that 72 percent of respondents favored the U.S. war in Iraq. Poll results 24–26 October of the same year showed that the percentage of respondents that supported the war had dropped to 54 percent—a decline of eighteen percentage points in six months. Other general opinion questions illustrate the same decline. On 14 April 2003, Gallup results showed that 73 percent of respondents believed that it was worth going to war in Iraq. Just over three months later, on 27 July, that number had dropped to 56 percent and fell as low as 49 percent by December 2003 (Gallup 2017). This decline is displayed visually in the graph below.

All in all, do you think it was work going to war in Iraq, or not?

Source: "Iraq," Gallup, www.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx

Pew polling data shows a similar trend. In March 2003, over 72 percent of survey participants felt that it was the right decision to use military force in Iraq. Toward the end of 2003, that percentage had dipped below 60 (Pew Research Center 2008). In both polls, overall support for U.S. military involvement in Iraq shows a generally consistent downward trend. Some polls display other time periods with significant

drops, though they are not seen consistently in all the surveys. Across all polling questions that were used, only the first six to eight months show significant fluctuations in public support. For this reason, I limit my analysis of public opinion to this time period.

A cursory study of the events surrounding the first six to eight months of the Iraq War yields no conventional explanations for the rapid drop in public opinion. Prior research attributes public opinion declines to rising casualties. Although the U.S. did incur casualties during this time, monthly U.S. casualty numbers increased more significantly and consistently in 2004 and again later in 2007, yet these increases were accompanied by a more gradual decline in public opinion (iCasualties 2009). If casualty rates are the driving force behind public opinion declines, then one would expect to see the largest and most significant drop occurring in 2004 and 2007, while public opinion rates during the first six months of the war should remain relatively stable. Instead, public opinion declined most rapidly in the first six months, when casualties were relatively low, and remained relatively stable later on, when casualty rates increased dramatically. A simple statistical correlation test analyzing the relationship between monthly public support during the first year of the war and monthly casualty numbers over the same time period reveals a weak relationship, yielding a correlation coefficient of just -.0278. Given the large body of research arguing that sig-

Coalition Casualty Count by Month

Source: "Iraq Coalition Casualties: Fatalities by Year and Month," http://icasualties.org/iraq/ByMonth.aspx.

nificant casualties in war lead to large drop offs in public opinion, we would expect this negative relationship to be much stronger. At least in terms of explaining public opinion behavior during the first six months of the war, it appears that the correlation between casualty rates and public opinion is weaker than expected.

Other research suggests that public opinion support for war declines as the length of the war increases. This may be true in Iraq, but given that the most drastic drop in public support occurs during the first six months of the war, it seems unlikely that this is due to frustrations over prolonged conflict or doubts of success. Nor is there strong evidence that significant negative events during this time period changed public perception. Graphic or tragic events, such as the gruesome public hanging of Blackwater security employees or the controversial actions of U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib, did not occur until 2004. Most of the significant events of the first six months were relatively positive. Thus, it appears that traditional explanations for public opinion declines during war—casualties, lack of success, prolonged intervention, or gruesome and tragic episodes—do not apply to this period of the war. For this reason, I turn to a rhetorical analysis of media discourse surrounding the war in hopes of explaining this shift.

Discourse analysis studies a text within the larger societal context in which it is written. The theory suggests that the way individuals view and understand society is constructed through their consumption of discourse that exists within that society. Therefore, even the most mundane and ostensibly objective texts may present information in ways that alter the reader's understanding of society. Discourse analysis differs from traditional content analysis in that it focuses on the linguistic presentation of an argument rather than simply the information a text contains. As scholars Bazerman and Prior explain, discourse analysis examines signs of "social identities, institutions, norms as well as means by which these social formations are established, negotiated, enacted, and changed through communicative practice" (2004, 3). It is possible to manipulate discourse to express and support particular social formations through a variety of strategies, including foregrounding (placing an issue or event at the forefront of an article, thereby making it the central topic), backgrounding (minimizing or altogether omitting certain aspects of an argument or story), distorting agent-patient relationships (determining who is doing what to whom), and presupposing or insinuating.

Given that no traditional explanation for the significant decline in public opinion seems sufficient, a discursive analysis of mass media discourse pertaining to the war and the effect it had on public opinion offers a fresh alternative. My analysis corresponds to the methods of discourse analyst Thomas Huckin, whose process includes posing a research question, selecting a corpus of appropriate texts that are related to the research question and are representative of a larger body of texts, choosing an appropriate unit of analysis, gathering data, and interpreting findings (2012). In the context of my study, I will use newspapers, specifically the *New York Times* and

the *Wall Street Journal*, as appropriate texts to identify important discursive patterns that may influence public opinion surrounding the Iraq War. For these newspapers, I further refine my observation by limiting the unit of analysis to strictly headlines and first paragraphs from the front pages of these two newspapers from 20 March 2003 to 20 October 2003. I assume the average newspaper reader likely does not read every word of every article but that these readers are, at the very least, likely to read headlines and the paragraphs displayed on the front page. I also assume that although news sources at this time were accessed on the Internet with increasing frequency, the content and format of the electronic version remained relatively the same; thus, individuals viewing the electronic version were being exposed to the same front-page content as the print viewers. Studying two authoritative news sources with traditionally opposing ideologies and political leanings provides increased breadth to the analysis. Although these newspapers are considered more academic and perhaps less widely-read by the general public than other newspapers, combined readership of the two news sources in 2003 exceeded any other individual paper; because of its size, I assume this sample is representative. Consequently, based on the fundamental theories of discourse analysis, any linguistic patterns found across the two papers during this period of time likely influenced how readers of these texts understood the events of the Iraq War and, by extension, have affected their support for the war.

Findings

The New York Times

The *New York Times* was more openly critical of the war throughout the six months that I observed. This is unsurprising, given the publication's more liberal leanings. Criticism was apparent not only in terms of content—what stories and information about the Iraq War was most consistently and prominently displayed on the front page of their paper—but also in terms of language. Using principles of discourse analysis to identify patterns in the way information about the Iraq War was presented proves valuable in understanding the potential effect this discursive presentation had on the reader, as well as in understanding the relationship between media discourse and public opinion generally.

An apparent discursive strategy employed by *New York Times* writers is described in Huckin's writing as the manipulation of agent-patient relationships. Huckin explains, "Many texts will describe things so that certain persons are consistently depicted as initiating actions (and thus exerting power) while others are depicted as being (often passive) recipients of those actions" (2012, 112). On the 20 March front page of the newspaper—the day the war officially started—the principal headline read "Bush Orders Start of War," with a sub-headline saying "President Warns of Difficulty" (Burns 2003a). Placing President Bush as the central agent of both actions is linguistically significant. Rather than generalizing, attributing the actions to "the U.S.," "the U.S. government," or even "the White House," the *Times* pins the actions solely on Bush. Moving forward, this gives the public a specific name and face to

point to when problems arise. By implementing this strategy from the very beginning, *Times* authors establish an important precedent of pinning blame on Bush and his administration.

An additional example of the agent-patient relationship is the omission of the opposing forces when discussing U.S. casualties. Throughout this six-month period, stories focused on deadly altercations rarely mention the opposition force. A 23 March article titled "One Dies in Attack at US Camp; Soldier is Held" details one soldier killed and thirteen others wounded "when grenades were thrown and shots were fired" (Dwyer 2003). Unmentioned is the enemy that threw those grenades. In another example, a *Times* reporter writes "a car bomb was detonated" killing eleven people, though the individuals responsible for the act were never mentioned (Filkins 2003). This pattern of passive-voice constructions effectively removes the perpetrators of violent acts against U.S. troops from the war narrative. The effect of this strategy is significant: Removing the enemy focuses the reader's attention on the casualties. By constructing stories in this way, U.S. soldiers become patients—the victims of violence and death—but the agent, or administrator, of death is not the physical enemy being fought; it is war itself. Thus, these reports of U.S. soldiers dying, without clear mention of an enemy to blame, induce readers to turn their discontent toward the war generally. Rather than fueling patriotic revenge against a clear enemy, this writing strategy makes war, and the people who started it, the biggest culprit.

Another important discursive strategy used by *New York Times* writers with increasing frequency during these six months is framing. Framing refers to the way writers position a story by consistently bringing certain issues to the forefront and relegating other details to the background. Framing not only has important implications for what content is presented but also how the content's presentation leads a reader to certain conclusions. In any given article, the framing of a story proves vital because of the intrinsic meaning of the words and phrases, as well as because of what the articles implies without being explicit.

For example, many *New York Times* articles foreground the need for war strategy reform. Writers frequently address the shortcomings of the political and military strategy. Underlying these reports of "major revision[s] of strategy" and "sweeping review[s] of Pentagon policies" is the suggestion that the plan itself was flawed and failing and that the creators of these plans are unprepared and ill-equipped to manage the situation (Shanker 2003). Furthermore, these reports of policy restructuring—"rethinking approaches"—are portrayed negatively, frequently accompanied by references to "setbacks and pressures at home and abroad" (Weisman 2003). The article on 1 June "Bush Asks Europe to Work with US" may not be an overt criticism of the U.S. strategy in Iraq or indicative of strategic failure, but the framing of the article—emphasizing Bush's pleading that there is "'no time' for divisions"—suggests that Bush's calls for unity represent desperation more than anything else (Bumiller 2003). As the *Times* frames it, Bush's request for foreign aid appears a sign of America's failure in Iraq.

More generally, *New York Times* articles from the period emphasize negative press surrounding the Iraq war or weaken the effects of positive news regarding Iraq by pairing it with negative news. John Burns' article on 5 April reports the U.S. making military headway but simultaneously dampens enthusiasm for U.S. military successes with reports of "a relaxed Saddam" unperturbed and unthreatened by U.S. threats (2003b). Other articles show a similar pattern of juxtaposing positive news with more negative details to neutralize the feelings of progress. An 11 April headline read "Allies Widen Hold on Iraq; Civil Strife on the Rise" (Tyler 2003). The next day, on 12 April, an article read "In Baghdad, Free of Hussein, a Day of Mayhem." Rather than focus on the liberation of Baghdad from decades of authoritarian rule under Saddam Hussein, the article instead details the riots and looting that occurred as a result of the power vacuum left by the fallen totalitarian regime (Filkins 2003a).

The negative framing employed during this time period in the *New York Times* is even more surprising when compared to how the paper framed the situation in Iraq leading up to the beginning of the war. In sharp contrast to what the discourse during the war shows, the *New York Times* framed the war positively before entering. The *Times* published numerous articles about the need for U.S. intervention and the imminent danger posed by Saddam Hussein and his hidden stash of nuclear weapons (Rich 2006, 41). In 2004, editors of the *New York Times* released a statement admitting to sloppy reporting and false information in some of their early articles on the Iraq War (2004). Nevertheless, the stark contrast between positive framing of the Iraqi conflict before invasion and harshly negative framing of the conflict just a few months later makes this finding all the more significant.

Although the volume of news coverage on the Iraq War in the *New York Times* naturally declined in the weeks and months following the start of the war, discourse analysis of the front page of the publication from the start of the war on 20 March to late September reveals interesting discursive patterns used by the authors. Through framing, juxtaposition, and the manipulation of agent-patient relationships, the *New York Times's* coverage of the Iraq War over this six-month period became increasingly critical of the U.S. government. Although these patterns become obvious when analyzing the entire corpus, the average reader of individual articles was likely unaware of their rhetorical effect. Furthermore, the numerical impact of this politically critical rhetoric on U.S. public opinion is unclear. Nevertheless, these two phenomena—a sharp decline in public opinion and a growing criticism in both content and discursive construction—appear at the very least to correlate.

The Wall Street Journal

An analysis of the language and content of the traditionally conservative *Wall Street Journal* is perhaps even more instructive. One might not expect to find criticisms of Bush and the Iraq War in its pages. Patterns of significant discursively constructed criticism would suggest widespread negative opinion regarding the war.

The *Wall Street Journal* published significantly fewer articles discussing the war in Iraq on its front pages. This could indicate an attempt by the writers to mitigate the situation of the U.S. in Iraq. Alternatively, the limited coverage might represent a philosophy of "no news is good news." Albeit unlikely, it is possible that *Wall Street Journal* writers simply felt there was nothing noteworthy to report.

In addition, the *Wall Street Journal* displays many of the same discursive patterns identified in the *New York Times,* though employed with less frequency and greater subtlety. At the outset, the publication's coverage is more positive than the coverage seen in the *New York Times.* In direct contrast to the emphasis on Bush seen in the *Times* reporting, the *Wall Street Journal* generalizes the war. Their headline on 20 March highlights the initial differences between the two publications. The main headline from the *Wall Street Journal* read "US Launches War on Iraq," and U.S. action is described in the first paragraph as a "US military assault on Iraq" (Jaffe 2003a). This stands in stark contrast to the analogous *Times'* headline, where President Bush was highlighted, and more general terms like "the U.S.," "the military," or even "the president" were minimized. At this point in the conflict, it appears that *Wall Street Journal* writers hoped to keep their readership united in support for the war, thus choosing to highlight the war's collective effort rather than isolating one individual actor.

Early in the conflict, the *Wall Street Journal* uses softer language to describe harsh events. This again contrasts with what is seen in the *Times.* Rather than describing the conflict as "devastating" and "ferocious" or describing the political and military situation as "chaos" and "anarchy" as *Times* writers do, the *Wall Street Journal* uses gentler terms, describing American advances as troops "pouring into Iraq" in order to "bring down the regime." One writer describes an exceptionally bloody week as "a tough week" where troops were "met by some resistance" (Robbins, Jaffe, and Morse 2003). Even the inconsistent U.S. policy and military strategy—criticized incessantly in *New York Times* coverage—is covered using more positive language in the *Wall Street Journal*. A headline on 26 March states, "US Considers Options in Longer War" (Robbins and Jaffe 2003). Later, another front-page article focuses on Rumsfeld's attempts to "tap into political capital gained" from intermediate victories in Iraq in order to enact reform (Squeo 2003). Yet another headline reads "UN Poised to Endorse the US-led Administration in Iraq" (*Wall Street Journal* 2003b). This differs greatly from the *New York Times* in diction as well as content and framing. The *New York Times* reported evidence of resistance from UN members in backing the U.S. coalition government in Iraq and framed their coverage in this way to make the U.S. seem weak and helpless without the support of the international community. The *Wall Street Journal* coverage, on the other hand, approaches the story from a different angle. Their more optimistic approach has the U.S. at the forefront, leading the UN but not necessarily needing their help. The *Wall Street Journal,* at least in the early stages of the war, describes war reform in diplomatic language and frames the efforts around U.S. successes, whereas the *New York Times* uses coverage of reform as a way to insinuate failure and weakness on the part of the U.S. government.

This optimistic diction and positive framing in the *Wall Street Journal* begins to falter in later months, however. Even as early as June, stories with more critical language appear on the front page. Headlines referring to "Radical Realignment" and "Radical Shifts in Strategy" feel markedly different from the more positively-framed stories covering U.S. policy and strategy from earlier weeks (Jaffe 2003b). The *New York Times* strategy of juxtaposing positive and negative news begins to emerge in later months in the *Wall Street Journal* as well. A headline in June reported that U.S. troops "made progress, but setbacks are frequent" (*Wall Street Journal* 2003d). Both in terms of content and rhetorical patterns, coverage from later months of the *Wall Street Journal* show increased criticism and negativity regarding the events transpiring in Iraq. Whereas early reports regarding the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq removed Bush and the U.S. government as the agent, saying that "truth" about weapons of mass destruction "remains elusive" (*Wall Street Journal* 2003a), later reports fully implicate Bush and the U.S. government. A story describes how "Bush insisted Iraq had a program to make weapons of mass destruction, but stopped short of promising hard evidence of the weapons being found." The article calls the validity of Bush's claims into doubt by mentioning that troops assigned to search for these weapons were "running out of sites to search" (*Wall Street Journal* 2003c).

Coverage of the war deteriorates further toward the end of the observed six-month period. Issues previously framed positively were eventually framed more negatively. In the late weeks of August and early days of September, headlines such as "Bush Struggling to Turn Around a Deteriorating Situation in Iraq," "Bush Sees Little Hope of an Iraq Vote Before his UN Address," and "Iraq Defies Easy Solution for Bush as Costs and Casualties Mount" all appear (*Wall Street Journal* 2003e; 2003f; 2003g). Gone from these headlines is the positive framing that existed in earlier coverage. In addition, these headlines show an increased focus on Bush. Instead of distributing ownership to a more generalized and abstract "U.S. government" that planned and executed the offensive and democratic transition, these headlines place the blame directly on the president, making him a clear target in the eyes of dissatisfied readers.

Coverage of the Iraq War in the *Wall Street Journal* was less extensive and more positive than it was in the *New York Times,* but a survey of the first six months of the war as displayed on the front pages of the *Wall Street Journal* shows a clear pattern of discursive strategies reflecting declining support. Both in terms of content and discursive construction, the *Wall Street Journal* abandoned shielding Bush's agency, framing issues positively, and using euphemistic language, and instead pursued a more direct, pessimistic approach to war coverage.

These discursive patterns in the *Wall Street Journal's* coverage of the Iraq War are perhaps even more surprising and significant than the *New York Times's* fierce but relatively stable opposition to the Iraq War during the first six months. Appealing to a more liberal readership that was less supportive of the war from the start meant the *Times,* to appeal to its base, was unsurprisingly more openly critical of U.S. military

activity in Iraq. The *Wall Street Journal,* on the other hand, was writing to a more conservative readership that largely supported the war, at least initially. The shift in the way the *Wall Street Journal* wrote about the war during the first six months of the war speaks to the significant decline in public support during this time. Criticism of a controversial war from a left-leaning newspaper like the *New York Times* is not unusual. What is surprising, though, is a conservative publication like the *Wall Street Journal* shifting their message so clearly and so quickly. The fact that this dramatic and rapid shift occurred while public support for the Iraq War declined reinforces the initial hypothesis that media discourse regarding the war in Iraq and public opinion levels are in fact related.

Conclusions

My discourse analysis of the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal* yields new information, but it does not prove causation. Although this analysis fills a noticeable gap in existing studies of causes of public opinion shifts during the Iraq War, this approach is limited in its ability to make connections and draw concrete conclusions. First and foremost, discourse analysis, and the effects of discourse on public opinion that my analysis presented, is not easily quantifiable. Though pairing my study of discourse with declines in public opinion suggests that there is correlation, I cannot quantitatively test this relationship, and thus it is difficult to know if, or how much, media discourse actually affected public support.

The relationship between media discourse and public opinion also runs the risks of reverse causality. My hypothesis framed changing media discourse as the driver of changes in public opinion, but the relationship could also be the opposite. It is likely that the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal,* seeing the decline of public support for the Iraq War among their readers, altered their coverage of the war to match this growing discontent. If this were the case, public opinion would be driving discourse, rather than discourse driving public opinion as I initially asserted. The inability to disentangle this relationship, at least within the limited scope of this study, again reinforces the fact that, although these findings are interesting and important, they are not conclusive.

A final issue limiting our ability to draw more definite conclusions from this analysis stems from the limited scope of the study. I only analyzed coverage from the two newspapers for the first six months of the war, because this was the time period where public opinion data shows a significant shift. For this reason, I argued that any observable patterns in media discourse over this six-month period may correlate with this dramatic decline. Indeed, I found patterns in the media coverage that could be associated with the dramatic decline in public support during the early stages of war. Yet, what if the patterns I observed during the first six months were not significantly different from the patterns I observed in media discourse during the rest of the war? If this were the case, I could not claim these changing trends in media discourse caused the drastic changes in public opinion during the first six months, because while

public opinion trends changed after this six month period, patterns in public and media discourse would not.

Therefore, it is clear that employing discursive strategies to explain public opinion is not sufficient for claiming causation, but it can prove an insightful correlation. In both publications, the way the war in Iraq is portrayed shifts, becoming more negative over time in both cases. Both newspapers use similar strategies to articulate this diminishing support and increased negativity: through manipulating traditional structures of agent-patient relationship, writers are able to emphasize certain actors while minimizing others. In addition, through issue framing, writers for the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal* foreground certain aspects of the war they believe to be most important and background or fully omit other aspects they wish to minimize. The process of framing is important in its ability to both emphasize and de-emphasize certain issues. Both publications employ these discursive strategies. In articles found in the *New York Times,* these strategies are consistently used to portray the war negatively. In the case of the *Wall Street Journal*, on the other hand, some of the discursive strategies are first used to cover the war positively, but the trend quickly flips, and these tools are employed to express increasingly negative attitudes toward the war.

The theoretical foundations of discourse analysis are relatively new and unproven, but the effect is clear: Whether we are aware of it or not, the things we read convey messages deeper than just the words on the page. Every text draws from a variety of outside contextual influences and affects us in different ways depending on how we react to and interact with that text. In the case of discourse and the Iraq War, this analysis suggests strong links between the discourse of two major newspapers and declines in public support for the war as a whole. Greater attention to the power of discourse in societal and political contexts will allow us to more clearly see the underlying messages behind the texts we consume. As we see in the case of this study, a fuller understanding of discourse may have important implications in our ability to understand processes like the swings of public opinion.

APPENDIX

Survey Date	% Worth Going	Monthly casualties
3/24/2003	68	92
4/9/2003	76	80
4/14/2003	73	42
6/27/2003	56	36
7/25/2003	63	49
8/25/2003	63	43
9/19/2003	50	33
10/24/2003	54	47
11/14/2003	56	110
12/14/2003	62	48
1/9/2004	59	52
2/1/2004	49	23
3/25/2004	56	52
4/16/2004	52	140
5/21/2004	45	84
6/21/2004	46	50
7/8/2004	47	58
8/25/2004	51	75
9/5/2004	49	87
10/9/2004	44	68

Correlation Coefficient:	-.0278

Source: Casualty numbers: "Iraq Coalition Casualties: Fatalities by Year and Month," http://icasualties.org/iraq/ByMonth.aspx. Public opinion data: "All in all, do you think it was worth going to war in Iraq?" "Iraq," Gallup, www.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx

Gallup Poll Data

Do you favor or opposed the U.S. war with Iraq?

Do you favor or oppose the U.S. war with Iraq?

	2003 Mar 22-23	2003 Apr 5-6	2003 Apr 10	2003 Apr 22-23	2003 Oct 24-26	2004 Nov 19-21	2005 Mar 18-20	2005 Jun 16-19	2006 Feb 9-12	2007 Jan 15-18
Favor	72	70	72	71	54	48	47	39	40	36
Oppose	25	27	22	26	43	46	47	59	56	61

	Favor	Oppose
	%	%
2003 Mar 22–23	72	25
2003 Apr 5–6	70	27
2003 Apr 10	72	22
2003 Apr 22–23	71	26
2003 Oct 24–26	54	43
2004 Nov 19–21	48	46
2005 Mar 18–20	47	47
2005 Jun 16–19	39	59
2006 Feb 9–12	40	56
2007 Jan 15–18	36	61

Source: "Iraq," Gallup, www.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx

In general, how would you say things are going for the U.S. in Iraq?


Note: In order to simplify the visualization, categories "Very well" and "Moderately well" along with "Very badly" and "Moderately badly" were combined and grouped into categories "Well" and "Badly." The table on the next page provides combined percentages and percentages by category.

	Very well	Moderately well	Well	Badly	Moderately badly	Very badly	No opinion
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
22-Apr	21	64	85	14	12	2	1
5-May	30	56	86	13	10	3	1
30-May	11	59	70	29	22	7	1
27-Jun	5	51	56	42	29	13	2
18-Jul	6	48	54	45	30	15	1
25-Aug	6	44	50	49	30	19	1
8-Sep	6	41	47	52	31	21	1
8-Oct	6	36	42	58	34	24	*
5-Nov	4	34	38	61	34	27	1
7-Mar	9	46	55	43	28	15	2
5-Apr	5	30	35	64	31	33	1
4-May	4	33	37	62	32	30	1
3-Jun	6	34	40	60	35	25	*
8-Jul	5	35	40	59	30	29	1
11-Aug	5	40	45	53	28	25	2
24-Sep	4	42	46	52	27	25	2
5-Dec	6	34	40	59	26	33	1
7-Jan	5	35	40	59	29	30	1
6-Feb	13	40	53	46	28	18	1
18-Mar	8	44	52	45	24	21	3
29-Apr	6	36	42	56	31	25	2
7-Aug	5	38	43	56	28	28	1
21-Oct	7	35	42	57	29	28	1
6-Jan	8	38	46	53	32	21	1
10-Mar	6	32	38	60	32	28	1
11-Jun	8	39	47	53	30	23	1
10-Oct	3	32	35	64	29	35	2
7-Jan	3	25	28	71	33	38	1
3-Nov	8	35	43	56	43	13	1
25-Jul	8	38	46	51	32	19	3
23-Aug	9	38	47	51	31	20	2
5-Sep	13	39	52	47	26	21	1
14-Mar	8	43	51	43	29	14	5
10-Jul	7	49	56	40	26	14	3

Source: "Iraq," Gallup, www.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx.

## All in all, do you think it was worth going to way in Iraq, or not?

Worth going to war   Not worth going to war   No opinion

Worth going to war	Not worth going to war	No opinion
%	%	%
68	29	3
67	30	3
76	19	5
73	23	4
56	42	2
63	35	2
63	34	3
58	40	2
50	48	2
55	44	1
54	44	2
54	44	2
56	42	2
59	39	2
62	33	5
65	33	2
59	38	3
49	49	2
55	43	2
56	41	3
50	47	3
52	46	2
50	47	3
44	54	2
45	52	3
46	52	2
46	51	3
47	50	3
49	48	3
51	46	3
49	48	3
44	54	2
46	52	2
48	50	2
45	53	2
41	57	2
42	56	2
46	52	2
44	53	3
44	54	2
45	53	2
38	60	2
37	62	1
46	52	3
37	60	3

Source: "Iraq," Gallup, www.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx.

Pew Research Center Data

The raw data for U.S. public opinion surveys conducted by Pew during the Iraq War are not publicly available, results are presented in written reports and in graphs.

Decision to Use Military Force in Iraq?

Source: Public Attitudes toward the War in Iraq," Pew Research Center, www.pewresearch. org/2008/03/19/public-attitudes-toward-the-war-in-iraq-20032008/.

Casualty Data

Coalition Casualty Count By Month

Source: "Iraq Coalition Casualties: Fatalities by Year and Month," http://icasualties.org/iraq/ByMonth.aspx.

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