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Comparing Fundamentalisms: A Social Movement Theory Approach

David Romney

In the last forty years, the emergence of a number of Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups has resulted in a number of comparative studies that try to explain this phenomenon (e.g., Antoun and Hegland 1987; Sivan and Friedman 1990). Although scholars have argued varying reasons for this recent religious resurgence, most have recognized the importance of the 1967 Israeli War (Six-Day War) to both Jewish and Islamist fundamentalist movements. Some of these scholars see the religious resurgence following this war as a continuation of religious sentiments expressed by pre-1967 Zionist and fundamentalist Islamic groups rather than as a new movement (Davis 1987, 149–52). Others, while stressing the importance of previous Islamic revivalism, note the 1967 war marked a turning point for both Islamist and Jewish groups (Esposito 2005, 160–65). Some also see global trends that unite not just Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups but all fundamentalist groups (Keddie 1998). Others take a different tack, claiming Islamic and Jewish fundamentalist movements are actually quite different from each other and only superficially mirror each other. For instance, Hunter asserts that when compared to Islamic fundamentalism, Jewish fundamentalism focuses more on the possibility of future failures and the importance of preventing these failures rather than on past grievances or experiences (1993, 31–32). In spite of this research, two basic questions about Islamism and Jewish fundamentalism remain unanswered: 1) What effect has the 1967 War had on the Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist movements, and 2) Do these movements mirror each other or have they developed independently?

Using a social movement theory (SMT) approach, I will argue that post-1967 Jewish and Islamic fundamentalist movements mirror each other in a number of crucial

ways. According to SMT, individual political desires are translated into group-based social movements through the presence of appropriate social movement organizations (SMOs; Wiktorowicz 2004). As outlined by Robinson (2004), the presence and use of three factors can enhance the viability of an SMO: changes in political opportunity structures, effective mobilizing structures, and correct cultural framing. Robinson and Wiktorowicz have shown how Islamist activist groups can be analyzed under a social movement theory framework, but aside from Munson (2008), no one has applied this framework to explain Jewish activist groups. In this paper, I will show post-1967 fundamentalist Jewish movements, like their Islamist counterparts, can be better understood through SMT. By applying SMT, three ideas are made apparent: 1) The political opportunity structures for both Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups changed as a result of the 1967 war, stimulating the appearance of new SMOs on both sides after this war, 2) SMOs of both sides have used similar mobilizing structures since the 1967 war, and 3) since the 1967 War, SMOs of both sides have used cultural framing to address three similar issues: unfaithful coreligionists, the status of the land of Palestine, and past failures or tragedies.

I will use a purposefully broad definition of fundamentalism for this study. For the purposes of this paper, I define religious fundamentalist groups as those striving for religious orthodoxy. Although this definition is not specific, it allows me to look broadly at different fundamentalist movements. In this study, I will focus on examples from the fundamentalist movements of Hamas, Gush Emunim, and Kach, all of which conform to this definition of fundamentalism.

The 1967 Israeli War changed the political opportunity structures for Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist movements. For this study, changes in political opportunity structures are defined according to Robinson's definition: political changes that alter the opportunities available for an SMO (2004, 123). For Islamist movements, the capture of the occupied territories in the 1967 War was such a change. The failure of the Arab forces in this war and Israel's occupation of the Gaza strip and the West Bank led Palestinians to depend less on foreign sources of organization for their nationalistic movements, because foreign powers were forced to loosen their hold on parts of Palestine. Up until the 1967 War, resistance against Israel by the Palestinians consisted of fedayeen (suicide squads) attacks from Egypt or other states; however, as a result of the 1967 War, Israel began to occupy the areas where these attacks had originated (Tessler 1994, 399–464). Israel was able to rid these areas of many fedayeen fighters, but they were unsuccessful in getting rid of all of them. Over time, this neglect led to the emergence of many Palestinian activist groups, now more effective, because they have been operating inside Israeli-controlled territory.

For Jewish fundamentalist movements, the same event—the gain of territory after the 1967 War—changed political opportunity structures by allowing these movements to pursue their goal of incorporating Judea and Samaria in the state of Israel.

Some groups, particularly the revisionist Zionists led by Jabotinsky, expressed their desire early on to bring all of historical Palestine within the borders of the modern Israeli state. Before the 1967 War this goal was impossible to achieve. There were two main reasons the 1967 War changed this situation. First, after the war, the ownership of Judea and Samaria was a reality, not a dream (at least as far as the Israelis were concerned). Fulfilling these territorial desires was, therefore, a physical possibility. Second, many secular and religious Jews, not just fundamentalist groups, supported territorial expansion immediately following the 1967 War. As Sprinzak outlines, immediately following this war, Israeli politics were dominated by two camps: the maximalists (those who advocated territorial expansion, believing the occupied territories helped Israel better defend itself) and the minimalists (those who believed territorial compromise with the Arabs would help better secure the state of Israel) (1999, 115–16). Some of these maximalists wanted to spur settler movement into the West Bank for religious reasons. Kahane, who drew from Jabotinsky's ideology in explaining the religious justification for expansion, is perhaps the most famous religious maximalist from this time period (191). However, other maximalists wanted to expand for security reasons. They felt gaining this territory would provide the state of Israel with a buffer zone that would keep them safe from future attacks. This reasoning, although opposed by the minimalists who could not "ignore the implications of having become an occupying power," attracted secular and fundamentalist Jews, lending a broad support base to the settler movement (Oz 1983, 133). For these two reasons, territorial gains after the 1967 war changed the opportunities available to Jewish fundamentalist groups.

Since 1967, Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups have also used similar mobilizing structures, defined as networks, which enhance the ability of an SMO to recruit new members. In the years following the 1967 war, a huge spike in mosque construction and the creation of al-mujamma' al-Islami—an "Islamic collective" that eventually oversaw 40 percent of the mosques in Gaza strip as well as a university (Robinson 1997, 137)—formed an extensive mobilizing structure the Muslim Brotherhood and later Hamas used to recruit new members. As outlined by Robinson, the 1973 establishment of the mujamma' in the Gaza strip was, in part, a response to the secular nationalism of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and, in part, a result of changes following the 1967 War (136–47). Seeing the success the PLO had achieved in mobilizing activists through grassroots movements at Palestinian universities, the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza wanted similar organizations that would promote nationalistic ideology with an Islamist tinge. Because of the failure of secular governments during the 1967 War and increasing dissatisfaction of citizens, the mujamma's message was in some ways more palatable to the increasingly religious society. Evidences of this increasing religious fervor included doubling the number of mosques in the Gaza strip, a rise in the popularity of religious literature, and the establishment

of a number of Islamic universities for teaching Islamic law (136). According to Abu-Amr, mosques were the most important tools in recruiting (1993, 7–8). The Muslim Brotherhood, through the *mujamma'*, also ran libraries, social clubs, and other social organizations that endeared the population to Hamas. In the mosques, protected from Israeli interference out of a respect for religion, is where they recruited members by disseminating their ideas after the daily prayer services (1993, 8). By channeling the society's religious fervor in a political direction, and by organizing several institutions under the centralized *al-mujamma' al-islami*, the Muslim Brotherhood, and later Hamas, gained an audience for their message.

Similarly, after the 1967 War, the *yeshivot* (schools for Talmudic study) in Israel played a crucial role in the formation and recruitment efforts of the Jewish fundamentalist group Gush Emunim. One *yeshiva* in particular, Yeshivat Merkaz ha-Rav, has been important throughout Gush Emunim's history. In May 1967, just three weeks before the 1967 War, Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook powerfully declared his frustration at the fact the Jews did not yet hold all of Biblical Israel, stating, "Where is our Hebron—are we forgetting it? Where is our Shechem? Are we forgetting it? And where is our Jericho—are we forgetting it? And where is the eastern bank of the Jordan" (Segev 2007, 181)? When, after the war, Israel gained the exact cities Rabbi Kook had mentioned in his speech, many of his followers saw Israel's victory as a miracle. Some of the students from the *Yeshiva*, led by Rabbi Moshe Levinger, were inspired by this "miracle" to found Kiryat Arba, a settlement located just on the outskirts of Hebron. Kiryat Arba was the first settlement of what would later be called the Gush Emunim movement. Although the Gush Emunim movement would not be officially established until 1974, when the Yom Kippur War helped its movement gain more steam, its roots are found in the reaction of Yeshivat Merkaz ha-Rav to the 1967 War.

This *yeshiva* continued to be the primary means of recruitment as the movement progressed, and other *yeshivot* also began to support Gush Emunim. Like *al-mujamma' al-islami*, the *yeshivot* combined both religious and social services into one institution. The students there grow up together and spend time with the same teachers, developing social ties equivalent to those developed in the social clubs and mosques of the *mujamma'*. Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook took advantage of these close associations between students to encourage them to join the settlements, forming the ideologically devoted core that the movement needed during this formative stage (Sprinzak 1991, 125). During the period between the 1967 War and the formal organization of Gush Emunim, other *yeshivot* began to join by providing support, particularly the *yeshivot* of the Bnei Akiva movement. Even after 1974, when formal organizations were created to help with recruitment, the youth of Merkaz ha-Rav still continued to play an important role, inspiring others to join the movement (126).

Cultural framing, the last similarity between Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist movements I will address, is perhaps the most interesting of the three. In SMT,

cultural framing is an assemblage of tools through which we interpret the world around us (Wiktorowicz 2004, 15). According to Robinson, these tools are most effective when condensed into a pithy, “bumper sticker” statement; statements like these allow potential members to easily understand and either identify with or reject an SMO’s ideological leanings (Robinson 2004, 116–17). The religious rhetoric Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups used to address certain issues conforms to this description. Particularly, after the 1967 War, Islamist movements and Jewish fundamentalist movements began to use similar cultural framing devices to when approaching three topics: less faithful coreligionists, the status of the land of Palestine, and past failures or tragedies.

After 1967, fundamentalist groups on both sides increasingly demonize their less pious coreligionists, accusing them of undermining their righteous plans. According to Esposito (2005, 166), the issue of less faithful coreligionists is important for Islamist groups for two reasons: 1) They believe it is necessary to institute Sharia law before a government is considered legitimate, and 2) They believe jihad is incumbent upon all Muslims. In order for these two goals to be accomplished, Muslims in these fundamentalist groups need the help of other Muslims. For this reason, some of these groups have asserted that coreligionists who do not support Sharia law or jihad against unbelievers are the same as atheists or infidels. However, unlike Jewish fundamentalists, those deemed infidels are often government leaders rather than those leaning or of another political party. For instance, Hamas has often criticized Fatah, the main faction of the PLO, with these terms. Because Hamas criticizes Fatah with respect to an increasingly popular religious viewpoint (as already outlined, Gazans are becoming increasingly religious at this point in time), this term reverberates well with the population.

Jewish fundamentalist groups tend to demonize their less faithful coreligionists in a similar manner. For Jewish fundamentalists, the issue of less faithful coreligionists is important because they believe that immoral actions by secular Jews will delay the coming of the Messiah. These fundamentalists also blame the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the seculars, thinking that removing the secular Jews will allow God to fulfill the promises made to the Jews in the Hebrew Bible. A quote from Benjamin Ze’ev Kahane, son of Rabbi Meir Kahane, illustrates the intensity with which those on the Jewish side express these convictions:

The problem is not the Arabs—the problem is the Jews. The truth, the way we look at it, is that there has never been an Arab problem. We could have solved that problem in forty-eight hours, if only we wanted to. The real war is not with Arabs but with the Hellenized Jews. All the blood shed by Arab terrorism is “as if” shed by the Arabs; the people really responsible for the bloodshed are Jews scared by the Gentiles and attached to distorted Western ideas. (Sprinzak 1999, 264–65)

Here, the out-group being criticized is not, as is often the case, the Arabs; rather, it is secular Jews, who are not dedicated to the in-group's idea of what it means to be a "righteous" Jew, who receive the criticism.

Similar sentiments are expressed by those who apply the term "self-hating Jew" to others. This term has a long history of use: Herzl used it to describe those opposed to Zionism; some applied it to Jews in America, Germany, and other Western countries when the expansion of Hitler's power and the persecution of the Jews in other countries threatened Jews as a people; and politicians have used it to describe those who oppose Israeli policy (Finlay 2005, 11–15). Following the 1967 War, it has been used by Jewish fundamentalists to describe secular Jews, and because of its long history of use and its relation to the holocaust, it has easily become a "bumper sticker" term. A usage example of the term is found in a statement by Rabbi Meir Kahane, a fundamentalist who established the Jewish Defense League in 1968 following the 1967 War. He used this term to describe Jewish leftists when he wrote that Israel is "crawling with . . . Hebrew speaking goyim [non-Jews] whose self-hate . . . drives them to reject Judaism" (Paine 1994, 13). More recently, Ariel Sharon has used this term to describe the left when the Oslo peace process threatened the settler movement to the West Bank, saying, "Terrible self-hate engulfs us. . . . Our leaders talk to Arafat about disarming Jews and dismantling Jewish settlements" (Finlay 2005, 15). The use of this term helps other like-minded Jews to quickly view fundamentalists in a positive light. Therefore, both Jewish and Islamist fundamentalist groups used pejoratives as a cultural frame to attract new members who opposed less faithful coreligionists.

After the 1967 War, both Islamists and Jewish fundamentalists also began to use cultural frames when discussing the land of Israel or Palestine. Before the 1967 War, Palestinian claims to the land of Palestine were based on previous land ownership. This is still the main reason Palestinians want to return to Palestine; many still keep the keys to the homes they had to leave after the 1948 war, a symbolic reminder of their ownership rights. However, after the territorial gains by Israel during the 1967 War caused Islamic soul-searching and increased religiosity, Hamas began to emphasize all of Israel belonged to the Muslims by religious mandate. They did this by using a well-known Islamic concept of *waqf* (a religious endowment), usually consisting of property or buildings given by Muslims to the community. Giving one's land as a *waqf* is equivalent to donating it to God. After the 1967 War, Hamas began to declare: "Palestine is a *waqf*," a unique application of this religious term (Robinson 2004, 130–31). Although using the term in this manner is historically inaccurate, it was still effective insofar that it added a religious flavor to the traditional Palestinian right of return.

Similarly, Jewish fundamentalist groups have used religious cultural frames when discussing the occupied territories. They did this by using biblical names and stories in their attempts to get people to move into settlements. For instance, the

leaders of Gush Emunim and the leaders of other fundamentalist groups call the West Bank by its biblical names, Judea and Samaria. Also, present day ads for the settlements often make reference to famous stories from the Bible, implying the settlers are a continuation of a holy tradition. Since these groups and other like-minded people considered the victory in the 1967 War a miracle, using Biblical names like these reminds potential members of the spiritual nature of the 1967 victory, thereby framing the current settler movement in a similar manner.

Lastly, Islamists and Jewish fundamentalists have both used cultural frames when addressing how to overcome past failures or tragedies. For many Arabs, their loss in the 1967 War marked their biggest failure in recent history. According to Esposito, many Islamists blame recent Muslim failures, including the loss in 1967, on a decline in religiosity (2005, 160–62). Therefore, religious frames during this time period were effective for reaching out to those disaffected with the status quo. For Islamists, and particularly Hamas, the greatest such frame has been that “Islam is the solution.” Robinson cites this slogan as the most popular slogan among modern Islamist movements in the Middle East, noting this specific phrase and its sentiments appear in Hamas’s 1988 charter (2004, 130–31). Again, using a religious cultural frame proves useful in attracting new members.

Jewish fundamentalist groups, on the other hand, have used the slogan “never again” when addressing this issue. This is perhaps their most effective frame since the Holocaust left such a large impact on Israel. This term was actually used before 1967; it was popularized after the 1948 War as a deliberate attempt by the government to wipe away the image of the “Holocaust Jew” (Almog 2000). Because these efforts by the government still affect Jewish perceptions today, this frame resonates particularly well with potential members. For this reason, Kahane uses this phrase as the title of one of his books, which outlines the need for American Jews to rise up against those fighting the state of Israel rather than being passive in this fight (1971).

Looking at these examples, we see SMT is particularly useful for evaluating Jewish fundamentalist movements. By applying SMT in this study, we also see Jewish fundamentalist movements are quite similar to Islamist fundamentalist movements. Lastly, through application of SMT, we see a common explanation for the recent resurgence, namely the changes in political opportunity structures, an effective use of mobilizing structures, and a correct use of cultural frames since the 1967 war have together caused the recent increase in the number of Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups.

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The Role of Party Identification in a Nonpartisan Election: A Case Study in Provo, Utah

Sean Kelly and Allison Holmes

Introduction

Every November we are urged to go to the polls and vote for a wide range of elected officials. The process in which we make our decision is largely influenced by party identification. This is a low-cost tool voters use as they cast their ballots, but when official party identification is removed, as it is in nonpartisan elections, how do voters make their choice?

Nonpartisan elections originated from the hope that by removing party organizations from elections, voters would make their decisions for the best candidate and not the party affiliation (Schaffner et al., 2001, 9). Gerald C. Wright notes that “more than three-fourths of municipal elections and about half of all U.S. elections use the nonpartisan ballot” (2008, 13). With the large number of nonpartisan elections, political scientists still know little about the process voters go through in deciding who to vote for in these types of elections. We argue that whether or not party identification is removed as a factor in a nonpartisan ballot election is largely dependent upon campaign effects; where candidates use mailers, signs, phone calls, and door-to-door contacts to frame and counter-frame one another in partisan terms.

The 2009 Provo City mayoral race, an area in which both the voters and the candidates heavily lean toward the Republican Party, provides an excellent setting to analyze the effectiveness and use of campaign effects to introduce party identification in nonpartisan elections. The two mayoral candidates were Steve Clark and John Curtis. Our hypothesis was that Clark, through campaign effects, would frame Curtis as a democrat, making the election partisan. As a result, Clark would win the election due to the high concentration of conservative voters. While our assumptions that

Clark would frame Curtis as a democrat held true, Curtis counteracted Clark's efforts with his own campaign and win the election. These results are aligned with our thesis that in the absence of official party identification, candidates determine the impact of political identification through their campaign strategy.

Literature Review

Nonpartisan elections were created to limit party influence in politics. Schaffner et al. describe the progressive movement as the belief that by eliminating the influence of partisanship, elections would result in better outcomes, such as the election of government officials who are more attentive to local needs (2001, 8). Schaffner et al. go on to explain that the progressives' conclusions rely on an informed electorate interested in obtaining the "common good" (Schaffner et al. 2001, 9).

This ideal of a caring, informed electorate is unrealistic. Research shows that rather than spending hours online, reading the newspaper, or engaging in political dialogue, voters look for low-cost cues to help them make their vote choice (Schaffner et al. 2001, 9; see also Lupia 1994; Popkins 1994). Essentially, this means even among those who actually vote on Election Day, the majority have not invested much time researching and seeking for the "common good." Campbell et al. in the *American Voter*, explain that party identification is a significant low-cost tool that drives vote choice on Election Day (1960).

In the absence of official party identification, voting behavior may be significantly affected by other factors. In their study, Schaffner et al. conclude that without party identification, voters rely on the most readily available low-cost cue—incumbency. This augments the theory that voters do not take the time to search out the issues in order to make informed decisions. Schaffner et al. also suggest that in nonpartisan elections, "even a modestly effective campaign might have substantial effects where voters have few readily available pointers on who they should support" (2001, 26). Essentially, the theory that whoever wins the campaign contact battle will have a greater chance of winning seems correct. This could be said of any election, but it is more prevalent in nonpartisan elections where voters are more susceptible to campaign influence.

So far, the impact of removing party identification has been examined, and there is research suggesting party affiliation may still be influential in nonpartisan elections. Peverill Squire and Eric R.A.N. Smith explain that voters may not need the party officially identified on the ballot, because they "will pick up on partisan cues in the environment" and it is possible for voters to still "use partisan information to structure their voting decisions" (Peverill and Smith 1988, 177). This complements the theory of Schaffner et al. that campaign effects have greater potential to influence nonpartisan races. As a result, campaigns may turn nonpartisan elections partisan as they frame either or both candidates as being directly affiliated with a certain party.

Squire and Smith are not alone in their assumptions. Charles R. Adrian categorizes nonpartisan elections into one of four types. A type I election is when the candidate's party is easily identified and voters view the election in partisan terms (1959, 452). A type II election is where candidates are supported by a number of groups including parties; this type of election still contains the influence of the party but not as directly as in Type I elections due to the presence of other groups who are not associated with either party but are still politically active in the election (1959, 453). A type III election is characterized by the support of different interest groups for the candidates but very little support from political parties. Lastly, a type IV election is one where political parties are not important in campaigns (1959, 457). Adrian's article explains the party may play a role in nonpartisan elections in varying degrees ranging from very involved in Type I nonpartisan elections to not involved at all in Type IV nonpartisan elections.

In summary, the campaign is the largest determinant of election type. David A. Niven uses psychological research to explain how voters can be influenced. Voters are influenced depending on "the accessibility of the message" and "[thinking] themselves personally affected by the message" (Niven 2004, 871). Campaigns seek to influence vote choice; if they are successful in making their message "accessible" and salient, they can determine the level of partisanship in an election. This will depend on whether or not a candidate believes he or she has an advantage by attaching party identification to the nonpartisan election.

A Case Study: Provo, Utah

The 2009 Provo City mayoral race offered an ideal opportunity to understand how campaigns determine the effects of creating the illusion of partisanship in a nonpartisan election. Provo, Utah, is a distinctive place. The population is homogenous—especially among voters. The majority of residents are religiously active, politically conservative, and family oriented. In fact, more than 70 percent of the population identify themselves as republican (Appendix A, Table 1). While these demographics make it difficult to apply our findings to other populations, it allows us to isolate and analyze the role of partisan framing through campaign effects.

Both mayoral candidates, Steve Clark and John Curtis, have similar characteristics that reflect the population: they are both white, middle-aged males and members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. While neither one of them was technically an incumbent, Steve Clark was serving as a State Representative. Therefore, we assumed any incumbent advantage would transfer to him. Previous to the mayoral election, John Curtis had unsuccessfully run for a State House and Senate seat. As a result of their backgrounds, both candidates had significant campaign experiences. Clark and Curtis were raised in the Provo area, have large families, and were executives of successful local companies.

The two main issues facing Provo voters were iProvo and zoning law issues. When we looked at the candidates' web sites, we could not find a clear distinction between their views on these issues. Therefore, we assumed the issues would play little role in the outcome of the election.

Hypotheses

The literature suggests that even in a nonpartisan election, party identification can play a significant role. Due to the Republican Party dominance in Provo, we believed that if a candidate had any history with the Democratic Party, it would be a disadvantage to them at the polls.

While prominent members of the Republican Party endorsed both candidates, Curtis previously had been both the vice-president and president of the Utah County Democratic Party. As a result, we predicted Clark's campaign would frame Curtis as a democrat to turn the election partisan. We hypothesized that Clark would win the race with the clear republican advantage in Provo.

Data/Methodology

We collected campaign literature from both campaigns. This was necessary to determine whether or not Clark used Curtis' political history against him. It was also important to see how Curtis' campaign would respond to any suggestion that he was not "republican enough" to be the Provo mayor. Because we were interested in partisan framing, the only mailers we analyzed in this study were those that identified Curtis as a democrat and his response to those attacks.

We used data from the Utah Colleges Exit Poll to evaluate the effectiveness of both campaigns. The exit poll has been in operation since 1982 and has consistently been the most accurate poll in Utah. On Election Day, there were pollsters at all nineteen voting locations. They selected voters at a random interval based on the projected turnout for their given location. On Election Day, 10,750 people voted, and over 2,500 participated in the exit poll. We used three questions from the survey: the first measured the party identification of each voter, the second measured the perceived party identification of the candidates, and the third, a count of the campaign contacts the voters received during the campaign (Appendix 3).

Perceived candidate party identification, which will be referred to as candidate party identification, was measured on a seven-point scale (Campbell et al., 1960). The lower a voter ranked the candidate on the scale, the stronger their perception that candidate is a democrat. The "other" and "don't know" categories were also included in the question. We dropped these responses from our data and only considered options one through seven. We subtracted the party identification of Clark from Curtis to use as the dependent variable in our regression model. This produced a scale ranging from negative six to positive six. This scale was treated as semi-continuous and was analyzed in an ordinary, least-squares regression measuring the effect of

campaign in determining the difference in candidate party identification. A negative coefficient indicates voters saw Curtis as being more republican than Clark, and a positive coefficient indicates voters saw Clark as more republican. A response of zero meant voters saw no difference between the candidate's party identification (Appendix 2, Figure 1).

Campaign effects were measured via a question asking voters the ways they were contacted by each campaign. The question included nine ways the voters could have been contacted, including personal contact from the candidate or campaign, mailers, blogs, etc. (Appendix 3, Figure 3). The results of this question can be seen in Table 4 (Appendix 1). We used this data in several ways. First, we included in the model if they had received a letter from Clark or a letter from Curtis. We analyzed this separately from the others, because it was the only campaign effect used to shape candidate party identification. We did this to see if the letters would have a significant impact on candidate party identification. After totaling the contacts, we calculated the difference between Clark's total campaign contacts and Curtis' total campaign contacts (Appendix 2, Graph 2) to examine the distribution of campaign contacts for Clark and Curtis. This distribution, as demonstrated by the negative values on the x-axis, shows Curtis' campaign contacted more individuals than Clark's. Lastly, we included a model controlling whether a voter had received mail from both candidates (Appendix 1, Table 3). This table shows the majority of individuals who reported being contacted by a campaign received letters from both Curtis and Clark. This was calculated to see if the impact of letters on painting the partisanship of a candidate was statistically significant beyond the impact of receiving a letter on its own. If our thesis is correct, then campaign effects would be significant in determining how voters perceived candidate party identification. A null finding would be because voters saw no difference in party identification between Clark and Curtis and, thus, the election was in reality nonpartisan.

Results

John Curtis ultimately won the election but not without Steve Clark attempting to make the election about party affiliation. As was predicted, Clark's campaign sent out mail explaining to voters that Curtis had previously run for State Senate as a democrat and later was both the president and vice-president of the Utah County Democratic Party (Appendix 4, Figure 1). Curtis then countered with his own mailer explaining why he had previously run as a democrat and why it was not important for the Provo mayoral election (Appendix 4, Figure 2).

Candidate party identification was measured by calculating the mean party identification score for each candidate. These results may be seen in Table 2 (Appendix 1). This table shows Clark had a higher mean score than Curtis. Essentially voters saw Clark as being more republican. While Clark was not able to persuade

voters that Curtis was a democrat, voters did see him as being less-republican than Clark, which suggests that Clark's mailers did have an effect on the voters' view of Curtis' party identification. A comparison of means test was conducted to see if this difference in candidate party identification was significant. These results can be seen in Table 2 (Appendix 1). The test statistic was -10.41, which means the difference in party identification was significant at the 95 percent level.

Table 3 (Appendix A) shows the percentages of voters who were contacted by only Curtis, only Clark, both of them, or neither of them. This table shows both candidates contacted 53.8 percent of the voters combined. Overall though, Curtis contacted more voters than Clark. While Clark's campaign was successful at painting Curtis to be less republican, it is plausible that Curtis won because he simply reached a higher number of voters than Clark.

The responses for campaign contacts were calculated and are seen in Table 4 (Appendix 1). This table contains the percentage of respondents who were contacted in each of the nine categories. These percentages were calculated out of the 929 voters who responded to the question. This table shows Curtis contacted a higher percentage of the voters than Clark in every category except for blogs. This is supported by the campaign expenditures of the candidates where Curtis spent about \$90,000 and Clark only spent about \$36,000 (Provo City web site). It follows that Curtis would contact more by spending more.

For those voters who received mail from both Clark and Curtis, Curtis limited the effectiveness of Clark's efforts to frame the election in partisan terms. Figure 1 (Appendix 2), which is a frequency distribution of candidate party identification, substantiates this claim. This figure shows a plurality of voters did not see a difference between the party identification of Clark and Curtis. A response of no difference would be zero on the negative six to positive six party identification scale.

In order to explain which campaign contacts had the biggest effects on voter perceptions, we ran four different models utilizing various measurements of campaign effects on the dependent variable, difference in party identification. The results of these four models may be seen in Table 5 (Appendix 1).

The first model included whether or not the voter received a letter from Clark explaining Curtis' ties with democrats and whether or not they received a letter from Curtis countering Clark's claims. We recognize that we do not know which specific mailer(s) the individual voters received from either candidate, but we assume the voters who received mail most likely received multiple mailers, at least one of which framed Curtis as a democrat. This model reveals that those who received a letter from Curtis thought Curtis was more republican. Conversely, those who received a letter from Clark thought Clark was more republican. This is evidenced by the negative coefficient for a letter from Curtis and a positive coefficient for a letter from Clark. Additionally, both of these variables are significant at the 99 percent level. This pro-

vides evidence that Clark's campaign was successful at making Curtis appear less of a republican and that Curtis' campaign was successful at countering Clark's claims. It is important to note that the coefficient for the letter from Clark is larger than the coefficient for the letter from Curtis, because it suggests Clark's letter had a more substantive difference in affecting voters' perceptions of his party identification than Curtis' letter.

The second model consists of all nine campaign contact categories for each candidate, where the first model only looked at the letters sent by the candidates. The coefficients are still significant and still in the same direction, but they are smaller in magnitude than the coefficients in Model 1. When all campaign contacts are included in the model, the impact of each campaign on party identification decreases but is still significant. This could be because the content of the other campaign contacts did not concern party identification but could have been about other issues.

The third model contains the difference between the total campaign contacts of Clark and the total campaign contacts of Curtis. This variable's coefficient was significant and positive. This suggests that in total, Clark's campaign was better at influencing candidate party identification than that of Curtis, despite Curtis contacting a significantly larger percentage of voters.

The fourth model is the most complete, because it controls for the voters who received mail from both candidates (which was the largest percentage of voters). This makes it easy to analyze which campaign had greater impact on shaping voters perception of the candidates' party identification. Including whether or not voters received mail from both candidates resulted in Curtis' coefficient becoming larger than Clark's. This is noteworthy, because in the first model excluding the "both mail" variable, the coefficient for the letter from Clark was larger than the letter for Curtis. This means ultimately the Curtis campaign successfully counteracted Clark's effort to turn the election partisan. Both letter coefficients for Clark and Curtis were still significant. Also, the "both mail" variable was not significant. This indicates voters who received letters from both candidates did not see a difference in their party identification. This explains why Curtis won in such a conservative city despite Clark's efforts to paint him as a democrat. The r-squared values for the first three models were very low, the highest being 0.10. The r-squared value for the fourth model was 0.57. This large increase provides evidence that the fourth model is the best at explaining the difference in party identification between Clark and Curtis.

Limitations

The nature of nonpartisan elections limits how much we can generalize. A major theme of this paper is that candidate campaigns can have a huge impact on the level of partisanship in these types of elections. Additionally, a candidate's personal and political history can have a huge impact on nonpartisan elections. Also, the presence

of divisive issues where differences in political ideology are noticeable could affect whether or not nonpartisan elections really are nonpartisan. While we are confident about the Provo City mayoral election, it would be impossible to use these results to predict other nonpartisan elections, because there is too much variation in unobservable characteristics between cities.

Our study of the Provo City election gave us the ability to see the power of campaign effects in nonpartisan elections given the homogenous demographics of both the candidates and the electorate. While the homogeneity worked to our advantage in this case study, it also makes it difficult to apply our findings to other, more heterogeneous cities. Individual voters will react differently to campaign effects. For example, republicans and democrats might react differently to campaign effects, the effect of which was immeasurable in Provo due to the small presence of democrats. Gender, race, socioeconomic status, and education might also affect the voters' vulnerability to campaign effects. Further research on campaign effects in nonpartisan elections should be done in varying locations to take into account these considerations.

Conclusion

Both Clark and Curtis ran successful campaigns. Both influenced voters' decisions on Election Day through campaign effects. Clark was successful at framing Curtis as a democrat, but Curtis was more successful at counteracting Clark's attacks, and, thus, won the election. Curtis not only successfully counteracted his opponent's attacks, he clearly won the campaign contact battle, which likely contributed to his election victory.

The study of campaign effects in nonpartisan elections should be an area of continued research. Our research has focused specifically on the effect campaigns have on shaping the voters' view of party identification in a nonpartisan race. Nonpartisan elections were originally established to remove party identification from the candidates in order to focus the election on "who the best man for the job is" (Schaffner et. al 2001). As long as voters refuse to research each candidate and the issues, they will be easily swayed by low-cost cues typically sourcing from campaign efforts. Further research of the role party identification of candidates plays in nonpartisan elections would provide evidence for the continued use of nonpartisan elections or to their demise.

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Appendix 1

Table 1

Voter Party ID	Percent
Strong Democrat	4.93
2	1.21
3	7.83
Independent	14.10
5	24.36
6	13.02
Strong Republican	34.55

Table 2: Candidate Party ID Summary question.

Summary	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	t-test
Party ID Curtis	618	4.67	1.41	-10.41
Party ID Clark	615	5.52	1.34	

*Answers of 0 (no response), 8, 9 (prefer not to say, don't know) were all dropped from the Party ID

Table 3: Who contacted Whom

Clark

Curtis	No Contact	Contact	Total
No Contact	2	6.	32
Contact	14.2	5	68
Total	39.4	60.6	100

Table 4: Campaign Contacts

Campaign Affects	Clark	Curtis
Personal Contact	21.42	25.51
Contact by a Campaigner	23.57	30.89
Flyer at House	60.50	72.55
Mail	60.60	68.03
Church Friends/ Activities	23.25	24.54
Email	9.47	11.30
Blogs	10.33	8.40
Neighbor Contact	24.33	25.94
News/Magazine	24.87	27.34


These values are given as percentages.

Table 5: OLS Models


Dependent Variable: Difference in Party ID (6 to -6)				
Regressor	1	2	3	4
Curtis Letter	-0.72** (0.21)			-0.93** (0.27)
Clark Letter	1.12** (0.19)			0.72* (0.37)
Curtis Campaign Contacts		-0.18** (0.04)		
Clark Campaign Contacts		0.32** (0.04)		
Difference in Candidate Campaign Contacts			0.26** (0.03)	
Mail from Both Candidates				0.56 (0.43)
Intercept	0.63** (0.16)	0.52** (0.15)	0.92** (0.08)	0.72** 0.17
R^2	0.05	0.10	0.09	0.57
Standard errors are given in parentheses under coefficients, Individual coefficients are statistically significant at the *5% level or **1% level.				

Appendix 2

Graph 1



Graph 2



Appendix 3

Figure 1: Voter Party Identification

[Q] Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n)

- ☐ Strong Democrat
☐ Not so strong Democrat
☐ Independent leaning Democrat
☐ Independent
☐ Independent leaning Republican
☐ Not so strong Republican
☐ Strong Republican
☐ Other
☐ Don't know

Figure 2: Candidate Party Identification

[O] On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is a strong Democrat and 7 is a strong Republican, where would you place each of the following people? Circle one number for each line.

	Strong Democrat ▼		Independent ▼		Strong Republican ▼		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
a. Governor Herbert	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
b. Senator Bennett	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
c. John Curtis	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
d. Steve Clark	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Figure 3: Campaign Effects

[J] Candidates contact voters in many ways. Please mark the ways in which you have had contact with Steve Clark and John Curtis or their campaigns.

	Steve Clark	John Curtis
a. Personal Contact	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Contact by a Campaigner	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Flyer at House	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Mail	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Church Friends/Activities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Email	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
g. Blogs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
h. Neighbor Contact	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
i. News/Magazine	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Appendix 4

Figure 1: Clark letter/ Front Side

**IF CONSISTENCY IS IMPORTANT TO YOU,
REVIEW THE HARD FACTS:**


FACT John Curtis "I grew up a Republican in Salt Lake City"

FACT In 2000, John Curtis switched to the Democrat Party to run for State Senate as a Democrat, and lost.

FACT John Curtis then served as Utah County Democrat Party Vice Chair.

FACT Next, John Curtis served as Utah County Democrat Party Chair.

FACT In 2007 when a Republican state legislator retired, John Curtis switched parties again to campaign for the open seat as a Republican, and was not chosen.




FACT Steve Clark has represented Provo for 9 years as a Republican in the Utah State Legislature.

FACT Steve Clark served for 7 years on the Provo City Council as an advocate for conservative principles and values.

FACT Since 1979, Steve Clark has owned Clark Mechanical Contractors, a successful Provo business, known for fairness, quality work and fiscal responsibility.

"My conservative values are part of who I am. I don't change them year by year depending on the situations I'm facing. My principles guided me for seven years as I served on the Provo City Council, and during the nine years I've represented Provo as a Republican in the State Legislature. They'll continue to guide me as Provo's mayor." —STEVE CLARK




STEVE CLARK
MAYOR OF PROVO

**CONSISTENT VALUES & PROVEN LEADERSHIP
VOTE STEVE CLARK NOVEMBER 3RD!**

Back Side

Facts are stubborn things.

—Ronald Reagan




**> BEFORE YOU VOTE FOR PROVO MAYOR THIS YEAR,
REVIEW THE FACTS**

Paid for by the Committee to Elect Steve Clark
180 East 4th Avenue
Provo, UT 84601

NO POSTAGE
NECESSARY
IF MAILED
IN THE
UNITED STATES

For more information about Steve and the issues facing Provo, visit
www.StephenDClark.com

Figure 2: Curtis Letter/ Back Side



For more information
Call John at: (801) 362-0015
or Visit: www.JohnCurtis.org

Dear Concerned Citizens,

From the outset of this campaign I have been committed to focusing on the issues and being positive in my approach. This campaign is about principles not politics. No office is worth holding if you have to step on others to get there. For most of my campaign I have taken the false accusations about me quietly while I focused on the issues. However, this last attack by my opponent requires clarification and that is the purpose of this letter.

As I have often discussed, I have had significant involvement in both major political parties.

Almost a decade ago I became concerned that we lived in an area where elected officials won based solely on their party affiliation or were running unopposed. As a result, there appeared to be a lack of checks and balances which was not healthy and removed accountability from the process.

The verdict is still out on whether it was the right way to deal with the problems but I knew I had to try. I decided to work with the Democratic Party to build a platform that better represented Utah County values with issues like personal responsibility, limited government, and protection of the unborn as well as other conservative values. The goal was to give the voters a choice. Under this platform I ran for the State Senate. Many find it note worthy that my Republican opponent in that race has now endorsed me for mayor.

Ultimately the national issues of the Democratic Party were too uncomfortable for me and like many of you I listed myself as unaffiliated. Several years later I found myself once again a Republican running for Jeff Alexander's open seat at the persuasion of many good Republicans. Thanks to the informed Republican delegates who knew my history I received the most votes of the ten candidates running. However, the State Party Chair chose another candidate who has now also endorsed me for mayor.

I am currently a delegate in the Republican Party, a member of the State Ronald Reagan club, a contributor to the local Republican Party and a Mitt Romney Honorary Campaign Trustee. My run for mayor is endorsed by the former Republican House Majority Leader, two former Republican US Congressmen, all three Republican County Commissioners, the Republican County Sheriff, current and past Utah County Republican Party Leaders and four of our City's Republican State Senators and Representatives (colleagues of my opponent).

While some have not understood my involvement none have questioned my devotion to strong conservative principles that have made this country great. I will always place principles above party and make no excuses for that.



Sincerely,

John R. I
John Curtis

P.S. Ironically Ronald Reagan, which my opponent chose to use in his attack, was once a Democrat as well.

Paid for by: John Curtis for Mayor. 443 N University Ave, Provo, UT 84601

Front Side

Safety • Prosperity • Unity
Provo Mayor
Curtis

“There
he goes
again...”
—Ronald Reagan

> MY OPPONENT IS TRYING TO DEFINE ME.
YOU BE THE JUDGE

Cash, Schools, and Immigrants: The Effects of Income and Education on Xenophobia in South Africa

John David Clark

Introduction

Ethnic tension has long been a part of South Africa's history, most prominently with racial segregation during the apartheid years. In 1994, white minority rule was replaced with black majority rule, and the years following the breakup of apartheid saw a decrease in tensions between whites and other South Africans. However, despite this easing of tensions, problems still persist and a new trend in recent years has been violence against immigrants from other African countries, perpetrated by black South Africans. This problem is troubling and poses serious implications for the future of a multiethnic and democratic state like South Africa. Some of the more prominent reprisals against immigrants have been recent attacks in squatter camps in May 2008. These were carried out by local residents against immigrants. Another recent example has been government action used to "clean up" before the FIFA World Cup. The government paid local residents to forcibly evict immigrant squatters. These eviction squads were nicknamed "red ants" because of the bright red overalls and helmets the government uniformed them with. One red ant said, "It's our land and we have the right to help the authorities move them. If the municipality asks us to destroy these cockroaches then we'll do that and flatten their homes to dust" (*Sunday Times* 2010). Statements like these sound all too similar to those used in justifying Rwanda's genocide and seem ominous for South Africa.

This study attempts to answer the question of what effect income and education have on xenophobia. Although measuring education and income levels is relatively straightforward, one of the major problems with measuring xenophobia is that few people are willing to admit xenophobic tendencies. This problem is especially com-

pounded in a place like South Africa, where the last decade and a half has been devoted to the idea of ethnic integration and creating a "rainbow nation." South Africans deal with racial discourses on an almost daily basis and, therefore, have a good idea of what society expects in relation to other races. In such a setting, traditional surveys are certainly inadequate. One recent innovation in measuring attitudes on sensitive topics is the list experiment. This appears to participants to be a short survey asking them to tell the number of items that make them angry or that they do not like, etc. (note, it does not ask *which* items). In reality, the trick is that the treatment survey has one additional item, an item that appears to fit with the others on the list. Any difference between the mean number of items in the control and treatment groups is attributed to the extra question. The list format appears to promise participants anonymity and privacy, since they surmise, correctly, that researchers cannot identify which specific items make subjects angry. However, the average difference between groups produces an average treatment effect of adding the extra item.

Data was collected in three townships in South Africa during the summer of 2009. The areas in question are all relatively poor, most residents only finished secondary schooling, and many have only a few years of formal education. The survey consisted of the list experiment and several background questions. In this study, I look at the answers to the various list experiments and see how they relate to income and education levels. There were two questions, each with two treatments. The various questions and treatments dealt with xenophobia in general, as well as how it can influence elections. Some of the questions also deal with the ethnicity of South African presidential candidates but can also provide insights into xenophobia against non-South African ethnicities, since these questions also deal with racial attitudes.

After comparing high and low income and education, the results indicate that income and education had no effect on the xenophobic attitudes of the people in these townships. These results were statistically significant, at the 95 percent and 99 percent levels in many cases. This lack of education or income effects could be because the education and income levels are still too low to have an effect, or it could mean that income and education are not as effective in decreasing xenophobia as would be hoped for. It could also imply the relationship between income, education, and xenophobia are more complex and need to be studied more thoroughly in future research.

Literature Review

There are many arguments as to what causes xenophobia and anti-immigrant tension. Although I will only discuss income and education in depth, I will list other arguments and explanations. These include scapegoating (see Johnson 1996, 111; Citrin et al. 1997; and Noyes 2019), the influence of populists and demagogues (see Rydgren 2003; Collier 2003: 58–9; Crush 2000; and Ransford and McDonald 2001), resource scarcity from which I base one of my explanations), and in the specific case

of South Africa, a “culture of violence” (see BBC Online 2002; and UNODC 2010) Although these may matter in explaining xenophobia, I will focus on the potential impact of income and education.

There are two broad arguments for why people with lower education or lower income oppose immigration. The first is resource scarcity and the second is a cultural effect. The logic behind a resource scarcity is that if immigrants come into a labor market with limited jobs, then they can significantly increase competition for employment, and see locals as a the cause of unemployment and other social problems. The logic behind a cultural effect is that as people become more educated, they tend to be more accepting of other ethnicities and backgrounds. They would be less likely to react violently or resort to xenophobic attitudes. I will first discuss literature on the resource scarcity model and then briefly discuss some research on the cultural argument.

One of the most common explanations for animosity toward immigrants is that immigration increases competition for resources by creating resource scarcity. There are several researchers who have shown resource scarcity is a large contributor to xenophobic tensions. Percival and Homer-Dixon argue that certain resource scarcities in South Africa have played a role in increasing violence (1998), and Fisman and Miguel also show how the shrinking of Lake Chad has led to more conflict in that region. In fact, other regions experiencing similar shrinking of resources have also had up to a 30 percent greater chance of conflict (2008, 111–35). Although these have less to do with increased resource scarcity due to immigration, they still explain a similar phenomenon: more incoming immigrants potentially strain resource and job supplies and, therefore, cause more ethnic tension.

In the case of resource scarcity as it relates to jobs, it seems plausible that immigration into South Africa could possibly put a strain on job markets. Most African immigrants coming into South Africa are fleeing bad economic conditions in poorer parts of Africa, such as neighboring Zimbabwe. Since many of the countries are poor and less developed, few people coming from these countries are highly skilled. Even those with good skills are sometimes not given good jobs and so have to work in low skill positions (see Guardian 2010). In short, the immigrants in South Africa tend to be low skill workers. What is more, because of their desperate situations, they are often more willing than South Africans to work for low wages. This leads to the conclusion that the people who are most likely to dislike immigrants would be those with low skills or low income; in other words, the people with whom immigrants are competing. In such cases, a debate arises about who has a right to public goods (Wimmer 1997). When there are fewer resources, locals become the judges of who can enjoy resources and who cannot. And often that means immigrants will be excluded or abused.

Much research has supported this idea. Alan Kessler argues there is a robust relationship between lower income and education and xenophobia. Those people on the lower spectrum of income and education tended to oppose immigration (2001).

Eugene Campbell did a survey in Botswana asking natives their attitudes about immigrants (2003). He found that economic factors and nationalism both influenced peoples' attitudes about immigrants. As Campbell puts it, "There is a strong desire to preserve the 'fruits' of economic prosperity for citizens alone" (2003, 71). This supports the income argument: those with more income are probably less worried about losing the "fruits" of the country, since they have enough material benefits of their own. Interestingly enough, the survey also revealed whites were favored over other races and blacks were favored over Asians, especially Indians. Also supporting this theory, Anna Maria Mayda did a cross country analysis looking at how skill levels correlate to attitudes on immigration (2006). She found people with lower skill levels were generally more opposed to immigration. This also supports the resource-scarcity argument, since those persons with higher skills are often more able to find jobs. As a counter argument to these explanations, some have argued that people with more education are not necessarily less xenophobic, they are simply better at giving more socially desirable answers (see Ostapczuk *et al.* 2009). However, Ostapczuk and his colleagues used a randomized response test with a lie detector and found people with more education still tended to have less xenophobic attitudes than those with lower education levels (2009).

There is also the argument that improved education and income will lead people to be more open-minded and, therefore, willing to accept immigrants or other races. There is less political science or economic research on this topic, but I will mention some of the related literature. Hjerme has observed that Swedish youth who are better educated tend to participate in democratic processes more, whereas those who are less educated tend to resort to more violent measures and are, ultimately, more xenophobic (2005). Hainmueller and Hiscox strengthen this argument by showing Europeans with higher education levels are more open to the idea of immigration, regardless of whether they are unemployed or not, thus weakening the resource scarcity (or labor competition) argument (2007). They say this indicates cultural norms have a greater influence than economic incentives and education has tempering effects.

Although these analyses of xenophobia give us a general idea of some of the attitudes and causes of xenophobia, they have two major problems. First of all, they rely on methods that still fail to get an accurate measure of how people really feel. In other words, they mostly rely on expressed preferences, which are not necessarily the same as actual preferences. Even those methods that use something more still have some problems, like the randomized response test with a lie detector. They try to overcome some of the problems inherent in asking sensitive questions but still rely on participants consciously having to take external social norms into account. More importantly, however, they fail to admit the situation is far more complex than this and the relationship between income, education, and xenophobia has a complicated history throughout the world—especially in South Africa.

Theory and Hypotheses

The dependent variable is xenophobia. I define this as hatred, dislike, or strong mistrust of foreigners. The two independent variables are income and education. Income is money earned by a household, and education is years of schooling and types of education (such as secondary school or university). Education is a more problematic variable because of varying levels of educational quality in South Africa. The quality can be particularly low in townships such as the ones examined in this study (see for example Fiske and Ladd 2004). However, in these cases, studies have shown that job prospects for township residents can even be helped by low levels of education. Fryer and Vencatachellum show how women in a South African township, Machibisa, have better job prospects even if they only have two years of secondary school education. This implies that even if education quality in these areas is low, education is still important and can influence job opportunities.

The four hypotheses I will focus on are:

- 1) Increased income and education will decrease xenophobia because of decreased "resource scarcity." This means those persons with low levels of income or education have to compete for scarce jobs or resources more than richer or more educated people do.
- 2) Increased income and education will decrease xenophobia because of a "cultural effect;" education makes people more open and tolerant of other ethnicities so they are less likely to be antagonistic to others.
- 3) Increased income and education will not decrease xenophobia because the relationship between the variables is too complex.
- 4) If income and education levels are too low, then they will not decrease xenophobia

Methodology

Experiments

Since this study relies on quantitative data from a field experiment, I will briefly discuss my reason for using experiments. In recent years, there has been an increase in the social sciences of using experiments as a way to more accurately measure causality. The debate about their effectiveness is extensive and some researchers still strongly oppose them as a valid means of determining causality, while others see them as a vital key in political science and economic research (see for example Deaton 2009; Duflo et al. 2007). Although this debate is too extensive to cover here, I will cover the most important points in order to justify my use of experimental data.

The biggest criticism is that experiments are not externally valid. There is some legitimacy to this, yet just because they are not 100 percent externally valid does not mean we should not make use of the insights we can gain from them. Well-designed

experiments can provide powerful insights into why people behave in certain ways, given certain circumstances. In other words, they give us a way to control all other factors and focus on causality, something that observational data cannot do. Experiments are really a practical application of *ceteris paribus*, a fundamental assumption in many disciplines. This assumption simplifies the tangle of data and potential causal variables and can help provide understanding that would be unavailable otherwise. I do not argue that the one approach is more important than the other but rather that both experiments and observational data have their place in social science research.

List Experiments

This study makes use of a relatively new tool: the list experiment. Because of the potentially sensitive nature of some survey questions, respondents might not be completely truthful (see Janus 2007). Even if anonymity is presumably guaranteed, many respondents might have a desire to conceal their actual feelings. And those persons who do not deliberately try to cover their true attitudes are often conditioned to know what answers are socially acceptable or not, and perhaps do not even realize their own true feelings about other ethnicities. In other words, people often think that they fit with societal rules even when they do not. In these cases, an unobtrusive method is needed to get true answers to sensitive questions. In South Africa, where the last five years have seen attempts at building a cohesive, multicultural society, and where racial prejudice is certainly frowned upon, people might have even more incentive to hide xenophobic attitudes, or try to convince themselves they are not really xenophobic. A setting like this makes it especially important to use unobtrusive methods to ascertain racial attitudes.

The list experiment is a simple survey with two versions. In the control, participants are asked how many of the following make them angry (or asked how many of the items they do regularly, etc.). In this example, all of the things on the list are reasonable options for making someone angry. In the treatment, the rest of the participants also receive a survey, but this time with one additional item, which embodies the outcome of interest. Because the treatment group does not know their questionnaire is different from the control group (which also makes it especially important that participants do not see other people's questions), and because they are only asked to say how many items, not which specific items, they assume their answers are not particularly revealing. Further, because the items all seem like reasonable options to make people angry, the treatment is unobtrusive. However, by doing a difference of means test between the two groups, we are able to see if the treatment list, and particularly the treatment item, provokes a higher mean number from treatment subjects vs. control subjects. If it does, then we can attribute the difference to the treatment.

Here is an example of one of the lists that was used (Noyes 2009):

Table 1: Example of List Experiment: How many of the following make you angry?

Control	Treatment
Politicians who do not keep their promises	Politicians who do not keep their promises
The unemployment rate	The unemployment rate
High prices (for example: food and gas prices)	High prices (for example: food and gas prices)
High crime rates	High crime rates
	Immigrants moving into your community

There were two list questions, each with two different treatments, meaning that each participant got one of four options, or a control. The first list asked “How many of the following make you angry?” The second question was “How many of the following influenced your vote in the recent presidential elections?” Each list also had either a specifically anti-immigrant xenophobia question, or a question relating to the recent election in 2009. Here are all four treatments used in the two list experiments (Noyes 2010):

Table 2: Questions and Treatments

List	Xenophobia treatment	Election treatment
List 1 How many of the following make you angry?	<i>(Treatment 1-1)</i> Immigrants moving into your community	<i>(Treatment 1-2)</i> Having a president who is not of the same tribal ethnicity
List 2 How many of the following influenced your vote in the recent presidential elections?	<i>(Treatment 2-1)</i> Promises made by candidates or parties to take measures to counter immigration	<i>(Treatment 2-2)</i> Ethnicity of candidate

Experiment Design

The data was collected by Ken Noyes, in the summer of 2009, as part of his research on the effects of ethnicity on xenophobia (see Noyes 2009). I am using his data set to look at the effects of education and income, variables he did not look at. The subjects in the study all come from three townships (slum-like settlements in South Africa): Davyton, close to Johannesburg; Mdantsane, near East London; and Umlazi, situated near Durban. These townships were chosen because they seem to be a good representation of ethnicities in South Africa (excluding whites), in the hopes of getting a rough map of overall South African attitudes. Umlazi is mainly a Zulu township, Mdantsane is mainly Xhosa, and Davyton is a relatively good representation of all the other South African ethnicities (Noyes 2009). The other ethnicities are Swati, Ndebele, Sotho, Pedi, Tswana, Tsonga, and Venda (Britannica


2010). All nine of these major ethnic groups make up the majority of South African blacks, with Zulu and Xhosa being the dominant groups. Of course, a completely ideal survey would have chosen randomly from different places in South Africa, in the hopes of getting a truly accurate distribution of observations. However, this data ostensibly still gives a more-or-less accurate depiction of what black South Africans feel when it comes to xenophobia. Since this was the first such experiment in South Africa, it is not meant as an exhaustive survey but rather an attempt to get an idea of xenophobia in South Africa.

The data was collected by local university students familiar with the area. Zones were randomly chosen, as were routes and starting houses in these zones. The recruiters went at various assigned times to every third door and randomly chose an adult candidate for participation. They were then offered the opportunity to participate in a study about South Africa's ethnic groups, and to receive 60 Rand (about \$6). If the person accepted, they were handed an invitation to go to a local school where the research would be carried out. The invitation had the person's name on it as well as the time they were to come, to make sure the right person came to the study. When they came to the study, they were instructed on how to use the basic computer program and then did a survey about basic background information, as well as their responses to the list experiments.


The background questions asked them about their ethnicity, party affiliation, predominant language, where they were born, where they live, and information about income and education (see Appendix). For education, people were offered increments of schooling, which made a scale of one to seven, one being "no schooling" and seven being "completed university or polytechnic" (see table 3). For income, people were offered increments of annual earnings (see table 4). The lowest income was "R5,000 or less" (about \$500), and the highest was "R90 467 and above" (about \$9,000). To get an idea of what purchasing power in South Africa is like, the rand-dollar exchange rate at the time of the study was about R 10 to \$1, and gas cost about R7 a liter in 2009, which converted to about \$0.70 a liter, or \$2.66 per gallon ("Petrol Prices," *Mail & Guardian*, 27 February 2009). Other examples include: two liters of milk R18 (\$1.80), jeans R150–250 (\$15–25), movie ticket R20–50 (\$2–5), and pizza R30–65 (\$3–6.50) (Monash University 2009).

Education and income levels were generally low but perhaps not as low as expected. The mean for education was 4.621, with 659 observations, a standard deviation of 1.193, and minimum one and maximum seven (see Figure 1). The 4.621 mean implies most people had either completed secondary school or had some secondary school.

As for income, the great majority of people fell into the lowest range, R5,000 or less. The mean was 1.935, with 650 observations, a standard deviation of 1.387, and responses ranging from 1–6 (see figure 2).

Figure 1: Level of schooling completed

1: No schooling; 2: Some primary; 3: Completed primary school; 4: Some secondary school; 5: Completed secondary school; 6: Some university or polytechnic; 7: Completed university or polytechnic

Figure 2: Yearly Household Income

1: R5,000 or less; 2: R5,001–11,378; 3: R11,379–20,202; 4: R20,203–36,402; 5: R36,043–90,466; 6: R90,467 and above

Results

The control and treatment results for income were obtained by dividing all responses into high income and low income, each group making up about half of the responses. I labeled those with income of “one” as low income and all the others as high income in order to evenly split the data. Otherwise, there were too few observations in “high income.” Even with this divide, there were still slightly more people in the low-income group. I then took all people who answered the control and were high

income and combined them into a variable called "control high income." I then took all the high-income people who answered the treatment and made them a variable called "treatment high income." I conducted comparison of the means test, to see if there was a difference between the control and treatment high income groups. The next step was to take the low-income control and low-income treatment and compare them. To see if there is a difference between high income and low income, I looked at the 90 percent and 95 percent confidence intervals. If there was no overlap, I concluded there was a significant difference between high and low income. If they did overlap, then there was no significant difference.

For education, I also divided the data, as evenly as possible, into high and low income. I made levels one through four low education and five through seven high education. This was also done to evenly split the data so high education was not too small. Since there were such a large number in five (completed secondary school), the high education group is slightly larger, as can be seen in the data. I then did the same for income so I had variables for those that answered the control and had high or low education, and then the same for those who answered the treatment.

Income

Treatment 1-1

Variable	Control Mean	N	Treatment Mean	N	Difference	95% CI	90% CI	T Value
High Income	2.654 (0.118)	81	3.654 (0.138)	91	-0.609 (0.184)	-0.972 to -0.247	-0.912 to -0.306	-3.317
Low Income	2.618 (0.108)	110	3.356 (0.124)	118	-0.734 (0.165)	-1.063 to -0.412	-1.001 to -0.463	-4.467

The survey for this question was the first list experiment, which asked how many of the following makes you angry. The first treatment, the one this table is about, was "Immigrants moving into your community." Although there is a statistically significant difference between the control and the treatment, as can be seen by the strong t-values, when comparing high and low income there is little difference. The 95 percent confidence interval for high income is -0.972 to -0.247 and for low income it is -1.063 to -0.412. Although low income has a slightly larger difference, the confidence intervals still overlap, which means there is no statistical difference. In other words, all we can tell from this data is there is xenophobia against immigrants, but high- or low-income people are not any more prone to be xenophobic. Even with 90 percent confidence intervals, and at the risk of committing Type I error, there is still not enough statistical difference. In other words, at the 95 percent and 90 percent levels, there is no statistical difference.

Treatment 1-2

Variable	Control Mean	N	Treatment Mean	N	Difference	95% CI	90% CI	T Value
High Income	2.654 (0.118)	81	3.061 (0.133)	97	-0.407 (0.181)	-0.764 to -0.247	-0.706 to -0.108	-2.254
Low Income	2.618 (0.108)	110	3.349 (0.123)	106	-0.731 (0.163)	-1.053 to -0.409	-1.001 to -0.461	-4.476

The question for this treatment, in response to being asked how many of the following make you angry, was "Having a president who is not of the same tribal ethnicity as you are." Once again, although there is a difference from the control in both cases, there is no difference between high and low. The 95 percent CI for high income goes from 0.764 to -0.247 and for low income it goes from -1.053 to -0.409. Since there is overlap here, we can infer there is no difference between high and low income. The same goes for the 90 percent CI: once again, there is still quite a large overlap. Therefore, we can say, at the 90 percent and 95 percent confidence levels, there is no difference between high and low income in influencing xenophobic attitudes. In short, the only thing we know yet is that xenophobia exists against immigrants and high or low income is not an influencing factor.

Treatment 2-1

Variable	Control Mean	N	Treatment Mean	N	Difference	95% CI	90% CI	T Value
High Income	3.265 (0.113)	92	3.524 (0.144)	86	-0.258 (0.182)	-0.617 to 0.101	-0.557 to 0.041	-1.420
Low Income	2.927 (0.109)	110	3.214 (0.136)	126	-0.287 (0.178)	-0.637 to 0.063	-0.580 to 0.006	-1.614

These are the results from the second list of questions, where participants were asked how many of the following influenced their voting in the most recent elections, held in 2009. The treatment for this list was "Promises made by candidates or parties to take measures to counter immigration." In this case, there is not a statistical difference between the treatment and the control, which means this was probably not a significant enough issue for these people in this election. In addition, there is no difference between high and low income, at the 90 percent or at the 95 percent significance levels.

Treatment 2-2

Variable	Control Mean	N	Treatment Mean	N	Difference	95% CI	90% CI	T Value
High Income	3.265 (0.113)	92	3.253 (0.132)	87	0.012 (0.173)	-0.329 to 0.354	-0.273 to 0.297	0.071
Low Income	2.927 (0.108)	110	3.494 (0.144)	102	-0.494 (0.179)	-0.846 to -0.146	-0.788 to -0.200	-2.769

This is also from the second list of questions, i.e., the question of how many of these factors influenced your vote in the most recent election, and the question for the treatment in this one was "Ethnicity of candidate." Once again, the results are not statistically significant, in other words, ethnicity of the candidate did not play a major role for most of these people. Further, there is no difference between high income and low income, neither at the 90 percent level or the 95 percent significance levels.

Education**Treatment 1-1**

Variable	Control Mean	N	Treatment Mean	N	Difference	95% CI	90% CI	T Value
High Education	2.778 (0.096)	117	3.283 (0.116)	127	-0.506 (0.152)	-0.805 to -0.206	-0.756 to -0.256	-3.329
Low Education	2.405 (0.135)	74	3.366 (0.152)	82	-0.960 (0.205)	-1.365 to -0.556	-1.297 to -0.6227	-4.693

These data are once again from the first list experiment, where the question was "How many of the following make you angry," and where this particular treatment is "Immigrants moving into your community." Instead of being divided by income, the divide is by education, where the low-education group is represented from levels one to four and the high-education group in levels five to seven. In this case, there is a statistically significant difference between the control and the treatment means, for both high and low education, implying that immigration makes both groups upset. However, the confidence intervals for high and low both overlap, so we can infer there is no difference between high and low education in mitigating xenophobia against immigrants.

Treatment 1-2

Variable	Control Mean	N	Treatment Mean	N	Difference	95% CI	90% CI	T Value
High Education	2.778 (0.096)	117	3.264 (0.113)	121	-0.487 (0.149)	-0.780 to -0.193	-0.732 to -0.2418	-3.266
Low Education	2.405 (0.135)	74	3.134 (0.150)	82	-0.729 (0.203)	-1.130 to -0.327	-1.063 to -0.395	-3.586

This is also in response to the question of how many of the following make you angry, and the specific treatment is "Having a president who is not of the same tribal ethnicity." There is a difference between the treatment and the mean, but there is no difference between the CIs of high and low education, meaning high education and low education do not make a difference in influencing xenophobia.

Treatment 2-1

Variable	Control Mean	N	Treatment Mean	N	Difference	95% CI	90% CI	T Value
High Education	3.176 (0.098)	127	3.456 (0.127)	125	-0.280 (0.160)	-0.595 to 0.036	-0.543 to -0.017	-1.745
Low Education	2.920 (0.133)	75	3.172 (0.161)	87	-0.252 (0.213)	-0.673 to 0.168	-0.602 to 0.098	-1.185

These data come from the second list experiment, asking "How many of the following influenced your vote in the last election." The treatment is "Promises made by candidates or parties to take measures to counter immigration." As in all the previous examples, there is no difference between high and low education, and the results are also not particularly statistically significant either.

Treatment 2-2

Variable	Control Mean	N	Treatment Mean	N	Difference	95% CI	90% CI	T Value
High Education	3.176 (0.098)	127	3.439 (0.130)	107	-0.263 (0.160)	-0.578 to 0.052	-0.526 to 0.0002	-1.646
Low Education	2.929 (0.133)	75	3.220 (0.151)	82	-0.300 (0.203)	-0.700 to 0.101	-0.634 to 0.034	-1.477

These data ask how many of the factors on the list influenced your vote with the treatment of "Ethnicity of candidate." In this case, there is little difference between control and mean, and there is also no difference between high education and low education.

Discussion and Implications

In short, the results show that education and income were not significant predictors of xenophobia. This could have varying implications. First, it could mean levels of income and education in this study were too low to show any difference. This

might have been the case since many of the people had only a secondary school education. Perhaps education only has effects after much higher levels, like a university degree. Secondary school does not open up a lot of job opportunities, so these people would tend to be low-skill workers. But, as already indicated by the Fryer and Venkatachellum study, even low levels of education can help people escape from greater job vulnerability. Yet, there are still problems with such an explanation because even high levels of education do not always lead to high job safety. This is especially true of the outsourcing or off-shoring of jobs. At least in these cases, the people “stealing” jobs are too far away to be attacked. But either way, high- and low-skill jobs are both vulnerable to a certain degree.

As for the idea of certain stages of education being necessary to prevent xenophobia (secondary school diploma, college degree, etc.), we find some evidence. This is seen in that many of the immigrants attacked have been low-skill workers, and so it would be other low-skill workers from South Africa who were competing for the same jobs. On the other hand, even high-skilled workers from other countries are sometimes forced to work in low-skill jobs, because low-skill jobs are the only ones that will accept them (Guardian 2010). Even in these cases of higher skills, legal and illegal immigrants are perceived as a threat to low-skill jobs. However, as already explained before, this is still a problematic explanation, since many segregationist and violently xenophobic systems in the past, such as apartheid, slavery, or racial persecution, have often been carried out by the richer and more educated.

This leads to the other hypothesis that education can make people more tolerant and open, and so less xenophobic. In this scenario, more “enlightened” people would not engage in burning down the homes of immigrants, beating them, and dispelling them from communities. Most people in the West, while normally more educated and wealthy, were shocked when they saw the anti-immigrant violence 2008. Yet, it is exactly these countries that have carried out some of the most brutal and harsh treatment of perceived “inferior” populations. Past sins aside, the West is far from resolving all of its racial problems. Blacks in America are still less likely to get jobs they are just as qualified for as white people (see Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004), and the prisons are still disproportionately full of African-Americans (see Herbert 2010). And there is still the recent furor over the mosque and Islamic center in Manhattan, where people objected to a mosque and Islamic cultural center being built so close to ground zero (see Wright 2010). Such unwillingness shows Americans are still not so comfortable with other races yet and still struggle to a certain extent to trust the other.

Along these lines, Europe, another high-income and high-education area, is also enmeshed in its own racial and xenophobic turmoil. Several European countries have banned wearing hijabs and other religious covering. For an excellent look at some of these arguments and why none of them are worthy of a liberal democratic tradition,

such as Western Europe's, see Martha Nussbaum's article, "Veiled Threats?" (2010). She goes through arguments used against the hijab and shows how they are double standards—if these politicians really meant what they said, they would also ban high heels, pornography, and liposuction, and not allow people to wear scarves in the winter. In short, these seemingly neutral laws are badly disguised and hypocritical attacks on Muslims. Further, in the Netherlands, when Theo van Gogh was killed by a Muslim, there was massive outrage and a general feeling this was additional evidence Muslims were dangerous and radical. Yet when Pim Fortuyn was murdered the year before by an environmentalist, environmentalists were not seen as radical extremists, and there was no banning of environmentalist movements or the likes. As a final example, Switzerland, a supposedly free country, banned minarets on new mosques, by popular referendum. This is even more disturbing, because it shows a majority of the population, and not just some small group of politicians, were willing to make a law that limited the rights of a small minority group. All of these cases demonstrate countries that are supposedly free and tolerant, not to mention educated and wealthy, have many laws and attitudes that are xenophobic in nature. Therefore, even though education might temper some people against xenophobia, such as education about other people or places, it is still not a universal guarantor against xenophobia and does not automatically improve interracial relations all of the time or even necessarily most of the time. Therefore, these results are further evidence that income and education are inherently complex variables when it comes to solving ethnic tensions and xenophobic violence.

Limitations, External Validity, and Further Research

Although these results are intriguing, this study is limited in various ways. For one, the data is not exhaustive, it only shows three townships. Although the townships were selected by the original researchers in an effort to get a representation of all South African black ethnicities, they are still a small observation on the total demographics of South Africa. Further research would need to be done to fully ascertain the extent of racial perceptions throughout South Africa. Furthermore, the data is limited, because it only shows one snapshot in time and does not really indicate trends over time or trends without external shocks, such as elections and their accompanying rhetoric, as was the case in this study set during the 2009 elections. Nevertheless, it does provide an idea of racial attitudes and trends in South Africa today.

Perhaps this research can still be applied to the rest of South Africa. For one, the fact there are so many townships like the ones in this study means such results probably hold true for a large number of South Africans. Whether or not this also applies to the higher levels of South African society remains to be determined by further research. As for external validity to other countries, few places have such a starkly stratified society like South Africa's, where the education and income gaps were ex-

acerbated by segregationist legislation. South Africa provides a fairly unique picture of xenophobia. However, there are many ways the lessons learned in South Africa can be applied elsewhere. Many other African countries have slums like the South African townships; these results probably also apply for groups of people there. And apart from Africa, there are many other places in the world that also have similar settings, so these conclusions might also apply there, too.

Further research would also need to be done using these types of surveys to see which people from all sorts of backgrounds in South Africa are more xenophobic—not just black people in slums. Perhaps such research would show people with college degrees are less likely to be xenophobic. In any case, the most logical step after this research is to include all backgrounds. This would either strengthen the conclusion that higher education and income are actually not good at decreasing xenophobia, or perhaps weaken these conclusions. Both would have significant implications.

Conclusion

This paper has found varying evidence for the three hypotheses discussed earlier. There is some evidence for the resource scarcity explanation since it can be argued that the education levels here are still too small to make a difference to show people being able to escape significant job competition. Perhaps a greater threshold of education would be needed to see significant decreases in xenophobia. On the other hand, there is little evidence for the cultural explanation, because each year of schooling would be expected to make people more educated and open, whereas only certain levels of education will be any use for people looking for work. Each added year would be expected to moderate people, since this is unrelated to job availability. But finally, the most conclusive evidence from these tests is the whole story is more complicated. Education and income did not seem to make people any less xenophobic. This goes with the observation that much racial persecution over time has been perpetrated by richer, more educated people. Therefore, the implications are not as straightforward as increasing education and income. Perhaps this means education needs to be specifically geared toward decreasing anti-immigrant xenophobia and not just focused on abstract ideas of liberal democratic values. Another implication is that immigrants need greater protection, since they are often likely to be persecuted and be more vulnerable, no matter what the situation. Most of all, we need to take a less simplistic approach to dealing with immigrants and admit that any of us might be guilty of xenophobia—not just the people beating immigrants in the streets.

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The Rise of the Chinese Navy: What the World can Expect from Asia's Emerging Maritime Power

David Gerard

As China accelerates its climb toward superpower status, the rhetoric of a "China threat" is heard with increasing frequency throughout the world. In the past, this rhetoric was based on China's intimidating economic growth. Yet, in recent years, China-anxious nations have turned their focus to a "threat" with more palpable implications: the threat of military expansion. China's growing military power, specifically its naval power, is a source of growing anxiety for many in the international community. Two of China's closest neighbors, Japan and South Korea, see China's enlarged navy as the precursor to revisionist Chinese aggression (Page 2011). Others, like Southeast Asian countries, fear China will use its enhanced naval powers to impose unequal resolutions on territorial disputes in the South China Sea (*Washington Post* 2011). Even the U.S., a naval giant, sees the rise of the Chinese Navy as a potential threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region (*U.S. Library of Congress* 2010, 33). But are these concerns justified or has the world misread this latest maneuver in Chinese foreign policy?

The purpose of this analysis is to identify the cause of China's recent naval expansion and predict future Chinese naval behavior. It begins by relating the breadth and depth of China's naval improvements and reviews three prominent competing explanations for this growth. Next, I predict future developments in specific foreign policy issues, including China's dealings with Japan, South Korea, the South China Sea, the U.S., and the projection of naval power abroad more generally. This article posits that China's use of its newly improved navy is dependent on domestic considerations, namely, the level of domestic support for and the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Extent of Chinese Naval Expansion

Since the year 2000, China's official military budget has experienced consistent, rapid growth, increasing from 14.6 billion (USD) to its present day amount of 77.9 billion (USD) (Global Security). This increase has allowed the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the naval service arm of the People's Liberation Army, to acquire more naval assets abroad and simultaneously produce more naval assets at home. According to a recent Congressional Research Service report, the PLAN has focused its modernization efforts on the following key areas: anti-ship ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, submarines, the development of an aircraft carrier, and the production of surface combatants like frigates and destroyers (*U.S. Library of Congress* 2010, 2). The growth in these areas has been substantial. The Office of Naval Intelligence reports that from 1990 to 2009 the number of Chinese destroyers has increased by 37 percent, frigates by 86 percent, and ballistic missile submarines by 200 percent. They also predict China will have at least one operational aircraft carrier by the year 2015 (*U.S. Library of Congress* 2010, 19). To complement this growth in naval assets, the PLAN has also sought to improve the education and training of naval officers, logistics management, and operational mobility (Chaffin 2010). The Chinese Navy is not only growing in size but also in efficiency and expertise.

As intimidating as these numbers are, they might only represent a portion of the actual growth in the Chinese Navy. Chinese reporting procedures are notorious for their lack of transparency, and Western powers fear much of China's military growth remains undisclosed or carefully disguised by the Chinese government's accounting processes. In fact, in a recent *New York Times* article, American officials expressed concern for China's "lack of openness about the growth" seen in the military (Shanker 2010). The possibility of undisclosed military spending is further evidenced by the discrepancy between publicly reported data figures, like the World Bank's World Development Indicators, and intelligence-based estimations, like those produced by the CIA. While the World Bank statistics reflect a fairly consistent 2 percent of China's annual GDP has been dedicated to military purposes since 1993, the CIA's 2006 estimate more than doubles that figure at 4.3 percent (*World Bank* 2010). This estimate rivals the U.S.' current military spending level of 4.06 percent; more importantly, it suggests over half of China's military expenditures are unaccounted for in public reports.

Motivations for Expansion: Three Possibilities

While the scope and speed of China's impressive naval growth is undeniable, the motivations driving this unprecedented growth are less concrete. Politicians, analysts, and academics alike all struggle to convincingly explain this phenomenon and to penetrate the black box of Chinese foreign policy making. From this ongoing debate, three possible explanations for China's recent naval growth have emerged.

The first of these three explanations, coined “naval nationalism” by the theory’s main proponent Robert S. Ross, suggest China will “embark on a more ambitious maritime policy” in the pursuit of great power status (2009, 46). Ross bases his analysis on geopolitics and the behavior of former land-based powers. As a land based geo-polity, China is at a strategic disadvantage in naval endeavors; it lacks the land security to fully invest in an effective power-projecting navy. Ross argues that a motive outside of strategic interest is directing Chinese behavior. He claims this ulterior motive is a “prestige strategy,” in which China attempts to bolster domestic legitimacy with impressive military feats abroad. Ross points out that merely upsetting the equilibrium of global naval power might constitute a considerable victory for a prestige-seeking nation. Accordingly, China is pursuing an access-denial naval strategy. If achieved, this strategy will shift naval power in the Asia-Pacific region but cannot guarantee successful naval projection abroad. In sum, Ross claims it is nationalism, rather than concerns for security, that explain China’s recent investment in military might.

Ross supports his argument with a detailed account of China’s efforts to develop aircraft carrier capabilities. Since the idea of a native-built aircraft carrier was first conceived in 1986, the issue of whether or not to build such a craft became an increasingly public issue. Ross writes that support for an aircraft carrier became “mainstream” and “spread to the provinces and to all sectors of Chinese society, including to universities, government think tanks, industrial circles, the political elite, and the general public” (2009, 61). In turn, Ross argues, this potent nationalist sentiment dictates government decision-making. Leaders must concede to overwhelming nationalist sentiments in order to maintain their legitimacy as vanguards of China’s national interests.

A second possible explanation sees Chinese naval growth as an expected, unthreatening response to China’s increased integration into the world economy. Contrary to Ross, these scholars and analysts argue security concerns, rather than nationalism, are the driving force behind Chinese naval expansion. This viewpoint is expressed most clearly by Michael Glosny and Phillip Saunders in their formal critique of Ross’s naval nationalism theory. They cite China’s growing interdependence on foreign trade and communication as sufficient motivation for heightened attention on naval capabilities. They further insist Chinese naval build-up is narrowly calculated to serve as a minimal deterrence against foreign aggression, especially in sensitive issues of territorial sovereignty like Taiwan.

These scholars support their assertion with reference to the limited capabilities of China’s latest naval procurements. One advocate of this viewpoint, Greg Chaffin, notes that “China has focused on developing capabilities to control and respond to contingencies in its own backyard” (n.d., 1). For example, China currently operates only five replenishment ships, hampering its ability to sustain long-term naval campaigns. The Chinese also lack the necessary logistical expertise to conduct aerial

operations on aircraft carriers (Chaffin n.d., 1). The nature of these procurements suggests China's naval growth is not designed to facilitate Chinese aggression but rather protection. Glosny and Phillips add that China receives 86 percent of its imported oil via ocean shipping, giving the Chinese strong incentives to develop a navy that can guarantee access to sea lines of communication (2010, 163).

Xu Qi, a scholar and senior captain in the PLAN, offers a third possible explanation for Chinese naval expansion. Xu suggests Chinese naval growth is the result of fortunate circumstance. In the past, China unwisely isolated itself from the world because of its self-sufficient agriculture and Sino-centric worldview. However, in recent years, the Chinese have experienced favorable conditions for maritime emphasis and have responded accordingly. These conditions include China's growing economic power, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the peaceful negotiation of land boundaries (Qi 2006, 56). These developments grant China greater land security and expendable resources. Thus, Xu claims, China is in an opportune situation to shift its time and attention to maritime issues.

Analysis

The three aforementioned theories of Chinese naval expansion each enrich our understanding of China's recent naval development. In different scenarios and to different degrees, elements from each of these explanations will be helpful in forecasting Chinese behavior. Ross rightly recognizes the salience of China's growing nationalist sentiment, Glosny and Saunders consider important economic and practical needs for an enlarged navy, and Xu Qi provides an historical context with which to understand past Chinese actions. However, Ross identifies the most vital consideration for calculating the implications of Chinese naval growth: the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In fact, it is the legitimacy of the communist regime dictating the degree to which each of these theories will hold explanatory power in any given foreign-policy scenario. For instance, the degree to which nationalism (Ross' argument) or commercial and security concerns (Glosny and Saunders argument) influence Chinese decision-making is dependent on how these outcomes influence the CCP's overall legitimacy.

The Communist Party has three means of bolstering domestic legitimacy: 1) fostering consistent economic growth, 2) ensuring domestic stability, and 3) maintaining their appearance as vanguards of the national interest. Assuming the CCP is composed of rational, self-interested actors with a desire to remain in power, these three criteria for legitimacy can be used to predict Chinese behavior in a wide array of circumstances. The CCP will employ its new naval capabilities in situations that enhance its overall legitimacy but will refrain from the use of naval force in situations that damage their legitimacy. While I agree with Ross in identifying nationalism as an important force behind China's recent naval modernization, I expand his theory

to account for two other sources of legitimacy for the Communist Party. In turn, the inclusion of these two sources explain how nationalism is not the only reason for Chinese naval expansion but rather an expression of the Chinese government's deepest and most basic concern: legitimacy. Using this framework, one can predict Chinese naval behavior in relation to Japan, South Korea, the South China Sea, the U.S., and the international community as a whole.

Japan

Most contemporary foreign policy disputes between China and Japan can be traced back to World War II. In 1935, the Japanese invaded the Chinese mainland and, for a time, controlled much of northern China, Taiwan, former German concessions in the Shandong Peninsula, and Hong Kong. The undeniable brutality of some of these campaigns, like the Rape of Nanjing, left lasting scars in China's national memory. As a result, the Chinese possess an enduring skepticism toward the Japanese and are hypersensitive to issues of territorial sovereignty.

In more recent history, these deep-seated feelings have reemerged and ignited dispute in the waters dividing these two nations. This is most readily seen in the ongoing dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. While the islands are of questionable economic and strategic importance, they serve as a symbol of Japan's imperialist past. The Chinese claim the islands were stripped from them in the early nineteenth century and should have been returned at the close of the Second World War. This issue reignited in early September of this year, when the Japanese Coast Guard arrested a belligerent Chinese fishing captain for ramming a Japanese vessel near the islands (Johnson 2010).

Nonetheless, Chinese naval expansion will bring little change to the status quo in Sino-Japanese relations, unless anti-Japanese sentiment in China incites domestic instability. As a strategic trade partner, the Japanese serve an important role in providing the economic growth necessary for domestic legitimacy. In a May 2010 meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Wen admitted, "China and Japan have very close economic and trade ties. One could say they are at the point where neither could do without the other" (Nishikawa and Buckley 2011). Upsetting relations and risking broken commercial ties would substantially injure the Chinese economy and the CCP's reputation at home. However, since Japan-related, foreign-policy issues are closely associated with China's national identity, a surge in public anti-Japanese sentiment might alter CCP calculations. In the past, issues as mundane as Japanese textbook content have incited rioting in the Chinese mainland (Weiss 2008). If similar domestic unrest results from the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue, the party would suffer damaged legitimacy in terms of both internal stability and as vanguards of China's national interest. In such a circumstance, the Chinese would likely use naval force to challenge ownership of the islands.

South Korea

Similar to Japan, many of South Korea's maritime disputes with China are rooted in history. China's close relationship with the North Korean regime has bred skepticism in both the Chinese and South Korean camps. Furthermore, as with Japan, this closely ties any South Korean dispute to China's national identity and pride. At present, the most prominent expression of Sino-South Korean maritime disagreement is the territorial status of the Yellow Sea. In summer 2010, Chinese officials disapproved of the U.S.' intentions to conduct joint naval exercises with South Korea in the area (Sima n.d., 1). China claims a soft suzerainty in the Yellow Sea due to its arguably bay-like features and proximity to strategic Chinese cities.

Given the similarities between Japan and South Korea, both in close geographic location with China, Chinese naval behavior toward Korea will likely resemble China's behavior toward Japan. The communist regime understands the loss of an important economic partner is more detrimental to their legitimacy at home than any legitimacy gained in a crusade of national interest. In his comments on the recent Yellow Sea squabble, Major General Yin Zhuo of the PLA affirmed, "The peace and stability of the Korean peninsula is important to peace in China and to China's economic development, hence we advocate maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula" (Sima n.d., 1). However, these calculations could be overturned if a South Korean maritime dispute ever incited drastic domestic instability within China.

The South China Sea

China's territorial claim to islands in the South China Sea predates the founding of the People's Republic of China. Early Republic of China maps contain generous, inclusive boundaries of Chinese sovereignty that dip deep into the South China Sea. China justifies its ambitious assertions with ancient documents claiming original discovery of the islands. Today, ownership of the islands in this area is heavily contested. Vietnam, Brunei, the Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Malaysia all lay claim to some portion of this island speckled region with varying legal justifications. Of these islands, the Spratly and Paracel chains are of particular concern because of their newly discovered offshore oil and natural gas deposits.

The possibility of Chinese naval intervention to solve the South China Sea disputes is not a novel idea. In 1988, the Chinese used naval force to besiege some of the Spratly islands from Vietnam. Southeast Asian nations fear an expanding Chinese Navy is indicative of similar campaigns to come. Moreover, in July of 2010, Chinese officials indicated territorial disputes in the South China Sea constitute a "core national interest" of the PRC, equivocating them with other foreign policy priorities like Taiwan and Tibet (*U.S. Library of Congress* 2010, 8).

According to the three proposed sources of CCP legitimacy, the Chinese will likely use naval force to occupy the South China Sea if favorable negotiations cannot be

reached. The oil and gas deposits surrounding the islands offer China an opportunity for economic growth. Moreover, the Chinese's deep conviction of their own just cause, coupled with the belief that the South China Seas dispute is a "core national interest" of the PRC, guarantees aggressive actions to secure the territory will be considered a protection of national interest with citizens at home. Moreover, it is also unlikely any such action would disturb social stability. Thus, in total, aggressive maritime policy in the South China Sea would only serve to bolster legitimacy for the communist regime.

Recent events suggest China is becoming more aggressive in its South China Sea claims and is moving closer to military action. At the Southeast Asian Regional Forum in July of 2010, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi implied that competing maritime claims from "smaller" Southeast Asian countries are subservient to claims from "larger" countries, like China (Twining 2010). Many interpret Yang's statement to be a justification for Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia and, consequently, a threat to use coercive force. Later in the same month, Geng Yansheng, a spokesman for the Ministry of Defense boldly asserted that China holds "indisputable sovereignty" over the South China Sea, despite a recent statement by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton calling for reconsideration of the issue (Pomfret 2010; Clinton 2010). In each of these cases, China's unwavering commitment reflects a willingness to use naval force if negotiations fail to meet Chinese standards.

U.S.–China Relations

An enhanced Chinese Navy will redefine important dynamics in U.S.–China military relations, particularly with regard to the Taiwan issue. Most scholars and analysts agree Chinese naval modernization is aimed, in large part, at preventing third-party participation in a future Taiwanese crisis. In other words, the new Chinese is specifically designed to prevent the U.S. from aiding Taiwan, as it positioned itself to do so in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis (*U.S. Library of Congress* 2010, 4). This reality is reflected in China's procurement of anti-ship ballistic missiles, attack submarines, and C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems. Together these advancements would allow the Chinese to slow or halt the movement of American naval vessels to the Taiwan Strait but offer little assistance in conducting long-term naval operations abroad. The changed dynamic in U.S.–China relations is the American calculation to assist Taiwan in the event of war. Whereas the U.S. was previously confident in its abilities to aid Taiwan, PRC naval improvements might serve as an effective deterrence to U.S. involvement.

Although China's capabilities to engage the U.S. Navy will be increased after modernization is complete, the Chinese have little incentive to provoke another Taiwanese conflict or, more broadly, challenge U.S. dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. Again, the Communist Party's need for legitimacy dictates these dynamics. Both Taiwan and the U.S. are substantial trading partners. Attacking either of these states

would damage the Chinese economy and injure the party's legitimacy as provident economic planners. However, if Taiwan instigates an armed conflict, the party's calculus would quickly reverse itself. Since Taiwan is considered a vital national interest, the CCP's legitimacy would be weakened unless it sought to reclaim an independent Taiwan. Therefore, while Chinese naval development will alter American calculations regarding a potential Taiwan conflict, it will not increase the likelihood of Chinese aggression against U.S. forces.

Projection of Power

China has limited experience in projecting naval power abroad. The majority of its long-distance naval deployments have consisted of short anti-piracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden (*U.S. Library of Congress* 2010, 5). This is primarily due to the purpose and design of the Chinese. Until recent efforts of modernization, the PLAN was intended to serve as a coastal defense and lacked the means to sustain itself on extended voyages. Yet, with recent upgrades and a plan to build an aircraft carrier, the PLAN is beginning to resemble a true, blue-water navy. In the future, perhaps in the next decade, China will possess the capacity to project its naval influence around the world (*U.S. Library of Congress* 2010, 6).

Despite its increased capabilities, China is not likely to increase its number of international naval deployments. When they do engage in naval operations far from home, the Chinese will likely be narrowly concerned with securing economic interests. Once again, this prediction is consistent with the Communist Party's desire to ensure domestic legitimacy. Projecting naval force abroad provides little benefit for internal stability. Furthermore, the Chinese have few key national interests—besides those previously mentioned—that would necessitate naval intervention. China's use of naval force in the coming years will likely be driven by economic interests and will resemble China's past behavior in the Gulf of Aden. China will deploy limited forces in order to protect sea lines of communication important to the Chinese economy. The Office of Naval Intelligence agrees that outside of the Taiwan issue, advancements in the Chinese are intended to address China's "economic dependence on sea lines of communication" (*U.S. Library of Congress* 2010, 5).

Conclusion

The heightened sense of alarm surrounding China's growing navy is understandable. After all, few nations sit quietly while their neighbors are arming themselves. However, with the exception of the South China Sea dispute, the rise of China's navy will not translate into a more aggressive Chinese maritime policy. This prediction is based on an understanding of the Communist Party's ultimate goal of regime legitimacy. The party has three means of enhancing domestic legitimacy: economic growth, internal stability, and acting as a vanguard of the national interest. In the majority of these disputes, the economic advantages of a peaceful maritime policy take

precedence over all other considerations. Therefore, disputes with China's closest neighbors, like Japan and Korea, although tense, are highly unlikely to result in naval conflict because of Japan and South Korea's importance to the Chinese economy. For similar reasons, there is also no increased likelihood of Chinese aggression towards the U.S., especially in regard to the Taiwan issue. The general projection of Chinese naval power abroad is also likely to be limited and narrowly affiliated with strategic protection of important commercial shipping lanes.

While Chinese naval growth does not increase the likelihood of a U.S.–China naval conflict, the U.S. is not insulated from these developments. A more capable Chinese will surely increase the costs in America's cost-benefit analysis regarding any future Taiwanese conflict. The U.S. must carefully reconsider its participation in such an event and prepare itself for resistance from a more formidable opponent.

The other notable exception, and area of greatest concern, is the South China Sea dispute. Unlike the aforementioned examples, both economic interest and the need to uphold national interests coincide to suggest China will use its newly developed naval force to intervene in the South China Sea. This sobering reality should give pause to both students of foreign policy and the heads of state tied closely to this delicate issue.

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Branded: The Importance of Names in Politics

Kirk Snider and Haley McCormick

Introduction

When studying the effect of politicians on the political realm as a whole, we might ask ourselves how important is a name? Brand names are commonplace in the everyday lives of Americans. Whether it is the purchase of cereal or a new car, the name of the product is significant in the decision-making process. A name attachment can create a sense of luxury or a sense of dependability when choosing between products. This same phenomenon occurs with a politician's name. An officeholder's name may persuade voters to believe something they may not have already or to vote in a certain way. This happens merely because they trust the politician and trust the actions he is taking while serving them.

The aim of our research is to identify whether or not attaching the name of a well-known public figure to a public works project would increase or decrease support of that project. In studying the Provo City Mayoral Election of 2009, we decided to examine the name effect of the outgoing mayor on a public building project that would soon be implemented in the city. Participating with the Utah Colleges Exit Poll, we developed questions and included them on surveys administered to voters to measure the effect name branding played on supporting the building of a new recreation center. Both questions gauged support of a new recreation center; however, one form included the name attachment of Mayor Lewis K. Billings while the other did not. The inclusion of the departing mayor's name allowed us to examine several theoretical issues. The question of trust in local political figures was a major focus. Whether the people of Provo felt Mayor Billings was a trustworthy leader would undoubtedly influence the support for a proposal using his name. We also raised the question of whether support

for Mayor Billings' idea would be boosted simply by his retirement from office. The idea of the public giving the outgoing politician a "pat on the back" as he leaves office would be an important factor as to whether or not policies supported by the politician would be supported by his constituents. On the other hand, we sensed many Provo citizens were disappointed with other policies enacted and public works projects implemented while Billings was in office. The implications of these perceptions would generate less support for the new recreation center in the survey responses. We found there was a statistically significant correlation between the name of the outgoing mayor and the support of the building of a new recreation center. Ultimately, the inclusion of a politician's name in this specific study did have a negative impact on how respondents viewed his "product"—the new recreation center.

Literature and Theory

By attending town hall meetings, monitoring local media outlets, and speaking with prominent and knowledgeable members of the Provo community, we discovered several issues that could be relevant in examining public opinion towards elected officials. In particular, the issue of iProvo seemed to strike a chord with the general public as being a very regrettable endeavor. The mismanagement of this fiber-optic Internet infrastructure became a blemish upon the latter end of the mayor's term, effectively ending his candidacy for another re-election. This type of bad publicity led us to question if attaching his name to a popular public works project would lead to its disapproval.

The concept of iProvo was first brought to the city council in the 1990s. Much debate ensued on whether this new project would be beneficial to the community and a worthwhile investment. In 2004, construction finally began, taking nearly two years to complete. Fiber-optic lines now ran between homes, businesses, and municipal buildings including schools, hospitals, and traffic signals. This provided resources for a city-wide service company to deliver affordable Internet access to community members. However, the management of iProvo was seen as a large burden for the city to handle, being the largest municipally owned fiber-to-the-home network in the nation. The city council unexpectedly decided to sell the service to another network managing company called Broadweave. Although Broadweave anticipated turning iProvo around and generating marginal profit, they were forced to merge with another company, Veracity. This new holder of the project not only owed the city \$39.5 million but also asked for the monthly payments to the city to be reduced by about 30 percent in order to gain capital. Veracity would pay the full amount due plus interest at a later date than scheduled; however, many citizens still felt iProvo had been a large disaster for the city. Many seemed to believe the local government was at fault for the issues that had arisen and much blame had been placed upon the mayor who had served for the last three terms (Toth 2009).

Knowledge of the political climate surrounding public sentiment toward Mayor Billings led us to make three claims: First, he was not viewed in a favorable light when it came to the management of iProvo. Second, he was retiring from office, so he might receive support and approval due to his voluntary decision to not run for reelection after serving twelve years. Third, the public feeling toward Billings would have an impact on a new policy he proposed that is attached to his name.

Because of the negative publicity Mayor Billings received for supporting iProvo, we assumed the level of trust in the local government structure has been shaken. In assuming that such distrust exists in the local political climate, there is a strong likelihood the residents of Provo would be more aware of local issues that could possibly affect their community. Such an awareness of local issues would foster a greater involvement on the part of the citizenry, which would manifest itself in an increase in individual participation with the political process (Bowler 2007). Consequently, any projects started by government officials would either be widely supported or widely condemned by the voting public in relation to their trust in the local officials. This support or distrust of local issues could be influenced by the voluntary departure of an unpopular politician, as is the case for Mayor Billings.

The literature in relation to the effectiveness of incumbents that are considered "lame ducks" suggests publicity in the media can have a lasting impact on the credibility of the politician leaving office (Johnson 1986, 52). Consequently, any suggestions on future works by political figures that are not in viable contention for reelection can be seen as "pitiful last gasps of a dying giant," which could in turn change support for a neutral policy proposal (Johnson 1986, 50). This study focused on "lame duck" presidents, but we argue this can be applied to any executive officeholder who announces they will not run for reelection or who has reached their term limits and is waiting to be replaced. We extend the theory presented by asserting that when a politician leaving office is perceived negatively by their constituents and the media, their policy proposals will be branded with their negative name and not receive public support. In general, we assert that public opinion does have an effect on public policy implementation. What is often in question within the discipline of political science, however, is the extent of its effect. According to Burstein, "Public opinion affects policy three-quarters of the times its impact is gauged; its effect is of substantial policy importance at least a third of the time, and probably a fair amount more" (Burstein 2003, 36). Taking into consideration that public opinion has an effect on policy 75 percent of the time it is considered, we also assert the public's perception of individual political actors is a critical factor. For those who are trying to pass policy legislation, any negative attachment to bad projects or unpopular individuals within the political environment can influence the passing of future proposals. The literature that examines policy implementation suggests there are four sets of variables needed to be present in order to execute policies on the local level, which are "characteristics

of the policy and its goals, characteristics of implementing agencies, variations on administrative and governmental processes, and *beliefs and attitudes towards key policy actors*" (Harbin et al. 1992, 105; emphasis added). Assuming this to be true, a government trying to implement a policy will not be able to do so if there are negative attitudes toward the main political actors. This study validates our theory; politicians with a negative name connotation will have a difficult time receiving public support and will, therefore, have difficulty in passing a policy, proposal, or project branded with his or her name.

Our hypothesis is that if Mayor Billings' name is included with a question about approval for a new recreation center, then the overall approval for that project will be lower than if his name is not included. In analyzing the data we have in relation to his public approval, we also hypothesize that constituents with negative feelings toward Mayor Billings will be less likely to support a new recreation center if it has his name on it. Our final hypothesis is that respondents who feel iProvo was a bad idea will be less likely to support the new recreation center proposed by Mayor Billings, because our assumptions are grounded in the public sentiment towards the iProvo issue.

Methods

To test these hypotheses, the dependent variable is the approval for the recreation center as measured by a five-point approval scale (strongly approve is equal to one; strongly disapprove is equal to five). The independent variable is the presence or absence of Mayor Billings' name within the question concerning the building of the recreation center. A secondary issue we chose to analyze concerned the letter grade given to Mayor Billings by the voting public. In the analysis of his letter grade, the approval of the recreation center is still the dependent variable, but Mayor Billings' letter grade is the main independent variable. Hence, we test the effect of his approval on levels of support for the recreation center he proposed. The letter grade variable is coded on a scale from 1 to 12 (1=A, 2=A-, 3=B+, etc). To check our assumption that attitudes toward iProvo had an impact on perceptions of Mayor Billings, we also ran a test where Billings' letter grade was the dependent variable and whether a respondent thought iProvo was a good idea as the independent variable. This was measured on a scale from one to five; one being strongly disagree and five being strongly agree (See Appendix A).

In order to test our hypotheses we incorporated our questions on the survey from the Utah Colleges Exit Poll. This was administered to voters in the Provo City 2009 Municipal Elections on 3 November. The survey was created by a committee of students (including ourselves) in a political science course at Brigham Young University dedicated to conducting exit polls. We were guided in our survey creation by professors Quin Monson and Kelly Patterson. We sampled from every voting precinct in the city using two separate survey forms throughout the day. We recruited students from BYU

to administer the surveys at the various locations throughout the city. Respondents were randomly selected by creating intervals according to the expected turnout for each precinct, thereby ensuring every voter in Provo had an equal chance of being asked to respond to both survey forms. After collection, the surveys were taken to a local Utah company called DataWise that entered all of the results in a file we then could use to run our statistical analyses. We used the computer program STATA in order to run these statistical tests.

Analysis

The survey responses showed the issue of building a new recreation center is popular among the citizens of Provo. The form that included Mayor Billings’ name in the recreation center question indicated that 54.85 percent of those surveyed would be in favor of building the new center, while 59.62 percent of those surveyed supported its construction on the form that excluded his name in the question. Although there is a majority of support in both questions, there is a 5 percent discrepancy between the form that included Billings’ name and the form that did not. When examining this shift, it appears the difference is between those who strongly supported the initiative on the first form and those who opposed it on the second. The difference in the strongly favored response shifted from 20.85 percent on the form including his name to 25.28 percent on the form that did not. The majority of the 5 percent change appears to have ended up in the oppose response, with 12.71 percent opposing the plan with the mayor’s name, and 8.39 percent opposing the plan without the mayor’s name (See Table 1).

Table 1: Responses by the voting public in support of building a new recreation center.

Support of Rec. Center	Form w/ Name (%)	Form w/o Name (%)
Strongly Favor	20.85	25.28
Favor	34	34.34
Neither Favor nor Oppose	28.21	28.38
Oppose	12.71	8.39
Strongly Oppose	4.24	3.69
N	897	894

(Source: Utah Colleges Exit Poll data 2009)

The scale used to measure support for the recreation center was an approval scale of five options from one (strongly approve) to five (strongly oppose). The mean of the responses on the form that included Mayor Billings’ name was 2.45 on the recreation approval scale, and the mean of the responses on the form that did not include his name was 2.31, a statistically significant difference ($p=0.04$). This means those who received

the form with Mayor Billings' name were less supportive of the construction of a new recreation center. The finding of our analysis suggests the reputation of a politician to the general public can have an influence on the support of a public work (See Table 2).

Table 2: Comparison of means test of the two forms used in the exit poll.

Support for rec. center	Mean	N
Form with Billings' name	2.45	897
Form w/o Billings' name	2.31	984
Difference	0.14	

P-value: 0.04

t-value of t-test: 2.89

(Source: Utah Colleges Exit Poll data 2009)

(For method, see Appendix B: I)

To better quantify our findings, we created a linear regression that compared the two forms. We discovered that those who were presented a question about building a new recreation center without Mayor Billings' name on it were 0.15 units lower on the approval scale (which indicates more support of the initiative) than those who were presented the question with his name. However, the variable of this regression explains less than 0.47 percent of the variance in opinion (See Table 3). Once again, the public perception of a public official had a statistically significant influence on the support of the public project.

Table 3: Linear regression analysis of support for the recreation center in relation to the color of form the respondent received.

Support of rec. center	Coefficient
Color of form	-0.15*
R ²	0.0047

*significance greater than 1 percent

(Source: Utah Colleges Exit Poll data 2009)

(For method, see Appendix B: II)

The next set of data we examined utilized the letter grade question rating Mayor Billings' performance throughout his tenure as well as public support for the building of the recreation center. Since the letter grade question was exclusive to a single form, we were not able to include responses from both forms when running the data analysis. In trying to determine the factors that influenced his support within the community, we created several binary variables we could use to examine support of the recreation center by the public. The use of binary variables made the coefficients easier to interpret and allowed us to determine which factors contributed most to feelings about the recreation center. We used a linear regression that would tell us the influence each variable has on public opinion concerning the recreation center. The variables included

in the regression were: marital status, income, level of conservatism, party affiliation, number of children, level of education, and feelings toward iProvo (See Appendix B: III). Since the issue of iProvo was pivotal in the creation of our hypothesis, we decided to run two regressions, one excluding the iProvo variable and one that included it. The results we present will follow in that order.

In the first regression that excluded the iProvo variable, we found there were three statistically significant variables: the grade given to Mayor Billings, conservative self-identification, and to a lesser extent, income, which was significant only at the 10 percent level. From the regression, we discovered as the letter grade of Mayor Billings decreased by one unit (from A to A-, or from A- to B+, etc.), the support for the recreation center decreased by 0.11 on a scale of five with a p-value of 0.00. Those who considered themselves conservative were more likely to oppose the building of the recreation center by 0.25 on the five-point approval scale than someone who did not consider themselves conservative, with a p-value of 0.05. A one unit increase in income classification resulted in a 0.04 unit increase in support for the recreation center on a scale of five with a p-value of 0.06. Of the three variables, the letter grade the respondents gave Mayor Billings had the greatest predictive value when trying to determine whether a respondent would support the new recreation center or not. The difference between someone who gave the mayor an "A" and a person who gave him a "B" would result in a 0.33 drop in support for the recreation center. The next closest variable is the level of conservatism (0.25). The R-squared value of this regression was 0.1016, which means the variables in this particular regression only predicted 10.16 percent of the variance in a respondent's support for the recreation center (see Table 4). The results of this regression were still only a partially complete without the inclusion of the iProvo variable.

Table 4: Linear regression analysis of support for the recreation center with variables from the exit poll survey.

Support for Rec. Center as determined by the following variables	(1)	(2)
Letter Grade for Mayor Billings	0.11*	0.10*
Republican	-0.01	-0.01
Conservative	0.25**	0.23**
Married	-0.10	-0.10
Children	-0.00	0.00
Income	-0.04+	-0.03+
College Graduate	0.08	0.08
iProvo	--	-0.09*
R²	10.19	10.92

*significance greater than 1 percent

+significance greater than 10 percent

(Source: Utah Colleges Exit Poll data 2009)

**significance greater than 5 percent

In the second regression, we included all of the same variables as the first regression, with the inclusion of the iProvo variable. The significance of each variable was affected by its inclusion, and the number of variables that became significant increased from three to four. We found the factors that significantly influenced the support or opposition of building the recreation center were the grade given to Mayor Billings, how conservative a person identified themselves as being, and the opinion of whether iProvo was a good idea or not. Income was still significant at the 10 percent level, but its significance dropped from a p-value of 0.06 to 0.08 with the inclusion of the iProvo variable. From the regression, we discovered as the letter grade for Mayor Billings decreased by one unit (from A to A-, or from A- to B+, etc.), the support for the recreation center decreased by 0.10 on a scale of 5 (from one strongly approve to five strongly disapprove) with a p-value of 0.00. The public's opinion of iProvo was also a strong indicator of its support for the recreation center. As iProvo approval decreased, support for the building of the recreation center decreased as well by 0.09 on the scale of 5 with a p-value of 0.01. This means people who thought iProvo was a bad idea were less likely to support the building of the recreation center as well. The greatest predictor of support in the regression was still the letter grade given to Mayor Billings by the respondents. The difference between those who gave the Mayor an "A" and a those who gave him a "B" was a 0.30 drop in support for the recreation center, with a p-value of 0.00. The R-squared value of this regression was 0.1092, which means the variables in this particular regression only predicted 10.92 percent of the variance in a respondent's support for the recreation center. From these results, we see there is once again a significant relationship between the public's perception of the former mayor and support for a new recreation center. Yet the influence of iProvo on the letter grade of Mayor Billings is still important to examine.

By establishing that the letter grade given to Mayor Billings and the public sentiment about iProvo were significant factors in predicting support for the building of a new recreation center, we decided to look at the effect iProvo had on the letter grade itself. In order to examine this possible correlation, we used another linear regression. Our findings supported our initial hypothesis that feelings toward iProvo were indicative of feelings toward Mayor Billings. In analyzing the data, for a unit decrease in support of iProvo on the five point scale, there was a 0.68 decrease in the letter grade for Mayor Billings, with a p-value of 0.00. This means if a respondent moved on the response scale in the direction of not viewing iProvo as a good idea, their letter grade of Mayor Billings would decrease by 0.68 for each shift in negative opinion. The R-squared value for this regression is 0.1018, which means a respondent's feelings about iProvo predicted about 10 percent of their approval of Mayor Billings (see Table 5). This is significant when you consider it is only one in a wide range of issues within the mayoral campaign. This statistical analysis validates our initial assumption that iProvo affected the public's perception of Mayor Billings.

Table 5: Linear regression analysis of Mayor Billings' letter grade in relation to iProvo support

Letter Grade for Mayor Billings	Coefficient
iProvo	-0.68*
R ²	0.1018

*significance greater than 1 percent
(Source: Utah Colleges Exit Poll data 2009)

Conclusion

The results of all of these statistical tests allow us to suggest the impact of Mayor Billings' name decreased voter support of the proposed new recreation center. The implications of such findings could prove very important to local officials in the Provo area elsewhere in the United States. Lawmakers should recognize the approval or disapproval of a prominent elected official could greatly influence whether a proposed policy receives public support. This being said, public officials should be wary of how they frame new proposals and issues to constituents. If they are not receiving overwhelming support from their community members, it is possible they will have a more difficult time implementing new policies or embarking on new projects. This phenomenon is also evident at the national level of politics as well. Near the end of his term in office, President George W. Bush had a very low approval rating of 33 percent. Members of Congress who were in his own party did not openly accept endorsements for office, presidential support for their bills, and so on. Republican candidates in 2008 made it a point to distance themselves from the current president. John McCain tried valiantly to show the American public he would not be an extension of George W. Bush's eight years in office. Barack Obama used this to his advantage and focused on the change that needed to occur in Washington and went on to win the election with 53 percent of the popular vote as opposed to McCain's 46 percent. This example in national politics illustrates on a broader and more general scale the effect that occurred in the survey results from Provo, Utah.

As in any research in the discipline of political science, ours certainly has its limitations. One concern may be that the support for the new recreation center was so high, that the effect of Billings' name did not have a very substantive impact, regardless of statistical significance. The form that included his name would generate an average that increased opposition to the center by .11 on the scale of one to five. Although there was a statistical difference between this average and the average from the form not including his name, arguably, one could say this may not be a large difference overall. Another limitation might be the issue we chose to test in the community was very middle-of-the-road, so to speak. The recreation center received very broad support on both forms; this could suggest the influence of Billings' name could have been minimal and lack substantive significance, despite its statistical significance. The fact that our R-squared values are extremely low could be considered another

limitation in our study. This means in our first regression (which examined support for the recreation center in relation to the inclusion or exclusion of Billings' name) we were unable to predict much of the variance of support by knowing whether his name was included or not, as the R-squared value was only 0.47 percent. Our regression that examined the factors which predicted support for the recreation center only had an R-squared value of 10 percent meaning that by knowing all of the variables we did (including how the respondent graded Mayor Billings), we could only predict 10 percent of the variance in support for the new recreation center. Both of these values suggest there are issues outside of our analysis that had an impact on people's perception of Mayor Billings and the public works project in general. This could be categorized as omitted variable bias, which is seen as a limitation of our study. If we had further time and resources, we would try to formulate more questions that would help reveal why the public responded the way they did.

Overall, our theory of brand names in politics did appear to hold true. Knowledge about branding has been imperative to consumer researchers, public relation directors, and advertisers for decades and might even seem to be intuitive for politics as well. We tested our hypotheses through survey research and statistical methods to affirm the name of a politician, and the connotation that goes along with it, will affect how their constituents view their policies, decisions, ideas, and so on. Officeholders as well as councils, administrations, and other governing bodies should make note of this as they pursue new initiatives to whatever public they may be serving.

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Appendix A

1. Blue form
 - a. Question [E]
 - i. "Do you favor or oppose a plan to build a new recreation center for Provo?"
2. White Form
 - a. Question [E]
 - i "Do you favor or oppose a plan to build a new recreation center for Provo as supported by Mayor Billings?"
 - b. Question [L] part c
 - i. "Building iProvo was a good idea."
 - c. Question [P]
 - i. "Thinking back on Lewis K. Billings' service as mayor, what grade would you give him?"

Appendix B

- I. In order to examine the effects of the inclusion of Mayor Billings' name, we decided to use a t-test to compare the means of each question on both forms in relation to the support of building a new recreation center. We chose to use a comparison of means test because we believed that there could be a statistically significant difference between the results on the two forms since there was variation in question wording. The scale that was used to measure support for the recreation center was an approval scale of five options, from strongly approve to strongly oppose. These responses were coded from 1 to 5, respectively. Before we ran the statistical tests, we dropped any non-responses in relation to the questions that we were examining. In so doing, we felt that the data collected would be more accurate as to the general feelings of the public concerning support of the recreation center in relation to the presence of Mayor Billings' name. The superficial examination of the results showed that the inclusion of Mayor Billings' name when suggesting the building of a new recreation center fostered lower support for the public work as opposed to when his name was not included. The statistical significance of the test supported our assumptions. The outputs that we examined to determine statistical significance were the t-statistic and the p-value of the test. The t-statistic that was produced in our model was 2.89, and the p-value produced was 0.04. Both of these figures suggest that there is a statistically significant relationship between the two means of the forms examined. This means that those that received the form which included Mayor Billings' name were less supportive of the construction of a new recreation center. The finding of our analysis suggests that the reputation of a politician to the general public can have an influence on the support of a public work.
- II. In order to interpret the results on a micro level as opposed to a macro level, we put the data into a linear regression model to examine the coefficient. A linear

regression model allows us to determine an individual's likelihood of supporting the building of the recreation center and to what extent they will be swayed by the change in question wording. We first examined the information in relation to the color of the forms used that differed between the form that used Mayor Billings' name in the question and the form that did not. We changed the variables from 1 and 2 representing colors to 0 and 1 to make the variable binary. We did this to ensure ease in interpreting the data produced by the regression. The forms labeled 0 were the forms that included Mayor Billings' name on the question, and the forms labeled 1 were forms that did not include his name. The scale of support that was used in the regression was the same as was used in the t-test, with 1 representing those who strongly approved of the recreation center and 5 representing those who strongly opposed it. We then ran the regression with the dependent variable being the support for the recreation center and the independent variable being the color of the form. The results of the regression supported the results of the t-test. In examining the statistical significance of the regression, the p-value was 0.00 and the coefficient was -0.15. This suggests that with a one unit increase in the dependent variable (which in this case was the change from a form that did have Billings' name to a form that did not), created a response that was lower by 0.15 units.

- III. We created binary variables for marital status, conservatism, college education, and party affiliation to create larger groupings and to make the distinction between one group and another more distinct. We feel that the binary variables gave us results that were easier to interpret than if we had left them as continuous variables.

NATO's Credibility in the Kosovo War

Sead Osmani

Introduction

Before the conflict started in Kosovo, leaders from the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) explained why they intended to intervene in Kosovo. They most strongly emphasized the reason as humanitarian intervention. With research and comparison, I argue that sustaining NATO's credibility was the most important reason. After the Cold War, Europe autonomously initiated security projects. The main foreign policy interests of the U.S. and the EU started to diverge. The differing interests eventually evoked discussions regarding the future of NATO, with NATO officials offering various reasons for their participation in the Kosovo War, such as ending violence and repression, and the withdrawal of the military, police, and paramilitary forces from Kosovo (NATO 2010). Were these goals NATO's strongest motivation? Because the principal player in the Kosovo War was the U.S., and because NATO is the instrument through which the U.S. perpetuates its hegemonic role in Europe, I will use the official U.S. Department of State document regarding the Kosovo War to demonstrate that preserving NATO's credibility was actually the most important reason for the U.S. and NATO to participate in the Kosovo war. The Department of State official statement on the war in Kosovo outlines three objectives for U.S. and NATO participation in Kosovo. The first objective is "Averting a humanitarian catastrophe." I analyze whether Kosovo was the most pressing humanitarian crisis in which NATO could have intervened and the level of success it achieved in this effort. NATO did not accomplish this proclaimed goal, because the goal was actually an excuse to intervene in Kosovo. The second Department of State objective is "Preserving stability in a key part of Europe." With statements from the

interested country leaders involved in this objective, I will demonstrate stability was not truly at risk. The last section will offer my proposed explanation that the U.S. and NATO intervened in Kosovo to preserve NATO's credibility.

Literature Review

The intervention by NATO has been the subject of a great deal of academic commentary. NATO did not seek UN Security Council authorization for the attack on Yugoslavia, and the peculiar nature of the Kosovo conflict has led many scholars to be divided in their opinions. They can be grouped into two categories: those who write about NATO's illegitimacy in attacking (Hehir 2009 and Menon 2001) and those who try to find legitimacy for this attack (Greenwood 2000, Roberts 1999, and Glennon 1999). Scholars of the first category argue U.S./NATO did not seek UN Security Council authorization to attack; therefore, the intervention was illegal. These scholars fail to explain the reason U.S./NATO intervened without authorization. The second category of scholars argue that while the U.S./NATO did not have explicit authorization, through the resolutions written for Yugoslavia, NATO had implicit authorization from the UN Secretary General. Therefore, it was not necessary to request further authorization. This plausible explanation essentially justifies a controversial move. However, the UN Charter explains clearly that it is necessary to obtain authorization for such moves. Explanations of how NATO avoided getting explicit authorization for its actions unavoidably hint that NATO had underlying motives for doing so. Those motivations have yet to be fully explored.

Many justify NATO's intervention citing humanitarian and moral duties, despite the lack of legitimacy in attacking (Randy 2001, D'Amato 2001 and Simma 1999). However, these claims can be questioned because NATO's use of force against Serbs ultimately resulted in as many deaths as had already occurred (Herscher 2010). Others try to explain that NATO's attack was biased and was driven by other motivations such as economic interests or on distracting attention from the Lewinski sex scandal (Cohn 2002 and Bulent 2002). The U.S./NATO attack in Yugoslavia was illegal. In international law, there is no such thing as a "humanitarian" attack. The U.S. wanted no international security in Yugoslavia other than NATO, wherein their power is vested. The most powerful motivation for NATO's intervention in Kosovo was the Department of State's third stated objective: to preserve NATO's credibility (Ong 2003, Cooper 1999, and Dempsey 1999).

U.S. and NATO Objectives in Kosovo

On 26 March 1999, the Department of State released an official statement entitled "U.S. and NATO objectives and interests in Kosovo." It declares: "The U.S. and NATO objectives in Kosovo are to stop the killing and achieve a durable peace that prevents further repression and provides for democratic self-government for the Kosovar people." After this statement, it is listed that the U.S. had three strong interests at stake

(U.S. Department of State 1999): 1) Averting a humanitarian catastrophe; 2) Preserving stability in a key part of Europe; and 3) Maintaining the credibility of NATO.

Two days prior to the U.S. Department of State release, President Clinton appeared on national television and set down similar objectives, adding, "Our mission is clear: to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's purpose so that the Serbian leaders understand the imperative of reversing course" (U.S. Department of State 1999).

Although the first two interests listed in the Department of State statement might be reasonable justification for entering the Kosovo war, they were not achieved and were rhetorical rather than authentic. In other words, they look like "pretexts for U.S. and NATO policy, not motives behind the policy" (Layne 1999). The strongest motivation was evidently to maintain NATO's credibility at all costs, but the other reasons were needed to support that objective.

Averting a Humanitarian Catastrophe

Averting a humanitarian catastrophe was the first objective highlighted by the U.S. Department of State and President Clinton. Rather than achieving the objectives, the air campaign instead launched the crisis into colossal proportions. According to James Bovard, a policy advisor to the Future of Freedom Foundation, "The CIA had warned the Clinton administration that if bombing was initiated, the Serbian army would greatly accelerate its efforts to expel ethnic Albanians. The White House disregarded this warning and feigned surprise when mass expulsions began" (Bovard 2001). Arnold Kanter, former under secretary of state for Political Affairs, said the U.S. has to "be highly selective and restrictive in our decisions about using military force in humanitarian interventions, confining ourselves to the most serious or egregious cases" (Frye 2000). According to Kanter, the U.S. should set a high bar for its humanitarian intervention before participating in it. If the participation should be confined to the most serious or egregious cases, then the question naturally arises: Was Kosovo among the most serious or egregious cases? No atrocity in the world should be underestimated, and each one needs clear and accurate attention. It is not my intention to underestimate the Kosovo atrocities induced by Slobodan Milošević; I am the first one to condemn them. Nevertheless, it is important to put the Kosovo War in perspective with other atrocities to understand whether intervention in Kosovo was truly a humanitarian intervention.

Was Kosovo among the Most "Serious or Egregious Cases"?

Kosovo was not among the most exigent of egregious cases during the 1990s. Several cases were (and continue to be) worse. The Kurds' situation in Turkey was far more serious than the Kosovo case. According to a 1994 Human Rights Watch report, thirty-nine thousand people died in the Kurdish southeast Turkey conflict, with over half the losses occurring in the previous year. "Two million Kurds had been displaced during ten years of conflict; 108 villages were depopulated only between 9 May and

10 July 1994, and in the autumn of 1994 some 137 were demolished” (Human Rights Watch 1994). In 2009, the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), which had twenty-one members in parliament, was closed down by the Constitutional Court. Turks strove to erase Kurdish culture by using threats of violence to ban Kurdish TV, radio, and language (Human Rights Watch 2009). Kurds could integrate into Turkish society only if they renounced any Kurdish identity.

Even though this apparent ethnic cleansing of the Kurds has been going on since 1984 and continues today, the U.S. and NATO have not intervened to prevent humanitarian catastrophe. If the U.S. and NATO were truly seeking to simply avert a humanitarian catastrophe, Turkey may have been a better destination than Kosovo.

Table 1: Comparison of Kurdish Crisis to Kosovar Albanian Crisis

	Number of deaths	Number of villages, hamlets, or settlements partly or completely destroyed	Number of people displaced
Kurds in Turkey	39,000	7,932	2,000,000
Albanians in Kosovo (as of 1998)	2,500	12	250,000
Albanians in Kosovo (during NATO action)	10,000	1,400,000	

Source: Data adapted from Taft (1998), Bozerslan (2001) and Murphy (2004).

Though the U.S. apparently strove to deter a humanitarian crisis, their intervention only aggravated the expulsion of Albanians. The estimated number of Kosovar Albanians driven from their homes by Serb security forces prior to the October 1998 cease-fire is 250,000 (Taft 1998)¹⁶ The UN Refugee Agency estimated 100,000 refugees from a potential conflict in Kosovo, prior to war (UNHCR 2000). The total number of Kosovar Albanians driven from their homes prior to NATO’s intervention was 350,000. On the other hand, the number of Kosovar Albanians expelled from Kosovo by Serbs (March to June 1999 NATO’s air campaign) was 863,000. (OSCE 2010) As the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe shows in its report “Kosovo/ Kosova As seen, As told” the number of refugees continued to increase through all seventy-eight days of NATO’s air attack. (OSCE 2010).

Most alarmingly, this consequence was not unforeseen. On 27 March, 1999, U.S./ NATO Commanding General Wesley Clark said it was “entirely predictable” that Serb terror and violence would intensify after the NATO bombing,” but on the same day State Department spokesperson James Rubin said, “The U.S. is extremely alarmed by reports of an escalating pattern of Serbian attacks on Kosovo Albanian civilian” (Clines and Myers 1999).²⁰ General Clark was apparently aware of possible violence against Kosovar Albanian, but still wanted to attack Yugoslavia. It was estimated the

NATO attack killed as many people as the Serbian attack did prior to the air strike (Herscher 2010)²¹ This fact alone shows that preventing humanitarian catastrophe was not the primary motivation.

Avoiding Humanitarian Catastrophe without Diplomacy while conceding to Deal with Terrorist.

The UN Charter states that a member of the UN “shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice” (UN 1945).²² The U.S. did not do what the Charter prescribes in order to avoid humanitarian catastrophe.

If the U.S. was purely motivated by preventing humanitarian catastrophe it would have also tried to stop the KLA, which functioned on the Albanian side. Before the Rambouillet Peace Accords, Ambassador Holbrooke, at that time assistant secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, was sent by President Clinton in October 1998 to seek a cease-fire in Kosovo and allow an international mission to supervise the troop pullback (Crawford 2002)²³ Many Western officials would later accuse Milošević of undermining the agreement, but these accusations were not accurate (Solana 1999). General Naumann, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia said, “The Yugoslav authorities honored the [Holbrooke] agreement” (ICTY 2002²⁵ recognizing only the Serbian side. Because of this agreement, the KLA used the Serbian restraint as an opportunity to launch a new offensive. However, the KLA rejected the agreement and it met no demands at all, and as General Naumann witnessed, “the majority of violations [of the Holbrooke agreement] was caused by the KLA” (ICTY 2002)²⁶

Ignoring KLA caused more problems. George Robertson, former Secretary of Defense in the Blair government, said in the Examination Witness of the UK Parliament, “Up until Racak earlier this year [1999] the KLA were responsible for more deaths in Kosovo than the Yugoslav authorities had been” (UK Parliament 1999)²⁷ The U.S. and NATO did not intervene. They asked Albanis for a ceasefire but nothing else. If they had intervened, the war in Kosovo would have taken another path, perhaps a diplomatic one without NATO’s attack

Barton Gellman reported in the *Washington Post*: “U.S. intelligence reported almost immediately that the KLA intended to draw NATO into its fight for independence by provoking Serb forces into further atrocities” (Gellman 1999)²⁸ KLA leader, Hasim Thaci, knew every time they provoked Serbs there would be a counterattack against civilians, but he and other KLA leaders were willing to let many Kosovar Albanians die (Little 2010).²⁹ NATO would have been more eager to stop the KLA if they were truly motivated by humanitarian motives.

The KLA offensive increased and goaded the Serb forces to react to the offensive. With that reaction, Western officials did not have trust in Serb officials, but on the other hand, they did not do anything to stop the KLA offensive; instead they helped the KLA. The *London Sunday Times* reported: "American intelligence agents [associated with the OSCE mission] have admitted they helped to train the Kosovo Liberation Army before NATO's numbing of Yugoslavia" (Walker and Aidan 2000)³⁰ The U.S. was indeed sympathizing with the KLA. Alan Little, a BBC journalist, asked Madeleine Albright, "[If] there was no clear mechanism to punish [the KLA] if they failed to behave in what you call a reasonable way?" Albright answered, "Well, I think the punishment was that they would lose completely the backing of the U.S. and the Contact Group" (Little 2010)³¹ This statement suggests the U.S. was actually supporting the KLA. In fact, the KLA received American intelligence support prior to NATO's air strike (Walker and Aidan 2000). This assistance seems especially duplicitous when KLA was recognized as a terrorist group by the U.S. itself (Bissett 2001).³³ BBC News reported on 28 June 1998 that Robert Gelbard, U.S. Special envoy for Kosovo, condemned KLA by saying, "I know a terrorist when I see one and these men are terrorists" (BBC 1998).³⁴ This statement was made prior to the Holbrooke agreement, which was made in October 1998. Not only U.S. officials recognized KLA as a terrorist group, but other members of NATO also did, such as Lord Ashdown, Leader of the Liberal Democrats in the UK and later High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In early 1998, the U.S. Department of State listed the Kosovo Liberation Army as a terrorist group, but then in 1999 the U.S. and the Contact Group dealt with the organization (Bissett 2001)³⁵ It is clear the U.S. changed its position toward KLA and its activities in order to attack Milošević. Their willingness to deal with terrorists shows their desperation to attack Milošević and also to have the opportunity to use NATO's power in order to preserve NATO's credibility, and also shows their lack of a desire to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe.

Rambouillet Peace Accord without Real Diplomacy

Diplomatic approaches were lacking during the Rambouillet Peace Accords for Kosovo, which can be called the "do what we tell you to do" accords. On that occasion, the U.S. wanted only to command, to dictate the solution without compromising. Their attitude and their firmness strongly implied the real issue was not to try and avoid humanitarian catastrophe but something else. Even though the Clinton administration was firmly convinced it was possible to solve the Kosovo problem with an open and unconditional dialogue, the Rambouillet Peace Accord showed the dialogue was unilateral, closed, and conditional. Albright arrived at Rambouillet unwilling to have diplomacy without threat of force against Yugoslavia (Little 2010).³⁶ On this occasion U.S. diplomats showed no skill and no desire to solve the problem with peaceful diplomacy.

According to Albright and James Rubin, it was necessary on that occasion to have a clear-cut U.S. and NATO position. There was no real desire to seek an agreement, because U.S. officials did not believe it was possible to find one with Serbs (Little 2010).³⁷ In the "Kosovo Report" the Independent International Commission on Kosovo writes, "Albright and others had been so firm about the supremacy of NATO over any other institutional actor in this context, and so many aspects of the Rambouillet process had been presented as explicitly non-negotiable, that there was little reason for Serbia to have expected flexibility from NATO. If a deal were possible, it would have had to have been initiated by NATO powers" (Oxford 2000).³⁸ Albright's determination that NATO was the only solution for Kosovo shows the problem was not avoiding humanitarian catastrophe but establishing the supremacy and credibility of NATO. The events in Kosovo happened at the right time and the right place.

The lack of diplomacy and the pretenses to use NATO were clear in Annex B of the Rambouillet Peace Accord. Toward the end of the meetings, the Serbian delegation accepted the political aspects of the accord. Christopher Hill, former ambassador to Macedonia, said Milošević was open to the political deal offered in Rambouillet (Oxford 2000). The biggest problem the Yugoslavian delegation found was in Annex B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation force. In this annex, it is stated that a NATO peacekeeping force would occupy Kosovo, as well as Yugoslavia if necessary. It is obvious the Serbian delegation would not accept this part of the agreement, because it violated the principle of sovereignty. Henry Kissinger said, "The Rambouillet text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops throughout Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing. Rambouillet is not a document that an angelic Serb could have accepted. It was a terrible diplomatic document that should never have been presented in that form" (Kissinger 1999). Before a definitive "no" from the Serbs, there were signs they might accept international peacekeepers, like OSCE or UN, but not under NATO (Rendell 1999).⁴ U.S. diplomats refused that idea. In a CNN interview, Albright said, "There is no question that the basis of the deal is a NATO-led force" (Albright 1999). Since the U.S. did not want other international peacekeepers, it did not sincerely intend to find a peaceful solution. In fact, a U.S. official told the press the U.S. intentionally set the bar high in order for the Serbs to comply. Lord John Gilbert, UK Minister of State for Defense Procurement, in an "examination of witness" declared "I think the terms put to Milošević at Rambouillet were absolutely intolerable; how could he possibly accept them; it was quite deliberate" (UK Parliament 2000).

Even though the Rambouillet agreement did not introduce a referendum for an independent Kosovo—which the KLA leaders wanted and is the reason they did not at first accept the agreement—at the end, the Albanian delegation did sign the peace accord, leaving Serbs alone. Signing was a simple tactic the KLA used because it was

easier for them to let NATO have a war with Serbia than for the KLA to have a war with Serbia. This tactic was, in some ways, suggested by Albright. Veton Surroi, Kosovo Albanian Political Leader said that Albright was very clear with Hashim Thaci, KLA leader. He reported: "She was saying you sign, the Serbs don't sign, we bomb. You sign, the Serbs sign, you have NATO in. So it's up to you to say. You don't sign, the Serbs don't sign, we forget about the subject" (Little 2010). It was intentionally calculated by U.S. diplomats to put NATO in Yugoslavia. Diplomacy was not present in Rambouillet, because the two interested parties were never together to discuss the issues, but discussion happened separately and through letters (Auerswald and Auerswald 2000).

In brief, the humanitarian catastrophe was not avoided and as the British committee on Foreign Affairs said: "We accept the view of expert witnesses that the North Atlantic Treaty gives NATO no authority to act for humanitarian purposes, and we recommend that the government examine whether any new legal instrument is necessary to allow NATO to take action in future in the same manner as it did in Kosovo" (Select Committee on Foreign Affairs 2000). NATO did not have any authority to act because there is no "right" of humanitarian intervention that could be found in the UN Charter or in the international law. Even the U.S. rejected supporting the doctrine of humanitarian intervention (Chesterman 2001). The only convincing purpose for the intervention is for NATO's own credibility.

Preserving Stability in a Key Part of Europe

The second objective President Clinton, his administration, and NATO suggested was preserving stability in a key part of Europe. According to them, the ethnic cleansing would cause many Kosovar Albanians to leave their country. Neighboring countries did not want refugees, because they would create tensions and ultimately destabilization in Europe. This objective might be important, and it is not possible to say with firmness the Kosovo War could not destabilize that part of Europe; nevertheless, it is possible to say it was not likely to happen because Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro accepted all the Kosovo refugees. The only concern these countries had was receiving enough international aid for the refugees. The coming of those refugees was relatively organized and under control (CNN 1999).

In his address to the American people, President Clinton said, "Let a fire burn here in this area, and the flames will spread. Eventually, key U.S. allies could be drawn into the conflict." According to the Congressional Research Service, the allies President Clinton was referring to are Greece and Turkey (Migdalovitz 1999).

Greece and Turkey's Reactions

The Greek prime minister was at first opposed to NATO's intervention in Kosovo without the UN mandate but later passively accepted NATO, even though Greece did not participate in military operations (Migdalovitz 1999). In response to President

Clinton's statement regarding a possible conflict in the region, the prime minister "disagreed . . . that this development could lead to conflict with Turkey," and said, "Greece . . . is a stabilizing force in the area. There is no reason for anyone to fear that there will be implications with Turkey" (Migdalovitz 1999, 4). It is clear the Greek political leaders did not agree with President Clinton's statement. Greece did not recognize any possible destabilization of the region.

Turkish political leaders also differed with President Clinton's statement. The Turkish foreign minister said, "A state of war between Turkey and Greece due to the Kosovo crisis is possible only if Greece supports Serbia by leaving NATO and fights NATO. And I don't expect that such a situation will happen." The Turkish leaders equally refused to believe that the Kosovo War would have implications with Turkey and the Kurds in the southeast Turkish region (Migdalovitz 1999, 5).

In brief, President Clinton's statement regarding the destabilization of a certain part of Europe does not rely on any great support. Turkish and Greek political leaders assured the destabilization in that part of Europe was almost impossible; therefore, destabilization was not a valid concern, even if it was possible. History agreed with Turkey and Greece.

Proposed Explanation: NATO's Credibility

My proposed explanation for U.S./NATO participation in the Kosovo war is that NATO's credibility was at stake. In order to explain why this proposed explanation is the most credible, it is necessary to give a short background of NATO and EU history.

NATO History in Context

During the Cold War era, Europe's predominant defense force was NATO, which was mostly the U.S. with its powerful nuclear capabilities. Europe needed the U.S., and this need made the U.S. a dominant power in Europe. As Theodore Draper points out, NATO was an arrangement, not an alliance: "It was, in effect, a unilateral U.S. guarantee of European security, because only the U.S. was able to defend itself and any of the members" (Draper 1983). But with the end of the Cold War, NATO became a very strange institution without any obvious purpose.

Throughout the 1990s, U.S. policymakers wrestled with the problem of reinventing NATO, particularly the redefinition of both its purpose and its membership. In the meantime, Europe started to think about its own defense and security projects, which made the U.S. uncomfortable. In April 1990, President Bush wrote to France's President Mitterrand: "NATO is the only plausible justification in my country for the American military presence in Europe. If NATO is allowed to wither because it has no meaningful political place in the new Europe, the basis for a long-term U.S. military commitment can die with it" (Sarotte 2010). As President Bush said, NATO's living purpose is being present in Europe to defend Western Europe, but Europe started to see NATO's purpose as no longer necessary in the new Europe. U.S. political leaders

understood NATO was entering a crisis. In November 1991, NATO held a summit in Rome, after the London meeting of 1990, to find a better reason for NATO's existence, and to "transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising era in Europe" (NATO 1991). NATO would have a different function from its role in the Cold War.

EU History in Context

On 7 February 1992, twelve European countries signed the treaty on the EU, also known as "The Maastricht Treaty," in which these countries undertook to implement a "common foreign and security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world" (EU 2010). This event is significant because it was the first time an official document talks about a common European defense. Fearing a possible failure of their organization, NATO leadership organized a meeting in Berlin with the foreign ministers and representatives of the member countries of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In this meeting, it was decided the Western EU would oversee the creation of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO structures ((North Atlantic Council 1996). This creation was necessary to avoid a possible independent European defense that would "destroy" NATO. Nevertheless, on 2 October 1997 the European Community signed the Treaty of Amsterdam. Through this treaty, they created the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and they initiated the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), now known as Common Security and Defense Policy (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997). The next year at the 1998 Saint-Malo summit, there was a joint declaration between France and the UK on European defense. An important passage of the declaration stated: "The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises." (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1998). This statement declared the ESDP road map clearly does not include NATO but instead a separate and autonomous defense force.

The Clinton Administration started to become nervous about Europe's steps on defense. In fact, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott said, "We would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO, but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO" (Howerth and Keeler 2003). Clearly, the U.S. did not want any competition for NATO. Even though EU members did not explicitly want to weaken NATO, none could really foretell what the future would hold or what would be the eventual nature of the Atlantic Alliance. The U.S. did not want, and still does not want,

to accept this outcome, because NATO's presence in Europe means the U.S. will continue to have a strong influence in Europe, and it will continue to exercise its military hegemony there. The U.S. has done everything to preserve its power by demonstrating NATO's necessity and credibility. NATO's credibility was at stake as it approached its fiftieth birthday.

Kosovo War

The Kosovo conflict was a perfect opportunity for the U.S. and NATO to display their power and influence. After the war in Bosnia, and prior to NATO's fiftieth anniversary, it was necessary to show NATO needed to exist and Europe could do without the Atlantic Alliance. Milošević's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was the perfect opportunity to exercise NATO's power and to strengthen the U.S.' hegemony in Europe. Kosovo was to be a new sort of war, one fought in the name of universal values and principles, rather than for narrow interests. In all the Yugoslavia conflict, but especially in Kosovo, the Europeans wanted to take the lead with diplomatic means, but the U.S. acceded, because if the Europeans had to work through diplomacy, it would mean NATO had to be sidetracked; and if NATO led, it would provide a central role for the U.S. and NATO (Hyland 1999).

The U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was the biggest NATO supporter. Albright started to talk about bombing Yugoslavia from the beginning. This bombing had to be under NATO (Albright 2003). In order to have a NATO attack, the alliance had to have a legal right to intervene unilaterally in Kosovo. Unfortunately, the alliance did not have that legal right, because it would violate the UN Charter. The British Foreign Minister Robin Cook wanted UN Security Council authorization, but Albright stopped him, saying in a phone conversation with him, "If a UN resolution passed, we would have set a precedent that NATO required Security Council authorization before it could act" (O'Connell 2000, 384). It was not possible to ask for UN approval, because the U.S. did not want to validate the principle that the Security Council held an effective veto over NATO decisions, a position Congress would never accept. Therefore, the motive was used of avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo: a justification for NATO's action.

Right before the air attack, the Clinton Administration and NATO officers campaigned strongly for NATO's intervention. Albright, together with Holbrooke, argued with the members of the Alliance that an agreement for peace was achievable only if NATO authorized the use of force (Albright 2003), otherwise there would be no other occasion where NATO could show its power and, therefore, its necessity in Europe. The former secretary alone said the Kosovo situation was a "key test of American leadership and of the relevance and effectiveness of NATO" (Albright 2003, 391).⁶ Milošević's ethnic cleansing came at the right moment for the U.S., and they used it to show NATO's credibility.

If Milošević was the only problem, and if it was necessary to remove him from office, the U.S. could have done it. Michael Dobbs, *Washington Post* foreign service journalist, wrote an article explaining that American pollster Doug Schoen helped Milošević's opposition overthrow him. Dobbs wrote: "The lead role was taken by the state department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, the government's foreign assistance agency, which channeled the funds through commercial contractors and nonprofit groups such as NDI and its Republican counterpart, the International Republican Institute (IRI)" (Dobbs 2000).⁶ U.S. officers often met Milošević opposition in Hungary for various seminars and helped it financially. In this way, Milošević was overthrown. Now the question naturally arises: Could the U.S. not do the same thing in the elections prior to the NATO attack? The answer is, yes. The demonstrations in 1996–97 showed Serbians were tired of Milošević. Unfortunately, the U.S. had another plan in mind, which involved NATO's credibility.

Many scholars have discussed NATO's possible failure: "If NATO cannot meet this challenge and defeat it, why does the alliance still exist?" "NATO will be sunk if it loses." Any retreat "would be a deadly blow to NATO" (Bandow 1999, 81). The fear of failing and losing credibility was high.

NATO's credibility prevailed over avoiding humanitarian catastrophe and destabilization of a part of Europe. The British House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs wrote in its report on Kosovo that: "Carl Bildt [former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina] is reported as having been told by White House staff ten days before the bombing started that NATO needed to launch air strikes in order to save its credibility" (House of Commons 1999). This is further evidence of the real objective the U.S. and NATO had in mind.

After eleven weeks of continual bombing, Milošević agreed to a peace plan. In that agreement, the sovereignty of Yugoslavia was recognized, the presence of the UN was confirmed, and NATO and UN presence was finalized just on Kosovo territory. This is the agreement Yugoslavia's government almost accepted in Rambouillet (Bilder 1999). If U.S./NATO accepted the agreement after the air strike, they could have accepted it before the air strike, unless this tactic was planned in order to win against Milošević and to show NATO's credibility and power.

After the retreat of Serbs from Kosovo, the KLA started its own revenge against Serbs. Many atrocities during that year happened when NATO-led KFOR was responsible for security in Kosovo (King and Mason 2006, 53). All told, almost a quarter of a million people fled Kosovo during the period after the war ended (BBC 2003). Nevertheless, the media and the international community did not emphasize the problem in the same way they emphasized the Serbs' attack against Kosovar Albanians.

NATO's intervention was seen as a triumph. It had to be that way to show NATO's credibility and necessity even more. The U.S. reaffirmed U.S. hegemony and set a precedent that NATO could go to war virtually whenever it wished, without

the authorization of the UN Security Council. The U.S.' dominance over Europe was preserved. The main benefit of the Kosovo War for the U.S. was the reestablishment of the key institution of U.S. hegemony in Europe: NATO.

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