

SIGMA

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The Israel Lobby and the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process

Miles Hansen

Abstract

This paper uses foreign policy analysis theory to study the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in the period following Mahmoud Abbas' election until Hamas' surprising victory in the January 2006 parliamentary elections. It integrates a narrative of the year leading up to Hamas' victory with an analysis of U.S. policy toward Israel and Palestine, and the influence of the Israel Lobby—particularly AIPAC. The author argues that the Israel Lobby prevented the U.S. from supporting a moderate Palestinian Authority, thereby shifting Palestinians' support to extremists and consequently decreasing prospects for peace. The lack of support from the U.S. inhibited the PA's ability to function as an effective governing power and to provide essential public goods, e.g., political, social, economic, and security reforms. The Palestinian people, disenchanted with the weak leadership of Fatah, elected Hamas as a protest against Fatah—not as an endorsement for Hamas' terrorist tactics. The paper concludes that the possibility for outcomes constructive to the peace process would have been higher if the U.S. had lent Abbas its full support.

Introduction

The past eighteen months have been a difficult time in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a means of accomplishing its political goals, the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority has refused to accept the existence of Israel and renounce violence against Israeli civilians. Civil strife has been rampant in the Occupied Territories as Hamas and Fatah vie for political power, resulting in the effectual split of Palestine into two separate entities—one led by Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the other led by Fatah in the West Bank. Israel has continued to confiscate land unilaterally as it works to complete its Separation Barrier, dividing the Occupied Territories even further. The U.S. has continued its boycott of aid to the Palestinian Authority and Israel refuses to release millions of dollars of tax revenue collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority (PA)

(Department of State 2007). The lack of these funds has crippled the PA's ability to provide basic needs to its people, raising the level of human suffering in the Occupied Territories to new levels.

These unfortunate developments in the conflict followed a period during 2005 when, according to both Israeli and Palestinian leaders, the prospects for peace were high (Oliver 2005). This paper looks at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a struggle driven by missed opportunities and analyzes the period following moderate Mahmoud Abbas' election as president of the PA until Hamas' surprising victory in the January 2006 parliamentary elections. Abbas' willingness to rein in Palestinian militia groups, while actively pursuing a closer relationship with the West, in concert with the peace process was a breath of fresh air following the tumultuous years of the Al-Aqsa Intifadeh. These developments provided a new beginning of sorts in the peace process and a prime opportunity for a lasting peace to be forged between Israel and Palestine. Despite the optimistic mood of the time, as the year continued to progress, hope turned to disillusionment and compromise to belligerence as leaders neglected their commitments, failing to capitalize on the opportunity, thereby opening the door for Hamas' rise to power and allowing the prospects of peace to stagnate and disappear into history as yet another missed opportunity.

Attempting to understand what went wrong at this particular juncture will enable policymakers to adjust future policy to ensure that similar problems are not repeated. The role of the U.S. has been prominent throughout the conflict, and U.S. policy is greatly influenced by domestic pro-Israel lobbyist groups, particularly the American Israel Political Affairs Committee (AIPAC). While compiling a narrative of the year leading up to the Hamas victory, I integrated different analyses of U.S. policy towards Israel and Palestine in an effort to find the effects of U.S. policy on the shift in political power from Fatah to Hamas. To understand this relationship better, it is critical to study the influence the Israel Lobby had on U.S. policy. The evidence suggests that U.S. policy failed to keep its commitments to Abbas, undermining U.S. support of the PA while Fatah was in control, thereby inhibiting the PA's ability to function as an effective governing power. Because the PA could not provide essential public goods such as political, social, economic, and security reforms, it had politically weak leadership. As a result, the Palestinian people became disenchanted with the failures of Fatah and elected Hamas as a protest to Fatah. Therefore, Hamas' victory was not an endorsement for Hamas' terrorist tactics or its refusal to consider peace with Israel. Rather, the group won *in spite of* these extremist views, because it was the only other viable alternative to Fatah.

Historical Context

In January 2005, Israel and the PA seemed on the verge of peace. Both sides recognized the right of the other to exist, and leaders publicly proclaimed a desire to reach a peace agreement. Mahmoud Abbas successfully negotiated support from Hamas and Islamic Jihad for a cessation of hostilities with Israel. Then on 8 February, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Abbas negotiated a ceasefire between Israel and Palestine, ending a five-year Intifadeh. At a meeting in Sharm el-Sheik, Egypt, Sharon declared that "Israel [would] cease all its military activity against all Palestinians everywhere" (Oliver 2005). Interestingly, President George Bush had promised Abbas \$350 million of direct foreign aid just a week before to help

support the newly elected leader in his efforts to rein in Palestinian militias and to enhance the governing capability of the PA. Bush also invited Sharon and Abbas to the White House to build upon this new foundation of peace. Sharon and Bush recognized the opportunity to reach an agreement with the pragmatic Abbas and therefore directed policy toward supporting the newly elected leader. Abbas best summarized the positive mood about the prospects for peace when, referring to Sharm el-Shiek's epithet as the city of peace, he asserted that "a new opportunity for peace [was] born today in the City of Peace . . . let's pledge to protect it" (Oliver 2005).

Recent history shows that, despite commitment from all three parties to a two-state solution and a mutual desire for peace, this was yet another lost opportunity in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict tragedy. Over the course of eleven months, the ceasefire and the peace process slowly unraveled, concluding when Hamas' electoral victory indefinitely derailed the peace effort.

As long as Hamas remains in power and refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist, Israel will refuse to negotiate. The conflict between Fatah and Hamas will cripple the PA's ability to represent all Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, let alone in the international community. How was the momentum for peace that came out of the City of Peace in February 2005 lost? What contributed to Fatah's demise and Hamas' victory in the 2006 elections? What role did U.S. policy play in this process, and how did the Israel Lobby influence U.S. policy?

Answers to these questions may be found, in part, by analyzing the role the U.S. played in the conflict and the effects of U.S. policy on political developments within the PA. Illuminating these effects (and their negative impacts on the peace process) clarifies the benefits if the U.S. assumes a balanced position between the belligerent parties in the conflict. In order to understand how this occurs, this paper analyzes the foreign policy formulation process within the U.S., particularly the strong influence of the Israel Lobby. The effects of this influence did not coincide with the stated goals of both the U.S. and Israel and, therefore, at least in this particular instance, the Israel Lobby does not further the interests of either state. In order for peace to come to Israel and Palestine, it is imperative that the policies of all stakeholders are designed to accomplish the goals Sharon and Abbas agreed upon in Sharm el-Sheik. These goals, according to numerous public opinion polls, are supported by a majority of Israelis and Palestinians as well as the current leadership of Israel, Fatah, and the U.S. These stakeholders all want peace between Israel and Palestine within the framework of a two-state solution where two states—one Palestinian and the other Israeli—live side by side in peace (Opinion Leader's Survey 2007).

Theoretical Framework

The conflict between Israel and Palestine is intensely complex with a multiplicity of actors, influences, causes, and desired outcomes. This paper searches for a degree of clarity in the confusion by focusing on U.S.–Israeli and U.S.–Palestinian interaction and analyzing the effects of these relationships on the PA's domestic politics and the impact on the peace process between Israel and Palestine. In order to understand these relationships, a number of assumptions must be made regarding how states interact with one another, how states formulate and implement foreign policy, and how domestic actors within a government vie

for political power. The study of interstate relations is embodied under the wide umbrella of international relations (IR) theory. Traditionally, IR theory has assumed that the state is a unitary actor in the international arena, thereby neglecting the formative dynamics of foreign policy within the state that are critical to the analyses conducted in this paper. Therefore, I will first establish the theoretical framework that pertains to interstate interaction. Secondly, I will use foreign policy analysis (FPA) to establish a theoretical basis through which the study of intrastate foreign policy formulation is conducted. Finally, I will look at the assumptions made in public choice theory in order to provide the framework to analyze the political struggle within the PA between Hamas and Fatah.

Within IR theory, there are various schools of thought through which scholars view and interpret interaction between states, the most dominant of which is Realism. According to the Realist tradition, states are unitary actors in an anarchic international system making rational decisions with the goal of preserving their individual sovereignty (Teti 2002). Therefore, each state, acting as a unitary entity, is capable of formulating various foreign policy options and then implementing the option that best enhances the state's power in the international community. States are assumed to be unitary actors because each decision-making group within a state is a rational actor sharing a common goal of self-preservation (Levy 1997). According to rational choice theory, if an actor is rational, it weighs all options and finds the one that is best as defined by its preferences and constraints. When faced with decisions, each decision-maker within a state will rationally analyze the situation and come to the same rational conclusion. Thus, states are unitary actors when competing in the international arena.

Realism describes the acquisition and loss of power between these primary actors as a zero-sum scenario that results in a "balance of power" approach to maintaining stability in the international system (Walz 1979). Kathleen Christison, a former CIA political analyst, used this basic tenet of Realism to illustrate the downfalls of U.S. policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (1997). Christison wrote that U.S. policy has continuously favored Israel, thereby maintaining an imbalanced distribution of power between Israel and Palestine (1997, 47). According to the Realist tradition, this lack of balance of power perpetuates the conflict between the two countries.

While Realism adequately describes the interactions between states, it has been criticized for its oversimplification of the international system and neglect of the domestic foreign policy formulation process (Teti 2002, 10). A pluralistic approach has developed within the Realist tradition to account for actors other than states in the international arena (such as intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational corporations). In the realm of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, pluralism has been used to factor in the effects of the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and a host of other organizations that are actively participating in the conflict.

Pluralism also incorporates more nuanced approaches to rational choice to account for the non-unitary reality of decision making within a state. Work by economists Eda Karni and Zvi Safra recounted the growing acknowledgment that rational choice theory does not accurately account for the vast number of inputs that go into each decision and the variance among decision-makers' interpretations of these inputs (1987). Recognizing these limitations of rational choice allows Pluralism to provide a theoretical framework that more accurately

reflects the true nature of foreign policy decision making. Robert Keohane, a professor at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs, argued, "The next major step forward in understanding international cooperation will have to incorporate domestic politics fully into the analysis—not on a merely ad hoc basis, but systematically" (Waever 1996, 21). This Pluralistic approach is known as foreign policy analysis.

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) is based on the premise that the ground upon which all IR theory is built is the formulation of foreign policy (Hudson 2005). This situates FPA as the intersection of IR theory and public policy, thereby opening it up to influences from a wide range of disciplines and theories. According to FPA, foreign policy is technically formulated and implemented by a network of government agencies, but this process is greatly influenced by a complex web of international organizations, public opinions, personalities, and domestic organizations. This pluralistic approach of looking at foreign policy "allows us to look into the 'black box' of the state, allowing us a better understanding of the complex genesis of foreign policy" (Teti 2002, 10). However, the difficulty of building an effective theory for understanding foreign policy formulation cannot be understated when one considers the seemingly infinite number of actors, influences, motivations, variables, and possible policies that exist for each policy decision. In a critique of FPA, Ole Waever noted that the difficulty of integrating domestic and international explanations for foreign policy has led to disappointment with FPA within the IR discipline (1996, 21).

Despite the limitations of FPA in applying a cohesive theory to both the domestic and international factors of foreign affairs, no superior theories have been developed to date. FPA remains the only significant attempt to bridge the interrelated realms of domestic foreign policy formulation and its implementation in the international system. Hence, FPA's focus on the domestic factors of foreign policy is the gateway through which I have analyzed the influence of the Israel Lobby on U.S. foreign policy. The seminal work on this topic, the *Israel Lobby* by Walt and Mearsheimer, is an in-depth look at the Israel Lobby and its effects on U.S. foreign policy (2006). The authors asserted in their opening statements that "the overall thrust of U.S. policy in the region is due almost entirely to U.S. domestic politics, and especially to the activities of the Israel Lobby" (2006, 2). Although they did not formulate an explicit theory, all of their arguments took place within the domestic realm of foreign policy with an eye toward the impact of policy in the international system. This duality is best viewed and explored through the lens of FPA.

While looking at the causes of the rise of Hamas within Palestine, this paper posits that foreign influences inadvertently played a significant role in increasing domestic support for Hamas. Nevertheless, the actual struggle for political power between the two factions is a domestic issue within the PA. The underlying assumptions of public choice theory serve as a solid foundation upon which discussion of the internal politics of Palestine may take place (Scaff and Ingram 1987). Public choice studies the behavior of voters, politicians, and government officials as (mostly) self-interested agents. Their interactions in the domestic social system are based on self-interested actions that are determined by personal preferences. These preferences are defined by individuals or organizations with which an individual associates (e.g., Hamas and Fatah). Actors within the political process are rational, making choices that will maximize their satisfaction as defined by their preferences. Political parties rise and fall in

power as the preferences of constituents change. In a similar manner, political leaders pursue their preference for maintaining/increasing political power by making decisions according to the preferences of their sources of power—political parties they belong to, constituents they represent, and the government in which they work. Rubin (2006), Malki (2006), and Sharnasky (2006) all used assumptions grounded in public choice theory as they analyzed the reasons for Hamas' rise to power.

This paper looks at the interplay of three actors on the international stage. Even in this relatively simple case study, the complex reality of international relations requires a number of interrelated yet different theoretical frameworks, each of which accounts for a unique sphere in which these actors operate. The patchwork of multiple theories that is required in this study limits the generalizations that may be drawn from its conclusions. This weakness illustrates that no adequate theory currently exists that is capable of accurately framing the causes and effects of foreign policy formulation and implementation. Further work towards constructing such a theory will continue to clarify the complex relationship between domestic factions and foreign policy implications.

Methodology

I conducted a content analysis through archival research, looking at the shift in power from Fatah to Hamas that occurred over a twelve-month period and led to Hamas' victory in the January 2006 parliamentary elections. This content analysis was done using a database of day-by-day newswires coming out of the Occupied Territories. This database, the Monthly Media Monitoring Review (MMR), was collected by the Division on Palestinian Rights (DPR), a subsidiary of the United Nations Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (CEIRPP). I identified events, quotes, and actions that may have influenced or indicated the changing political tide. I also studied previous research that identified weak leadership, corruption, and an inability to satisfy public needs as chief causes of Fatah's political demise. While compiling a narrative of the year leading up to the decisive elections, I integrated analyses of U.S. policy towards Israel and Palestine, including the role the Israel Lobby played in influencing that policy, in an effort to find the effects of U.S. policy on the shift in political power between Hamas and Fatah. The evidence suggested that the U.S. did not substantially support the PA as it had committed, which contributed to the PA's inability to function as an effective governing power and provide essential public goods. As a result, the Palestinian people shifted their support to the only available alternative—Hamas.

The Israel Lobby and U.S. "Policy Schizophrenia"

A vital finding of this paper was that a key determinate of U.S. foreign policy is the influence of pro-Israel Lobby groups within the United States. While there are a significant number of organizations that share a mutual goal of promoting a pro-Israel agenda within the U.S., as stated previously, the most influential group is AIPAC (Lerner 2007).

The link between Israel and AIPAC has been identified by both former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and current Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. To a U.S. audience, Sharon said, "When people ask me how they can help Israel, I tell them—help AIPAC." Olmert concurred, "Thank God we have AIPAC, the greatest supporter and friend we have in the

whole world.” Commenting on the power AIPAC wields in Congress, former Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC) noted that “you can’t have an Israeli policy other than what AIPAC gives you” (Mearsheimer 2006, 31).

Building arguments on an FPA theoretical framework, Walt and Mearsheimer detailed the effects of the Israel Lobby on U.S. policy toward Israel and Palestine, writing, “Washington has given Israel wide latitude in dealing with the Occupied Territories, even when its actions were at odds with stated U.S. policy” (Mearsheimer 2006, 31). One third of all foreign aid leaving the U.S. makes its way to Israel, the sixteenth richest nation in the world (Zunes 2007). Israel receives an average of \$3 billion in U.S. foreign aid annually, with an exclusive exemption from U.S. oversight on how the money is allocated. According to Walt and Mearsheimer, this exemption “makes it virtually impossible to prevent the money from being used for purposes that the U.S. opposes, like building settlements in the West Bank” (2006, 31). They concluded that “were it not for the lobby’s ability to work effectively within the American political system, the relationship between Israel and the United States would be far less intimate than it is today” (2006, 39).

Dumke effectively opened the proverbial black box of policy formulation by exposing how the Israel Lobby influences Congress. He reported that the Israel Lobby donates more money than any other foreign-oriented lobby to local, state, and federal elections (\$42.3 million from 1982–2002 compared to \$297,000 by pro-Arab groups during the same time period). He also cited a number of examples to show how the Israel Lobby politically punishes those who do not comply with its policy positions (Dumke 2006, 8). Uri Avnery, a prominent Israeli peace activist, noted, “Every few years the Jewish lobby ‘eliminates’ an American politician who does not support the Israeli government unconditionally. This is not done secretly, behind closed doors, but as a public ‘execution’” (Dumke 2006, 9). The onslaught of anti-Semitic accusations that were flung at Jimmy Carter following the publication of his book *Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid* is an excellent example of a political “execution” to which Avnery referred (Elliot 2007).

The power of the Israel Lobby is impressive but, in and of itself, it is not illegal or even unethical in terms of contemporary lobbying practices. AIPAC and other pro-Israel organizations play by the same rules as other interest groups; the greatest difference is simply that the Israel Lobby does it much better. Nevertheless, if the Israel Lobby supports Israel, as Sharon and Olmert declared, then the policies it seeks to implement should work to further Israeli efforts to achieve a lasting peace with Palestine in the context of a two-state solution, which are objectives supported by Israel’s most recent prime ministers (Elliot 2007).

Losing an Opportunity

As previously noted, a great deal of optimism surrounded Abbas’ election and the ceasefire agreed to in the February 2005 Sharm el-Sheik meeting. It appeared as though Abbas had the trust of Sharon and the support of the U.S. as long as he continued to implement needed political and security reforms. Armed with pledges for financial aid from the U.S. and a willingness to negotiate from Israel, Abbas returned from Sharm el-Sheik prepared to rein in Palestinian militias and respectfully work with Israel—two endeavors that would require risking his political power domestically, particularly among Palestinians wary of the

U.S. and Israel. An analysis of the months that followed showed that Abbas made significant efforts to maintain the Palestinian side of the ceasefire and to bridle Palestinian militias, all pursuant to U.S. foreign aid requirements. However, U.S. policy, with its customary influence from AIPAC, undermined the Palestinian president's efforts. Without U.S. support, the peace process and Abbas' political power began to unravel, evidenced by the disintegration of the ceasefire and the shift in public support from Abbas' party, Fatah, to Hamas, as was manifested in the January 2006 elections.

The optimistic mood that existed following Sharm el-Sheik in February 2005 did not last long. On 25 February, a suicide bomber blew himself up at the Stage nightclub in Tel Aviv. The blast killed five Israeli youth and injured approximately fifty more. Immediately, Abbas denounced the attack as an attempt to sabotage the peace process and Israel just as quickly began to express doubts that Abbas could "tighten the screws" on militant groups within the Occupied Territories (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005). After recommitting Palestinian militias to cease attacks against Israel, Abbas made significant efforts to combat Palestinian militants. The UN Division for Palestinian Rights (2005) reported the following steps that Abbas took:

- Deployed a six hundred-man Palestinian security force with the mission to stop all attacks by Palestinian militants against Israel.
- Replaced security commanders who failed to stop attacks against Israel from originating in their respective areas.
- Denounced Hezbollah's connection with Palestinian militants and dispatching senior PA officials to urge Hezbollah leaders to cease aiding Palestinian militias.
- Searched out and destroyed illegal arms caches and smuggling tunnels.
- Arrested Palestinians from all factions, including Fatah, suspected in collaborating with Palestinian militants.
- Persuaded Hamas to abide by the terms of the ceasefire and participate in parliamentary elections, thereby entering the political process for the first time.
- Held a conference in Cairo with representatives of thirteen Palestinian factions in an attempt to bring a stronger sense of unity among the various groups and to agree to changes in the Palestinian parliamentary election process in order to make the political process more pluralistic.
- Implemented widespread institutional reforms and reorganized PA security and police forces in order to bolster the PA's monopoly on violence in the Occupied Territories.
- Forced the retirement of over 1,100 security officials who did not agree with PA efforts to fight Palestinians in order to halt violence against Israel.
- Formed technical committees comprised of forty-two Palestinian experts in "politics, security, planning, media, environment, and economics" in order to coordinate the planned Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.
- Threatened to use "an iron fist" against anyone who violated the ceasefire with Israel.
- Issued a decree banning civilians from carrying unlicensed weapons and then enforced the decree with arrests and fines.
- Demolished homes of Palestinian officials who had illegally obtained building material and property with public funds.

Abbas' aggressive efforts to enforce PA authority throughout the Occupied Territories prompted Aharon Zeevi, Israel's Military Intelligence chief general, to recognize that "there is determined action on [Abbas'] part in terms of his aims and intentions. [Mr. Abbas] has changed the people in his office, has limited incitement, and made changes in the legal sphere. He is succeeding to maintain the calm. . . ." (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005).

Ironically, on the same day that Zeevi articulated Israeli acknowledgment of Abbas' efforts, the U.S. Senate approved House Resolution 1268, an emergency spending bill that dramatically undercut the PA. Leading up to the bill, Bush had asked his fellow Republicans in Congress to approve the foreign aid package he promised Abbas during the State of the Union Address. In the speech before Congress, Bush had promised Abbas \$350 million if the Palestinian president continued to rein in militant groups within Palestine and worked towards developing a lasting peace with Israel—requirements that, according to Israel's senior intelligence official, Abbas had met. The money was to be used "to support Palestinian political, economic, social, and security reforms" (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005). This pledge was repeatedly confirmed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice throughout the spring of 2005. Congress responded to these U.S. commitments and Abbas' efforts by passing a measure that forbade direct assistance to the PA, even denying President Bush the customary right to waive restrictions in the interest of national security. The foreign aid package did so in an amazing display of bipartisanship with a 388–44 margin in the House and sailed through the Senate with equal force. The resulting aid deal was a far cry from the pledge Bush made to Abbas. The bill called for a trimmed offer of \$200 million to be given to nongovernmental projects expressly outside the control of the PA. Interestingly, \$50 million of the \$200 million was allocated to the Israeli government to invest in more rigorous checkpoints throughout the Occupied Territories, thereby strengthening Israeli control over lands considered by the international community as being illegally occupied Palestinian territory per Articles 33, 53, and 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Security Council Resolution 242. In a measure dubbed as "Palestinian Healthcare," the bill allocated \$2 million to Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization of America (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005).

The effects of the congressional action were a "huge slap in the face" and a "startling setback to Abbas" according to Edward Abington Jr., a Washington-based PA consultant (Kessler 2005). Danny Ayalon, Israeli ambassador to the U.S., responded in support of the restrictions, saying that Abbas had been "very disappointing" due to his failure to confront Palestinian militant groups, a position that, as previously shown, was not supported by the facts or senior officials in Israel's intelligence corps (Kessler 2005). AIPAC was directly involved in the package's negotiations, playing its typical role as a lobbying group and conducting research for congressional representatives and senators (McArthur 2005). While it was difficult to investigate specific actions taken by AIPAC during the private negotiations surrounding HR 1268, it was telling to note that among the strongest advocates of stringent restrictions on aid to Abbas and the PA were Representative Tom Delay, House Majority Leader; Representative Nita Lowey, a member of the Appropriations Committee; and Representatives Tom Lantos and Shelley Berkley, of the International Relations Committee (McArthur 2005). In 2004, these four representatives were reported among the top ten recipients of pro-Israel PAC funds, netting a combined \$499,493 over their careers (Galford 2004).

The Bush Administration had assured Abbas that U.S. aid would be sent to strengthen the PA, but the powerful Israel Lobby converted the policy so that in the end the PA was adversely affected. Not only did the lack of expected funds weaken the PA, but the rebuff from Washington also eroded public support among Palestinians for leaders who had justified cracking down on fellow Palestinians with promises for sorely needed political support and economic/humanitarian aid from the U.S.

Despite this significant setback, throughout May and June, Abbas continued his rhetoric against militant factions within the Occupied Territories, although with diminishing ability to maintain stability. From this period forward, Abbas' ability to maintain his political/security reforms and the ceasefire with Israel began to deteriorate at an increasingly rapid pace. On 21 June, Abbas and Sharon met for two hours in Sharon's official residence in Jerusalem. Comments following the meeting indicated a significant change in tone from both leaders. Following the meeting, Abbas and Sharon did not meet together as planned in a joint press conference, and Abbas refused to address journalists as he had scheduled, instead sending PA Prime Minister Qureia to meet with members of the media. Qureia reported, "This was a difficult meeting, and did not live up to our expectations. In all the basic issues for which we were expecting positive responses, there were none" (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005). The events and comments that followed the meeting were strong indicators of the pessimism that existed within the PA and the changing tide in the peace process.

In July, with the unilateral withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip fast approaching, the circumstances on the ground continued to grow more complicated for Abbas and the PA. Sensing weakness, and in response to Israel's announcement of the final route of the Separation Barrier through East Jerusalem, a route that would cut off 55,000 Palestinians from the rest of the city, Islamic Jihad successfully carried out two suicide attacks on 12 July. Fortunately, no one other than the militants involved in the bombings was injured, and PA leaders denounced the bombings as attacks against the peace process (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005). Regarding the Separation Barrier, Abbas expressed growing frustration over the failures in the peace process. He said, "The [East Jerusalem wall] plan is totally rejected. I don't believe that carrying out such measures by the Israeli Government would bring peace or security, instead it puts obstacles on the road to peace" (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005). PA Prime Minister Qureia added to Abbas' complaint, calling the plan "theft in broad daylight," and stated, "This decision makes a farce of any talk about peace and turns the Gaza withdrawal into a useless initiative" (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005). Saeb Erakat, Chief Negotiator for the PA, said that Israel's unilateral decision to build the wall on Palestinian territory was "determining the fate of Jerusalem before we begin negotiations" (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005). The unilateral nature of Israel's actions in building the Separation Barrier and its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip without working to ensure a smooth transition had great effects on Abbas' political power.

After reviewing the events that followed the failure of the U.S. to fulfill its commitment to Abbas and the PA, the stark difference in Abbas' ability to control the various Palestinian factions before and after House Bill 1268 and the overall mood of the peace process cannot be emphasized enough. Washington's lack of support, both financial and rhetorical, for the Palestinian cause significantly undermined Abbas, who had consistently worked to meet

the requirements set by the U.S. to receive badly needed economic support, support that unfortunately did not come.

August 2005 is remembered most for the unilateral withdrawal of all Israeli settlers from the Gaza Strip and from four settlements in the West Bank. This move was discussed by Sharon and Abbas in Sharm el-Sheik as an opportunity for the PA to have territory exclusively its own to govern. While the pullout occurred, Israel only allowed one gateway between Gaza and the outside world, placing extreme pressure on the PA's ability to effectively build an economy and govern the area. On 23 August, just eight days after the well publicized withdrawal from Gaza, Prime Minister Sharon initiated the largest West Bank settlement expansion yet, confiscating an area larger than the Gaza Strip between East Jerusalem and the Ma'ale Adumim settlement. After the completion of the expansion, there would only be thirteen kilometers between the newly confiscated land and the Jordanian border, leaving the West Bank nearly divided into northern and southern halves. Regarding the expansion, PA Chief Negotiator Saeb Erakat said, "Such decisions will only serve to undermine any efforts to resume negotiations," adding, "This will destroy President Bush's vision of a two-state solution" (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005). President Bush was silent on the issue, opting instead to continue to praise Israel for its withdrawal from Gaza and put pressure on the PA to halt all attacks coming out of the Occupied Territories (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005).

The last four months of Fatah's control of the PA were marred by increasing hostilities between Israel and Palestine. From 15–17 October, Israeli Defense Forces arrested hundreds of Palestinians. Abbas objected to the arrests but did not have the power to translate his objections into any concessions by Israel, and the U.S. took no action to pressure Israel to abide by the terms of the peace agreement. Israeli raids on Palestinian leaders began to increase through November and December, and Palestinian militias stepped up rocket and mortar attacks on Israeli outposts during the same period (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005). Just a few months after Sharon and Abbas shook hands in Sharm el-Sheik, the fragile peace they brokered was all but lost.

The Fall of Fatah and the Rise of Hamas

On 25 January 2006, the political landscape within the PA changed abruptly. In a surprising victory, Hamas won 74 of 132 seats on the Palestinian Legislative Council, allowing it to form the PA government on its own (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005). In order to distance itself from the radical image of Hamas, members of Fatah boycotted the new government, refusing any positions within it. Acting Prime Minister Olmert announced that Israel would not hold any negotiations with a government comprised of members of Hamas, and the U.S. led a boycott of Western aid to the Hamas-led PA. In the days leading to the election, Hamas made it clear that if elected into power, it did not intend to accept peace with Israel or renounce violence as a means to accomplish its political goals (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005). This put an indefinite stop to the peace process and led to increased violence between Israel and Palestine as well as between Hamas and Fatah factions within Palestine. The effects of the increased isolation of the PA within both Gaza and the West Bank and the freeze placed on foreign aid and Palestinian tax revenues were felt by

Palestinians throughout the Occupied Territories. The prospects for peace that had existed one year before were lost, and the consequences included an increase in the number of lives lost and a decrease in the living conditions in the West Bank. This tragedy entered a new stage with a dim prospect for peace.

There is consensus as to why Fatah lost power in the period preceding the election. Barry Rubin cited weak leadership as the chief cause of Fatah's demise. Rubin saw the situation through a public choice lens by viewing the PA's ability to meet the needs of its people (accommodate the preferences of its constituents) as the measure of its strength (2006). Since the PA was unable to provide adequate health care, education, and security for its people, the leadership is categorized as weak. Riad Malki, director of the Palestinian Center for the Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development, agreed with Rubin that the fall of Fatah may be attributed to the lack of progress it achieved in the Occupied Territories. He argued that insecurities stemming from the stalled peace efforts and the failed political initiatives of Palestinian leaders weakened Fatah. Abbas did not have the ability to translate his consistent optimism with real results in the lives of Palestinians (Malki 2006). Economic progress was also elusive for the PA. In the weeks leading up to the election, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said, "The number of Palestinians living in poverty had risen to 64 percent from 55 percent last year. Half of those living in poverty, or 1.2 million Palestinians, lived on less than \$1.60 a day, 60 cents below the poverty line" (United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights 2005).

This brief review of literature on the subject shows that Abbas' PA failed to deliver needed social, political, security, and economic reforms. As would be expected with a public choice perspective, the Palestinian electorate shifted its support away from Fatah. It is interesting to note that the aid package Bush committed to Abbas' Fatah-led PA was intended to support these very facets of the PA's capacity to govern. When Bush initially proposed the direct aid to Abbas in his 2005 State of the Union Address, he cited the need to "promote [Palestinian] democracy" through "supporting Palestinian political, economic, and security reforms" (Bush 2005). This support never came, but the very aspects of society that the Bush administration identified as critical to an effective PA were indeed the key issues that spurred the shift in public support away from Fatah to Hamas.

It is unreasonable to assume that had the U.S. made good on its pledged financial assistance, Abbas would have brought about monumental improvements in the lives of average Palestinians in the six months leading up to the parliamentary elections. However, as previously noted, in the first five months of his presidency and in accordance with the Sharm el Sheik agreements, Abbas focused his efforts on reining in militant groups through security reform and in persuading Hamas and other Palestinian factions to participate, for the first time, in the political process. Abbas invested heavily in these security reforms with the assurance from the U.S. that if progress was made, outside support from the U.S. would come to fund the economic and political reforms that were critical to Abbas' domestic support. While Abbas' progress was tenuous, steps in the right direction were made, and it is reasonable to conclude that the promised support from the U.S. would have strengthened Abbas' political power and enabled him to begin the economic reforms that would most benefit average Palestinians, thereby garnering the necessary support to win the 2006 parliamentary elections.

Conclusion

What would have happened if the U.S. had upheld its commitments to Abbas and provided his government with \$350 million in direct aid? What policy would the U.S. have pursued if the Israel Lobby did not have as much influence on the U.S. legislative branch, and what alternative outcomes would have been possible if the policies pursued by AIPAC served to further the development of a two-state solution instead of undermining the growth of moderate elements within the PA? Definitive answers to these questions may not be possible, but after reviewing the events leading to the disintegration of this round of the peace process, I conclude that the possibility for alternative outcomes, outcomes constructive to the peace process, would have been higher if the U.S. had lent Abbas its full support.

The months leading up to the 2006 elections and the Hamas victory show that if the PA is unable to provide for its people, then, given the opportunity, the people will register their discontent by voting for change. Polls immediately following Hamas' victory show that, despite a majority of Palestinians voting for Hamas, 75 percent of Palestinians supported a negotiated peace with Israel, a position that is an anathema to Hamas' ideological foundations (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 2006). This shows that when the Israel Lobby stopped the U.S. from supporting a moderate PA, public support shifted from ruling moderates to the opposition that, in the Palestinian case, is comprised of extremists who vow to defend their cause at all costs. These developments, for obvious reasons, are detrimental to Israel, the U.S., and all those who desire peace, and are an excellent example of what happens when the U.S. superficially supports the PA while concurrently maintaining a staunch pro-Israeli policy, consequently worsening the situation.

As future opportunities for peace arise, it is critical that the U.S. recognize these inherent flaws in past peace efforts. Given widespread commitment for a two-state solution, it is imperative to the peace process that all stakeholders committed to peace work to build a viable Palestinian state. Thus, all parties supporting a two-state solution, including Israel, the PA, and the U.S., should work together to implement necessary policy reforms to ensure cooperative support of moderate Palestinians. Only when positive rhetoric is backed with real, productive action will progress be made in this seemingly never-ending tragedy. Peace can come, and hope should exist, so long as policymakers courageously hold themselves and others accountable for fulfilling commitments and pursuing a course consistent with a two-state solution.

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Split-Ticket Voting and Voter Choice in Utah

Brad Jones and Veronica Walters

Abstract

American democracy is driven by individual voters casting ballots in federal and local elections. Although this simple action is critical to the functioning of our democracy, it is little understood. In this paper, we test several theories of voter choice. We look specifically at the decision of whether or not to cast a split ballot by using a pooled dataset derived from twenty-four years of exit polling conducted by Brigham Young University's Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy. Using a multinomial logit model, we find evidence that non-political factors—such as a candidate's gender or religion—have a significant impact on individual vote choice. We also find evidence supporting the claim that individuals might pursue a policy-balancing approach when deciding which candidates to support. Our findings cast some light on a vexingly opaque issue and suggest the need for further study.

Introduction

How individuals formulate their voting decision is of central importance to political science. In the news coverage that surfaces during every election, the media gravitates toward the easy explanations. These explanations vary from identity-centric explanations that inevitably lead to questioning whether the U.S. is ready to elect any of a number of demographic types, to explanations that oversimplify the advantages of incumbency and name recognition, and the popular media often gets it wrong. For all of the attention it receives, the process by which individuals make their vote choice remains largely opaque. In this paper, we focus on one aspect of the voting process: the decision to cast a split ticket.

Political scientists are becoming increasingly interested in answering the question of why the U.S. is becoming more politically divided. Split-ticket voting and elections in the state of Utah are especially intriguing. Candidates who identify with the Democratic Party are at a disadvantage in this predominately Republican state. In 2004, George W. Bush took 67 percent

of the vote in Utah’s Second District, but many of those same voters elected Congressman Jim Matheson, a moderate Democrat. This election and a number of others in Utah’s congressional districts provide interesting examples of the split-ticket voting phenomenon. Using data from the Utah Colleges Exit Poll results from 1982 through 2006, we tested the theories of split-ticket voting and synthesized them into a model for understanding causes of split-ticket voting in Utah.

Utah presents a unique case for studying the practice of split-ticket voting and theories of divided government. As a predominately Republican state, there is relatively little uncertainty in Utah presidential elections. Its homogenous, predominately white, Latter-day Saint (LDS), and conservative population has some effect on which candidates decide to enter races. For example, a Democratic candidate from Utah might be to the right of some Republican candidate from another state.

Theoretical Framework

The existing research on divided government and split-ticket voting may be broadly categorized by voter motives and structural or individual level influences. The major theories fall into one of four categories included in our theoretical framework, depicted in Table 1. Each category provides a competing explanation for an electorate’s decision to split his or her ticket.

TABLE 1

	<i>Accidental</i>	<i>Intentional</i>
<i>Structural</i>	Systemic	Cognitive Madisonianism
<i>Individual</i>	Personal Vote	Policy Balancers

The Accidental/Structural explanation suggests that a person’s vote choice is most influenced by system-level factors. As such, divided government may be the result of characteristics inherent to the electoral competition. For example, the incumbency advantage, straight-party voting, and the difference between midterm and presidential electorates have all been credited for influencing split-ticket voting. The momentum created by incumbency is especially relevant in congressional elections where the “financial advantages that most incumbents possess drives voters toward split ballots” (Burden and Kimball 1998). Straight-party voting is currently an option on ballots in seventeen states, including Utah. A study done by Campbell *et al.* in 1960 found split-ticket voting to be 8 percent higher in states that did not offer the straight-ticket option, leading us to believe that ballots with a straight-party choice decrease split tickets. Finally, the difference between midterm and presidential electorates could have some effect on voting decision. These differences include lower midterm turnout and differences in age, education, and income between the two electorates (McIntosh *et al.* 1981).

The Accidental/Individual explanation suggests that an individual votes for the best candidate. This is a straightforward statement, but when compared to the rest of our theoretical framework, the importance of this statement becomes apparent. Based on this theory, voters do not intentionally vote a split ticket, nor do they necessarily vote a split ticket based on the

structural influences above. The voter considers each election on its own merits and selects the candidate they judge to be best qualified, taking into account the candidate's gender, religion, and political experience (Kimball 1997). As a result, a voter who chooses the Republican presidential candidate may vote for the Democratic house candidate if the alternative they are offered is of poor quality (Burden and Kimball 2002). This was evident in the 1992 elections in Utah's third district where the electorate voted for Bush, but also elected the Democratic House candidate Bill Orton. Following the candidate quality theory, third district voters split their tickets when presented with a weak, last-minute Republican candidate. The Accidental/Individual explanation notes the increasing importance of this personal vote and the weakening of parties. Weakening party attachments are credited for increasing the occurrence of split-ticket voting and an increased focus on the aforementioned candidate quality (Beck *et al.* 1992).

The Intentional/Structural argument holds that an individual votes with the intention of creating a divided government. Split-ticket voters want to create a balance of party control between the executive and legislative branches, and so we refer to them as Madisonian voters (Fiorina 1992, 1996). In contrast to the Accidental explanations, voters in the Intentional/Structural model consider elections in the national context. For an individual to make a split-ticket vote choice that would have bearing on creating a divided government, we must assume that the voter has a good idea of which party will control which branch. In Utah, where the electorate will decidedly vote for the Republican presidential candidate, a voter would be likely to vote split ticket if he or she were informed about the likelihood that the vote for the Democratic representative could create or continue Democratic control of the House.

Finally, the Intentional/Individual model contends that individuals with moderate political views are motivated to vote split ticket because they hope to achieve centrist policy. These individuals would vote split ticket for "ideological reasons that have nothing to do with a desire for divided government" (Burden and Kimball 2002). In order to create this policy balance, the theory assumes that voters are informed on candidates' policy positions and that the individual practices expressive or calculated balancing. Expressive balancing occurs when individuals vote for the candidates they want, regardless of the probability that their candidates will be elected. Calculated balancing means the individual has weighed the likelihood of his or her vote being significant in creating a policy balance and makes his or her candidate choices accordingly. In this model, ticket splitting is more likely when the candidates are polarized (Fiorina 1996). When faced with two extreme candidates, moderate voters respond to the wider range of policy choices by splitting their ticket in an attempt to balance the two extremes.

Data and Methods

Our data was taken from the 1982–2006 Utah Colleges Exit Polls (UCEP). The period of our study encompasses the birth of the UCEP through its most recent general election iteration. This provided a wealth of data ($n = 60,000 +$) but also presented some unique challenges. As a student-run poll, the UCEP has evolved over its twenty-five-year lifespan (older now than most of the students who actually conduct the polling) and established itself as a credible source of understanding the motivations of the Utah voter. This evolutionary process presented a challenge to cross-sectional analysis. Undoubtedly, the way student

interviewers conducted the survey has changed from that first experiment in November 1982 to the fully institutionalized methods used in recent years. Among the problems we encountered in pooling the information from the extant UCEP data, the most serious were the differences in question wordings across the years. The most serious of these problems was that the questions involving income included different income categories as possible answers in different years. Laying aside the questions of inflation and the changing meaning of income categories, the exit poll has compromised the results further by employing several different schemes for measuring respondent income involving different groupings and numbers of categories in different years. To correct for these differences, we standardized¹ income for each year. In doing this, we lost some of the substance in the data but controlled for differences between voters of different socio-economic status. The appendix contains a detailed overview of the data to include question wordings.

Lacking specialized questions designed to tease out our specific answers across the period of our study, we relied on some imperfect proxy measures. We have classified theories of divided government and split-ticket voting into four broad categories (mentioned earlier), and we devised tests that measure to what extent Utah voters can be classified under each category. However, tests of the Structural/Accidental theories of divided government are outside of the scope of this paper. Although Utah provides the straight-ticket option,² we do not have data on other states to compare or apply results to. For example, we cannot test the effect of other potential meta-structural reasons for split-ticket voting.

To test Structural/Intentional motives, we collected data on the composition of the House of Representatives going into each election. Combining this data with information on which party controlled the presidency allowed us to test whether or not individual voters take the national context into consideration when deciding whether to cast a split ticket. Of course, this assumes that the voter was aware of the makeup of Congress, which may be a rather strong assumption. Alternatively, one could imagine that elites were more involved in local races during elections when it appears control of the Congress was in question. However, lacking more information about the knowledge of the typical voter, we will assume the latter. If our variables measuring the national context at the time of the election are statistically and substantively significant predictors of whether or not people decide to cast a split-ticket ballot, our model will have provided evidence for the Structural/Intentional theories.

In order to test the Individual/Intentional theories of government, we collected data measuring the issue positions of incumbent representatives. Using standardized and lagged DW-NOMINATE scores³ from each year of our study, we created a measure of how much the Utah congressmen and -women have moved in comparison with the rest of the nation and where they are ideologically. By design, the DW-NOMINATE score will equal 1 or -1, for Republicans or Democrats respectively, for a legislator in the mainstream of his or her party. The larger the number, the more conservative the legislator, and conversely, a lower score indicates a more liberal representative. The lagged values were used to calculate a difference score. Positive differences indicate a representative who moved more to the right; negative scores show legislators who moved to the left. Using this data, we tested whether or not an individual makes the decision to cast a split ticket as the ideological position of his or her representative changes.

Again, use of this measure relies on the assumption that the individual voter was aware of the changing positions of the representative.

The final tests we ran related to the Individual/Accidental theories of divided government. To test for the presence or absence of Individual/Accidental motives, we collected data on each of the candidates for the twenty-four years of the study. Specifically, we were interested in religion (an especially pertinent issue in Utah), gender, and candidate quality.⁴ Data was collected from newspaper stories, the *National Journal's* biennial political almanac, and, where possible, interviews with the candidates. To fill in some of the missing data, we contacted Wayne Holland, Party Chair of the Utah Democratic Party. By using this information, we tested for some other-than-partisan reasons for vote choice.

We structured our regression as a multinomial logit⁵ regression. Multinomial logit tests the probability of a qualitative outcome (in our case, vote choice) against the probability of some arbitrarily assigned baseline category. Our baseline was casting a straight Republican ticket, by far the most common choice for Utah voters. In order to make the most of our data, we simulated the presidential vote for midterm elections⁶ and used all twenty-four years of exit poll data. We were interested only in votes for the two major parties, and in consequence our dependent variable can assume four values: straight Republican; straight Democrat; split, Republican president/Democratic representative; split, Democratic president/Republican representative. Table 2 shows the variables included in the model (for more detailed summary statistics, see the appendix).

TABLE 2

Variables

Dependent:	Vote Choice
Independent:	Voter Demographics: Party ID, Ideology, Party ID/Ideology Interaction, Religion, Education, Race, Gender, Income
	Candidate Demographics: Quality, Gender, Religion
	Congressional Race Dynamics: Money Parity, Primary Contests, Previous Presidential Support, Margin of the Last Election
	National Context: Party that Controls the Presidency, Party that Controls the House, Seat Margin in the House

We structured our tests around these variables, necessarily simplifying many of the complex issues that must be addressed in a study of vote choice. We used Gary King's CLARIFY⁷ program to present our results.

Structural/Intentional Voting

The Structural/Intentional voter, described by Fiorina and others, makes the vote choice by weighing party choices at the local level against the national context. The argument suggests that certain individuals prefer divided government and vote with that aim in mind. To test for the presence of Structural/Intentional voters in the Utah context, we included the national context variables listed in Table 2. If these variables show the correct signs and are statistically significant, we have evidence that voters made a strategic calculation in their vote decision. Particularly, we expected that voters would be more likely to split their ticket when one or both

of two conditions exist: 1) Congress and the Presidency are controlled by the same party, or 2) the margin of House seats is slim enough to make it likely that control could switch.

Using the CLARIFY program, we tested the Structural/Intentional hypothesis by examining the effects on the probability of voting a straight or split ticket. Our median voter was a white male, independent-leaning Republican who described his political views as conservative. He is an active member of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, a college graduate, and his household income is above the mean. His district has the characteristics of the second district in 1998; that is to say, he is represented by a two-year incumbent, male, moderate, LDS Republican, challenged by a female non-LDS candidate who has never held elective office before. His representative narrowly won his seat in the last election. There is a Democrat in the White House, and Congress is held narrowly by Republicans (sixteen seat margin). Table 3 shows the probability of voting a split ticket, and how those probabilities change when the values of the variables change. In this and subsequent tables, we only present the probabilities of voting for a straight Republican (RR) ticket and a Republican presidential candidate with a Democrat in the House of Representatives (RD).⁸

The first column in this and the following tables contains the values for the baseline voter as described above. The other columns show the predicted probabilities for voters with different demographic characteristics. For example, Table 3 shows the baseline voter is predicted to have an 85 percent probability of voting a straight Republican ticket. A pure independent with the same values of the other variables has a 59 percent probability of voting a straight Republican ticket. Changing the president to a Republican changes the probabilities as shown.

TABLE 3

Intentional/Structural			
	Baseline Voter	Pure Independent	Ind. Liberal Democrat
RR	85 (1)	59 (2)	11 (1)
RD	13 (1)	22 (2)	9 (1)
Republican President; Small R. Majority (+16)			
RR	86 (2)	69 (4)	32 (4)
RD	14 (2)	28 (4)	30 (4)
Republican President; Larger R. Majority (+31)			
RR	84 (2)	66 (4)	29 (4)
RD	16 (2)	30 (4)	31 (4)

Standard errors in parentheses

Structural/Intentional theories depend on an instrumentally rational voter who has the specific goal in mind of balancing power between the two branches. The individual voter sees the opportunity to institute a Madisonian balance when the margin of seats in the House held by one party is small. This would require the voter to know which party controls the House and by how many seats, but presumably if this is the goal, the voter will have acquired the necessary information prior to casting a ballot. The model did not give much support for the Intentional/Structural hypothesis. Although RD split-ticket voting increased

in the expected direction for the baseline voter, the increase was not statistically significant when we accounted for the increasing standard error.

Individual/Intentional

Although similar to the Structural/Intentional school, Individual/Intentionalists contend that voters split their tickets out of a different motivation. The instrumental assumption of the Structural theory is relaxed, and we can imagine voters who split their tickets out of an affective reasoning. Perhaps individuals vote a split ticket if the preferred outcome is somewhere in the middle of the two policy extremes offered on the ballot. This may not be with an eye toward changing the outcomes of the election, but rather some internal reconciliation. If these theories hold, we expect that as the ideological position of a representative gets more extreme, more individuals would vote a split ticket in order to balance against that extreme position. Similar to the Structural/Intentional theories of divided government, we tested for the effect of Individual/Intentional motivations on split-ticket voting by holding the values of the other variables constant while examining the effect of changing the representative's position on a variety of hypothetical median voters. Table 4 shows these results.

TABLE 4

Intentional/Individual			
	Baseline Voter	Lib. Pure Independent	V. Cons., Strong Republican
NOMINATE = 0.8			
RR	84 (1)	45 (3)	97 (0)
RD	13 (1)	23 (2)	2 (0)
NOMINATE = 1.2			
RR	72 (2)	32 (3)	94 (0)
RD	34 (3)	38 (3)	5 (1)
NOMINATE = 1.2; Change = +.04			
RR	60 (4)	24 (3)	90 (1)
RD	38 (4)	55 (4)	10 (2)
Standard errors in parentheses			

As the table shows, there appeared to be good evidence for the Intentional/Individual theories. As we can see, all of the hypothetical voters in Table 4 were less likely to split their ticket when the representative had a moderate voting record. Holding the other factors constant, as the representative moved to the right, we see our hypothetical Republicans becoming more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate. Recalling that the baseline voter is an independent-leaning Republican, the marginal effect was greater on the baseline voter than it was on the strong Republican, which lines up with the theory.

What is surprising is the magnitude of the change. For our Republican-leaning hypothetical voter, there was a substantial twelve-point average drop in the probability of casting an RR ballot and an even larger increase in the probability of voting RD. It is not clear how the voter connected this relatively minor shift in ideology with the need to balance the ticket in this way.

Individual/Accidental

Finally, we turned our attention to the Individual/Accidental theories. We expected that if voters make a decision between the candidates only on their merits, national context and representative ideology do not matter (insofar as individuals do not make a link between their opinion of the legislator and the candidate's ideological position). Like the other theories, these tests examine the effect of changing the characteristics of the candidates (quality, gender, and religion) on a slate of voters. Recall that the candidates in the district are a two-year incumbent, male, LDS Republican, and a female Democrat who is not LDS and has never held elective office. Again, the median voter in this case is an independent-leaning Republican who describes himself as a conservative.

TABLE 5

Individual/Accidental				
	Baseline Voter	Not LDS	Female	Female (Not LDS)
RR	84 (1)	81 (1)	58 (3)	77 (4)
DR	13 (1)	16 (1)	26 (2)	19 (3)
Quality Female Candidate				
RR	84 (1)	80 (2)	57 (3)	79 (4)
DR	14 (1)	18 (0)	28 (2)	20 (4)
Female Republican Incumbent				
RR	66 (9)	48 (9)	65 (9)	45 (9)
DR	32 (9)	49 (10)	34 (9)	51 (9)

Standard errors in parentheses

Holding other factors constant, gender appeared to be the most significant factor in the probability of straight-ticket voting. When we changed the voter from an LDS male to a non-LDS female, there was a drop in probability of voting a straight Republican ticket from a mean of 84 percent to 58 percent,⁹ and the probability of casting an RD ticket doubled. Changing the gender of the Republican incumbent from male to female showed similarly large changes. As expected, the probability of our male, baseline voter casting an RR ballot decreases, while the female voter was more likely to cast an RR ballot. The increases in standard error were most likely due to the small number of female, Republican candidates from which the model constructed the probabilities.¹⁰

The effect of religion, however, was not insignificant. Recalling that the female candidate is not LDS, we examined the effect of religion. Our non-LDS baseline voter was more likely to vote for the Democrat, and this effect increased when we changed the gender from male to female. The female, non-LDS voter displayed some odd characteristics. She was *more* likely to vote for the male, LDS candidate than the Democratic challenger, who she arguably has the most in common with. The probability of her voting for the Republican incumbent dropped precipitously when we changed the candidate's gender to female. Again, this may be due to the small pool of candidates from which the model relied on in constructing its parameters.

Conclusion

While we were unable to find any convincing support for the Structural/Accidental and Structural/Intentional arguments in our framework, our data analysis produced interesting

results for the remaining two theories. We can argue that the gender of a candidate affects voter choice under the Individual/Accidental model, validating the importance of the personal vote. Our results also support the Individual/Intentional theory, demonstrating that moderate voters are significantly more likely to vote a split ticket as their candidate choices move away from moderate voting records. Our research has covered some of the wide range of variables and explanations involved in divided government and split-ticket voting. Split-ticket voting in Utah is likely influenced by individual-level motivations such as candidate characteristics, as well as electorate policy preference and some intentional effort on the part of voters to balance ideologies.

While our study was restricted to Utah, our findings have important implications for the wider U.S. electorate. Drawing from a homogenous pool of candidates (not entirely unlike the national pool), we provided evidence that individuals give considerable weight to nonpolitical attributes of the candidates when making their vote choice. More work is required, however, to uncover how individual voters make their choices at the polls, and our paper suggests one way to study these intriguing problems.

NOTES

1. Standardized variables are derived by subtracting the mean of a particular variable from the observation and dividing the resultant difference by the standard error. A standardized coefficient of x can be interpreted as: a one unit increase in the standardized variable leads to an x standard deviation increase in the dependent variable.
2. Utah is one of seventeen states that allow voters to select a straight-ticket option. By marking the party of choice, the voter need not mark each individual race and is aided in casting a straight ticket. Burden and Kimball (2002) found evidence that this option increases propensity of straight-ticket voting.
3. DW-NOMINATE, created by Jeffrey B. Lewis and Keith T. Poole, is a way to spatially map out the ideology of legislators. The scores serve as a useful, comparative measure of how conservative or liberal an individual congressman or -woman is.
4. We defined candidate quality as having ever held previous elective office (Jacobson 2004).
5. Results from a multinomial probit model are very similar to the MNLM and are included in Appendix C. Multinomial logit depends on the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The most common example of this is a model that predicts which mode of transportation an individual will take. Given four options—driving, riding a bicycle, taking a red bus, or taking a blue bus—we would theorize that taking the red bus and taking the blue bus would be equivalent alternatives and should not be jointly considered in the same model. If we were to run the misspecified model including both colors of bus, the multinomial logit, by construction, would return the probability of each of the three other transportation choices against the probability of driving (the arbitrary baseline category in this case), and these probabilities for each observation would sum to one. In this example, however, we would theorize that the color of the bus is irrelevant, and the model would under-predict each of the bus options. The better model would be multinomial probit, which considers each choice independent of the other ones and presumably would return equal probabilities of taking the red bus and the blue bus. In models of vote choice, multinomial logit is appropriate insofar as we can assume that voting a Republican/Democrat and Democrat/Republican ticket are not equivalent choices to the voter. Theoretically, if one subscribes to Structural/Intentional theories or Individual/Intentional theories of vote choice, this assumption may be violated. If the voter's goal is merely to balance power between the branches or balance the policy outcomes by his or her vote, then it may not matter which party controls which office. For the Utah voter, it seems safe to assume that a Democrat/Republican ticket is not equivalent to a Republican/Democrat ticket, as Utah Democrats are, in general, considerably to the right of their colleagues in the national party.
6. Simulations were created by running a logit regression with presidential vote choice (Republican or Democrat) as the dependent variable and with demographic variables (party identification, ideology,

religion, and information on Senate vote choice in elections, when applicable) as the independent variables. The model predicts presidential vote correctly more than 90 percent of the time. The parameters from that regression were used to simulate presidential vote choice in midterm election years. If anything, these simulated values will understate the actual propensity of split-ticket voting because the roughly 10 percent that were incorrectly predicted are the most interesting and salient cases when considering vote choice.

7. CLARIFY uses a bootstrapping method to calculate simulated parameters of interest from a variety of regression models. It also generates standard errors for its predicted values that facilitate interpretation (Tomz et al. 2003; King et al. 2000).
8. Appendix B contains tables that list the probabilities of the voting for the other categories. They are generally substantially smaller than the probability of voting RR or RD. As noted earlier, the probabilities will sum to unity for any individual.
9. When the standard errors are considered, the difference could be anywhere between 18 and 34 percent.
10. This is cause for some concern. We are drawing from a rather small pool of homogeneous candidates, which may somewhat bias our estimates.

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APPENDIX A: Summary Statistics

VARIABLE	DESCRIPTION	OPERATIONALIZATION	MEAN	STD. DEV.	MIN.	MAX.
Vote Choice	Which candidates did the respondent vote for (or would be simulated to vote for)?	Q 1, 2	0.71	0.88	0	3
Democrat	Does the respondent identify as a Democrat?	Q 3	0.52	0.99	0	3
Republican	Does the respondent identify as a Republican?	Q 3	1.11	1.24	0	3
Conservative	Does the respondent identify as a Conservative?	Q 4	0.71	0.72	0	2
Liberal	Does the respondent identify as a Liberal?	Q 4	0.20	0.48	0	2
Dem.*Cons.	Interaction between Democrat and Liberal	Q 3, 4	0.17	0.75	0	6
Dem.*Lib.	Interaction between Democrat and Conservative	Q 3, 4	0.30	1.01	0	6
Rep.*Cons.	Interaction between Republican and Conservative	Q 3, 4	1.25	1.88	0	6
Rep.*Lib.	Interaction between Republican and Liberal	Q 3, 4	0.04	0.34	0	6
Stdzd. Income	What is the voter's income?	Q 5	0.00	1.00	-2.03	1.96
Male	Is the respondent male?	Q 6	0.47	0.50	0	1
White	Is the respondent white?	Q 7	0.87	0.33	0	1
Education	Respondent's reported education	Q 8	4.22	1.12	1	6
LDS	Is the respondent LDS?	Q 9	0.66	0.47	0	1
Active LDS	Is the respondent active and LDS?	Q 9, 10	0.58	0.49	0	1
R. Primary	Was there a Republican Primary?	1 = Primary	0.43	0.50	0	1
R. Prim. Pct.	What was the outcome?	Winner's percent, equals one if there was no primary	0.18	0.21	0.5	1
D. Primary	Was there a Democratic primary?	1 = Primary	0.04	0.21	0	1
D. Prim. Pct.	What was the outcome?	Winner's percent, equals one if there was no primary	0.02	0.09	0.52	1
Money Parity	How much of the campaign money in the district is the Republican's?	Republican's Money divided by sum of Democrat's and Republican's	0.64	0.22	0.22	1
R. Last Vote Share	What percent of the vote did the representative last take?	?	10.70	7.99	-4	27
Dist. R. Pres Support	How much does the district lean toward Republican presidential candidates?	Average of the Republican Voteshare in the last two Presidential races	63.65	10.27	42.5	77.5

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R. Incumbent	Is there a Republican incumbent in the Race?	1 = R. Incum.	0.57	0.50	0	1
R. Incum. Years	How many years?		4.29	5.50	0	20
D. Incumbent	Is there a Democratic incumbent in the race?	1 = D. Incum.	0.24	0.43	0	1
D. Incum. Years	How many years?		0.85	1.70	0	6
Unopposed	Was there a challenger in the race?	1 = No Challenger	0.04	0.19	0	1
R. Quality	Has the Republican candidate held prior elective office?	1 = Yes	0.85	0.36	0	1
D. Quality	Has the Democrat?	1 = Yes	0.48	0.50	0	1
R. Male	Is the Republican male?	1 = Yes	0.90	0.30	0	1
R. Male*Male	Is the voter also?	1 = Yes	0.42	0.49	0	1
D. Male	Is the Democrat male?	1 = Yes	0.76	0.43	0	1
D. Male*Male	Is the voter also?	1 = Yes	0.36	0.48	0	1
R. LDS	Is the Republican candidate LDS?	1 = Yes	0.95	0.22	0	1
R. LDS*LDS	Is the voter also?	1 = Yes	0.63	0.48	0	1
R. LDS*Act. LDS	Is the voter also active?	1 = Yes	0.55	0.50	0	1
D. LDS	Is the Democrat LDS?	1 = Yes	0.70	0.46	0	1
D. LDS*LDS	Is the voter also?	1 = Yes	0.47	0.50	0	1
D. LDS*Act. LDS	Is the voter also active?	1 = Yes	0.41	0.49	0	1
House Margin	How many more seats do the Republicans hold in the House?	Difference between number of Republican and Democrat seats at the time of the election	-35	52.36	104	31
Rep. President	Is the President Republican?	1 = Yes	0.69	0.46	0	1
R. Pres.*House Margin	Interaction between Republican President and House Margin		-32.9	47.83	104	31
Stdzd. NOMINATE	What is the ideology of the district's representative?	Standardized NOMINATE score	0.76	0.78	-0.59	1.72
Lagged NOMINATE	How much (and in what direction) has the ideology changed from the last Congress?	Current NOMINATE less the NOMINATE score from the previous Congress	0.05	0.69	-2.31	1.85
R. Incum.* NOMINATE	Republican incumbent's ideology		0.69	0.67	0	1.71

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D. Incum.* NOMINATE	Democratic incumbent's ideology	-0.09	0.19	-0.59	0.01
R. Incum.*Lagged	(If the representative has served more than one term) Change from previous Congress ideology	0.05	0.38	-0.37	1.85
D. Incum.*Lagged	(If the representative has served more than one term) Change from previous Congress ideology	0.11	0.42	-2.31	0.02

APPENDIX B: Regression Results

Multinomial Logit: Vote Choice (Straight Republican Ticket is the Base)									
	DD/RR			RD/RR			DR/RR		
Democrat	2.813	(0.076)***		0.619	(0.084)***		2.4	(0.08)***	
Republican	-1.98	(0.085)***		0.54	(0.022)***		-1.09	(0.069)***	
Conservative	-0.68	(0.053)***		-0.36	(0.035)***		0.59	(0.074)***	
Liberal	0.949	(0.074)***		0.347	(0.072)***		0.36	(0.106)***	
Dem.*Cons.	-0.5	(0.06)***		0.1	(0.068)		-0.49	(0.067)***	
Dem.*Lib.	-0.4	(0.121)***		0.12	(0.133)		0.34	(0.127)***	
Rep.*Cons.	-0.14	(0.097)		-0.05	(0.019)***		0.133	(0.06)**	
Rep.*Lib.	-0.32	(0.144)**		-0.08	(0.05)		-0.01	(0.129)	
Stdzd. Income	-0.04	(0.022)*		0.035	(0.014)**		0.04	(0.029)	
Male	-0.16	(0.146)		-0.08	(0.088)		0.17	(0.2)	
White	0.007	(0.083)		0.078	(0.065)		0.1	(0.104)	
Education	0.209	(0.021)***		0.102	(0.014)***		0.042	(0.028)	
LDS	0.009	(0.334)		0.23	(0.249)		0.469	(0.422)	
Active LDS	1.6	(0.321)***		-0.29	(0.218)		1.86	(0.414)***	
R. Primary	6.52	(0.696)***		2.652	(0.505)***		6.651	(0.857)***	
R. Prim. Pct.	13.89	(1.67)***		5.473	(1.218)***		14.56	(2.032)***	
D. Primary	23.09	(6.327)***		39.02	(4.196)***		7.807	(9.367)	
D. Prim. Pct.	51.2	(13.35)***		84.77	(8.827)***		16.05	(19.8)	
Money Parity	-0.2	(0.238)		-1.46	(0.157)***		1.582	(0.337)***	
R. Last Vote Share	-0.04	(0.005)***		0	(0.003)		-0.06	(0.006)***	
Dist. R. Pres Support	0.066	(0.01)***		0	(0.007)		0.074	(0.012)***	
R. Incumbent	-2.4	(0.465)***		2.73	(0.323)***		-1.65	(0.619)***	
R. Incum. Years	-0.02	(0.009)**		0	(0.007)		0.007	(0.011)	
D. Incumbent	1.185	(0.495)**		-1.16	(0.33)***		2.743	(0.716)***	
D. Incum. Years	0.24	(0.117)**		0.347	(0.081)***		0.37	(0.159)**	
Unopposed	5.07	(0.438)***		1	(0.318)***		4.75	(0.515)***	
R. Quality	0.748	(0.181)***		0.458	(0.12)***		1.062	(0.263)***	
D. Quality	0.03	(0.082)		0.088	(0.055)		0.05	(0.112)	
R. Male	2.27	(0.534)***		0.95	(0.371)***		0.704	(0.72)	
R. Male*Male	-0.08	(0.144)		-0.21	(0.083)***		-0.01	(0.2)	
D. Male	0.23	(0.137)*		0.26	(0.096)***		0.02	(0.167)	
D. Male*Male	0.121	(0.106)		0.206	(0.071)***		0.087	(0.136)	
R. LDS	-1.11	(0.408)***		0.568	(0.29)**		0.82	(0.556)	
R. LDS*LDS	-0.89	(0.304)***		-0.29	(0.224)		-0.9	(0.388)**	
R. LDS*Act. LDS	0.197	(0.289)		-0.43	(0.193)**		0.799	(0.38)**	
D. LDS	-0.65	(0.117)***		0.43	(0.093)***		-0.59	(0.144)***	
D. LDS*LDS	0.194	(0.162)		-0.04	(0.128)		0.098	(0.196)	
D. LDS*Act. LDS	0.51	(0.161)***		0.584	(0.115)***		0.358	(0.191)*	
House Margin	0.009	(0.002)***		0.003	(0.001)**		0.019	(0.003)***	
Rep. President	-1.71	(0.23)***		0	(0.168)		-2.32	(0.263)***	
R. Pres.*House Margin	0	(0.001)		0.005	(0.001)***		-0.01	(0.002)***	
Stdzd. NOMINATE	-1.02	(0.341)***		1.14	(0.243)***		-0.9	(0.432)**	
Lagged NOMINATE	-0.15	(0.335)		1.85	(0.224)**		0.373	(0.466)	
R. Incum.*NOMINATE	1.703	(0.364)***		1.084	(0.253)***		1.635	(0.473)***	
D. Incum.*NOMINATE	1.822	(0.497)***		-0.68	(0.329)**		3.033	(0.653)***	
R. Incum.*Lagged	-0.06	(0.298)		1.376	(0.203)***		-0.75	(0.416)*	
D. Incum.*Lagged	-0.11	(0.177)		0.951	(0.115)**		-0.91	(0.256)***	
Constant	-67.7	(13.02)***		89.2	(8.466)***		-35.3	(19.65)*	

N.....50,956

Log Likelihood..... 30,429.30

Pseudo R-squared.....0.463

Standard errors in parentheses: *** indicates significance at the 0.01 level, ** 0.05, * 0.1

Multinomial Logit and Probit Models Compared

	DD/RR		RD/RR		DR/RR	
	MNLM	MNPM	MNLM	MNPM	MNLM	MNPM
Democrat	2.81 ***	1.86 ***	0.62 ***	0.29 ***	2.40 ***	1.45 ***
Republican	-1.99 ***	-1.25 ***	-0.54 ***	0.46 ***	-1.10 ***	-0.71 ***
Conservative	-0.69 ***	-0.61 ***	-0.37 ***	-0.32 ***	-0.60 ***	-0.48 ***
Liberal	0.95 ***	0.81 ***	0.35 ***	0.21 ***	0.36 ***	0.37 ***
Dem.*Cons.	-0.50 ***	-0.21 ***	0.10	0.02	-0.49 ***	-0.20 ***
Dem.*Lib.	-0.40 ***	0.40 ***	-0.13	-0.01	-0.34 ***	-0.32 ***
Rep.*Cons.	-0.15	0.10 **	-0.06 ***	-0.03 **	0.13 **	0.11 ***
Rep.*Lib.	-0.32 **	-0.27 ***	0.08	-0.06	-0.02	-0.12 *
Stdzd. Income	-0.04 *	-0.03 **	0.04 **	0.03 **	0.04	-0.03 *
Male	0.16	-0.03	0.09	-0.04	-0.17	-0.02
White	0.01	0.00	0.08	0.05	0.11	-0.05
Education	0.21 ***	0.16 ***	0.10 ***	0.08 ***	0.04	0.04 **
LDS	0.01	0.00	0.23	0.17	0.47	0.21
Active LDS	-1.61 ***	1.18 ***	-0.30	-0.07	-1.86 ***	-1.20 ***
R. Primary	6.52 ***	4.71 ***	2.65 ***	1.16 **	6.65 ***	5.74 ***
R. Prim. Pct.	13.90 ***	10.12 ***	5.47 ***	1.99 *	14.56 ***	13.14 ***
D. Primary	23.09 ***	18.43 ***	39.03 ***	31.35 ***	7.81	11.90 **
D. Prim. Pct.	51.20 ***	40.64 ***	84.77 ***	67.99 ***	16.06	25.07 **
Money Parity	-0.20	-0.18	-1.47 ***	-1.33 ***	1.58 ***	1.22 ***
R. Last Vote Share	-0.05 ***	0.04 ***	0.00	0.00	-0.06 ***	-0.05 ***
Dist. R. Pres Support	0.07 ***	0.04 ***	0.00	0.00	0.07 ***	0.04 ***
R. Incumbent	-2.40 ***	-1.84 ***	-2.74 ***	-1.49 ***	1.65 ***	-2.27 ***
R. Incum. Years	-0.02 **	-0.02 ***	0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.01
D. Incumbent	1.19 **	0.69 *	-1.16 ***	-0.97 ***	2.74 ***	1.64 ***
D. Incum. Years	-0.25 **	-0.14	0.35 ***	0.33 ***	0.38 **	-0.25 **
Unopposed	-5.08 ***	-3.57 ***	-1.01 **	-0.39	4.75 ***	3.69 ***
R. Quality	0.75 ***	0.63 ***	0.46 ***	0.40 ***	1.06 ***	1.05 ***
D. Quality	-0.03	-0.02	0.09	0.07	-0.05	0.03
R. Male	2.27 ***	1.54 ***	0.96 ***	-1.18 ***	0.70	0.91 *
R. Male*Male	-0.08	0.10	-0.22 ***	-0.17 ***	-0.01	-0.10
D. Male	-0.23 *	-0.14	0.27 ***	-0.21 ***	-0.02	-0.07
D. Male*Male	0.12	0.00	0.21 ***	0.13 **	0.09	0.01
R. LDS	-1.12 ***	-0.82 ***	0.57 **	0.98 ***	-0.83	-1.06 ***
R. LDS*LDS	-0.89 ***	-0.62 ***	-0.29	-0.31 *	0.91 **	-0.50 **
R. LDS*Act. LDS	0.20	0.27	0.44 **	-0.31 **	0.80 **	0.51 **
D. LDS	-0.65 ***	-0.36 ***	-0.43 ***	-0.15 **	-0.60 ***	-0.28 ***
D. LDS*LDS	0.19	0.13	-0.04	0.05	0.10	0.13
D. LDS*Act. LDS	0.51 ***	0.28 ***	0.58 ***	0.27 ***	0.36 *	0.21 *
House Margin	0.01 ***	0.01 ***	0.00 **	0.00 **	0.02 ***	0.01 ***
Rep. President	-1.71 ***	-1.18 ***	0.00	0.04	-2.32 ***	-1.57 ***
R. Pres.*House Margin	0.00	0.00	0.01 ***	0.00 **	-0.02 ***	-0.01 ***
Stdzd. NOMINATE	1.02 ***	-0.71 ***	1.14 ***	1.02 ***	-0.91 **	-0.90 ***
Lagged NOMINATE	-0.16	0.22	-1.86 ***	-1.47 ***	0.37	0.07
R. Incum.*NOMINATE	1.70 ***	1.30 ***	1.08 ***	0.41 *	1.64 ***	1.91 ***
D. Incum.*NOMINATE	1.82 ***	1.50 ***	-0.69 **	-0.58 **	3.03 ***	2.85 ***
R. Incum.*Lagged	-0.06	-0.01	1.38 ***	1.14 ***	-0.76 *	-0.54 *
D. Incum.*Lagged	-0.12	0.00	0.95 ***	0.83 ***	-0.91 ***	-0.50 ***
Constant	-67.78 ***	52.50 ***	-89.24 ***	-69.45 ***	-35.35 *	-40.87 ***

N..... 50,956

Log Likelihood MNLM -30,429.30

Log Likelihood MNPM -30,529.01

Intentional Structural				
	RR	DD	RD	DR
	85 (1)	1 (0)	13 (1)	1 (0)
<i>Pure Independent</i>				
	59 (2)	14 (1)	22 (2)	5 (1)
<i>Independent Liberal Democrat</i>				
	11 (1)	70 (3)	9 (1)	10 (1)
Republican President; Small R. Majority (+16)				
	86 (2)	0 (0)	14 (2)	0 (0)
<i>Pure Independent</i>				
	69 (4)	3 (1)	28 (4)	0 (0)
<i>Independent Liberal Democrat</i>				
	32 (4)	36 (6)	30 (4)	2 (1)
Republican President; Large R. Majority (+31)				
	84 (2)	0 (0)	16 (2)	0 (0)
<i>Pure Independent</i>				
	66 (4)	3 (1)	30 (4)	0 (0)
<i>Independent Liberal Democrat</i>				
	29 (4)	37 (6)	31 (4)	2 (1)
Standard errors are in parentheses				

Intentional Individual				
NOMINATE = 0.8	RR	DD	RD	DR
	84 (1)	1 (0)	13 (1)	1 (0)
<i>Liberal Pure Independent</i>				
	45 (3)	26 (3)	23 (2)	6 (1)
<i>Strong Republican, Very Conservative</i>				
	97 (0)	0 (0)	2 (0)	0 (0)
NOMINATE = 1.2				
	72 (2)	2 (0)	34 (3)	2 (0)
<i>Liberal Pure Independent</i>				
	32 (3)	25 (3)	38 (3)	5 (1)
<i>Strong Republican, Very Conservative</i>				
	94 (0)	0 (0)	5 (1)	0 (0)
NOMINATE = 1.2; Change = 0.4				
	60 (4)	1 (0)	38 (4)	1 (0)
<i>Liberal Pure Independent</i>				
	24 (3)	18 (3)	55 (4)	3 (1)
<i>Strong Republican, Very Conservative</i>				
	90 (1)	0 (0)	10 (2)	0 (0)
Standard errors are in parentheses				

Individual Accidental				
	RR	DD	RD	DR
	84 (1)	1 (0)	13 (1)	1 (0)
<i>Female</i>				
	81 (1)	2 (0)	16 (1)	2 (0)
<i>Not LDS Female</i>				
	58 (3)	12 (2)	26 (2)	5 (1)
<i>Not LDS Male</i>				
	77 (4)	3 (1)	19 (3)	1 (0)
Quality Female Candidate				
	84 (1)	1 (0)	14 (1)	1 (0)
<i>Female</i>				
	80 (2)	2 (0)	18 (0)	1 (0)
<i>Not LDS Female</i>				
	57 (3)	11 (1)	28 (2)	5 (1)
<i>Not LDS Male</i>				
	79 (4)	2 (1)	20 (4)	1 (0)
Republican is also Female				
	67 (9)	0 (0)	32 (9)	1 (1)
<i>Female</i>				
	65 (8)	0 (0)	34 (9)	1 (1)
<i>Not LDS Female</i>				
	45 (9)	1 (1)	51 (9)	2 (2)
<i>Not LDS Male</i>				
	47 (9)	1 (1)	49 (10)	2 (1)
Standard errors in parentheses				

APPENDIX C: Question Wordings

- 1A) (1982–2003) In the U.S. Representative race, who did you vote for?
- a) Republican Candidate
 - b) Democratic Candidate
- 1B) (2004–2006) In today's election for U.S. House of Representatives, did you just vote for:
- a) Republican Candidate
 - b) Democratic Candidate
- 2A) (1982–2002) In the presidential election, who did you just vote for?
- a) Republican Candidate
 - b) Democratic Candidate
- 2B) (2004) In today's election for U.S. president, did you just vote for:
- a) Republican Candidate
 - b) Democratic Candidate
- 3) Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be:
- a) Strong Democrat
 - b) Not so strong Democrat
 - c) Independent leaning Democrat
 - d) Independent
 - e) Independent leaning Republican
 - f) Not so strong Republican
 - g) Strong Republican
 - h) Other
 - i) Prefer not to say
- 4) On most political matters, do you consider yourself:
- a) Strongly Conservative
 - b) Moderately Conservative
 - c) Neither, Middle of the road
 - d) Moderately Liberal
 - e) Strongly Liberal
 - f) Don't know, No Opinion
- 5A) (1982) Was your (last year's) family income:
- a) Under \$10,000
 - b) \$10,000–\$14,999
 - c) \$15,000–\$24,999
 - d) Over \$50,000
- 5B) (1984–1993) What was your (last year's) family income?
- a) Under \$10,000
 - b) \$10,000–\$14,999
 - c) \$15,000–\$24,999
 - d) \$25,000–\$39,999
 - e) \$40,000–\$49,999
 - f) \$50,000 and over
- 5C) (1990) What was your (last year's) family income?
- a) Under \$10,000
 - b) \$10,000–\$14,999
 - c) \$15,000–\$24,999
 - d) \$25,000–\$39,999
 - e) \$40,000–\$49,999
 - f) \$50,000–\$100,000
 - g) Over \$100,000
- 5D) (1992–2000) What do you expect your (current year's) family income to be?
- a) Under \$15,000
 - b) \$15,000–\$24,999
 - c) \$25,000–\$39,999
 - d) \$40,000–\$49,999
 - e) \$50,000–\$74,999
 - f) \$75,000 and over
- 5E) (2002–2006) What do you expect your (current year's) family income to be?
- a) Under \$25,000
 - b) \$25,000–\$39,999
 - c) \$40,000–\$49,999
 - d) \$50,000–\$74,999
 - e) \$75,000–\$99,999
 - f) Over \$100,000
- 6) Are you:
- a) Male
 - b) Female
- 7A) (1982) Are you:
- a) Caucasian
- 7B) (1984–1998) Are you:
- a) White
- 7C) (2000–2006) Are you:
- a) White/Caucasian
- 8A) (1982) What was the last grade in school you attended?
- a) Eighth grade or less
 - b) Some high school
 - c) High school graduate
 - d) Some college
 - e) College graduate
- 8B) (1984–2006) What was the last year of school you completed?
- a) Did not graduate from high school
 - b) Completed high school
 - c) Some college but not four years
 - d) Four years of college or more
 - e) Post-graduate
- 9A) (1982–1986) What, if any, is your religious preference?
- a) Mormon
- 9B) (1988) What, if any, is your religious preference?
- a) LDS
- 9C) (1990–2006) What, if any, is your religious preference?
- a) LDS/Mormon
- 10A) (1982) Do you consider yourself active in the practice of your religious preference?
- a) Yes
 - b) Kind of
 - c) Not Very
 - d) Not Applicable
 - e) Prefer not to say
- 10B) (1984–2006) How active do you consider yourself in the practice of your religious preference?
- a) very active
 - b) somewhat active
 - c) not very active
 - d) not active
 - e) prefer not to say

The Effects of Foreign Aid on Income Inequality

Tim Layton

Abstract

This article furthers the research on the inability of foreign aid to address the economic needs of receiving states, particularly in the area of income inequality. We hypothesize that foreign aid is distributed and used in ways that worsen inequality. Additionally, we predict that foreign aid will cause more inequality in autocracies than democracies. While not contradicting any existing theories on the causes of income inequality, our theory shows that foreign aid may act as a catalyst for many of the established theories about what increases inequality. The newly developed database of foreign aid loans (PLAID) provides data on the independent variable, and the Gini coefficient is used as the measure of the dependent variable. In addition, we control for eight separate causes of income inequality. The study includes two panel datasets including 169 observations from twenty-four countries. To account for limitations in the OLS, we used a Feasible Generalized Least Squared (FGLS) model. The results suggest that a highly substantive relationship exists between foreign aid and inequality, although the effects may be subject to endogeneity. Holding all things constant, this finding shows that while aid may help the poor, it clearly benefits the rich more.

Introduction

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of literature criticizing the current methods for giving foreign aid. There is an abundance of literature that suggests the foreign aid money the West gives to the developing world is limited in its effectiveness (Easterly 2006; Boone 1996; Easterly 1999; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1978). Other scholars continue to argue that foreign aid is effective, but only under the right conditions (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Hansen and Tarp 2001; Collier and Dollar 2001; Nunnenkamp 2005). All of these studies use economic growth to determine the effectiveness of foreign aid. A few researchers have approached the question of what other effects of foreign aid exist, such as its effects on quality of life (Kosack

2003), but research on many areas affected by foreign aid remain relatively untouched. One of these areas is the effect of foreign aid on income inequality in the developing world.

Scholars agree that income inequality is detrimental to economic growth in the developed world (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and Tabellini 1994). Robert Barro concluded that the growth-retarding effect of income inequality is greater in poor countries (2000). In democracies with majority rule or in autocracies where the people have some influence, if the mean income exceeds the median income, redistribution occurs. The redistributive policies retard growth in those economies (Alesina and Rodrik 1994). Inequality also causes sociopolitical unrest (Alesina and Perotti 1996). Income inequality has been directly linked to a reduction in happiness levels, as well (Blanchflower and Oswald 2003). This reduction is greater among those at lower income levels and those with less education. As a result, the poor begin to commit crime, form riots, and participate in other disruptive activities (Barro 2000; Pastor 1995; Alesina and Perotti 1996). This increase in unrest hurts the economy and, more importantly, decreases the quality of life of all people in the country, especially those without the means to protect themselves.

Because of the detrimental economic, political, and sociopolitical effects of inequality, it is important to understand what causes differences in inequality in various countries around the world. Much of the developing world experiences some degree of inequality, but some countries suffer less from economic differences. Why do these differences exist? How do some countries escape extreme inequality, while others experience a rift between the rich and the poor that increases in size every day? In this paper, we theorize that one of the causes of inequality in the developing world is the foreign aid money that the West sends in an attempt to reduce the rift between the rich and the poor. We contend that economic growth is not the only important factor to examine when determining the effectiveness of foreign aid. If aid does increase economic growth but also increases inequality, then the goal of that aid (to reduce poverty) is not met. The aid may also have a reverse effect by increasing inequality, which then retards growth. It is important to understand this relationship so that aid organizations may better determine the effectiveness of their efforts.

Review of Existing Inequality Literature

The study of income inequality has produced a limited amount of literature that addresses the question of what causes changes in inequality. The literature that does exist provides a list of socioeconomic and sociopolitical causes that fall into four related but distinct camps: political explanations, international integration explanations, macroeconomic explanations, and demographic explanations. Each of the camps emphasizes a particular category of independent variables as causes for changes in income inequality. There is some overlap between the camps, as some of the theories do not refute, but rather add to, the theories of the other camps.

Political Explanations

The political explanations camp focuses on four political causes of change in income inequality: social spending, democracy, public sector expansion, and legislative partisan political power distribution. Rudra and Huber *et al.* found that social spending must be divided into education spending, health spending, and social security/welfare spending in order to see the true

effects of each type of spending (Rudra 2004; Huber *et al.* 2006). Rudra found that only education spending decreases inequality. She contends that social security and health spending are subject to greater lobbying and clientelism. Huber *et al.* found that health and education spending have no effect on income inequality; this finding may be due to their use of an aggregate measure that combined the two variables into one. Huber *et al.* and Rudra also found that social spending increases inequality, yet Huber *et al.* made this conclusion in the context of non-democracies. This phenomenon occurs because social spending only aids those employed in the formal sector who are usually the political elite in non-democracies.

Several studies looked into the effect of democracy on inequality (Reuveny and Li 2003; Huber *et al.* 2006; Simpson 1990; Bollen and Jackman 1985). While Bollen and Jackman concluded in 1985 that democracy has no effect on inequality, several recent studies have reversed that conclusion, the most recent of which (Huber *et al.* 2006) showed that the strength of the democratic tradition is one of the best explanatory variables for changes in inequality in Latin America (*see also* Muller 1988). Reuveny and Li also made the interesting conclusion that democracy decreases inequality when interacted with globalization, a variable that will be discussed later. Lee also studied the effect of democracy on inequality but in the context of public sector expansion, concluding that public sector expansion in non-democracies increases inequality. In non-democracies, the state supports particular core industries and client populations, which causes this inequality increase. This does not occur in democracies where the political mechanisms allow the state to help meet the needs of the lower classes (Reuveny and Li 2003).

Another political factor that affects inequality is the “legislative partisan political power distribution.” Huber *et al.* (2006) concluded that in Latin America, countries with strong histories of left-leaning legislatures have lower inequality (*see also* Mahler 2004). Their conclusion pointed to the idea that income inequality may actually be reduced by political means.

International Integration Explanations

The second camp of scholars is made up of those that believe factors dealing with international integration explain changes in income inequality. There seems to be a consensus in the literature that foreign direct investment and trade both increase inequality (Alderson and Nielsen 1999; Evans and Timberlake 1980; Reuveny and Li 2003; Gustafsson and Johansson 1999). The idea is that the money that comes into a country through FDI and trade goes to the sector where the country has a comparative advantage, increasing incomes in that sector while leaving all other sectors of the economy in the dust. Reuveny and Li did suggest that when trade is interacted with democracy, it actually decreases inequality. As previously stated, this occurs because a democracy allows a country to meet the needs of the poor.

Macroeconomic Explanations

The third group of scholars is mostly made up of economists who believe that macroeconomic factors best explain changes in inequality. The original theory about income inequality falls into this camp. This theory suggests that all countries are somewhere on the Kuznets Curve, an upside-down U (Kuznets 1955; Alderson and Nielson 1995; Robinson

1976). Kuznets suggested that income inequality in countries increases as the country develops (defined as increases in per capita income) and then decreases after it reaches a critical point. Much of the literature on inequality seeks to explain why this curve exists, because most economists do not accept changes in per capita income as an adequate explanation.

Samuel Morely put forth several additional macroeconomic explanations for inequality in Latin America. He claimed that inflation increases inequality because it hits the poor harder than the rich (Morely 2001; Albanesi 2007; Bulir 2001). The rich can invest in capital or land when inflation occurs, and these investments do not decrease in value with inflation. The poor, however, cannot do this because such a large percentage of their income goes toward consumption. Morely suggested that recessions also increase inequality because they hit the poor harder than the rich (Morely 1995; Psacharopoulos *et al.* 1995). Recessions cause unemployment, usually at the low end of the income bracket. They also cause the rich to spend less on the goods and services that the poor provide, decreasing the income of the poor and increasing inequality. Morely's final explanation for inequality was change in the minimum wage (1995). He suggested that a decrease in the minimum wage leads to more formal sector jobs, decreasing inequality, and that an increase in the minimum wage leads to fewer formal sector jobs, increasing inequality.

Demographic Explanations

The final group of scholars explains changes in inequality using demographic variables. The most prominent theory in this camp is that an increased youth population increases inequality (Simpson 1990; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Gustafsson and Johansson 1999). Young people have less experience and are more often unemployed. They also provide a competitive pool for employers to draw from, decreasing the wages of the youth and increasing the profits of the employers. Huber *et al.* suggested that the effect on inequality of the youth population actually decreases inequality, but only insignificantly. This finding is interesting, yet not well explained. Morely suggested that the real explanation for inequality is not in the size of the youth population but rather in the dependency ratio, the number of workers compared to the size of the family they are supporting (1995).

Another demographic variable that helps explain changes in inequality is the percent of the population employed in the informal sector (Huber 2006 *et al.*; Gustafsson and Johansson 1999; Alderson and Nielsen 1995; Nielsen 1994). The literature concludes that a higher percent of the population employed in agriculture (high sector dualism) increases inequality because wages are often lower in the informal sector, and the workers do not receive much of the benefit of government social spending through social security and welfare programs.

Another demographic factor that affects income inequality is ethnic diversity. There are certain levels of ethnic diversity or racial diversity that cause large discrepancies in income distribution (Meisenberg 2007). When political leaders come from a particular race or ethnic group, they tend to reward that race or ethnic group. In his article, Bayart listed African dictators who diverted money to tribe members (1992). This tendency to divert funds to the leader's ethnic group leads to inequality; as one group is preferred over others, that group obtains better jobs, government contracts, and higher income.

The final demographic explanatory variable is education. Most scholars argued that education decreases inequality over time (Lee 2005; Morely 1995; Alderson and Nielsen

1995; Crenshaw 1992). Education allows the poor to escape poverty and obtain jobs that pay better wages. Widespread education also attracts widespread foreign direct investment, not just FDI in certain sectors, but in all sectors where there are educated individuals.

Our theory that foreign aid affects changes in inequality falls into the international integration explanation camp. Although foreign intervention through foreign aid is not the same as intervention through trade and FDI, it still involves foreign powers or organizations investing money into an economy. The differences are that aid organizations invest this money through the governments of the developing countries, and the goal of the money is to improve the welfare of the poor instead of to gain profits. The foreign aid theory does not contradict any of the established theories about the causes for changes in income inequality. Instead, it seems that foreign aid money acts as a catalyst for many of the established theories about what increases inequality. Aid is used by developing countries to fund various programs that increase inequality: education spending, health spending, social security/welfare spending, public sector expansion in non-democracies, FDI attraction, trade liberalizing, and economic growth. Because foreign aid supports these inequality-increasing programs, it should lead to increased inequality itself.

Why Foreign Aid Leads to Inequality

Several mechanisms describe how foreign aid money leads to an increase in inequality. All of the mechanisms play some role in the process of aid money flowing to certain groups and away from other groups.

The first causal mechanism exists through politics. As rational actors, politicians act to please their supporters. Often, a politician's supporters are made up of a group of high-income private citizens with special interests. The politicians have a vested interest in pleasing their supporters so that the supporters help them win subsequent elections, pay living expenses, and find employment after several faithful terms in public office. In his study on the effectiveness of foreign aid, Boone concluded that all political systems favor a "high-income political elite" when it comes to aid distribution (Boone 1996). He divided countries into three groups: those with elitist governments, egalitarian governments, and laissez-faire governments. From his evidence, he concluded that all three government types favor the high-income political elite. Since the governments are the organizations that ultimately control how aid money is used, it can be assumed that the money is distributed in a manner that favors those high-income individuals who support the politicians in office. This increases the incomes of a small group of individuals, including the politicians and their supporters, but leaves the poor essentially in the same position before the government received the aid money, leading to an increase in income inequality. Even if the government decides to give equal amounts of aid money to the poor and their supporters, income inequality increases because the money given to the poor has to be distributed among a large group. The money given to the supporters is distributed among a much smaller group, allowing each individual to receive a larger share. Easterly claimed that governments also have little incentive to increase the productive potential of the poor because this might foster political activism that would threaten the politicians' and their supporters' social and political standing (Easterly 2003).

Some argue that the conditionalities aid agencies include in loans and grants are designed to force governments to use aid in ways that benefit the poor. The conditionalities often require

a liberalization of economic policies (which may or may not help the poor) and improvements in institutions. Over the last several decades, these conditionalities have been under attack because of ineffectiveness, lack of enforcement, and lack of credibility (*see* Bauer 1993; Collier *et al.* 1997; Leandro *et al.* 1999; Morrissey 2004; Svensson 2000). The conditionalities force unwanted policies on unwilling governments. Because of this, the governments find ways to get around the conditionalities. Sometimes they do not fully implement the policies, sometimes they repeal the policies as soon as they get the money, and sometimes they refuse to implement the policies and count on the benevolence of the aid organization to induce the giving of the loan or grant without the conditionalities. Because of these problems with aid conditionalities, the money still goes to the high-income political elites, increasing inequality.

This might, however, still decrease inequality if these high-income individuals would invest the money in the domestic economy. An increase in investment could cause economic growth by increasing the number of jobs and the amount of credit available to all members of society. Commonly referred to as a “trickle down” effect (Azam and Laffont 2003), this effect does not fully occur unless the money is invested domestically, which seldom occurs (See Easterly 1999 and Boone 1996). Investors in poor countries favor foreign markets for several reasons. Investments in developing economies may provide more opportunity for profit, but the associated risk often encourages local investors to look abroad. Globalization has facilitated international investment and expanded investment choices, enabling a broader and more stable portfolio. In cases where the trickle down effect does occur, inequality continues to increase because the political elite continue to receive the majority of the funds.

The aid organizations’ selection process for giving aid causes another disincentive for politicians to improve the welfare of the poor. Logically, aid organizations make decisions based on the needs of the poor, giving aid to those nations whose poor need it. If the welfare of the poor improves, the aid money will eventually slow. For this reason, the governments that receive aid money have little incentive to actually help the poor; if the welfare of the poor does not improve, the aid money will keep coming (Svensson 2000). Bauer claimed that the problem is that aid goes to governments whose policies retard growth and create poverty (1993). These countries have an incentive to keep their institutions from improving; more economic crises means an increase in aid money (Azam and Laffont 2003). The improvement of institutions is crucial to decreasing inequality because better, more democratic institutions allow the government to meet the needs of the poor (Reuveny and Lee 2003). Better institutions and governance could also decrease inequality by redistributing income through effective taxation and by decreasing the influence of the high-income political elites through crackdowns on corruption.

International aid-giving organizations are also subject to the interests of their member states (Nielson and Tierney 2003), giving a new incentive to the politicians in aid-receiving countries. If they want to receive aid, they need to encourage programs that cause the member countries of the aid organizations to give them aid, suggesting that the developing country is more likely to use the money to improve its standing with the donor countries than to help the poor. This causes an increase in income inequality because the money is spent on programs that favor the elite that are well connected with the West, rather than those programs that aid the lowest income groups.

For a moment, let us assume that aid money does actually get through the government and is invested wisely in the domestic economy. It is logical to assume that the aid is directed to the sector that has the highest potential to generate profits and, thus, has a potential to cause economic growth. If the money is directed to these sectors, the owners of those sectors profit most. The workers in those sectors should profit some as well. While the other sectors probably experience some growth due to the success of the highly profitable sector, the growth is much less pronounced. This causes an increase in income inequality because, while the incomes of the members of the specified sector rise significantly, other incomes remain unchanged or increase insignificantly.

Foreign aid can also affect inequality through the ethnic diversity hypotheses listed in the literature review. If the political leaders who distribute the aid money belong to a particular ethnic group, they tend to prefer that ethnic group when distributing foreign aid. They use the aid to make sure the members of that ethnic group receive better-paying jobs. They also use the money to directly improve infrastructure in the areas where members of their ethnic group reside. Since the literature has established that ethnic diversity tends to lead to inequality, we add to that literature by suggesting that one way that this relationship exists is through the distribution of foreign aid.

From this theoretical discussion we extract two hypotheses: 1) foreign aid will lead to income inequality, and 2) foreign aid will cause more inequality in autocracies than democracies. We suggest that this increase in inequality is caused by aggregate aid. It may be the case that some aid programs actually decrease inequality, but the goal of this study is to discover the effect of net inflows of foreign aid money. We hypothesize that most of the aid distributed in the form of projects that are meant to decrease inequality is not spent in the way that is desired by the donors. The aid is often used for other purposes that actually increase inequality. Because of this misuse of aid and the other natural effects of aid mentioned in our theoretical framework, we hypothesize that the net impact of aid on inequality will be positive: foreign aid increases inequality. We used aggregate aid as our dependent variable because of its availability and because it is the measure of aid most frequently used in foreign aid literature (*see* Burnside and Dollar 2000, Hansen and Tarp 2001, Easterly 2003).

Data Collection

The dependent variable of this study is the Gini index of income inequality. It was provided by the United Nations' University World Inequality Database, WIID (UNU-WIDER 2005). This database provides quality ratings and other information for each of the observations. Following the methods of Huber *et al.* (2006), we filtered the data in order to obtain the most valid observations. First, we deleted those observations with expenditure, consumption, earnings, or market income as the measure of income. Second, we deleted all observations that did not include data for the entire population. The observations were given a quality rating of 1, 2, or 3, 3 being the lowest and 1 being the highest. We eliminated all observations with a quality rating of 3. In many cases, there remained several observations for the same year. When this occurred, we deleted all cases that used the household or family as the unit of analysis. Where multiple values still existed, we deleted any observation with the quality rating of 2. A few

multiple year observations still remained, so we averaged the remaining values. This process yielded a dataset with valid observations and one observation per year.

There is much contention over the use of the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality. It may not provide the most valid measure for this variable, but it is the measure with the most available data. Because of the high level of availability in comparison to other measures of inequality, we decided to use the Gini coefficient as our measure of inequality for this study. The vast majority of scholarly articles in the field of inequality research have also used this measure.

Unfortunately, the data on the Gini coefficient, while much more prevalent than other measures of inequality, is limited. For most countries, the Gini coefficient is not available for multiple consecutive years. Because of this limited availability of data, our datasets were limited in their inclusion of countries and years. However, we did include all of the countries and years possible in our analysis.

Data for our independent variable, foreign aid, comes from a newly developed comprehensive database of foreign aid loans and grants called the Project-level Aid Database (PLAID) (Brigham Young University 2007). PLAID is a database currently under construction by Brigham Young University and the College of William and Mary. The project has been funded by the National Science Foundation and is currently under consideration for further funding from the Gates Foundation. Its database contains bilateral and multilateral loans and grants to all countries across the world since 1970. While the database is still under construction, the data it provides is more complete than any other data source for foreign aid inflows because it includes data from the OECD and the World Bank. We use aggregate foreign aid data for each country each year there is a Gini coefficient. The aggregate data is obviously less descriptive than disaggregated. In fact, it is possible that some types of aid may decrease inequality. Upon the completion of the PLAID database, we will run further tests to determine which types of loans cause income inequality to increase and which types cause income inequality to decrease. Nevertheless, this aggregate study should reveal the overall net effect of foreign aid on income inequality. We expect this relationship to be positive because recipient countries use this aid at their own discretion. Aid money intended for income equalizing programs may be misused, as our theory predicts. We followed the trend in the current literature by using an aggregate aid database.

Our study also includes several independent variables established in the literature to allow us to understand the effects of our independent variables after controlling for the explanatory variables that scholars have established. Summary statistics for these variables, along with our independent and dependent variables, appear in Table 1. Following the table are theoretical explanations for including each of the control variables.

Inflation

Several authors agreed that inflation promotes inequality. Morley argued that labor markets lag when adjusting to high inflation (2001, 72). This lag causes a decrease in real wages, which hurts minimum wage workers proportionately more than other workers. The IDB (1998) and De Ferranti *et al.* (2004) suggested that hyperinflation has strong effects on inequality. We agreed with these authors and hypothesized that inflation increases income inequality. To measure

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Model Including Agricultural Employment

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Gini Coefficient	169	8.7845	.4764	7.9914	9.7739
Agricultural Employment	169	27.6317	8.5415	14.8644	43.6666
Youth Population	169	22.8479	15.0327	1	66.7
FDI Net Inflows	169	3190000000	7070000000	0	43800000000
Inflation (GDP Deflator)	169	90.6111	312.5484	-23.4789	2509.465
Ethnic Diversity	169	.4116	.2419	.007	.859
Polity Democracy Scores	169	5.515	5.5152	-7	10
Log Foreign Aid	169	20.5092	1.3323	13.6523	1023.1212
Polity X Log Foreign Aid	169	3.75112	.2972	3.1224	4.1865

inflation, we use the World Bank's World Development Indicator's measure of inflation, the GDP deflator (WDI 2005).

Education

The literature suggested that education also has an effect on inequality. As a country becomes more educated, more people obtain meaningful employment. This increase in employment causes inequality to decrease. Measures for education are plentiful, but many of those measures are unavailable for countries and years in our sample. Because of this, we chose to use the most widely available measure of education, the literacy rate (WDI 2005).

Youth Population

The argument that inflation hurts unskilled workers is extended to the variable of demography. The youth population is one of the principal suppliers of unskilled labor. Many authors made a link between youth population and income inequality. Alderson and Nielsen argued that a large youth population causes an oversupply of unskilled workers, thus driving down the wage of unskilled labor (1999). Therefore, we expect that a high youth population increases inequality. For this data we used the World Bank's World Development Indicators, WDI (2005). This dataset provides a percentage of each nation's population younger than fifteen years. We used this percentage as the measure of youth population in a society.

Agricultural Share of GDP

There were differing views regarding employment in agriculture and its effects on income inequality. Alderson and Nielson argued that decreasing proportions of employment in agriculture increase inequality, based on the assumption that inequality in the agricultural sector is lower (1999). Huber *et al.* argued the opposite for Latin America. They found that the Gini index in urban areas suggests less inequality than in rural areas (2006). Thus, increased employment in agriculture leads to greater inequality. Because of the limited availability of data on employment in agriculture, we used the World Bank's WDI (2005) to obtain the agricultural share of GDP. We used this data as the measurement of employment in agriculture.

Ethnic Diversity

Some literature argued that ethnic divisions create more inequality. De Ferranti *et al.* (2004) argued that this inequality is better explained by differences within ethnic groups instead of between them. However, we predict that countries with higher levels of ethnic diversity have more inequality. People seek to elect politicians from their same ethnic group, and these politicians return favors to people of their ethnic group. This promotes income inequality along ethnic lines. We used the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization index, ELF (Roeder 2001), as the measure of ethnic diversity. The ELF index is an estimate of the probability that any two people in a population will belong to the same ethnic group. The data supplied a probability value for the years 1961 and 1985. We selected the 1985 value because it is more relevant to our research. We expected those countries with a lower value in the ELF index (more ethnically diverse) to have more income inequality.

Democracy

Many theorists agree that democracy provides institutions that empower the poor. This provides more opportunity for redistribution mechanisms. As the level of democracy increases, politicians are more responsive to the needs of the citizens. Thus, one would expect that democracy would decrease inequality. The empirical data has been ambiguous in many studies, but Reuveny and Li (2003) found a significant relationship between democracy and inequality when controlling for trade openness. We agreed with Reuveny and Li and hypothesize that our model will yield a negative relationship between the level of democracy and income inequality. We used data from Polity IV as a measure for democracy (CIDCM 2004). The Polity IV dataset provides a measure of democracy and a measure of autocracy. The sum of these two measures is the polity score.

GDP per capita (PPP)

The dominating theory regarding economic development and income inequality is Simon Kuznets' (1995) inverted U-shaped curve. At lower levels of development, income inequality increases as per capita income increases. At higher levels of development, income inequality decreases as per capita income increases. In our dataset, we focus on countries that receive foreign aid. It is safe to assume that most of these countries are at lower levels of development, so we predict that per capita GDP growth increases income inequality. Our measurement of per capita GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) comes from the WDI (2005) data.

FDI—Percentage of GDP

Many authors agreed that the inflow of foreign direct investment has a positive effect on inequality. Reuveny and Li found this to be the case for a sample of countries from around the world (2003). Tsai found that this effect of foreign direct investment on inequality is region specific (1995). Huber *et al.* hypothesized that FDI increases inequality in Latin American and the Caribbean because this type of investment applies to capital-intensive industries that provide relatively few jobs (2006). However, the jobs provided are relatively well paying. For this variable, we use the WDI to determine foreign direct investment as a percentage of

GDP (2005). We used the percentage of GDP that comes from FDI because only net inflows of FDI that make up a significant portion of the country's GDP, not just high inflows of FDI, should affect inequality.

Other Variables

In our literature review, several additional variables were mentioned. The first of these is social spending. Both Huber *et al.* (2006) and Rudra (2004) suggested that social spending has a positive impact on inequality in developing countries. The logic behind this effect is sound, but the results seem questionable. When deciding whether or not to include this variable, we weighed the cost of losing a large number of cases due to holes in the social spending data against the benefit of including a slightly significant control variable. We decided that the cost outweighed the benefit and left out the variable.

Huber *et al.* (2006) also found that the legislative partisan political power distribution has an effect on income inequality. We would have controlled for this variable, but we could not obtain the data required. However, the variable only became extremely significant after controlling for the interaction between democracy and social spending. Since we could not include the social spending variable, we determined that our results would not be harmed by omitting the legislative partisan political power variable.

The final variable omitted from our study was the minimum wage. Morely (1995) suggested that a high minimum wage tends to increase inequality because of its effect in causing a lower number of people to be employed in the formal sector.

Methodology

To test the relationship between foreign aid and income inequality (Gini coefficient), we used two unbalanced panel datasets. The first dataset omits a control variable, percent of total employed population employed in agriculture, because of its limited coverage throughout the time period. The second dataset includes the agricultural employment variable but has a smaller sample size. We ran tests on both datasets to test for the robustness of our results across difference sample sizes and different control variables.

Model 1 (omitting agricultural employment) includes 211 observations from twenty-nine developing or transition countries from 1975 to 2002. The countries included in the first dataset are: Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Paraguay, the Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Post-Communist Russia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Venezuela. Model 2 (including agricultural employment) includes 169 observations from twenty-four countries from the same time period as the first dataset. The countries included in the second dataset are the same as those included in the first dataset minus Bangladesh, Belarus, Moldova, and Sri Lanka. We selected countries and years based on the availability of Gini coefficients in the WIDER database. We also selected the countries based on the availability of key control variables. The lack of inequality data was problematic, but we made make due with what was available. Because of data availability problems, this group does not represent a truly random sample of developing and transition countries. As is evident in the lists of countries, there are no African countries in the sample. The results of this study,

then, cannot necessarily be generalized to developing African nations. However, the sample does include a fair number of countries from Europe, Asia, South America, and Central America, allowing for some generality of the results of this study throughout those regions.

Attempting to estimate regression models from panel data presents several problems that must be addressed. First, with most panel data, the errors produced by ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models exhibit strong heteroskedasticity—that is, there is not constant variance across the error terms. Heteroskedasticity causes OLS to use incorrect standard errors when producing t statistics for the coefficients. Normally, this problem may be corrected for by using robust standard errors that provide the correct t statistics for the coefficients. However, heteroskedasticity also causes the OLS estimators to be poor linear unbiased estimators. This problem can also be corrected, and we will discuss our method for doing so below. The second problem that occurs when using OLS to estimate a model using panel data is correlation between the error terms (autocorrelation). Autocorrelation often occurs in panel data because of the time-series nature of the data. The errors are not independent of each other because they rely somewhat on the errors that precede them. Autocorrelation also causes OLS estimated t statistics to be invalid and OLS estimators to be poor linear unbiased estimators. Because of these violations of key assumptions of OLS, certain strategies must be used to allow for the best estimation of the models.

There are several ways to overcome the problems of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, but it would first be wise to test for the existence of the two violations of OLS. In order to test for serial correlation between the errors, we used a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data (Statacorp 2007). For Model 1, the test suggested that we could reject the hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation with 90 percent confidence. For Model 2, the test suggested that we could reject the same hypothesis with 99.9 percent confidence. Because of the high probability that autocorrelation exists, we corrected for this problem. In order to test for heteroskedasticity, we first ran a generalized least squares (GLS) regression (which we will discuss more in depth later) allowing for heteroskedasticity. Secondly, we ran the same GLS regression forcing homoskedasticity. We then used the results to run an LR test to determine the statistical significance of the restriction placed on the model; in other words, we tested to see if the models were significantly different when allowing for heteroskedasticity and when forcing homoskedasticity. The LR tests for both models produced results suggesting that we could reject the hypothesis of homoskedasticity in the original model with 99.9 percent confidence.

Because we found that the OLS model for our data exhibits both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, we must transform the model to obtain maximum likelihood estimators and valid t statistics. There are several ways to transform panel models to correct for these problems. We chose to use a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) model because it does a fairly good job of correcting for these problems. OLS assumes constant variance among the error terms and an absence of covariance between the error terms, but we have shown that these assumptions are invalid for our models. An FGLS model transforms the OLS model by multiplying the dependent variable, the independent variables, and the error terms by the square root of a matrix Ω that is equal to the quantity $\sigma^2 C$, where σ^2 is an unknown constant and C is a known $G \times G$ matrix where G is equal to the number of linear equations involved in the model, or the number of countries (Wooldridge 2002). Because C is usually unknown in GLS estimation,

FGLS estimation is used to estimate it. When Ω is used to transform the model, FGLS produces estimators that are consistent, unbiased, and of minimum variance. The transformation also forces the variance/covariance matrix to have constant variance down the diagonal and zero covariance in the upper-left and lower-right portions of the matrix. This variance/covariance matrix produced by the transformed model now complies with the OLS assumptions of homoskedasticity and no autocorrelation. Because of this, the t statistics are valid and the estimators are the best unbiased linear estimators. According to Wooldridge, the FGLS model also complies with the first assumption of OLS, normality, because the transformation causes the model to be asymptotically normal, providing completely robust estimators (Wooldridge 2002).

The FGLS model still makes several strong assumptions, however, that could cause problems for the model. The FGLS model assumes that the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable are equal across all of the countries and time periods. We would hope that this is the case, but it is possible that it is not. The FGLS model also uses a zero conditional mean assumption $[E(u_i|X_i) = 0]$ which implies that every element of X_i and u_i are uncorrelated where u_i represents the error terms. This assumption may also be violated, but we hope that it is not. Other models may do a better job of providing the best linear unbiased estimators without making such “heroic” assumptions as FGLS. A preferred model is the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions model. While this model may provide better estimators, it requires larger samples than those which are available to us within each unit (country). Because of this, a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions model is infeasible. However, despite the possible violation of the FGLS assumptions, according to Wooldridge, “the FGLS is more efficient than any other estimator that uses the orthogonality conditions, $E(Xu) = 0$ ” (Wooldridge 2002). Because of the efficiency of the FGLS estimators, we have chosen to model our data using a FGLS model.

Other problems may exist with our model because of a possible difficulty with endogeneity. It is possible that income inequality causes foreign aid payments rather than the other way around. This problem could be overcome by including a lagged dependent variable on the right side of the equation, making an autoregressive model; however, the extreme lack of data on the dependent variable prevents us from including a lagged dependent variable. In the future, we may attempt to control for this problem by using software to impute past values. We also hope that the availability of income inequality data will improve in the future to allow for better testing of hypotheses like ours. For now, we are content with our model that does not include a lagged variable, and we will rely on our theoretical framework for the relationship between foreign aid and inequality to establish the definite possibility that foreign aid actually causes income inequality to increase. Nevertheless, the potential endogeneity problem may cause our estimators to be incorrect.

Despite these myriad problems, we are confident that our model provides consistent, best linear unbiased estimators to show how each of our independent variables affects income inequality.

Results

The results of the analysis are found in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 contains the results of the initial FGLS regressions, and Table 3 contains the results of the FGLS regression including additional variables. We will first focus our discussion on the results in Table 2.

Table 2: Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) Regressions of the Relationship Between Foreign Aid and Income Inequality (Omitting Agricultural Employment)

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Log GDP per capita (PPP)	2.9990*** (.6090)	2.9008*** (.5851)	2.7884*** (.5852)
Youth Population	.9596*** (.0645)	.85915*** (.0663)	.8610*** (.0658)
FDI percent of GDP	.1202*** (.0421)	.1239*** (.0404)	.1311*** (.0404)
Inflation (GDP Deflator)	.0059*** (.0017)	.0051*** (.0016)	.0048** (.0016)
Ethnic Diversity	14.0200*** (2.302)	15.2084*** (2.2276)	14.7894*** (2.2275)
Polity Democracy Scores	.3516*** (.0883)	.3251*** (.0850)	1.2034 (.9248)
Log Foreign Aid		1.4414*** (.3401)	1.4225*** (.9248)
Polity X Log Foreign Aid			.0749* (.0452)
Constant	-16.1642*** (5.4625)	-42.2893*** (8.0932)	-40.94772*** (8.0814)
R-Squared	0.684	0.709	0.7123
N	211	211	211

The dependent variable is the logged Gini coefficient. The values outside of the parenthesis are the GLS estimates of the coefficients. The numbers inside the parenthesis are the standard errors. The probability z is as follows: * p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

The model presented in Table 2 attempts to replicate the results suggested by the literature. All of the variables that are discussed in the literature review proved to be significant except for agricultural employment. Because of its insignificance in initial estimations of all of the models, we left out the agricultural employment variable in the final estimations. Model 1 shows that all of the variables except for democracy are correlated with income inequality in the hypothesized directions. GDP per capita, youth population, FDI as a percent of GDP, inflation, and ethnic diversity all increase inequality. It is interesting to note, however, that democracy is significantly positively correlated with inequality. This goes against the literature, which establishes a nonexistent or negative relationship. Perhaps a ruling majority in a democracy could use its power to repress a large minority, helping the majority and hurting the minority. This could cause inequality to rise.

Model 2 adds the key independent variable, foreign aid, as an explanatory variable for inequality. Again, all of the control variables, except democracy, are significant and correlated in the hypothesized direction. As we hypothesized, the regression results also suggest that a significant positive relationship exists between foreign aid and inequality. The null hypothesis that there is no relationship between foreign aid and inequality can be rejected with over 99.9 percent confidence.

Model 3, the final model, also adds the interaction variable, testing for a magnified effect of foreign aid on inequality in democracies. The regression results show that the interaction

is positive, but only slightly significant. The null hypothesis that there is no additional effect in democracies can be rejected with 90 percent confidence, not the 95 percent benchmark we would like. However, the relationship is positive as the theory suggests. The final model produced by the regressions is as follows:

$$\text{Income inequality} = -40.95 + 2.78(\text{Ln}(\text{GDP per capita})) + 0.86(\text{youth pop}) + 0.13(\text{FDI}) + 0.0048(\text{inflation}) + 14.80(\text{ethnic}) - 1.20(\text{democracy}) + 1.42(\text{Ln}(\text{aid})) + .07(\text{aid} * \text{democracy}) + \epsilon$$

It is important to note that the results of these regressions have proven robust to several different tests. The foreign aid variable remained positive and significant when using GLS fixed effects models, GLS random effects models, FGLS models, OLS models controlling for year and country, and models including more independent variables which proved insignificant. We also ran regressions using a dataset that contained values imputed using the statistical program *Amelia* to determine whether or not the results would be robust to a large increase in the sample size. The dataset, including the imputed values, had about 360 cases and produced similar results for the effect of foreign aid on inequality, proving the robustness of the results. We concluded that the two additional variables, foreign aid and the interaction variable, added significant explanatory power by running a Chow test. The test suggested that the two variables were important.


To provide further interpretation of the results, we will examine the coefficients for the variables. In the final model, the coefficient for foreign aid is 1.4225. Because the foreign aid variable is a logged variable, this coefficient can be interpreted to mean that a 1 percent increase in aid flows causes a 1.4225 point increase on the Gini index, a substantively significant relationship. Because the Gini coefficient is a slow-moving variable, an increase of 1.42 points is large. This relationship is especially significant after observing that many activists are currently calling for a doubling of aid, or a 100 percent increase. Our results suggest that an increase of this magnitude would cause income inequality to increase rapidly.

Further significance of the aid variables may be determined by examining the r-squared values of each of the regressions. The r-squared value of the initial model (without the aid variables) was 0.684, suggesting that 68.4 percent of the variance in income inequality can be explained by the control variables. This is a large portion of the variance and suggests that the original model explained much of the change. The r-squared value for the final model was 0.712, suggesting that the aid variables explained an additional 3 percent of the variance in inequality. This may seem like a small increase, but because the goal of this study was to determine whether or not aid explained *any* of the variance in inequality, and not to determine a list of causes of inequality, a 3 percent increase is significant. As mentioned earlier, a Chow test was also used to determine that the aid variables were important to the model.

Another way to determine the explanatory power of the final model is to examine some of the predictions the model made. We ran a regression with the last two cases (Venezuela 2001, 2002) omitted and then predicted the Gini values for those two cases. The model predicted that the 2001 value would be 47.96 and the 2002 value would be 45.02. The actual values for these two years were 46.39 and 47.52 respectively. These predictions were fairly accurate; however, the model seems to be inconsistent at either over predicting or under predicting. This could be a problem, but comparing the predicted values to the actual values on the chart below (Figure

1) shows that the model predicts the Gini coefficient on a fairly consistent basis. Because of this, we assume that the forecasting ability of the model is relatively strong. These variables do an excellent job of explaining variance in income inequality.

Figure 1: Predicted Values vs. Actual Values



In Table 3, we include the agricultural share of GDP and literacy as additional control variables and also add multiple lagged foreign aid variables. We will discuss the purpose of these lagged variables below; the reasoning for including the agriculture and literacy variables is found above.

The first model found in Table 3 presents the control variables we extracted from the literature. Some differences exist between this model and the previous models. One of the major differences is the direction of the relationship between GDP per capita and inequality. In these models, the direction appears negative; previously the relationship appeared positive. Perhaps this difference exists because of the ambiguity of the relationship between GDP and inequality. Because the relationship changes as GDP increases, it is hard to tell the nature of the actual relationship in a normal regression. The significance of the variable also seems to fluctuate from regression to regression. The other variables remain significant in this first model.

The addition of the literacy and agricultural share of GDP variables provided some interesting findings. The model suggests that higher literacy rates actually lead to higher inequality. It is possible that literacy is an indicator of education, and when education is higher, more inequality exists. This relationship could be explained by the idea that higher education leads to a higher variation in jobs, with a higher variation in income from those jobs. Higher education may also lead to a larger job market, which increases competition among the workers and decreases wages. The other interesting finding presented in this model is the idea that as the agricultural share of GDP increases, inequality decreases. This is different from the hypothesized

Table 3: Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) Regressions of the Relationship Between Foreign Aid and Income Inequality (Omitting Agricultural Employment)

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Agricultural Share of GDP	-.6534*** (.1319)	-.5489*** (.1286)	-.4680*** (.1367)
Log GDP per capita (PPP)	-2.3232** (1.113)	-1.852* (1.072)	-1.0661 (1.1452)
Youth Population	1.2302*** (.0928)	1.176*** (.0888)	1.1351*** (.0937)
Literacy	.1688*** (.0632)	.2217*** (.0618)	.2099*** (.0633)
FDI share of GDP	.0638* (.0404)	.0727** (.0388)	.0896** (.0399)
Inflation (GDP Deflator)	.0052*** (.0016)	.0047*** (.0015)	.0041*** (.0015)
Ethnic Diversity	8.194*** (2.508)	8.697*** (2.406)	9.474*** (2.518)
Democracy	.4420*** (.0839)	.4032*** (.0809)	-1.347* (.9221)
Foreign Aid (logged)		1.419*** (.3269)	1.2236*** (.4776)
Foreign Aid (lagged 1 yr)			3.15e-10 (4.88e-10)
Foreign Aid (lagged 2 yrs)			1.88e-10 (4.55e-10)
Aid X Democracy			.0857** (.0447)
Constant	13.0719* (11.6177)	-24.1305** (14.049)	-26.374** (15.0213)
R-Squared	0.727	0.749	.734
N	210	210	201

The dependent variable is the logged Gini coefficient. The values outside of the parenthesis are the GLS estimates of the coefficients. The numbers inside the parenthesis are the standard errors. The probability z is as follows: * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

positive relationship. It could be that the agricultural share of GDP increases as farmers begin to become more efficient and better at farming. If this is the case, the incomes of farmers should be increasing and inequality should be decreasing. This finding does fall in line with the findings of Crenshaw (1992). The logic behind these relationships is not incredibly solid, but the findings are quite interesting.

Model 2 adds our foreign aid variable. The relationship observed in the models from Table 2 is observed again in this table. After controlling for literacy and the agricultural share of GDP, both significant explanatory variables for inequality, foreign aid remains highly significant. The coefficient for foreign aid also remains about equal to the coefficients found in the models discussed above. This suggests that a highly substantive relationship exists between foreign aid and inequality and that this relationship is robust to changes in the model and sample size.

We also ran one final regression to test for the time effects of aid on inequality. Pieces of our causal logic require time for aid to actually increase inequality, so we created two lagged foreign aid variables. The first variable is a lag of one year, and the second variable is a lag of two years. We included both lags in our final model, which produced some interesting findings. Neither of the lagged variables was significant when controlling for the current year's aid. However, further tests showed that both of the lagged variables had significant effects on inequality on their own, not controlling for the current year's aid. Because of this, there is still some ambiguity surrounding the relationship between foreign aid and inequality. The results have two possible implications. The first is that aid has a real effect on inequality, but that effect is instantaneous; it does not occur over time. The second is that the relationship between aid and inequality is endogenous; inequality could cause aid organizations to give more aid. Because both of these relationships are possible, it is difficult to make solid conclusions about the relationship from these tests. Further research must be done, including more observations and further tests, in order to reveal the true relationship between aid and inequality. However, even if the relationship is occurring in the other direction (inequality causing aid), this is a new and significant finding. Nobody has ever suggested that aid organizations are concerned with inequality. Through this selection process, aid organizations may be looking for countries that have worse inequality so they can use aid to decrease that inequality and, therefore, improve the conditions for economic growth. This would be a positive impact of the selection process.

The insignificant nature of the lagged variables is still quite interesting, however. If aid has no effect on inequality over time, it is failing with respect to its goal of decreasing inequality. Aid is either helping nobody or it is helping the rich and the poor rather than just the poor. This finding has implications somewhat similar to the implications that come from a positive relationship between aid and inequality. Aid is not doing what it is meant to do, and this may impact some donors' willingness to give.

Implications and Conclusions

The analysis of this data supports our theoretical framework suggesting that foreign aid increases income inequality in developing and transition nations. The quantitative tests show that foreign aid is a robust explanatory variable for increases in inequality in these nations. While the limited sample of countries precludes us from generalizing our results to all nations across the globe, the varying characteristics of the countries studied allow for some conclusions to be made. It must be remembered, however, that our sample included no African countries, meaning that these results cannot be applied to African nations. Nevertheless, our datasets do include multiple countries from Eastern Europe, Asia, South America, and Central America, making it possible to generalize our results to those areas.

The quantitative analysis suggests that the effect of foreign aid on income inequality is statistically and substantively significant. After controlling for all the other factors, increases in foreign aid are related with limited increases in inequality. It must be remembered, however, that foreign aid is intended to increase the well being of the poor alone. Most aid-giving organizations obtain contributions and operate under the goal of decreasing world poverty. Thus, our finding that foreign aid has a small but statistically significant effect on inequality is important. We have found that while aid may help the poor, it is obviously helping the rich

more, which is a problem. Most contributors to organizations that provide aid assume their money is used for the poor. While there is a chance that these donors would still be satisfied if they knew a small portion of their money helped the rich, they would probably not be satisfied knowing that their money increases the incomes of the rich more than the incomes of the poor, an implication of our findings.

While the effect of foreign aid on income inequality may be small, it exists, and it causes inequality to increase in these developing countries where inequality is already a problem. Inequality causes slowed growth, higher crime rates, and other serious problems across the world. One goal of foreign aid is to *decrease* this inequality and provide better lives for the poor. This goal is not being met; even worse, the opposite is occurring. Foreign aid causes inequality to increase.

Foreign aid money is given to these countries every year in amounts equaling millions and sometimes billions of dollars. If those amounts are causing a small increase in inequality every year, after ten or fifteen years, inequality will be much higher than it is today. This will cause the growth that foreign aid is meant to encourage to slow or stop and extreme hardship for many of the citizens of these developing countries, while providing unnecessary luxuries for a select few.

We do not mean to suggest that aid organizations should cease giving aid. We do suggest, however, that the way in which aid is given to these developing countries improve. It is obvious from our results that foreign aid is not decreasing inequality but increasing it. Because of this, aid organizations should reevaluate their methods for giving foreign aid. Careful analysis should be performed using the newly released Project-level Aid Database (PLAID) to determine which types of aid cause increases in inequality and which types of aid cause decreases. Aid organizations should then focus their efforts on providing aid through those which decrease inequality. The PLAID database provides scholars and aid workers with a comprehensive database of aid loans and grants classified by project type. This data could be used to determine each type of aid project's effects on inequality. We suggest that aid organizations intensify their level of responsibility and use their money to improve the conditions and the incomes of the poor more than the rich. If reducing inequality, one of the key goals of foreign aid, is not met, the way in which aid is distributed should be changed.

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Without Distinction: Testing Realist Theory with the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination

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Abstract

This article tests realist theory using a case study on the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. It provides a brief overview of realism and gives four hypotheses about how anti-discrimination law is consistent with realist ideas: 1) states form and join the ICERD, 2) the convention will allow a noncommittal membership, 3) enforcement is conditional on state involvement and agreement, and 4) ICERD has a limited ability to change structures. Using qualitative evidence from the writings of ICERD and the reaction of various states to treaty provisions, the article shows that ICERD is a relatively weak body, yet it has still influenced national laws and state actions. While full compliance to the convention may never be attainable, ICERD has been partially successful in helping the UN fulfill its mandate. The test has produced mixed results on how well realist theory describes the origination, development, and implementation of ICERD.

Introduction

Suppose . . . that there were some . . . distinction made between men upon account of their different . . . features, so that those who have black hair . . . or grey eyes should not enjoy the same privileges as other citizens; can it be doubted but these persons, . . . united together by one common persecution, would be as dangerous to the magistrate as any others that had associated themselves merely upon the account of religion? . . . There is only one thing which gathers people into seditious commotions, and that is oppression..

—John Locke, *Letter Concerning Toleration*

John Locke wrote more than three hundred years ago about how distinguishing someone based on hair or eye color would be dangerous. Since John Locke's time, much has been done to propagate intolerance, promote tolerance, and combat discrimination, whether that discrimination is based on religion, race, or some other method for classifying humanity. International action

has been coupled with national action against discrimination as international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) have become more involved in interstate relations and even domestic affairs. The primary instrument combating racial discrimination is the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).

ICERD was opened for signature and ratification on 21 December 1965 and entered into force approximately three years later on 4 January 1969 (UN GA Resolution 2106). Since then, many states have become party to the convention, and the Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has worked actively with states' parties to implement laws against racial discrimination.

The development of anti-discrimination law in the international arena offers an interesting case to test the realist theory in political science. To formally test the theory, I will first provide a brief overview of realism and give hypotheses about anti-discrimination law consistent with realist ideas; these hypotheses will then form the structure for the paper. Each section will include qualitative evidence from ICERD's writings and work, the reaction of various states, and the interaction of the committee and states' parties for the implementation of treaty provisions.

Realism

In the fifth chapter of the *Twenty Years Crisis*, E.H. Carr established the basic tenets of realist thought. Realism attempts to explain the world not in terms of moral absolutes but in the actions of imperfect people. Carr established three foundations of realist theory. First, history is a series of causes and effects that may be understood through analysis. Second, theories do not exist independently of reality. Third, "morality is a product of power." In other words, without central authority there can be no right or wrong; there is no such thing as a natural right, because no such rights exist independently of power.¹

Realism has changed since Carr wrote his book. In addition to these foundational principles, realists such as Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth N. Waltz focused on "the limits imposed on states by the international distribution of material resources" (Legro and Moravcsik 1999, 6). Waltz has written clearly and indefatigably on structural realism. The following is a list of vital points extracted from his "Structural Realism After the Cold War" and "The Emerging Structure of International Politics":

- International politics operate among self-interested, security-minded states. Also, states must maintain internal security while keeping a close eye on world developments in order to maintain power (2000, 6, 37).
- States compete for wealth as well as power and will watch the development of other countries closely for signs of changes in the power structure. Thus, states may seek a greater role in international organizations as a road to power (2000, 33–4).
- States have at least two options in the international structure: balancing or bandwagoning; bandwagoning is often easier, though perhaps not as effective (2000, 38).
- International relations are dominated by the bipolar structure of the Cold War (2000, 39). Also, the bipolarity of the Cold War system predicts that the Soviet Union and the United States would act similarly (1993, 46). This manifests itself in the convention on at least two occasions; the inclusion of anti-Semitism and the denial of the need

to vastly change laws. The Soviet excuse was no discrimination; the U.S. excuse was protecting other rights.

- “[Uncertainty] about the future does not make cooperation and institution building among nations impossible; [it does] strongly condition their operation and limit their accomplishment;” thus, dramatic shifts in structure are highly unlikely (2000, 41).
- With the end of the Cold War, the world disarmed to a degree rather quickly; however, “leaders saw that without . . . constructive efforts the world would not become one in which [people] could safely and comfortably live” (1993, 55). This idea may be applicable during Cold War times, as well.

I derived four hypotheses from this list. First, realists predict that states hesitate to join a convention unless a compelling security concern existed; however, states may see participation as a method to interact with other states and consolidate power, or states may relish the opportunity to jump on the bandwagon. In ICERD’s formation, it is likely that the U.S. and the Soviet Union would play significant roles. Second, realists hold that states would agree on only a noncommittal treaty, allowing themselves to pull out should compliance become too costly. Third, the strength of the enforcement mechanism would be conditional on the strength and involvement of states’ parties. Thus, ICERD should have little power independently and would have a weak enforcement mechanism. Finally, ICERD would not dramatically change either internal or external affairs, and its accomplishments would be limited.

Hypothesis 1: States Forming and Joining ICERD

The first hypothesis is that states would hesitate to join a convention unless a compelling security concern existed; however, states may see participation as a means to interact with other states and consolidate power, or states may simply jump on the bandwagon.

ICERD arrived after a series of declarations and conventions prohibiting racial discrimination. The Charter of the United Nations declared “human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” (UN Charter). The most important body for law on racial discrimination within the UN was the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. This was established by the Commission on Human Rights in 1947, “to undertake studies, particularly in the light of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and to make recommendations to the Commission on Human Rights concerning the prevention of discrimination of any kind” (Santa Cruz 1977, 35). Notably, there already existed two conventions concerning discrimination in employment and education. The UN was not treading on new ground; it was merely expanding the already existing body of human rights treaties.

The sub-commission’s work received a higher place on the agenda during the winter of 1959; this will sound commonsensical, but ICERD would arguably never have come into being without acts of negative discrimination. In West Germany and other places around the world, certain groups had attacked Jewish sites. This anti-Semitism alarmed the international community (Banton 1996, 53). Others referred to this as an “epidemic of swastika-painting and other forms of racial and national hatred and religious and racial prejudices of a similar nature.” The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities happened to be in session in January of that year and condemned the acts, later composing factual data to

for analysis. It recommended an instrument to “impose specific legal obligations on the parties to prohibit manifestations of racial and national hatreds” (Schwelb 1966, 997–8).

The idea that discrimination is reproachable can be traced at least as far back as the Enlightenment. This paper began with a quote from Locke that discussed mostly religious intolerance but touched on what might be called racial intolerance as well. The dissemination of these ideas led various governments to condemn and outlaw slavery. Then, the victors of World War I imposed various standards for how the nations carved out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire should treat minorities.

During World War II, Nazi Germany showed that racial discrimination begins with exclusion and ends in extermination. Genocide became a crime, and the international community realized that discrimination is the seed for it. Anti-Semitic acts, then, performed so close to the end of the war, told the world that discrimination would not just disappear; people of their own accord would not give up these potent ideas, and members of the United Nations realized that there ought to be national laws prohibiting some or all forms of racial discrimination. Future conflict could destabilize the postwar system, and states saw international action against racial discrimination as a means to prevent future conflict. Thus, the introduction of the treaty to the agenda is in line with realist predictions about security.

In fact, ICERD’s preface used both the word “security” and the phrase “all necessary means.” That racial discrimination and mistreatment of minorities has been a key propagator of conflict has been affirmed by various conflicts during both world wars and time and again over the last half century. ICERD offers valuable help and advice for responsible states attempting to deal with these problems.

One author warned that states should be acutely aware of the social costs of racial discrimination in all forms, in private as well as public settings (Meron 1985, 294). The social exclusion of a group may lead to political unrest, extremism, and riots; often those without political means of redress consider violence as the next best option. Considering such costs, states would wisely make anti-discrimination law a matter of national security.

After the postwar acts of anti-Semitism, African states in the UN General Assembly (GA) demanded a convention. Some in the GA wanted a convention that considered both racial and religious discrimination (Banton 1996, 54). Apparently, Arab state delegates did not want a mention of religion in the convention because of the nature of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Eastern Europe did not consider religion as important as race. Schwelb argued that “political undercurrents” favored the racial question, and states agreed to make a convention considering religious discrimination separately (1966, 999). Interestingly, it does not appear that the stronger, more powerful Western states were responsible for the initial push for the convention; however, smaller states’ action openly is to some degree a sign of attempts to take a greater position on the international stage.

Schwelb mentioned that most states did not want the convention to be an organ of the UN, wanting instead states’ parties to be accountable only to one another (1966, 1035). As a largely independent organ, the convention is like a horizontal self-help organization, like Alcoholics Anonymous, where people willingly subject themselves to a kind of monitoring with an eye on the potential benefits of membership and a desire to change. Pressure from other states that join may convince a state that to remain influential in the international community, it must

adopt international norms; jumping on the bandwagon enthusiastically may win friends.

While the theoretical links are logical, the extent to which states were in fact motivated by security concerns is unclear. Banton argued that many states did not really understand racial discrimination as defined by the convention (1996). The treaty itself looks at racial discrimination as a crime, but many states referred to it instead as a sickness; this definition implies no one is held responsible. The Soviets, believing they had created a perfect socialist society, believed racism to be a natural extension of capitalism and imperialism. Also, former colonies spoke against colonialism, believing they had suffered from discrimination but would not need to act against it in their own states. Perhaps states saw the convention as a way to get back at capitalists and former colonial masters without imposing any great obligations on themselves. There is some evidence of this as some states have later refused to make great adjustments in national laws and deny the existence of discrimination in their countries.

In fact, only the United Kingdom is mentioned as publicly admitting discrimination. States like the UK held that racial discrimination would exist anywhere race was a distinction; laws might limit its effects, but the discrimination would always exist (Banton 1996, 58–9). The UK also held a unique view on another related point. Instead of using the phrase, “prohibit and bring to an end” [ICERD Article 2 (1d)], it wanted to say, “with the purpose of bringing to an end.” The Netherlands and Turkey proposed a mild compromise, and Ghana offered the phrase “required by circumstances.” Apparently, some countries believed this phrase meant that states would be exempt from enacting new laws if no discrimination existed (Schwelb 1966, 1017).

It is arguable, then, that there was no consensus on the nature of discrimination and the expectations for states' parties. One of Banton's most important insights was as follows: “The belief that racial discrimination could be eliminated . . . mobilized governments in pursuit of a higher objective . . . without [which] they would never have committed themselves as they did” (1996, 50). Some evidence supports that states thought they could sign the convention and not change any national laws; however, most states did understand the treaty and the concept of discrimination; “the travaux préparatoires reveal that governments were well aware of the far-reaching and mandatory nature of [the convention]” (Mahalic and Mahalic 1987, 88). Schwelb concurred, saying that many newly independent states participated actively and significantly in the convention (1966, 1057). To summarize, this evidence suggests that states were involved in the convention formation, but many did not intend to change national laws. If states anticipated great security benefits, the benefits would have had to come from changes in other countries and not in their own states. Arguably, though, the great powers knew about the potential security benefits, or suggestions by smaller states for the convention would never have been seriously considered.

Realist predictions about the polarity of the debate are difficult to determine; realists predict that U.S. and Soviet camps would arise. One example illustrates the alignment on one issue. The U.S. and Brazil together proposed that a specific mention of anti-Semitism be included in the convention (Banton 1996, 60–61), and Austria, Poland, and Ecuador agreed. There was some disagreement about whether anti-Semitism qualified as racial or religious discrimination. The Afro-Asian delegates held that the convention already covered anti-Semitism and that no mention was necessary (Greece, France, Sudan, Jamaica, Italy, Nigeria, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, India, Jordan, Trinidad and Tobago, Zambia, Panama, Ecuador, Uganda, Ethiopia, and

Guatemala agreed). Belgium thought leaving out anti-Semitism somehow limited the treaty. There was a general agreement that anti-Semitism did fall under the definition of racial, not just religious, discrimination, because even non-practicing Jews experienced it. The USSR agreed that anti-Semitism was a form of racial discrimination (Schwelb 1966, 1014). Again, this agreement is not consistent with realist predictions about polarity but may be consistent with a prediction that the U.S. and the Soviet Union may behave similarly.

To conclude this section, it seems that the majority of states were not overly concerned about security, though many states participated enthusiastically, as if to gain power or to jump on the bandwagon. The bipolar nature of the debate is difficult to determine, though the fact that the convention passed a unanimous vote does not seem to coincide with this hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: Convention Will Allow Noncommittal Membership

Realists hold states would want to remain relatively noncommitted to a treaty, allowing themselves to pull out should compliance become too costly. Language in the treaty would be vague, with standards difficult to measure and easy to avoid. Perhaps the best test for this comes in Article (4). The reaction of states to this burdensome demand will provide useful information for the test of realism.

The U.S. and other Western states expressed concern about Article (4b), which called for state's parties to "prohibit organizations which incite discrimination and make participation in them punishable by law." The West saw potential conflicts with freedoms of association and speech, though it chose not to pursue the debate and counted on being able to make reservations (Banton 1996, 62). The Third Committee omitted the part about reservations by a small number of votes, but the General Assembly put it back into the convention. Schwelb commented "the [resulting] provision is rather liberal and goes far in the direction of flexibility in the matter of reservations" (1966, 1055–6). Schwelb also called ICERD a maximalist document; the goals, aims, and specifications could lead to drastic changes, but the lenient reservations would allow the West to become a part of the treaty (1058) and likely limit its impact.

Many states have indeed made reservations. The U.S. delegate said the following when voting for the convention:²

Here in this Assembly I wish to state that the United States understands Article 4 of the convention as imposing no obligation on any party to take measures which are not fully consistent with its constitutional guarantees of freedom, including freedom of speech and association. This interpretation is entirely consistent with the opening paragraph of Article 4 of the convention itself, which provides that in carrying out certain obligations of the convention, States Parties shall have due regard to the principles embodied in the UNDHR and the rights expressly set forth in Article 5.³

—*American Journal of International Law*

The UK tended to agree that Article (4) was impossible to implement (Schwelb 1966, 1025). ICERD, however, has emphasized the need to eliminate not only acts of discrimination but also the roots of discrimination, namely "prejudices and objective socio-economic conditions." This is the likely objective of Article (4), which requires the criminalization of the act of spreading racist ideas. Part of the problem with this is that an act not subversive to U.S. law and order may be quite dangerous in another country without the same legal and social

controls and norms (Meron 1985, 297–9). Apparently, some Western states have defended the rights to freedom of speech and association over the right to not be discriminated against.

Since the convention entered into force, debate about these rights has continued among committee homes. The positions of significant actors are outlined below (Meron 1985, 301):

- UK: Article (4) dissemination clauses should be carried only out with full respect for rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- Belgium: Laws must be in full compliance with Article (4), while at the same time allowing freedom of expression and association.
- U.S.: “[Limit] the scope of the obligations assumed under the convention to those which would not restrict the right of free speech as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and those which would not restrict the right of free speech as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and laws of the United States.”
- West Germany: “After careful consideration, [Germany] has reached the conclusion that dissemination of opinions of racial superiority should be punishable if it was intended to create racial discrimination or hatred.”

States having their own separate interpretations of the most far-reaching and controversial clauses of the treaty would be consistent with realist expectations. However, at one point the Secretary General intervened and drafted the “Model Law Against Racial Discrimination,” clarifying what kind of laws states ought to have to be in compliance.⁴ Since then, states including Italy, New Zealand, Russia, South Africa, Croatia, and Spain are among countries that have modified laws to be more in compliance with this interpretation of Article (4). Even the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case *Wisconsin vs. Mitchell*, ruled that tougher sentencing for racially motivated crimes is constitutional (Lerner 1996).

That the Secretary General had to step in and clarify the meaning of Article (4) is evidence that the committee has not conclusively handled some of the more difficult issues on its own; the positive reaction of states, though, is more than realists would predict. As far as the level of commitment to the treaty is concerned, debate about Article (4), as well as different views concerning the right to discriminate privately, has largely been unresolved. It is clear from reservations and statements that states have their own interpretations, and while the committee has also attempted to rule on these matters, states made sure before agreeing to the convention that they would have an escape clause.

Hypothesis 3: Enforcement Conditional on State Involvement

The third hypothesis is that the strength of the enforcement mechanism would be conditional on the involvement of state’s parties. Thus, ICERD should have little power independently. There is conflicting evidence that the committee is both relatively weak and that it has expanded its powers and influence. A weak committee would be unable to coerce states to comply with the treaty obligations.

According to Part II of the convention, a committee is to be composed of “eighteen experts of high moral standing and acknowledged impartiality elected by States Parties from among their nationals” (Article 8:1). Members of the committee do not serve as state representatives but are nonetheless more closely associated with their states than other committee IGOs; a given representative may only be nominated by his or her state because

states cannot nominate other nationals. Also, ICERD specialists are compensated by their respective states for services (Schwelb 1966, 1033). This would make ICERD more subject to state preferences and politics, arguably weakening the committee as a whole and allowing states more power.

State's parties are required to submit a "report on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which they have adopted" (Article 9:1) within one year of entry into force and then every two years; this gives the committee time to analyze reports and to request more information. Reporting is the main instrument for monitoring and enforcement.

Schwelb called reporting "a measure of implementation which is more acceptable to governments than judicial proceedings and arrangements for the quasi-judicial settlement of complaints. In certain contexts it has proved very useful and effective" (1966, 1034). In its work, the committee as a whole cannot consider outside documents, though individuals on the committee are not restricted in the kinds of information they may accumulate (Prado 1985, 499).

The committee itself submits reports to the General Assembly. Some wanted the committee strictly linked to state's parties, others wanted it to be a UN organ. Italy proposed a compromise inherent in the treaty: principles in ICERD apply to all member states of the UN, but the obligations are only binding on state's parties to convention (Prado 1985, 498).

While realists may question the power of reporting, the committee has since been effective and expansive with the reporting system. In the sixth session, the committee decided to invite a representative of state's parties to defend and explain reports (Santa Cruz 1977, 37–9). In the seventh session, the committee asked to know more about Article (4), which requires states to make certain acts criminal offenses. The committee requested that states report on specific laws that had been passed or on what laws already existed (Santa Cruz 1977, 39). This shows that ICERD has since actively engaged state's parties, probably realizing that states were not certain about what to report on. In this way, ICERD can make recommendations on reporting procedures, which then become standard for all state's parties. Also, ICERD has had states report on matters of noncompliance.

Almost by default then, ICERD can interpret the convention and make additional demands; State's parties may or may not accept them, but because ICERD considers the reports, it has some sway in how states are required to implement convention obligations (Meron 1985, 285).

Success through reporting has been mixed. The committee asserted, "Legislation in accordance with Article 2(1d) is mandatory for all States Parties regardless of their circumstances." And while "discussions with the committee have been instrumental in the enactment of specific legislation prohibiting racial discrimination by some sixty States Parties, . . . some twenty-five States Parties maintain that no specific legislation on racial discrimination is required under [this article] because racial discrimination does not exist in their territories" (Mahalic and Mahalic 1987, 85–8).

Realists also predict that the committee may become politicized and fragmented. Schwelb admitted to this possibility, arguing that as an institution the committee may form its own interests or become a forum for disagreement between factions. Mr. Dechezelles, a particularly outspoken committee member nominated by France, illustrated this potential. Of

a Belarusian report, he said “[I am] skeptical of statements claiming that in whole continents, or at least in a very large area of the world, not a single case of racial discrimination had been brought before the courts because racial discrimination had completely disappeared among the population.” Another committee member, Mr. Sviridov, later commented: “[racially discriminatory] practices [do] not exist in socialist countries,” adding that he, “could not agree . . . that racism was an inherent evil in every man” (Banton 1996, 124). This example shows that a fractioned committee would likely give mixed signals to states’ parties and prevent an effective approach. Such disintegration is consistent with realist predictions, though in light of the benefits to security, states may be more inclined to cooperate. Clearly, the polarization of the international system is evident in this anecdote.

Another author stated contrarily in 1985 that ICERD based its actions more and more on a group of formal guidelines (Prado, 507). While I have no evidence of this, I would comfortably predict that with the spread of capitalism and democracy, states that formerly denied the existence of racial discrimination would be more willing to work with the committee to recognize and correct it.

In addition to reporting, the convention allows states to monitor one another and alert ICERD to violations. Article (12) allows for an ad hoc Conciliation Commission composed of five members. Appointed by “unanimous consent” of parties involved, this commission then adopts its own rules. According to Article (13), the commission submits a report about the facts and recommendations, then the committee chairman gives it to the states, and after three months the states accept or decline.⁵ The convention makes no other mention of this process, which is not strong: these conciliatory commissions can issue nothing legally binding. This conciliation process is consistent with realist predictions; a powerful process would result in a legally binding, enforceable decision.

In summary, the second prediction of realists, that the treaty would be non-binding in nature with weak enforcement features, is mostly consistent. The treaty has as its primary instrument a reporting mechanism and has no capacity to issue binding disputes. As shown above, the committee has not historically presented a unified face, though it may increasingly do so in the future. Also, the biggest problem with reporting is when states either do not report at all or take too long to submit reports (Prado 1985, 493). However, through the dialogue allowed by the reporting process, the committee has effectively helped states pass more meaningful and effective national laws against racial discrimination. In this regard, reporting may be an influential tool. This principle seems to be in line with theories about soft power: a committee to hold states accountable even through just dialogue can bring about change. It is also clear that while the committee members have disagreed, the work of the committee is carried out largely without a great deal of outside influence. In this regard, ICERD may be taking on a more independent role than realists would have predicted.

Hypothesis 4: Limited Success and Inability to Change Structures

The fourth and final hypothesis is that ICERD would not dramatically change either internal or external affairs and its accomplishments would be limited.

Mahalic (1987, 101) stated, “It is noteworthy that the combined efforts of the committee and States Parties . . . have clarified misconceptions, fostered more consistent interpretations

of the convention, and resulted in a greater degree of compliance with its provisions by a majority of States Parties.” Banton added to this positive assessment with two of the committee’s achievements: first, states have much better laws; and second, the committee is now established, autonomous, and generally not political (1996, 8–10).

Concerning the potential efficacy of a then newly formed treaty, Hernan Santa Cruz reported that states have adopted a “great variety of measures,” some legislative and some constitutional, to pursue the ends of the treaty. He also gave an exhaustive list of various bans on discrimination in many constitutions (1977, 49). Cruz suggested that the treaty prompted a rush to bring national laws against anti-discrimination in line with ICERD demands. In one way, the direct cause and effect is irrelevant; a convention such as ICERD draws attention to a matter when states are challenged to sign and ratify. This is one way the UN and other international organizations influence state behavior, somewhat like an interest group would lobby.

While ICERD may be effective, there are numerous examples of persistent, intense discrimination in member states. Three examples of such discrimination follow:

1. Caste discrimination has arguably been one area of failure for ICERD and other UN Human Rights bodies. There has been a failure to define, research, and actively pursue policies against this; there is even debate about whether or not caste discrimination qualifies as a form of racial discrimination. UN action is referred to as “a story of selective perception, tepid reactions and token gestures” (The Hindu 2001).
2. The Bangladeshi constitution declares that the state shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. Bangladesh is an ICERD member; ICERD has ordered that the constitutional provision is not enough. However, Bangladesh has yet to pass specific laws criminalizing discrimination, and Bangladesh itself continues to discriminate. For example, the Jumma people do not receive equal rations and have not received previously confiscated land back. This is a case of discrimination against a group of indigenous people (Asian Centre for Human Rights 2008).⁶
3. Japan has argued about the term “national origin” since 1946. It believes that the term is nothing akin to race or ethnicity. Instead, “the term . . . should mean the legal nationality one had before migrating from one country to another, or before naturalizing in a country in which one was born an alien” (Weatherall 2007).

Paul Roth of the University of Otago called the main method to encourage compliance “naming and shaming.” Roth reported a more positive case with New Zealand, when ICERD expressed a number of concerns about a particular law and made recommendations, requesting that New Zealand include an update in the next report. Roth congratulated ICERD for what he called constructive dialogue, though he lamented some of the consequences of New Zealand being called down. First, New Zealand had a nearly flawless human rights record. Second, ICERD will be looking closely at New Zealand for the indefinite future. Third, other treaty bodies will also look into the issue. New Zealand later reported on the implementation of the law (ICERD 2007). For states like New Zealand, which cares about its human rights record, the opinion of the international community matters, and this is an incentive to comply and avoid scrutiny.

Two references to expert opinions, one of them quite dated, and four anecdotes are mostly inconclusive about the fourth hypothesis. ICERD has not drastically changed the structure of the international system, though it appears that on the national level many states have adjusted old laws and passed new ones in attempts to comply with the treaty. It is also clear that discrimination will remain pertinent.

Conclusion

Article (55) of the UN Charter states that the UN is to work for “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion” (Banton 1996, 21). The UN has taken that mandate to form ICERD, to which many states are now a party. This paper has given four separate realist hypotheses concerning an anti-discrimination convention and tested them, which test has produced mixed results; some cases were more conclusive than others. ICERD seems to be a relatively weak body, yet it has still influenced national laws and state actions. While full compliance to this convention may never be attainable due to the nature of racial discrimination, it can be concluded that ICERD has been at least partially successful in helping the UN fulfill its mandate without distinction. Given the security implications involved, realist predictions are more accurate than I would have expected. A more thorough study would likely include a detailed analysis of reservations, national laws, and the evolution of international attitudes towards minorities.

NOTES

1. Interestingly, this debate about the origins of authority surfaces in another form in the various views defining human rights. The Soviet Union commonly held that there are no rights without a powerful state, while the West claimed human rights exist independent of a state and can act against a state.
2. The reservation lodged upon ratification also discusses article four, as well as the overall respect for privacy that the constitution promises.
3. Article (5) states that the rights of freedom and expression are to be granted without distinction.
4. The draft law states: 1) it shall be an offence to threaten, insult, ridicule or otherwise abuse a person or group of persons with words or behavior that may be interpreted as an attempt to cause racial discrimination or racial hatred, and 2) it shall be an offence to defame an individual or group of individuals on racial grounds. Organizations that violate these restrictions should be declared illegal and prohibited.
5. Banton reports that no state has ever gone through this commission process. That may be because most states resolve violations through negotiations.
6. I have chosen not to include any in-depth discussion of the treatment of minorities or self-determination in this paper.

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Explaining the Implementation of CEDAW: A Quantitative Study of 151 Countries

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Abstract

The sphere of women's rights presents a unique challenge to improving the protection of human rights throughout the world. The difficulty surrounding the implementation of women's rights treaties may largely be attributed to the complexity of reconstructing international norms so that they fall in line with current local norms that perpetuate women's derogatory status. My quantitative study of 151 countries shows that "dissonant" states (i.e., states whose local views and treatment of women conflict with international norms) are less likely to implement the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Policymakers need to look for other ways, in addition to international treaties, if they want to improve the status of women in these states. Statistical analysis also shows a strong correlation between economic development and CEDAW's implementation. Future research can strive for more valid measures of local actors and NGOs, bringing us closer to understanding how to improve the lives of women.

Introduction

Within the past fifty years, the international human rights campaign has grown significantly, both in the number of its participants and in the contextual breadth of its declarations. However, scholars still debate if international human rights norms actually lead to greater women's rights protection. The forefront of their disagreement is the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). CEDAW holds a secular, Western view of women, which comes into direct conflict with more religious, non-Western views of women. Because of this contention surrounding international women's rights norms, states face ever-increasing challenges as they proceed to interpret and implement them.

Previous research shows that CEDAW's ratification has led to improved outcomes for women, but the progress has been slow and varies from state to state (Gray, Kittilson, and

Sandholtz 2006). If states are willing to ratify treaties on the rights of women, what factors prevent them from implementing those treaties at the same rate? Furthermore, do international women's rights treaties improve women's rights in states where domestic norms do not coincide with international ideals? If not, can culturally and religiously dissonant states reconcile opposing views without completely adapting to Western, secular views of women's rights? In answering these questions, I hypothesize that 1) states whose local norms are dissonant with international norms are less likely to implement CEDAW, and 2) local factors have a greater impact than international factors on the implementation of CEDAW in states with dissonant local norms.

In studying the implementation of human rights norms, CEDAW is an important case study for two reasons. First, women's rights are difficult to implement. No region in the world provides women the same legal, social, and economic rights as men (Weiss 2003, 582). By studying the most difficult type of human rights implementation, it will be easier to apply the findings to other realms of human rights treaties. Second, improving the lives of women improves society in general. If a woman is physically, emotionally, and economically secure, she will positively impact her family and her community. For example, educating the young women of a country will improve the mortality rate, decrease the fertility rates, and positively impact the health and education prospects for the next generation (World Bank 2004). Finding what factors influence CEDAW's implementation potentially has worldwide effects.

The convention requires that all states' parties review their existing laws on women, change laws that discriminate against women, and submit periodic reports to the convention's committee. Article 3 of the treaty best summarizes CEDAW's fundamental nature:

States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men (United Nations 1981).

Although some treaty provisions conflict with widely held views of women and their roles, especially in the Muslim world, treaty ratification has come rather easily. International pressure led more than 90 percent of the UN's membership to ratify the treaty. As the global women's movement strengthened toward the end of the twentieth century, international norms demanded that states improve the condition of women (Weiss 2003, 582). Western governments and international donors began to tie development assistance to human rights records and were reluctant to support states who did not commit to improving the treatment of women. Ratification proved to be a valuable public relations move, keeping the state from being a target of international shame (Weiss 2003, 583).

However, CEDAW's ratification not only requires that states align their domestic laws with the provisions of the convention; it also compels states to fully realize those treaty provisions by implementing practical measures for women to access the opportunities. The implementation stage is the most difficult, especially when a state's local ideas, culture, and religion do not necessarily support CEDAW's provisions, such as predominately Muslim states. The most heavily debated issue is that of *equality* versus *equity* (Weiss 2003, 585). In

many countries, equality refers to a Western concept in which men and women ought to have the same treatment. Many other societies, however, believe that the distribution of power, resources, and opportunities between men and women need only be equitable. For example, one of the most controversial topics during the 1993 Vienna Human Rights Conference was the debate over inheritance laws. Westerners argued for a resolution that would ensure equal inheritance rights for sons and daughters, but representatives from other countries argued that although inheritance specifically went to the son in their state, there were support mechanisms built into society that provided benefits not measurable in terms of currency or land to the daughter (Weiss 2003, 585). The law was equitable but not equal. The debate about which value is superior is the basis for the secular and religious divide that continues to hinder CEDAW's implementation. Although nearly all UN member countries have ratified a universal treaty on women's rights, each individual state must frame CEDAW's ideals in a way that is harmonious with local religious and traditional values.

Theoretical Beginnings: Analyzing the Normative Discourse

Although current discourse on human rights norm formation and implementation offers great insight into how international organizations create women's rights norms, it cannot fully explain the variation in implementation because it fails to consider other factors that are unique to women's rights. By recognizing the inherent differences between general human rights and women's rights, theorists can more accurately explain why states ratify CEDAW, how and where implementation occurs, and what factors could improve the global protection of women.

The process of CEDAW ratification—not implementation—is similar to the norm emergence process described by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). The authors illustrated a three-stage process of norm emergence, norm cascade, and norm internalization. The first stage explains that norms emerge when norm entrepreneurs persuade the international community to accept a moral notion of appropriate or desirable behavior. Norm entrepreneurs must gain the acceptance of key actors by competing against the existing constellation of norms in order to reach the tipping point. At this point, usually one-third of states have accepted the norm, and the second stage of norm cascade begins. In this stage, socialization takes root, and states and transnational networks use peer pressure to bring other states into concurrence. Finally, after the norm has become automatic, norm internalization begins: the norm becomes natural, and advocates press for universal codification. Following this pattern, women's rights advocates brought women's issues to the international stage, convincing the world of their moral importance. More and more states committed to improving the status of women, and eventually the norm was established in international treaties and declarations such as CEDAW. States ratified the treaty as a way to conform to the international system, legitimize their presence, and avoid shame. CEDAW's ratification clearly follows existing theories on international pressure and global integration.

Unfortunately, the norm emergence process cannot explain why some states proceed to implement the treaty successfully and others do not. The work of Risse and Sikkink (1999) tried to explain how ideational forces improve states' human rights practices. They argued that transnational advocacy networks, made up of local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), and other states, aim to pressure

states into implementing human rights norms. In the first phase, transnational actors target an oppressive state by gathering information on its human rights practices and placing it on the international agenda. After distributing information on human rights abuses, the transnational actors persuade states to condemn the practices of the target state. In the second phase, the target state responds by denying the charges and campaigning for domestic support. The third phase begins as states pressure the target state into compliance by threatening the retraction of economic and military aid and membership in the international community. At this point, the state either concedes to the pressure and improves its practices, or it increases the oppression of its people, thereby increasing domestic opposition and opening opportunities for regime change. If the state concedes to the international pressure and begins to comply with and validate human rights norms, it has entered the fourth stage. Once on this path, the state eventually exhibits rule-consistent behavior, or the fifth stage of the spiral model.

Although these models effectively show how norm diffusion and socialization affect human rights protection in oppressive states, they have a few weaknesses worth noting. First, neither adequately explains the process of norm internalization. Both approaches disregard the effects of domestic political battles associated with treaty implementation and downplay the extent to which the continued conversation between collective norms and local practices redefines and alters the original norm, especially in the realm of women's rights (Zwingel 2005; van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007).

The 1995 World Conference on Women well illustrates the controversial nature of women's rights. Prior to this meeting, states reached a consensus on the reproductive and health rights of women at the Conference on Population and Development in 1994. However, there were extreme opponents to the consensus, including the Vatican and various Islamic states. The 1995 meeting provided a forum in which opposing groups could express their viewpoints on how to implement women's rights (Joachim 2003, 268; van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007, 236). Risse and Sikkink focused on a one-dimensional view of how human rights norms affect the identity and interests of states. However, states can have a more dynamic view of human rights norms and their diffusion and implementation.

Additionally, the sphere of women's human rights norms presents different challenges than human rights in general. Compared to an oppressive state torturing its citizens or refusing freedom of the press, violations of women's human rights are usually deeply entrenched in and facilitated by religious and cultural tradition. Oppression of women is usually the result of a specific paradigm—not an effort to retain power. For example, the division between a secular vision of women's rights and a religious view of women's rights is highly contested—especially in states where various religious and cultural groups define marriage and family law. Thus far, the international discourse on women's rights has taken a secular and western viewpoint, giving a hegemonic bias to international norm creation that previous studies have not addressed.

Even though Risse and Sikkink offered a persuasive explanation of general human rights implementation, they did not fully explain the variation in implementation of women's human rights. One variable that the authors ignored was how socialization influences implementation of women's rights. States have different circles of influence. They care more about gaining acceptance from friends than enemies—even when the enemy is the entire international

system. Even though the international trend is to accept the norm, a regional trend to reject the norm in the name of culture or religion may be more persuasive. When theorists consider these factors, the explanation of women's rights norms and implementation is more accurate.

By connecting the theoretical progress of Risse and Sikkink with the separate factors of women's rights, Susanne Zwingel presented a fuller explanation of women's rights and norm implementation (2005). She argued that CEDAW's domestic implementation depends on three factors: 1) the degree to which domestic institutions enable women to participate in public policy formation, 2) the existence of transnational government and nongovernment action that supports the implementation of international norms, and 3) the level of cultural acceptance of the convention (408). With these three factors, Zwingel showed how implementation of women's rights relies more heavily on domestic factors than Risse and Sikkink's model. An empirical test of Zwingel's explanation of women's rights norms leads to important implications for women's rights.

Empirical Explanations

Authors Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz posed the question, "How do rising levels of international interconnectedness affect the social, economic, and political conditions for women?" (2006, 293). Their subsequent study hypothesized that cross-national exchange improves the status of women. By analyzing both economic and ideational effects on international interaction, the authors performed a quantitative study of 180 countries from 1975–2000, measuring the impact of globalization on women's life expectancy, literacy, economic participation, and parliamentary participation. This study helps determine which theories best explain CEDAW's implementation and where improvements may be made.

The authors tested whether "countries that are predisposed (for internal reasons) to promote equality for women will both ratify CEDAW and show more favorable outcomes on the dependent variables" (322). They found that high trade levels and CEDAW ratification without reservations had a positive effect on female life expectancy and literacy. And although CEDAW ratification did not affect the number of women serving in parliament among democracies, it did correlate with a greater female percentage in the labor force and parliament in non-democracies—even when CEDAW was passed with reservations. These results refute the notion that ratification and positive levels of women's equality were both products of underlying factors (326). However, test results did show that religion played a major part in both CEDAW's ratification and levels of illiteracy among women. For example, predominately Catholic countries had lower levels of female illiteracy and were more likely to ratify CEDAW, whereas predominately Islamic countries had higher levels of illiteracy and were far less likely to ratify CEDAW. The authors concluded that participation in international organizations and treaties can change institutions, which in turn may alter culture in favor of protecting women's rights.

However, the authors' connection between international institutions and cultural change was weak. Their study did not account for the possibility of transnational interaction in the form of nongovernmental organizations. As argued by Zwingel, transnational government and nongovernment activism may affect the protection of women's rights. This effect cannot be measured by trade, foreign direct investment, membership in the UN and the World Bank,

or ratification of CEDAW (all the global interaction variables). Furthermore, the study assumed that domestic and international women's groups and organizations are empowered by the diffusion of gender equality norms initiated by international treaties and declarations. However, there is a possibility that the actual relationship between women's movements and international discourse is reciprocal in nature—both entities continue to influence and strengthen one another. Again, the study did not test for this possibility, and the question of NGO influence remains unanswered.

Moreover, the failure to account for variables of international interaction could explain why the authors did not show that certain states are predisposed to both better gender equality and treaty ratification. The article's theoretical discourse concluded that states that are "more open to the international system in terms of greater movement of goods and services across borders" (317) are more likely to support women's rights. However, economic factors also influence the level to which states interact ideationally in the international system: not only do goods and services cross borders, but so do ideas—especially in the form of international nongovernmental organizations. Although Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz (2006) showed that CEDAW's ratification is an important factor in the improvement of women's rights, their study did not illustrate the importance of transnational interaction specific to women's rights or the level to which different states value that interaction. We must ask how international women's rights norms can be reconciled with culturally or religiously dissonant communities.

The Importance of Local Factors in Dissonant States

The previous studies portrayed implementation as complete acceptance or complete rejection of the international human rights norm. However, Acharya proposed a different view of implementation that included local agents framing and reconstructing foreign norms to ensure that norms fit with the local identity and culture (2004). Even though international actors may "teach" women's rights norms to states, the reception of the norm depends on domestic political, religious, and cultural factors (2004, 243). In this process of reconstructing the international norm to make it congruent with local norms, the role of local actors is more important than the role of outside actors (2004, 244).

In relation to CEDAW's implementation, it is likely that both international and local factors affect implementation at the domestic level. However, it is also possible that one factor becomes more influential in certain cases. I hypothesize that local factors have a greater impact than international factors in states where local norms and values concerning women dispute the international norms outlined by the convention. In a state where the domestic values concerning the status of women contradict CEDAW's international values, the state will face strong domestic opposition from political, cultural, and religious leaders who do not want to change the current way of life. They strongly reject change because it has far-reaching cultural, social, political, and economic effects. Anti-Western sentiments and opposition intensify because they see CEDAW as a secular document. Therefore, the voices of transnational actors will be less effective, and possibly harmful, because the state sees CEDAW as imposing a Western ideal on a non-Western culture and because the actors will be less qualified to frame the ideal in a way that does not contest domestic culture. However, local factors in the form

of women's political empowerment and domestic women's groups can frame and reconstruct CEDAW's provisions so that they fall in line with national values.

The most important local factors to CEDAW's domestic implementation are the level to which women are represented in government and economic institutions, the level to which the government supports and cooperates with grassroots women's rights movements, and the level of congruence between international norms and local norms. While trying to implement CEDAW, states could face great barriers such as rigid institutions or deeply rooted cultural values that oppose the norm. However, if women are represented politically and economically, there will be more opportunities for advocates to frame or restructure CEDAW's provisions to fit with local norms. Similarly, if a state supports and encourages domestic groups that advocate CEDAW's implementation, then more resources will be devoted to their work. Most importantly, however, if a state's local norms are easily associated with international norms, implementation will be easier. On the other hand, the further removed a state's local norms are from CEDAW's essence, the more difficult it is for local actors to frame the norm in a harmonious way, and the more important their work becomes.

Case Study of Pakistan

Although the purpose of this research is to show quantitatively that local factors are more influential in the implementation of CEDAW in dissonant states, a qualitative example helps illustrate the challenge of achieving women's rights in Muslim countries. Pakistan's efforts to implement CEDAW show how the engendering of Muslim civil society poses a challenge to international norm diffusion (Weiss 2003, 581).

Pakistan's current legal structure, a result of Zia ul-Haq's 1979 Islamization program, places women in an unequal position to men (583). According to the WomanStats multivariate scale measuring CEDAW's implementation, there is virtually no enforcement of laws consonant with CEDAW in Pakistan, or such laws do not exist (WomanStats 2007). Pakistan's report to CEDAW's commission states that, unfortunately, laws and customs derogatory to women are "justified in the name of Islam or have been introduced as Islamic laws when clearly they are retrograde customs and traditions, or ill-informed interpretations that bear no relation to the divine design" (Weiss 2003, 587). Although Pakistan ratified CEDAW in 1996, it warned that its adherence to the convention depended on the provisions in its constitution. Simply ratifying CEDAW did not mean instant success for Pakistani women.

Today, Pakistan is struggling to construct culturally acceptable definitions of women's rights and appropriate ways to implement them because it does not have and does not allow an active local network to reconstruct the norm. Although some elite women hold a presence in Pakistani politics, women have generally been excluded from the political process. Long-standing traditional beliefs define women's roles within the home, and the proliferation of religious schools exclude women from the public sphere, as well, denying them any source of education or personal income. Additionally, various grassroots women's rights groups that strive to raise the issues of domestic violence, women's political participation, and female education are severely limited by the state. The central government "warns them not to push it too far so as not to anger the various Islamist *madrasas* now aspiring to have greater influence over Islamic laws" (593). All three of the most important local factors contributing

to CEDAW's successful implementation are missing in Pakistan, illustrating the importance of local factors in dissonant states.

Data Collection

Although Pakistan offers a poignant example of implementation in dissonant states, a large-n, quantitative study was helpful in discovering what factors are most influential in causing states to implement CEDAW. By studying as many countries as possible, I observed maximum variation in both my independent and dependent variables and effectively controlled for other factors contributing to CEDAW's implementation. This makes my findings more generalizable and helps me avoid the selection bias inherent in qualitative case studies. I limited my study to countries whose total population is over one million, which allowed me to include 151 countries in my sample. Because data concerning the status of women, especially in developing countries, is so difficult to gather, I chose to confine my study to data collected between 2000 and 2006. Although the information does not come from the same year, the range is small enough that valid comparisons may be made.

In testing my hypothesis that local actors have a greater impact on CEDAW's implementation in dissonant states, I collected data about the variation in states' local norms concerning the status of women. A dissonant state exhibited significant formal reservations to CEDAW and limited the discussion of gender issues within society. I expected to see that the overwhelmingly majority of states that are culturally dissonant to international women's rights norms were Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist. *It is important to note that most religious norms that harm women are not necessarily due to the religion itself; however, religious interpretation and cultural practices associated with these three religions may condone gender inequalities.* For example, every Muslim country that has ratified the treaty has stated that certain provisions of the convention may be contradictory to tenets of Islam (Weiss 2003, 584). To test local norms in my statistical analysis, I have chosen to operationalize dissonant states as countries in which the majority of the population is Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist majorities. I found the religious breakdown of each country using the Central Intelligence Agency's *World Factbook* (2007). Religion is an overarching predictor of cultural and societal values, and, therefore, a valid measure of the level to which a state's local norms are congruent with international norms.

If my hypothesis is correct, states that are both dissonant and successful in implementing CEDAW when all else is held constant should show several commonalities. First, NGOs focused on women within the country will be largely domestic: grassroots level organizations as opposed to organizations outside the state. If NGOs act more as international actors, then their efforts will be less effective in a state that does not value the international norm. Second, within a dissonant state that exhibits a higher level of implementation, women will readily participate in the political and economic arenas and partake in the decision-making processes of both. If the analysis demonstrates these implications, it would show that local factors are more influential in dissonant states.

Regrettably, both of these implications proved difficult to measure with the time and resources available. Ideally, I collected data measuring the level to which a state's NGOs were grassroots level organizations as opposed to international organizations; however, this information was difficult to collect, and I could not find a comparable substitute. In addition,

I hypothesized that international factors such as the level to which a state values global integration and the presence of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) within the state should show no correlation with implementation levels in dissonant states. Because local factors are the key to framing and reconstructing the international norm in a culturally accepting way, these international factors do not affect CEDAW's implementation.

To test the effect of international factors on CEDAW implementation in dissonant states, I operationalized global integration by measuring the amount of time a state has been a member of the UN and the World Bank and measured its trade level. These measures are modeled from a study by Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz. They theorized that the longer a country has been a member of these international organizations, the more likely they are to absorb the international women's rights norms promulgated by each organization (2006, 309). Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz operationalized global integration by measuring the level to which a country trades with others, with high levels of trade implying that the country has more investment in and interaction with the international system—and the women's rights norms associated with it.

Lastly, I measured the number of INGOs present in each state. Because I could not test whether local NGOs affect implementation, it was especially important to find evidence that international actors do not affect implementation in dissonant states.

In terms of my second implication, women's political and economic decision-making power, the UN's *Human Development Report's* Gender Empowerment Measure indexes the inequality between men's and women's political and economic opportunities. This information was available for eighty-four countries. For the other countries in my sample, I measured the percentage of women in government at the ministerial level. Although this does not specifically represent the level to which women have decision-making power in the political and economic realms, I can assume that the more women there are in government, the more women there are that have decision-making power overall.

It is important to note that there are several other factors that contribute to the status of women around the world. For example, I assumed that lesser developed countries would have fewer protections for women's rights due to the nature of poverty and the resources available to the state. Additionally, regime type has been shown to affect the protection of human rights. I also expected that more populous countries would have a harder time controlling human rights practices and that countries in the midst of conflict are subject to an increase in human rights abuses. Therefore, I have included control variables for economic development, regime type, size of country, and conflict. These controls are based on those used by Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz (2006) and Landman (2005). These controls, along with the rest of the variables, are outlined in Table 1.

Defining Implementation of CEDAW

Within the context of my research, I defined CEDAW's implementation as the level to which a state's laws are consistent with CEDAW, if those laws are enforced, and how much the government prioritizes enforcement. To measure implementation, I used the Scale of the Degree of Discrepancy between Law and Practice on Issues Concerning Women in Society (WomanStats Codebook 2007). The scale examines three sub-clusters, including physical

Table 1: Variable Definitions and Sources

<i>Variables</i>		<i>Definition</i>	<i>Source</i>
<i>Dependent Variable</i>			
CEDAW Implementation		Level to which a state's laws and practice are consonant with continuous scale 0 to 4 with 0 meaning high implementation and 4 meaning low implementation	WomanStats Database 2007
<i>Independent Variables</i>			
International Actors	UN/World Bank Years	Collective years of membership in the UN and the World bank	World Bank 2007/UN 2007
	Trade Ratio	Natural log of a state's total imports plus total exports divided by GDP (Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz 2006)	World Bank 2006
	INGOs	Natural log of the number of INGOs registered in each state	Landman 2005
Local Actors	Women's Political Participation	Percentage of women in ministerial positions	UN HDR 2007
Dissonance	Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist States	States in which the majority of the population is Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist (dichotomous)	CIA World Factbook 2007
<i>Control Variables</i>			
Conflict		States which were in a civil war in 2000 (dichotomous)	Landman 2005
Democracy		Scale - 10 to +10	Polity IV
Economic Development		Natural log of GDP Per Capita in U.S. dollars	CIA World Factbook 2007
Size		Natural log of population of country in thousands	World Bank 2006

Table 2: Implementation Scale

<i>Score</i>	<i>Definition</i>
4	"The laws are consonant with CEDAW and are well enforced; such enforcement is a high priority of the government."
3	"The laws are consonant with CEDAW; these are mostly enforced, and the government appears to be fairly proactive in challenging cultural norms which harm women."
2	"The laws are consonant with CEDAW, but there is spotty enforcement; the government may or may not signal its interest in challenging cultural norms harmful to women."
1	"Laws are for the most part consonant with CEDAW, with little effective enforcement; improving the situation of women appears to be a low priority for the government."
0	"There is virtually no enforcement of laws consonant with CEDAW, or such laws do not even exist."

*All definitions taken from Hudson, *et al.*, 2007

security and bodily integrity, education, and family freedom. The original scale ranges from zero to four with zero being high implementation; however, for ease in interpreting quantitative results, I have inversed the scale, and the resulting breakdown is outlined in Table 2.

Because data concerning the status of women is difficult to gather, especially in countries whose treatment of women falls below the international standard, the validity of some of the measures within my quantitative analysis is less than ideal. The multivariate scale measuring the law and practice of each state is missing values for twenty-five countries out of my dataset

of 150 countries. To compensate for the missing values, I entered in values for another, similar multivariate scale measuring the discrepancy between law and practice concerning women's physical security. This measure correlates with the original multivariate scale 70.3 percent of the time. Although not a perfect substitute, using the physical security scale allows me to continue with the study without having to wait for the compilation of more complete data.

Criteria for Verification

After statistical analysis of the above implications, I will conclude that my theory is correct only if the data meets the following criteria. First, I will conclude that norm dissonance negatively affects CEDAW's implementation if I find that the implementation levels of congruent states are 20 percent higher than those of dissonant state. I will only accept this criteria if the difference is statistically significant as well. I will conclude that norm congruence does not affect implementation if the difference is less than 10 percent or is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Second, I will conclude that local actors have a greater impact on implementation in incongruent states if the measure of women's political participation, when interacted with the variables for dissonance, shows at least a 10 percent difference in implementation between dissonant and congruent states. Similarly, I will only accept this criteria if the variables prove statistically significant at the 0.05 level. However, if the difference in implementation affected by local actors is less than 5 percent, I will conclude that local actors are not any more influential in implementing CEDAW in dissonant states than in congruent states. Overall, the variables measuring the effect of local factors were most affected by missing data; therefore, I will be cautious in approaching the results of this statistical analysis.

Third, I will conclude that international factors are no less influential than local factors if I find that UN/World Bank membership, trade levels, or presence of INGOs show a 10 percent difference in implementation levels between dissonant and congruent states. If any of these variables show a 10 percent difference in implementation that is significant at the 0.05 level, then the data will show that international actors do have an impact in dissonant states and that my second hypothesis is incorrect. However, if none of the variables show a significant difference in implementation levels, then the data will show that international actors have no more influence in implementation than local actors.

If my analysis meets these criteria, I will be confident that there is a correlation between local actors and CEDAW implementation in incongruent states. However, these measures will not fully show that the influence of local actors actually causes greater implementation. Nevertheless, I feel that correlation in itself will be a significant finding and leave it to future qualitative research to test the causation between local actors and implementation of women's rights norms.

Methods and Results

To test my first hypothesis that dissonant states are less likely to implement CEDAW, I ran a linear regression of all variables to see if there was a significant difference between dissonant states and congruent states in the level of implementation. The results from this regression are outlined in Table 3. The regression shows that economic development, as

Table 3: Implementation of CEDAW

	Model 1
<i>Controls</i>	
Polity	-0.0029 (0.0123)
GDP Per Capita (natural log)	0.5727*** (0.0868)
Population (natural log)	0.0367 (0.0562)
Conflict	0.0114 (0.4528)
<i>International Actors</i>	
UN/World Bank Years (natural log)	-0.1105 (0.1366)
Trade Ratio (natural log)	-0.0237 (0.1251)
INGOs (natural log)	0.0833 (0.0682)
<i>Local Actors</i>	
Women's Political Participation	0.0022 (0.0068)
<i>Dissonance</i>	
Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist Majorities	0.5197*** (0.1648)
<i>Number of Observations</i>	137
<i>Adjusted R²</i>	0.5076
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 4: Implementation of CEDAW with Interaction

	Model 1
<i>Controls</i>	
Polity	0.0041 (0.0127)
GDP Per Capita (natural log)	0.5709*** (0.0874)
Population (natural log)	0.0484 (0.0587)
Conflict	0.0696 (0.4623)
<i>International Actors</i>	
UN/World Bank Years (natural log)	-0.0061 (0.1492)
Trade Ratio (natural log)	-0.0294 (0.1442)
INGOs (natural log)	0.1019 (0.0814)
<i>Local Actors</i>	
Women's Political Participation	0.0006 (0.0072)
<i>Dissonance</i>	
Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist Majorities	0.2096 (0.9968)
<i>Interaction Terms</i>	
Dissonance by UN/World Bank Years	-0.0088* (0.0052)
Dissonance by Trade Ratio	-0.1341 (0.1975)
Dissonance by INGOs	-0.0345 (0.1600)
Dissonance by Women's Political Participation	0.0066 (0.0247)
<i>Number of Observations</i>	137
<i>Adjusted R²</i>	0.507
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

measured by the natural log of GDP per capita, and the dummy variable for dissonant states were the two statistically significant variables affecting CEDAW's implementation. These results show that a state's development level and local norms were the two greatest predictors of how effectively that state will implement CEDAW and explain nearly 51 percent of the variance in implementation of CEDAW. The coefficients of each variable were substantively significant as well. For example, the difference in implementation level between dissonant states and congruent states was 0.52 points on the 0–4 scale of implementation; in other words, implementation levels of dissonant states are about 10 percent lower than congruent states. Although this percentage may be considered low, I conclude that is significant because of the difficulty in predicting implementation of human rights treaties.

In terms of my second hypothesis, there should be a difference in the significance levels of the international and local actor variables if local actors are more influential in dissonant




Figure 1: Economic Development and Implementation of CEDAW

states than in congruent states. I tested for this difference by creating interaction terms that modeled each of the international actor variables with the dissonance dummy variable. If any of these interaction terms prove to be significant, then there is a difference between that variable's effect on implementation in dissonant and congruent states. The results of this test show that the interaction term between UN/World Bank Years and dissonance is statistically significant, meaning that the effect of a state's total years of membership in the UN and the World Bank is stronger in dissonant states than in congruent states (*See Table 3*). The coefficient is also negative, meaning that membership years more negatively affect implementation in dissonant states than in congruent states, which supports my hypothesis that international actors are less effective in dissonant states.

However, the difference is small and therefore not substantively significant. This result could be due, however, to the validity of my measures. Because I had to adjust my measures to solve the problem of missing data, my results may not accurately describe the true relationship between CEDAW's implementation and international and local actors. However, none of the international factors showed a significant impact in dissonant states. In sum, I cannot conclude that either local actors or international actors are more influential in dissonant states than in congruent states with the available data.

Although the results from this study do not support my second hypothesis, they do surprisingly show the overwhelming significance of economic development in women's rights implementation. However, a scatter plot of the relationship between economic development and CEDAW's implementation (Figure 1) shows a potential problem with heteroskedasticity.

In other words, the graph shows that economic development is a better predictor for high-implementation states than low-implementation states, which means that the coefficient I found for the effect of GDP per capita could be problematic. Heteroskedasticity also suggests that there is another variable that is not accounted for in my model that would explain the increased variation in implementation.

Conclusion

The sphere of women's rights presents a unique challenge to improving the protection of human rights throughout the world. The difficulty surrounding the implementation of women's rights treaties and declarations may largely be attributed to the complexity of reconstructing international norms so that they fall in line with current local norms that perpetuate the derogatory status of women in many societies. After completing a quantitative study of 151 countries, the results support my first hypothesis that dissonant states are less likely to implement CEDAW but do not support my hypothesis that local actors are more influential in dissonant states. The results also show a stronger-than-expected relationship between economic development and CEDAW's implementation. These results are statistically significant but must be interpreted with the validity of the measures in mind. Even though not all of the variables measured what I initially intended to measure, I can conclude that there is a significant difference between dissonant states and congruent states in terms of CEDAW's implementation. This shows that the two different types of states should be treated differently in efforts to improve the status of women. Although this research does not show what factors should be focused on in dissonant states to increase CEDAW's implementation, future research can strive for more valid measures and incorporate additional explanations that would bring us closer to understanding how to improve the lives of women.

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Inside the Death Star: Rational Decision Making, Neoconservatism, and the American Enterprise Institute

Tim Taylor

Abstract

This paper applies the rational decision-making model to the inception, rise, and influence of the neoconservative foreign policy movement, as propounded by staff at the American Enterprise Institute. The author analyzes the AEI's administration, staff, and scholarship to show how the AEI defined the U.S. foreign policy and defense problem, generated a variety of possible solutions, and selected the best solution—neoconservatism. Quantitative evidence shows that the AEI's neoconservative viewpoint dominates neoliberal and realist viewpoints whenever the U.S. contemplates war. The article describes how the AEI implemented the chosen decision as would a typical think tank. Although most AEI scholars pushed for the invasion of Iraq, now most have criticized the execution of the war and have since distanced themselves from neoconservatism. The paper concludes that the rational decision-making model appropriately applies to the AEI in terms of the evaluation and modification stages of neoconservatism, but the model applies poorly to actual implantation of public policy. This is partly due to the competition of ideas and diversity of opinions at the institute.

Introduction

The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research is, at its heart, a refuge for economists. Its founders christened the organization as the American Enterprise Association and dedicated it to repealing the wartime economic regulations of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Only much later did AEI expand into areas such as defense policy, cultural studies, and political analysis. One distinctive word in its name—"Enterprise"—denotes an economic focus, particularly the kind labeled as capitalistic, entrepreneurial, and risk tolerant. The institute's economics-based history and etymology run concomitantly with its presidents. All three have been economists by trade.

Thus, given the affinity of AEI's administration, staff, and scholarship for the quantifiable, the practicable, and the utilitarian, I submit that the organization's behavior as a whole is best modeled by the rational decision-making model, hereafter referred to as the rational model (Robbins 1997; Frank 1995; Pounds 1969; March 1994). The model's systematic description of group behavior fits well with the psychology of its managers: in all aspects of their work, they lay out a target, then work to reach it.

In particular, this paper examines how the rational model describes the inception, rise, and influence of the neoconservative foreign policy movement as it has been propounded by AEI staff and scholars. While "neocon" is a pejorative term in many academic and political circles today, the movement of the same name has had a remarkable influence on current foreign policy. Its sudden and full-hearted adoption by the Bush administration is worth an explanation and fair analysis.

The Rational Decision-Making Model

The rational decision-making model, once novel, has blossomed to the point that today it alone may be considered a sub-discipline of organizational behavior (Klein 1998; Hardy-Vallée 2007). The model has a massive body of scholarship girding it. However, at its center are seven essentially sacrosanct steps that organizations must follow to make rational decisions (Pounds 1969; Harrison 1995, 75–85; Robbins and Judge 2007, 156–158). The steps are as follows:

1. Define the problem.
2. Generate all possible solutions.
3. Generate objective assessment criteria.
4. Choose the best solution.
5. Implement the chosen decision.
6. Evaluate the success of the chosen alternative.
7. Modify the decisions and actions taken based on evaluation.

While entire books have been written on each of these seven steps, their essence is simple. The sentences above should suffice for a basic understanding of the rational decision-making process.

Like any other rational choice-based model, the rational decision-making model requires certain assumptions. These include the following: that decision makers can define objective assessment criteria, that those criteria are measurable, that every potential solution to a problem may be identified and properly evaluated, that decision makers have the prescience to correctly identify the true consequences of different solutions, and that the outside world is predictable. Only under these assumptions can the rational model work perfectly.

Given these limitations, most organizations use the more realistic, bounded rational decision-making model (Zur 1997, 326–328; Loizos 1994). The bounded model takes into account the fact that decision makers are unlikely to generate every possible solution to a problem, and, thus, are unlikely to find the categorically perfect solution to a problem. The bounded model also acknowledges that decision makers are imperfect in their ability to grasp the complexity and the contingences of the problem at hand and that the environment with which the problem interacts is predictable and rational. With these restrictions on perfect

rationality in mind, then, the bounded model defines decision making as optimal when it is “good enough.” That is, the decision maker makes the best choice among available alternatives when the search for more alternatives becomes more costly than continued inaction. A good example of this phenomenon occurs in hospital emergency rooms. A doctor must choose quickly among treatments for a critically injured patient, even if the available treatments’ efficacy is unknown, because the alternative is for the patient to worsen or die.

The rational model is widely applicable. For the purposes of this paper, it is applied to the conception and rise of the neoconservative foreign policy movement. Using the simple outline, the process may be described thus:

1. Define the problem: How does the U.S., first, conceptualize the post-Soviet world order, and, second, promote its interests in that world order?
2. Generate all possible solutions: Should the U.S. pursue a policy based on realism (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979), neoliberalism (Nye 2004), civilizations theory (Huntington 1996), neoconservatism (Fukuyama 1992; Kristol 1995), or something else?
3. Generate objective assessment criteria: Which theory best keeps the U.S. safe, its interests and allies safe, and allows the U.S. to further advance its interests?
4. Choose the best solution: “The policy of the United States [is] to seek and support the growth of democratic movements . . . with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world” (Office of the Press Secretary 2005).
5. Implement the chosen decision: Enforce regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq from dictatorship to democracy, as advocated by AEI scholars.
6. Evaluate the success of the chosen alternative: A large body of scholarship from the American Enterprise Institute discusses what has and has not worked in Iraq.
7. Modify the decisions and actions taken based on evaluation: The recalibration of both neoconservative thought and AEI’s relationship with it.

The Autobiography of an Idea

AEI prides itself as a place of ideas, and of the many debated there, chief among them is what constitutes “vigilant and effective foreign and defense policies” (AEI 2007a). For the purposes of this paper, this is the problem defined: What foreign and defense policy *is* most vigilant and effective? While the neoconservative outlook is the institute’s prevailing—though not the only—answer to the question, that has not always been the case. A close examination of AEI’s deliberations from the 1980s until now demonstrates how the movement rose to prominence among the many potential solutions to the problem of an effective foreign policy.

During the 1980s, there was no clear consensus at AEI as to which direction U.S. foreign policy should take. AEI resident scholar Joshua Muravchik was one of the first at the institute to promote the neoconservative viewpoint. His initial foray into the area, 1986’s *The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy*, rebuked Carter for his administration’s perceived selectivity in promoting human rights and condemning abuses. His next work, however, was the ambitious *Exporting Democracy* (1991), which advocated an idealistic foreign policy backed by the force of arms. While one review of the book characterizes Muravchik’s work as a framework for the post-Cold War world (Abbajay 1991),

work on the book began much, much earlier. Over a week-long search for certain documents in AEI's dusty basement archives (complete with oversized video cassettes from the 1970s), I came across a box filled with Muravchik's notes, conference papers, and correspondence from the 1980s. One common theme ran through them: democracy promotion is the key to promoting U.S. interest, whether that promotion occurs in China, the Soviet Union, the countries of Yugoslavia (all of which were prescient preoccupations for Muravchik, according to the contents of the box), or anywhere else. Muravchik conceived his ideas far earlier than we might otherwise suspect.

A different strain of foreign policy thinking came from AEI's Jeane Kirkpatrick. She joined the institute in 1985, after finishing four years as U.S. ambassador to the UN. She described her own vein of thinking in the *United States and the World: Setting Limits* (1986). The book argued, as the title suggests, that the U.S. must curtail its expectations for democracy in other nations and make due with its ideologically imperfect allies and potential allies. The "Kirkpatrick Doctrine," as this vein of thought became known, advocated alliances with any nation, whether democratic or dictatorial, so long as it was anti-Communist.

Finally, a realist strand of deliberation came from, surprisingly, Richard Perle. His first work for AEI, *Reshaping Western Security* (1991), contained several scholars' views on a framework for a post-Cold War Europe. Perle, the book's editor and most prominent essayist, argued that Western nations needed to orient their alliances and policies toward the Middle East to ensure the region remained stable and that NATO did not collapse. Perle's book and earlier work within the Reagan administration advocated the importance of stability, geopolitical positioning, and other realist themes.

We may view these competing theories of foreign policy thought as step two of the rational decision-making model: generating all possible solutions. While AEI probably rejected neoliberal ideas *prima facie*, there was vigorous debate within the institute among the ideas that were suggested. Through the debate, which benefited tremendously from the hindsight of the Cold War and was shaped by the events of Bosnia and Somalia, a set of evaluation criteria emerged: what foreign policy best ensures the security of the U.S. and the promotion of its interests abroad, in the long term? As Vaclav Havel penned for AEI, "The real threats today are those such as local conflicts fueled by aggressive nationalism, terrorism, and the potential misuse of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction" (1997). This was the reality of the post-Soviet world, and U.S. foreign policy had to meet its challenges.


In this battle of ideas, neoconservatism came out on top. Using an index of AEI's publications, I coded the institute's scholarly output on foreign policy, and the results show in part how this occurred. This coding is admittedly less rigorous than I would have liked, but it does adhere to certain principles. First, I included only those articles that discussed foreign policy in relation to what the U.S. should or should not do (or should not have done). Second, I excluded articles discussing foreign policy as it relates to trade, finance, or technology with no interrogation of the political ramifications. Third, I categorized each article as primarily neoconservative, realist, or neoliberal in its outlook. True, only about half of the articles fit tidily into one school of thought over another. For the more difficult cases, I simply did my best to identify themes distinctive to each category. For neoconservatism, this included the promotion of democratization, human rights, and the embrace of American exceptionalism.

For realism, this included geopolitics, mistrust of international institutions, the balance of power, and similar concepts. For neoliberalism, this included diplomacy, culture, sanctions, and other kinds of soft power.

The results of this investigation are shown below:

Year	Neoconservative	Realist	Neoliberal
1996	6	4	2
1997	3	3	3
1998	7	1	2
1999	8	7	2
2000	4	2	4
2001	5	2	0
2002	5	3	1
2003	10	1	4
2004	10	2	1
2005	7	3	2
2006	6	7	3
2007-	2	2	1


Here are the same results in figure form:



The data demonstrates one fact: whenever the U.S. contemplates war, the neoconservative viewpoint becomes dominant. There are three spikes of neoconservative activity on the graph: 1998, 2001, and 2003–2004. Not coincidentally (since most of the articles addressed the subject), each of these years had significant debate about the use of U.S. force abroad. In 1998, this was Kosovo; in 2001, Afghanistan; and in 2003–2004, Iraq. While many of the articles over this time period discuss other trouble spots for U.S. security, such as China, North Korea, Iran, and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, most focus on the pressing conflict of the time.

Viewing these results through rational decision-making theory, we can safely say that, at least during times of war, neoconservatism has been AEI's proposed solution to the problem

of U.S. security. This is especially true regarding the Iraq war. If we remove the neoliberal “noise” from the data (most of the neoliberal scholarship has revolved around diplomacy and trade with China and North Korea), we easily see the strength of neoconservatism at AEI:



AEI’s Irving Kristol confirmed this dominance of neoconservatism not only at the institute, but in the Bush administration as well, when he stated:

By one of those accidents historians ponder, our current president and his administration turn out to be quite at home in this new political environment, although it is clear they did not anticipate this role any more than their party as a whole did. As a result, neoconservatism began enjoying a second life (2003).

Even so, the rational model’s step of generating alternatives does not perfectly describe AEI’s deliberations. This is so, first, because AEI’s scholars were not conscious collaborators on the problem of effective defense policy. We can assume the scholars critiqued each others’ work, but this is different from the intentionally cooperative, additive approach of the rational model. Second, in the rational model, once the best alternative is identified, it is pursued exclusively. AEI takes no official positions, and while the neoconservative school of thought has dominated the institute at times, it has never gone unchallenged.

The rational model does, however, provide a good framework for understanding how AEI’s work has been translated into policy. Thus we may ask, how much influence have AEI’s ideas had on the current administration, and how have those ideas transferred from the twelfth floor of 1150 17th Street to the West Wing and the State Department?

The Dark Side of the Force?

A portion of the blogosphere refers to the American Enterprise Institute as the “death star” (e.g., Encho 2007), but AEI’s actual influence on public policy is far from all-powerful. Columnist David Brooks best described the reality of the relationship between the “neocon cabal” and government when he stated:

In truth, the people labeled neocons (con is short for “conservative” and neo is short for “Jewish”) travel in widely different circles and don’t actually have much contact with one another. The ones outside government have almost no contact with President Bush. There have been hundreds of references, for example, to Richard Perle’s insidious power over administration policy, but I’ve been told by senior administration officials that he has had no significant meetings with Bush or Cheney since they assumed office. If he’s shaping their decisions, he must be microwaving his ideas into their fillings (2004, 23A).

I did see General Peter Pace, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, at lunch with AEI’s Fred Kagan, but that was the extent of direct communication between government and think tank that I observed.

The much sleeper reality is that AEI executes step five of the rational decision-making model, “implementing the chosen decision,” using the typical think tank tools of literature, speaking engagements, and conferences. The institute has used all three to promote neoconservative foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, and has done so particularly since September 11.

Literature

AEI disseminates its work several ways: through books and op-eds, articles for newspapers, magazines and journals, in-house through its “On the Issues” and “Outlook” publications series, the *American* magazine, and the AEI web site.

Books


The books shape public policy in two ways. First, they influence public opinion because the public reads them. Second, and possibly more importantly, the books shape opinion leaders’ opinions. Early in my AEI internship, I spent a few afternoons stuffing hundreds of copies of AEI’s latest books into previously labeled envelopes. Each envelope was addressed to a key opinion maker: Joseph Biden, U.S. Senate; Bill O’Reilly, *Fox News*; James F. Hoge, *Foreign Affairs*; and so on. AEI mails and e-mails its smaller publications to the subscribing public, but also to a “highly customized lists . . . of policy specialists and professionals” (AEI 2007b). As demonstrated earlier, these publications often took on a neoconservative slant from the late 1990s until 2006.

Speaking Engagements


AEI scholars frequently promote their views through speeches, typically given at universities, at sponsored lecture series and forums, and at professional group meetings. The six international relations scholars who have been at the institute continuously from the year 2000 until the present (Thomas Donnelly, Joshua Muravchik, Reuel Mar Gerecht, Michael Ledeen, Richard Perle, and Michael Rubin), have given ten speeches and testified before Congress eleven times. Using the same coding instrument as earlier, I found that the policy recommendations of those speaking engagements were neoliberal twice, realist five times, and neoconservative fourteen times (see appendix A). Most notably, each speech advocated a regime change in Iraq, Iran, or both, or after March 2003, the continued presence of U.S. troops in Iraq.

Conferences

Since the year 2000, AEI has sponsored 1,549 conferences. Of those, 509 have been devoted to foreign and defense policy, 601 to economics, and 439 to social and domestic policy studies (AEI 2007). However, the amount of attention devoted to each area of study has changed from year to year, as demonstrated here:



While the number of total conferences held has consistently risen since 2001, they have risen most quickly in the foreign and defense policy, with the category overtaking economics and domestic policy in 2005. The rise of foreign and defense policy at AEI conferences is more easily seen when we present the numbers of conferences relative to each other:



AEI has consistently devoted more of its resources to foreign and defense studies over time at the expense of both its economic and domestic studies programs. It is a surprising turn, given the organization's economic *raison d'être*.

On this subject, rational decision making is a useful model, in so much as it is accommodated to the realities of think tanks. Unlike a business or executive department, a think tank cannot simply implement a new idea from beginning to end. Rather, it can only persuade—but, oh, how persuasive AEI has been! Its scholars and administration participate in the policy formation process through disseminating information effectively, which is as much as may be expected from a think tank in the rational model.

Evaluation and Readjustment

While AEI's scholars almost unanimously pushed for the invasion of Iraq, some as far back as 1997 (Muravchik 1997), and this push was dominated by the neoconservative viewpoint, the aftermath of the war has seen something different. Continuing with the rational decision-making model, its final steps are the evaluation of the chosen alternative and consequent modifications to it. In terms of evaluation of the Iraq war, it has not gone well. Nearly every article AEI scholars pen on the subject begins with a concessionary "Iraq is a mess." AEI's scholars have also been extremely critical of the Bush administration's execution of the war.

In terms of modification, two measures are worth noting. First, as shown earlier in this paper, AEI is beginning to distance itself from neoconservatism. From a high of about 75 percent of defense studies scholarship in 2003, neoconservative work makes up less than half of AEI's defense studies output today. Second, AEI's neoconservatives are distancing themselves from the unpopular Bush administration. Muravchik, for example, wrote an op-ed for the *Washington Post* in the aftermath of the 2006 election, which stated:

Is neoconservatism dead? Far from it. . . . It is the war in Iraq that has made "neocon" a dirty word, either because Bush's team woefully mismanaged the war or because the war (which neocons supported) was misconceived (2006, B03).

Richard Perle summed the current thinking of neoconservatives when he stated:

Huge mistakes were made, and I want to be very clear on this: They were not made by neoconservatives, who had almost no voice in what happened, and certainly almost no voice in what happened after the downfall of the regime in Baghdad. I'm getting damn tired of being described as an architect of the war (Rose 2006, 3).

The future will tell what direction AEI will take regarding its defense policies. If current trends continue, however, the neoconservative experiment may be over. While not affiliated with AEI, Kenneth Adelman suggested as much when he said that neoconservative ideas, after Iraq, are "not going to sell . . . you just have to put them in the drawer marked CAN'T DO" (Rose 2006, 2).

Here, rational decision theory stumbles. Unlike a unitary organization that corrects its course with one rudder, AEI is similar to a dozen little ships—each with an extremely opinionated captain. Thus, while most of the institute's scholars acknowledge things have gone poorly in Iraq, the reasons why and the remedies for them are diverse and sometimes

contradictory. Just as there is no one simple solution to the problems of current U.S. foreign policy, there is no one correction advocated by AEI.

Critiquing Rational Theory and the “Advocacy Tanks”

Is the rational choice decision-making theory the best way to describe AEI’s behavior as an organization? Probably not. I sincerely doubt that AEI’s administrators ever lay out policy alternatives and perform cost-benefit analysis so clinically as a business’ executives would. I believe they do evaluate stringently the areas more germane to their role as administrators, such as fund-raising, personnel recruitment, and marketing, but they are somewhat disinterested (though not uninterested) in the actual content of their scholars’ work.

I base this assertion on two facts. First, my own internship at AEI and my discussions with the scholars there show me this is the case. I was never constrained in my research to find the “right” answer to a question. While my work was often vetted for quality, it was never subject to an ideological litmus test. The same is true of the scholars there, many of whom have told me they enjoy the hands-off environment at AEI. When I asked one employee about the organization’s hierarchical structure, she laughed, saying, “Well, there’s everyone who works here, and maybe, I guess, Newt [Gingrich] about a half layer up” (anonymous, personal interview, 2007). Second, AEI prides itself as being an old-guard, “university-without-students”-model think tank. Brookings is another example of this kind of think tank. The work of these policy institutes is typically organic and inductive, without the predefined solution to a problem yet to emerge, as is the case with advocacy model think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation (the solution is conservatism), the Cato Institute (the solution is less government), or the Center for American Progress (the solution is more government). Thus, AEI is adept at presenting many alternative solutions but lacks the ability to execute any one of them so cleanly as the rational decision-making model would suggest.

The one part of the model that does dovetail nicely with AEI as an organization is in the evaluation and modification stages. Administratively, AEI’s managers cannot constrain their scholars to produce research in a certain direction. I view the relationship between the two as similar to that of presidents and Supreme Court nominations: a scholar’s past record is reviewed, he or she is appointed based on that record, and the managers hope the scholar continues in that same vein. But, like the Supreme Court, sometimes the appointers get a Clarence Thomas, and sometimes they get a David Souter. Nonetheless, the manager’s influence *is* important.

AEI’s university-style model also lends itself well on this point. Unlike the advocacy tanks, whose solutions are fixed in stone, the AEI scholars may change their viewpoints or admit they were flat-out wrong. Further, the institute encourages a competition of ideas within its walls, and debate serves as an excellent tool for frank evaluation and as pressure for adaptation—a pressure that is missing from the advocacy tanks. The diversity of opinions means a less cohesive message from the institution as a whole, true, but at least it guarantees many messages that have seen critical examination.

The rational decision-making model, again, is not a perfect, or even a good, descriptor of AEI’s behavior. Despite the conspiracy theories of many leftists, it is extremely doubtful that the institute’s scholars gathered in a basement on 11 September 2001 to decide how to best

convince government to take out Saddam Hussein. Instead, it is likely that the neoconservative outlook grew gradually and organically, both at AEI and elsewhere. While we may safely assume that AEI's administrators rationally determine the avenues for growing their organization's coffers and influence, it is doubtful they try to push policy in any one direction so forcefully as the rational decision-making model suggests.

APPENDIX A: Speaking Engagements of AEI Defense Scholars

Name	Speeches	Testimony
Joshua Muravchik	0	0
Thomas Donnelly	0	3
Reuel Mar Gerecht	2	0
Michael Ledeen	1	2
Richard Perle	1	5
Michael Ruben	6	1

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