

# SIGMA

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# Structural Adjustment Policies: A Feminist Critique

by Hillary Campbell

## Introduction

"It is clear that it is women who, as workers, producers, consumers, wives, and mothers, are the shock absorbers of adjustment efforts at immense cost to their well being" (Sadisavam 1997, 633). Although women have many roles to play in the economic and societal make-up of society, their gender specific roles and impacts are largely ignored or unseen by the international community. Due to this "invisibility," women may often bear the brunt of the burden when developing countries receive financial aid from international institutions due to the "conditionality" of these loans. In this paper, through the use of several feminist theories, I will evaluate and explain the detrimental effects of structural adjustment policies put in place by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in developing countries on women.

## Explanation of Structural Adjustment Policies

IMF describes its "core responsibility" as being to "provide loans to countries experiencing balance of payments problems" (IMF.org). In other words, IMF loans money to countries that are in high amounts of debt and find themselves unable to pay. The economies of these countries are weak and unstable. IMF explains the financial assistance helps countries to "rebuild their international reserves, stabilize their currencies, continue paying for imports, and restore conditions for strong economic growth" (IMF.org). The type of loan most likely given to these countries is called the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) loan, a loan with the written objective of making "poverty reduction . . . central to lending operations in its poorest member countries" (IMF.org). This means that not only does IMF work with the country to stabilize the economy but also attempts to reduce poverty in that country.

It seems like the perfect solution, an international institution lending money to poor countries, while at the same time placing them on an economic regulation program that will get their economy back on track. All that the country needs to do is to follow the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) set by IMF, which are widely used and continually effecting populations worldwide. "In nearly every developing country in the world today, short-term stabilization measures, structural adjustment programs, liberalization efforts, and economic reforms are to be considered, attempted, or adopted" (Biersteker 1990). Because SAPs are so widely accepted as the solution to indebted nations' problems, it is important to understand what they are, what they do, and what effects they have both on the country and international community.

The overall goal of SAPs is to reduce the current account deficit and improve the overall economy of a country. They stem from the idea of the "conditionality" of IMF loans (Balaam and Veseth 2008, 156). In order for IMF to give monetary loans to a country, the government must agree to put in place and implement the policies IMF specified. SAPs "typically mean significant changes in economic policies to ensure that the country's domestic and external deficits are drastically lowered or even eliminated. Failure to meet those conditions results in suspension, renegotiation, or even cancellation of the program" (Kapur 1998, 4). The different policies and regulations specified may vary slightly from case to case, but the overall ideas behind them are the same. The goal is to follow the principles originally stemming from the Washington consensus, liberalization, and privatization (Balaam and Veseth 2008, 156). These principles translate into reducing the state's economic influence and creating circumstances for the private market to flourish.

There are several policies used to increase a country's overall GDP so the country may begin to pay off debts. IMF so delicately calls the benchmarks that must be obtained and followed for funding "performance criteria" (PCs). There are two types of PCs, quantitative and structural. "Quantitative PCs typically refer to macroeconomic policy variables such as monetary and credit aggregates, international reserves, fiscal balances, or external borrowing" (IMF.org). A country must build up its financial reserves by decreasing spending, increasing output, and attracting foreign investment. "Structural PCs are also clearly specified structural measures. . . . These vary widely across programs but could, for example, include measures to improve financial sector operations, reform social security systems, or restructure key sectors such as energy"(IMF.org). Structural reforms are for the government programs that are allowed to stay in place. They must become more efficient, better managed, and cost less money.

The typical components of an SAP include policies that encourage price stability to control inflation and encourage savings, as well as the "macroeconomic policies of fiscal austerity" to cut state spending and subsidies (Balaam and Veseth 2008). IMF does not specify which programs to cut or reduce in funding, however it does require a net decrease in government expenditures. The country's necessary decrease in spending must come from somewhere in the budget. More often than not, countries begin the budget cuts with social programs and subsidies. They typically cut from programs such as health care, welfare programs, social security, education, and agricultural subsidies.



Usually other state programs' budgets such as the military and police force are left unchanged. A decrease in spending could mean everything from decreasing the staff size of a program or cutting funding from the program itself. Either way, these social programs usually take a substantial hit under the conditionality of fiscal austerity.

IMF also encourages privatization of many state industries (Balaam and Veseth 2008). Privatization is considered necessary because the private sector is viewed as more economically efficient than the state. Any state-owned industries, such as coal or steel, must become privatized and handled completely by the free market. Many social programs, such as education and healthcare, may privatize as much as possible so that they may be handled in a way that seems more economically efficient.

Macroeconomic policies of "monetary contraction and devaluation" are also instituted to generate trade, and higher interest rates are instituted to attract investment in the short run (Balaam and Veseth 2008). The country should cater to foreign investors by devaluing their currency and instituting higher interest rates to increase the amount of investment in their country. Usually, this process encourages multinational corporations or foreign-owned businesses to set up in that country because of the new policies. The goal of this process is to increase exports as well as foreign investment.

Microeconomic policy changes include the deregulation of labor markets, financial markets, agricultural prices, and the removal of trade barriers (Sadisavam 1997). An overall policy of liberalization is aimed at using all resources in the most efficient manner to maximize output by reducing state intervention in the economy. State intervention in areas like the labor market is seen as a hindrance to market growth and should therefore be reduced. Examples of state intervention could be wage regulation, working condition requirements, environmental condition requirements, and regulating prices.

The logic of IMF is to reduce the current account deficit short-term; this will be accomplished by increasing exports and reducing imports by financing the capital account and limiting borrowing needs. The hope is that in the long run the changes will stimulate overall economic growth and create a situation for the nation to have the ability to repay old debts and not need assistance in the future (Balaam and Veseth 2008).

Not only does IMF require specific economic criteria to be met, but it also requires specific political criterion be met. The introduction of political conditionality stemmed out of the Cold War and fear of communism. The new "political conditionality" threatened to cut development assistance to countries that failed to show progress in democratization (Kwame 1999). Democratization is viewed as necessary to the country's economy because democracies typically allow for a freer market to buy and sell items with much less state involvement and intervention. Also, communism was considered to be economically inefficient.

### **Explanation of Feminist Theory**

Feminism, known as a critical theory, stresses the importance of rendering women visible to the world scene and addresses the needs and concerns of those women. "Feminism is both an intellectual commitment and a political movement that seeks

justice for women and the end of sexism in all forms" (Haslanger and Tuana 2008). It is focused on gender-based analysis relating to societal norms and relations between men and women. However, there are many different branches and disagreements within feminism. "Feminists disagree about what sexism consists of, and what exactly ought to be done about it; they disagree about what it means to be a woman or a man and what social and political implications gender has or should have" (Haslanger and Tuana 2008). Although feminism is a highly fragmented theory with many different camps, I will attempt to use it in my evaluation.

The branch of feminism I will use in my evaluation is neo-feminism. Neo-feminism focuses on the "study of women's roles in the international political economy" and how they have been "overlooked because women are trivialized" (Balaam and Veseth 2008, 92). This theory discusses how the experiences of women, whether purposely or not, are not viewed as important as those of men. Due to this gender bias, women's issues are ignored or seen as unimportant. Neo-feminists say the trivialization of women's roles stems out of the patriarchy of society and that this male dominance is a key reason why women are not rendered as visible as they should be in order for their issues to be addressed (Aronson 2003). Neo-feminism is important to my evaluation because it gives a theory explaining why the grave issues women face often go ignored or trivialized due to a patriarchal system in which women do not get adequate representation. This understanding will later tie in to my evaluation of IMF-sponsored SAPs.

Neo-feminism is often referred to as having an agenda to end patriarchal domination in society. Maggie Humm defined patriarchal society as:

a system of male authority which oppresses women through its social, political and economic institutions. . . . Patriarchy has power from men's greater access to, and mediation of, the resources and rewards of authority structures inside and outside the home (Humm 1989, 200).

Men control and dominate women through social, economic, and political institutions, because they have more access to resources and authority. Men's and women's unequal access to resources and authority is important to understanding the effects of structural adjustment programs on women.

Neo-feminism also claims that women and their issues are objectified or trivialized when integrated into IPE research. In fact, E. Fuat Keyman claimed that women are often viewed in four destructive ways when included in research: as an empirical or cultural object, as a being, as a discursive construct, or as difference (Keyman 1995). Women are often unfairly viewed in research as a cultural or scientific object, a historical being in existence, a subject to be stated and passed over, or a difference from the norm. Keyman claimed that none of the current views of women in research truly grasp the woman as a living, growing, integral contributor to society. Instead, she is seen as an object in research, which misses out on her character and nature. Or she is seen simply as a being that existed in history, which misses out on her growing and changing nature. Or she is seen as a subject to be momentarily discussed and passed over, which misses the integral role she plays in the IPE. Or she is viewed as different

from the norm, which misses the integral role she plays in the shadow of men as the norm (Keyman 1995). He stated:

It is through a relational idea of identity that IPE creates a space for those whose experiences have been marginalized and served simply as an object of theory to act as active subjects of political economic research. Herein lies the significant contribution that the problematic of identity/difference makes to our understanding of international political economy (Keyman 1995, 94).

I will next evaluate structural adjustment policies in terms of neo-feminism. I will focus on how IMF trivializes or ignores women's issues, how the patriarchal domination of society and IMF set women up for greater abuse and neglect when SAPs are instituted, and how the research done on women is often an unfair representation.

### **The Invisibility of Women at IMF**

Women are shockingly underrepresented at IMF. Of the thirty senior officials at IMF, only three are women. Their positions are African department director, external relations department director, and statistics department director. Of the ten managing directors of IMF, not one has ever been a woman. Of the twenty-four-person executive board, only two are women. Of the four-person management team, not one is a woman (IMF.org). IMF does have a diversity statement emphasizing that:

Effective engagement in all member countries—in the context of globalization, the increasing prominence of emerging-market and low-income countries, and the changing role of women in the economy—makes diversity increasingly critical to all activities of the Fund (IMF.org).

Although it has made statements valuing diversity and have set benchmarks for diversity, IMF's 2007 Diversity Report stated, "With the Fund's current recruitment and promotion practices, we will be far from reaching our diversity benchmarks by 2010, let alone in 2008" (Klein 2007). In other words, what IMF says it will do and what it actually does are different. The diversity report outlined the lack of recruitment and promotion practices of women in IMF.

All of these statements and evidence show that although IMF has set goals for having more women, it has not taken the necessary steps to actually achieve the supposed goals. Does this mean it will eventually? Perhaps, but most likely the statements are made simply to pacify women in the international community. This exemplifies the idea in neo-feminism that women are ignored or trivialized. Those women who are at IMF go ignored and are not promoted to senior levels. Those women fighting for gender parity at IMF are trivialized by being given word with little action.

Not only are the women ignored and trivialized, but the lack of women in senior roles also seriously impacts the amount of weight and discussion women's issues have at IMF. Without women on the board to either fight for women's issues being trivialized or bring forward women's issues being ignored, the effect of SAPs on women will continue to go unseen or trivialized.

## **Invisibility of Women's Issues at IMF**

In order to determine whether or not women's issues are being discussed and evaluated by IMF, I looked at IMF's published magazine of journal articles. A search of the *Finance and Development* database brought up 135 articles with the word "women." This may seem like a large number, but compared to the roughly thousand plus articles in the database, it is relatively small. Not only was it a small number, but the majority of the articles with the word "women" were reader commentaries, not actual articles (IMF.org).

In the June 2007 issue entitled *Unleashing the Economic Power of Women*, there were several good articles that discussed women and the economy. One article called "Budgeting with Women in Mind" discussed gender inequality and the importance of gender parity. It explained the importance of incorporating women into macroeconomics and how to address the different needs of women in development planning (Stotsky 2007). Another entitled "Smart Economics" discussed benefits that could arise out of gender parity in society and gender-conscious economic policies (Buvinic and King 2007).

Despite this glimmer of hope that IMF seriously considers women's issues in their publications, none of the articles offer specific evaluation of IMF policies or specific critiques to help IMF be more gender conscious in their policies. This glaring lack of information helps to show that IMF is currently not addressing the issue of structural adjustment programs and the effect that they have on women in developing countries. There is little evidence that any such research has been discussed let alone carried out by IMF.

## **Detrimental Patriarchal Constructs that are Exacerbated by SAPs**

"There is a gulf between the rhetoric and reality of the IMF's role, a gulf that has been emerging since the fixed exchange rate system broke down in the early 1970s but which is proving increasingly hazardous" (Minton-Beddoes 1995). IMF may say many things regarding helping the developing countries and the poor within those countries, but actions speak louder than words. Despite having a loan entitled "Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility," little is done to actually alleviate poverty. The only thing focused on is economic growth.

There are many detrimental effects on the poor, particularly on women, due to structural adjustment programs. With the patriarchal society that exists in the world, cultural constructs ensure that women have less access to resources and power than men do. The structural adjustment programs exacerbate women's already unequal access, which further harms women.

Initially, it may appear that SAPs are working. GDP appears to be increasing and debts are being paid off. However, this data is misleading. Structural adjustment programs have been characterized, through growing amounts of evidence, as creating an economic and social environment in which the rich become richer and the poor become poorer.

In fact, recent World Bank evaluations of the results of SAPs acknowledge that while macroeconomic stabilization policies are necessary for growth, they are

not sufficient in reducing poverty or income inequality in all countries (Sadisavam 1997, 632).

Despite the goal of IMF loans being to help poor developing countries grow, the programs do nothing to alleviate poverty.

There is now a . . . growing volume of literature that not only shows how gender bias in neoclassical economic theory renders the effects of SAPs on women invisible, in any standard measure of policy evaluation, but also provides empirical evidence of the heavy transitional costs of adjustment on women (Sadisavam 1997, 632).

Basically, there are two main problems regarding the effects of SAPs on women. First, the effects are largely ignored or unseen by the international community, and second, those effects are empirically supported to be detrimental to women and society.

First, in order to truly grasp the way that structural adjustment programs affect women, it is necessary to evaluate the way that women's labor is viewed and evaluated by IMF developers. Through a neo-feminist perspective, I will look at the labor done by women and how it is trivialized in the international community. Economists focus overwhelmingly on the "productive economy;" in other words, they focus on those aspects of the economy that make profits and cover costs. By viewing the economy in this way, they ignore a huge portion of the economy—the "reproductive economy," which meets the needs of and sustains human life. This sector of the economy is where the majority of women work. The economists assume that the reproductive economy will continue the same way it always has despite a reallocation of resources that occurs during adjustment (Sadisavam 1997, 636). By viewing the economy in this way, women's labor is "invisible" and therefore, "obscures the economic and social costs of structural adjustment on women's work and lives" (Sadisavam 1997, 632).

How much could this oversight of labor actually be? "Women do 70 percent of the world's work but receive only 10 percent of the revenues, and own only 1 percent of the wealth" (Mothering 2003). Women's work, although extremely important, often goes ignored and unpaid. For example, women in Africa produce 78 percent of the food—both meat and agriculture (World Vision 2000). "Eight out of ten working farmers in Africa are women. In Asia, the ratio is six out of ten" (McGovern 2001). However, the majority of these women do not gain cash directly for their work, and their labor is discounted in censuses and statistics (Jacobson 1994). Daily work for women in subsistence economies includes everything from household work such as childcare, cooking, cleaning, gathering water, and fueling the home to working in the barn and field labor. Women have primary responsibility over the care of all the animals including feeding, tending, gathering eggs and milk, and gathering fodder (Chen 1983). Women also have primary responsibility over post-harvest work, as well as helping during pre-harvest and harvesting (Chen 1983).

Also, women generally work more hours a day than men in developing countries. In Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, women work twelve to thirteen more hours a

week than men (Finance and Development 1992). This translates to twelve to eighteen hours a day for women compared to men's eight to twelve hours of work each day (Jacobson 1994). Not only do women work more hours, they also "spend twice as many hours per week working to support their families" (Jacobsen 1992). Even though women contribute "a lion's share of work," it is viewed as "unproductive in the eyes of government statisticians, economists, development experts, and even their husbands" (Jacobsen 1992).

Such an oversight in acknowledging women's labor has a grave impact on women and society when structural adjustment programs are put into place. Women and female-headed households are the most at-risk group for poverty. There are approximately 700 million women living in poverty in developing countries (Buvinic 1997). Women comprise a greater portion than men of those living below the poverty line and those living without the basic essentials. "The number of women in rural communities living below the poverty line rose more than the number of rural men living below the poverty line—increasing by 47 percent for women versus 30 percent for men" (Buvinic 1997). Not only are women more at risk for poverty, but households headed by women are as well. Female-headed households are on the rise across the world. "Data compiled by the Population Council show a rise in female-headed households in eighteen out of twenty six censuses and surveys reviewed globally" (Buvinic 1997).

The International Center for Research on Women reviewed sixty-one headship studies conducted in developing countries over the last decade and in fifty-three of them found greater poverty in female-headed families (Buvinic 1997). By understanding that it is the women who are the majority of the poor and impoverished, we can begin to see the detrimental effect of IMF not focusing on the effect that SAPs have on women. If one of the goals is poverty alleviation and not enough research is done on those who make up the poor harm is likely to follow.

Also, "women's industries" are often unseen when compared to the actual GNP. For example, in India, after the SAPs were instituted, the Indian economy achieved a 1.5 percent growth rate. However, there was a recession in the agricultural and industrial sectors. This recession signified that "millions of workers . . . have been retrenched and have lost the purchasing power to procure the bare necessities of life" (Patel 1994). What is unseen in this picture is not only the poor but the majority of women that work in these two industries. The majority of employed women work in either the agricultural or industrial sector—the recession and loss of buying power hurt women the most. However, it was unseen due to an overall GNP rise.

### **Evaluation of Structural Adjustment Policies**

Next, I will evaluate some of the specific policies used in SAPs to spur growth in the economy. I will evaluate how a patriarchal society creates cultural constructs for women, which greatly exacerbate the effects of structural adjustment programs. I will focus particularly on the privatization of state-owned industries, decreased spending to social programs such as health care and education, decreased agricultural subsi-

dies, effects of an increase in the export driven economy, and the currency devaluation and high interest rates used to encourage foreign investment, and the way they affect women. By looking at these SAP parts and the way they affect women, I will evaluate specific economic policies and their detrimental effects.

One of the most detrimental effects of SAPs on women is the aspect of IMF's conditionality requirement for fiscal austerity. As stated earlier, IMF does not necessarily specify where the budget cuts must come from, just that spending must be decreased. More often than not, countries begin the budget cuts with social programs and subsidies. They typically cut from programs such as health care, welfare programs, social security, education, and agricultural subsidies. Social programs are seen as unnecessary, high cost expenses that must be cut in order for a state to decrease its debts. The ramifications of the loss of social programs are huge and are felt especially by women. Due to the patriarchal societies in which women live, they have less access to public resources, such as health care and education, than men do.

In Tanzania, for example, seventy-one mothers died in the first thirteen weeks of 1988, when economic reforms were in force—four times the maternal death rate of previous years. The deaths were attributed to poor hospital conditions as well as a shortage of blood, drugs, and transport facilities; more tellingly they were an indication of the deteriorating physical conditions in which women carried out their reproductive roles (Sadisavam 1997, 638).

Although the government was responsible for decreasing the health-care budget, IMF ensured that the budget was cut in order to give them funding. It did not matter where the money was cut from as long as there was a decrease in spending. Mothers died because of inadequate health care, which stemmed from a lack of sufficient funding. Those who had access to medical attention were unable to get adequate care to save their lives, and this number does not include the women who were unable to access medical care because of high costs or not being allowed to seek medical care.

A cut in government funds to education has a much greater impact on girls than on boys. This occurs because of the patriarchal cultural constructs already in place regarding female education. The patriarchal society denies access to education for women. In general, women are much less likely to have access to or complete even a basic primary education. "In fourteen of the developing countries with literacy data, only one out of five adult females can read, and in less developed countries only 5 percent of women are literate" (King 1990). Overall literacy statistics show the educational discrepancy between men and women; the literacy rate for the world in 2005 was 18.3 percent illiteracy (13.3 percent male and 23.3 percent female) (Herz and Sperling 2004). This shows that even though there are both men and women who are illiterate, the number of illiterate women is almost double that of men.

Given all of these statistics, an overall budget decrease in education forces many schools to shut down. A decrease in the number of schools decreases the already slim availability of schools for women. The privatization of schools leads to higher costs of schooling as well. In the patriarchal society, families are much less likely to educate their girls if the costs are higher due to privatization and lack of funds. Though the



increased cost of school and decreased availability cannot be directly tied to SAPs, they occur due to the required fiscal austerity. A decrease in the amount of funding for education will put an even greater economic burden on those families hoping to send their girls to school, and without government aid, a greater proportion will be unable to afford the cost of getting an education. Families would rather opt to keep their girls at home in order to help on the farm or send them to a factory to earn money, rather than spend money on education.

Another SAP requirement is for a country to increase its exports. In a developing country, this usually means that agricultural exports must increase. This leads to an increase in cash crops, crops that are grown primarily to sell to foreign countries for cash back to the farmer. Cash crops are grown in the place of subsistence crops, crops grown to sustain the family that grows it. The promotion of cash crops over subsistence crops has many ramifications: women's workload doubles, food and income for women and families decreases, malnutrition increases, and women's land ownership decreases. Although IMF does not force the government to have the people engage in cash crops, a country must increase its exports. Developing countries have little to offer the world beyond agricultural products. The ramifications of cash crops may be linked to SAPs because of the required increase in outgoing trade.

First, cash crops double the workload burden of women. Women must bear full responsibility for food crops and also help their husbands with cash-crop cultivation without getting any share of the income (Sadisavam 1997). Women must now farm two farms at once instead of just the single subsistence farm she once had to cultivate. This double workday takes considerable tolls on the health and well being of the mother as well as the family. She may not have time to prepare clean drinking water, get enough fuel for the house, take her children to get medical care, or do many other necessary things. The farm must take precedence over other responsibilities which often leads to serious consequences, such as death or disease.

Cash crops also decrease the amount food and income for women and their families as a whole. For example, in Ghana, due to an increase in the number of cash crops and an increase in the amount of land used to grow cash crops, Ghanaian women are left with smaller holdings and poorer soil, without the ability to practice crop rotation. "As a result, soil becomes eroded and less fertile. Food production declines and malnutrition deepens" (Jacobsen 1992). Men use more land for cash crops, and there is less land leftover for women to farm to feed their families. Not only is there less land available, but they can only use the least productive and least fertile land. The cash crop promoters say that instead of the women having to farm food, the men will have enough money to buy food for the family. Unfortunately, this is not the reality of the situation. "In Africa, according to a World Bank report, it is not uncommon for children's nutrition to deteriorate while wrist watches, radios, and bicycles are acquired by the adult male household members" (Jacobsen 1992). Men are buying extravagant items for themselves instead of spending money buying food for their wives and children. This is a ramification of SAPs because of the requirement to increase foreign exports. Although IMF does not force men to buy fancy things

for themselves rather than food for their family, it is the reality of what men do with their export money. The link between required increased trade and cash crops is real. Therefore, the link between the results of cash crops can, indirectly, be linked to SAPs.

As hinted above, malnutrition becomes rampant when cash crops begin to take over a country. Malnutrition takes the greatest toll on the women. Due to the patriarchal society, women regularly eat last—after all the men in the family—and do not get enough food to sustain their basic nutritional needs. If there is less food, the men receive the same amount of food, while the women receive even less (Jacobsen 1992). Also, women regularly give their male babies more food than their female babies because men are considered to be more valuable than women. “There is a consistent pattern—where rates of malnutrition are high, gender discrimination is prevalent” (Sethuraman and Duvvery 2007). In fact, due to chronic malnutrition in children, up to 50 percent of girls are stunted (Gall 2002).

Perhaps the most worrying part of increased female malnutrition due to cash crops is that it is cyclical in nature. Malnourished girls become malnourished adolescents who then marry early, have children early, and have low-birth-weight babies who then become malnourished children and adolescents (Sethuraman and Duvvery 2007). The cycle of malnourishment is extremely dangerous and detrimental to the health of women and their children. Due in part to SAPs and cash crops, female malnutrition is not going away; increases in the downward trend of malnourishment is falling at less than 1 percent a year (Sethuraman and Duvvery 2007).

Another worrying part of cash cropping is that it decreases the possibility of a woman owning farmland. Nearly all land is taken up by the government or private enterprises and sold to men for cash cropping. Very rarely will land be sold to a woman for cash cropping, let alone subsistence farming (Jacobsen 1992). In fact, “Despite World Food Program findings that women produce 90 percent of all food consumed in the homes of the Third World, they own only 1 percent of the farmland” (McGovern 2001). Cash cropping decreases the already low possibility for women to own land, which has many social and economic impacts.

Finally, SAPs encourage governments to allow currency devaluation and increased interest rates in order to promote foreign investment. In order to increase foreign currency, governments respond to the needs of the multinational corporation’s (MNC) need for cheap labor. Also, a deregulation of the market allows foreign companies to pay what they want or have whatever working conditions they want. The combination of these two consequences creates a dangerous exploitative environment for women in the workplace. Due to the patriarchal society, “Women are rigorously socialized to work uncomplainingly, under patriarchal control, at any allotted task however dull, laborious, physically harmful or badly paid it may be” (Patel 1994). In India, for example, “96 percent of the female workforce is in the decentralized sector which has a high degree of labor redundancy and obsolescence. These women have less control over their work and have no chances for upward mobility” (Patel 1994). This is a breeding ground for MNCs to exploit the cheap, uncomplaining labor of women.

However, despite such exploitation, the plight of women goes unnoticed. The focus lies on an increase in foreign investment and exports. Although SAPs are not responsible for MNCs exploiting women, they create further problems by forcing and encouraging the entrance of the foreign companies and investment into these developing countries' economies.

### **Evaluation of the Feminist Explanation**

Through testing the neo-feminist theory, I have shown some of the inadvertent effects of SAPs on women due to patriarchy and the trivialization of women. Although I could not prove that my effects were directly due to SAPs, I could show a strong link between SAP requirements, government actions, and the effect on women. My theories get to the root of the problems of SAPs by looking at how patriarchal societies enact the policies. Although it is the government that ultimately decides how to carry out the conditionality requirements, the requirements themselves are what cause governments to make the choices that they do. The economic choices made, as shown above, often have detrimental effects on women. I have also shown how the ramifications of SAPs are largely unseen and un-researched by IMF due to a lack of senior women in the program and little desire to research the impacts on women.

Another theory that is popularly used to explain the effects of structural adjustment programs is structuralism, a theory promoted by Joseph E. Stiglitz. He explained some of the same ideas I put forward but applied them broadly to all poor (Stiglitz 2006). This can be helpful because of his broader view; however, it misses the underlying discrimination of women. It does not see that women are the majority of the impoverished and why this is. It does not see that poor men and rich men alike exploit women for both their productive and reproductive labor. It leaves many of the questions unanswered by leaving the focus off of women. Therefore, although structuralism is another alternative to explaining my economic phenomenon, I think it is gender bias that harms our full understanding of the situation.

### **Conclusion**

In conclusion, IMF's structural adjustment programs indirectly cause a severe impact on women due to patriarchy of society and the invisibility of women at IMF. Although IMF does not specify how their conditions should be carried out, governments have little choice. They must cut funding to important programs such as health care and education; they must increase cash crops; they must draw in foreign companies and investors. IMF does not force these specific actions, but it does require improvements in fiscal austerity and increases in exports and investment opportunities for different countries. The issue is that the government does not have a lot of choice in what they can do to enact these conditions. Therefore, the ramifications of decreased public funding, cash crops, and foreign exploitation can be linked to SAPs.

Throughout this paper, I have shown the disparate impact of SAPs on women and the unacceptable "feminization of poverty" in many countries in economic transition. I have shown that the disproportionate cost of SAPs borne by women violates their most basic human rights to development guaranteed by both international and national trea-

ties (Sadasivam 1997, 643). Not only is the SAP's impact on women clear, but IMF is doing nothing to change their attitude toward women besides publishing a few journal articles. Without more senior women and increased research the SAP's impact on women, nothing is likely to change. Due to such overwhelming costs, it is necessary to see that development that comes with such a price is surely unsustainable.

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# The Process and Problems of Redefining Turkishness: Article 301 and Turkish Identity

by Josh Cook

## Introduction

Many traditional countries of the developing democratic world face serious obstacles in learning to tolerate critics and dissent. One particularly interesting problem pertains to “insult laws” and their implication for dissent in democracies. Insult laws protect the honor and dignity of government officials and national identity. Learning to adjust how these laws are interpreted to accommodate a democratic framework can be a difficult and even painful process for governments and public citizens. A growing trend among European democracies is to relax the enforcement of insult laws rather than completely revoking them. Changing the enforcement of insult laws is one way government officials acclimate their country to unregulated speech and criticism. The democratization of insult laws can have serious cultural implications.

Turkey reflects the unique national experience of a country in a transitional period grappling between tradition and democracy. Because of the historical foundations of modern Turkey, nationalism remains a fundamental part of Turkish culture and politics. Debate over the definition of Turkish identity intensified with Turkey’s recent bid for entrance admission into the European Union (EU). At the center of the discussion is Article 301 of the Turkish penal code, which prohibits the denigration of “Turkishness.” The EU requires either the removal or amendment of Article 301 for Turkish admission.

This paper will discuss the democratization of Article 301. Beginning with a brief introduction to the history of modern Turkey and the significance nationalism has on the country’s constitution and laws, the section will preface how Turkishness has been defined and why it is protected in Turkey. I next present an overview of three pivotal cases related to the Armenian massacres that will survey the implementation of Article 301 and mark the progress Turkey has made, along with the progress it has yet to make, towards EU admission. Turkey will adjust the enforcement of Article

301 to comply with EU requirements. In order to do this, Turkey will have to redefine Turkish identity to accept ethnic minorities and dissenting opinion on the Armenian massacres. Because of Turkey's long-standing history of nationalism, Turkey will retain Article 301 and follow the pattern of other European countries to relax the enforcement of insult laws instead of revoking them. In a broader sense, this thesis's analysis of Article 301 will explain the process and cultural implications associated with democratizing insult laws.

### **Insult Laws**

Insult laws "provide that it is a criminal offense, punishable by imprisonment and/or fines, to insult or defame the nation itself, the head of state, a variety of state institutions and bodies, foreign heads of state and diplomats, and public officials while they are exercising official functions or because of those functions" (Walden, 17). The form, function, and severity of punishment of these laws vary among countries depending on how a government interprets what the law protects and why it needs to be protected. Theoretically, the purpose of insult laws is to protect national pride, maintain peace, and promote unity. In practice, however, insult laws can be used "to stifle and punish political discussion and dissent, editorial comment and criticism, [or] satire and news that the government would rather hide from the public" (Walden, 7). Despite the repressive nature of insult laws, over one hundred states in the world have some variation of insult laws in place.

#### *The Origins and Justifications of Insult Laws*

The origin of insult laws may be traced to the concept of the divine right of kings (Walden, 1). This doctrine submits that sovereign rulers were ordained by God. Because a king was in power by divine appointment, criticizing him was intrinsically tied to insulting God. Questioning the king's authority was essentially questioning the wisdom and power of God in choosing that king and, in a sense, constituted a form of blasphemy. Consequently, under the façade of religiosity, kings protected themselves from critics and maintained a hold on power. The tradition of the divine right of kings has faded with the notion of democratic elections and the people's power to choose their leader, but evidence of the divine right of kings still appears in Western democracies. Instead of protecting kings, insult laws have come to protect presidents and national identity. Divine ordination and blasphemy have been replaced by national unity and public peace for grounds to regulate free speech and criticism. Just as speech regulations associated with the divine right of kings were used to suppress opposition, insult laws continue to be used as a tool to regulate free speech.

### **Introduction to Turkey**

Turkey's historical roots of nationalism make it a particularly interesting candidate to evaluate how a country deals with implementing free speech. Understanding the unique sense of nationalism related to Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code will explain why preserving "Turkishness" is such a fundamental part of Turkish society.



Based on current events and issues associated with Article 301, I predict Turkey will follow the trend of other European democracies in relaxing the enforcement of insult laws while retaining them in their law codes. The process of redefining Turkish identity as Turkey adopts principles of free speech demonstrates the cultural repercussions instituting free speech can have on a country. It also outlines the general pattern other countries follow as they democratize insult laws.

The historical, cultural, and ideological background of Turkey gives Turkish laws that protect national identity permanence that will be retained unless the government is forced to revoke them. As Turkey prepares to meet EU admission requirements, the government is essentially being forced to redefine "Turkishness." Implementation or perhaps exploitation of Turkey's Article 301 has been the work of ultra-nationalists who utilize the law as a means of stifling free speech in an attempt to prevent Turkey from becoming a part of the EU. Ultra-nationalists feel EU admission would desecrate Turkish identity because it would make Turks "European" instead of "Turkish." With the recent arrest of leading members of an active ultra-nationalist group, combined with amendments made to law, government leaders likely will turn a blind eye to minor discussion of the Armenian massacres which has previously been considered to be a violation of Article 301. Motivation for this new approach to interpreting 301 will be to gain entrance into the EU; but in the process, Turkey will likely adopt a freer press system and a new interpretation of Turkish identity. Evaluating the democratization of Article 301 will illustrate the complex cultural and political ramifications involved in reforming insult laws.

### **Contemporary Turkey**

Once the stronghold and capital of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has recently worked itself back into the international spotlight. As the northern neighbor to Iraq, Turkey is a critical ally for the U.S. "war on terror." The country's profile of a secularized government with a predominantly Islamic population and its strategic location in the hotbed of the Middle East make Turkey a controversial candidate for the EU. Talks of Turkish admission have attracted the interest of nations around the world. Turkey would represent the first predominantly Muslim country to become a member of the EU, which would make Turkey a significant ally for European countries. The EU has expressed particular concern over Turkey's controversial Penal Code 301, which makes it a crime to "insult Turkishness." Implementation of this law has had a major stifling effect on the freedom of speech in Turkey, especially as it relates to the Armenian massacres that occurred just before the founding of Modern Turkey.

Accordingly, over sixty violations of Article 301 have been filed. Most complaints have been the work of ultra-nationalists with the exception of some government-initiated court cases. Although many of these cases have been acquitted, the fact that people are being tried for breaking a law that is so subjectively interpreted raises concern. Among those tried have been several prominent Turkish authors and writers, such as Orhan Pamuk, Hrant Dink, and Elif Shafak, who have made some type of comment relating to the Armenian massacres. In response to pressure from the EU,

the Turkish Parliament has considered revamping or possibly eliminating the law altogether. Minor changes were made to the law rewording some key terms and transactional procedures, but they have happened so recently that enforcement of such laws has yet to be evaluated. In the past, ambiguity of the term “Turkishness” and conflict over Turkey’s aspirations for EU entrance has transformed the law into an important political device for public citizens, politicians, and lawyers to push agendas and test freedom of speech in Turkey. In the future, Turkey will change the way Turkish identity is defined and alleviate the enforcement of Article 301.

### **History of Turkey and Kemalist Ideology**

To better understand the current circumstances of Article 301, it will be useful to discuss the impact and influence of Turkey’s history on its culture. The Turkish Republic rose out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. Officially founded by military leader Kemal Mustafa in 1923, the Turkish Republic was built on principles of a democratic state (Repucci, 2). Mustafa, who came to be known as “Atatürk” (an honorary title meaning “father of Turkey”), asserted control of the region after entente-inspired Grecian troops invaded parts of western Anatolia (modern-day Turkey) (Repucci, 2). In an attempt to preserve the area from being divided into smaller regions and risk being governed by Western powers, Atatürk united peoples of different cultures, languages, and religions into a new and modernized nation (Repucci, 2). This country eventually came to be known as the Republic of Turkey. Atatürk’s philosophies for the creation of this modern nation are summarized by the term “Kemalist ideology,” based on Kemal Mustafa’s first name and on his writings (Cagaptay, 86). The principles outlined by Kemalist ideology define basic characteristics of the Turkish republic. Two foundational tenets of Kemalist ideology that have had particularly lasting influence on Turkish culture and politics are “revolutionism” and “nationalism.”

#### *Revolutionism*

Revolutionism is a term that calls for the modernization or secularization of the State. Atatürk implemented a series of religious reforms that banned external signs of religion, such as the fez and headscarf, and he oversaw the Romanization of the Turkish alphabet. He also designated Turkey a secularized republic and commissioned the military to intervene anytime the government attempted to return to Islamic rule. During the course of Turkey’s history, the military has officially intervened four times, the most recent of these being a military coup in 1980 (Repucci, 2). Following the coup, a military-drafted constitution was adopted and implemented in 1982 (Aydin, 12/10/07). This constitution is the one currently in use. Secularism has been a major issue in Turkish politics. Due to a strong Islamic presence in the country and the great reverence given to the revolutionary legacy of Atatürk’s modern state, Turks have struggled to maintain a secular government. The unique construct of an Islamic nation founded on principles of a secularized state makes it an unprecedented candidate for entrance into the EU.

### *Nationalism*

Another foundational contribution of Atatürk is Turkish nationalism. Atatürk sought to establish a Turkish national identity that did not exist under Ottoman rule. According to Kemalist ideology, nationalism entails the formation of a unified state within a geographic region that encompasses peoples of various cultures, religions, and languages. Turkish scholar Soner Cagaptay claims two methods were used to establish “Turkish National Identity” otherwise known as “Turkishness.” These methods were to establish a government-sponsored official version of Turkish history and to enforce a unified national language (Turkish) to be accepted and spoken by all people, including minorities and ethnicities (Cagaptay, 88). Both of these methods purposely blurred ethnic identity and controversial periods of history that would lead to divisions in Turkish society. Ironically, the repercussions of nationalism on ethnic identity and diversity in Turkey have led to more confusion than resolution. Turkish citizens were forced to accept versions of history with which they may not have agreed; in addition, they were forced to learn and speak Turkish, even though they were taught different languages and cultures at home. The struggle for the recognition of ethnic minorities is a major aspect of the debate over Article 301. The suppression of divisions among Turkish society is a tradition that began with Atatürk and continues today.

#### *Role of the Media in Establishing the Republic of Turkey*

Atatürk and his successors saw the media as powerful means of implementing Kemalist ideology. The government utilized state-sponsored newspapers, radio broadcasts, and eventually television broadcasts to promote and develop the Turkish Republic (Ogan, 511-13). Motivated by fear of the dissolution of the republic, Atatürk went to great measures to preserve and enforce national unity. He perceived the media to be both a tool to promote Kemalist ideology as well as a threat to developing national unity, so he held on to censorship laws that were established during the Ottoman Empire (Ogan, 511). The establishment of national identity and promotion of unity were justifications for regulating free speech

### **Nationalism in Turkish Law**

Kemalist ideology is deeply engrained in the politics and culture of Turkey. The constitution of the Republic of Turkey shows great reverence toward the doctrine of Atatürk’s philosophies of Turkish nationalism and revolutionism. The preservation of the “eternal existence” and “indivisibility” of the Turkish Republic is attributed to principles outlined by Atatürk, Turkey’s “immortal leader.” Unity, peace, and a guarantee of human rights are significant subject matters of the constitution. These points clarify how Article 301 is justified in Turkey. Excerpts from the constitution may enhance understanding of Article 301. The preamble of this constitution reads:

In line with the concept of nationalism and the reforms and principles introduced by the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk, the immortal leader and the unrivalled hero, this Constitution, which affirms the eternal existence

of the Turkish nation and motherland and the indivisible unity of the Turkish state, embodies

The recognition that no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Atatürk . . .

The recognition that all Turkish citizens are united in national honour and pride, in national joy and grief, in their rights and duties regarding national existence. . . .

Article II qualifies Turkey as a democracy. The Article states:

The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble ("The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey").

Throughout both the Preamble and Articles of the constitution, themes of national unity, respect for Atatürk, and preservation of Turkish identity are stressed. Ironically, Article 2 defines the Turkish nation as a republic and a democratic state, but principles of nationalism and unity have disturbed the complete realization of a democratic press.

Later in the constitution, sections 7 and 8 are entitled "Freedom of Thought and Opinion" and "Freedom of Expression and Dissemination of Thought." Although these sections designate free thought and expression as constitutional rights of the country's citizens, the prohibition of speech that may disrupt peace or safety is permissible. These guidelines are similar to Article 10 of the European Council, which defines speech that threatens peace as justifiable grounds for regulation. The sections on free speech and expression of the Turkish constitution read as follows:

#### VII. Freedom of Thought and Opinion

##### ARTICLE 25.

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and opinion. No one shall be compelled to reveal his thoughts and opinions for any reason or purpose, nor shall anyone be blamed or accused on account of his thoughts and opinions.

#### VIII. Freedom of Expression and Dissemination of Thought

##### ARTICLE 26. (As amended on 17 October 2001)

Everyone has the right to express and disseminate his thoughts and opinion by speech, in writing or in pictures or through other media, individually or collectively. This right includes the freedom to receive and impart information and ideas without interference from official authorities. This provision shall not preclude subjecting transmission by radio, television, cinema, and similar means to a system of licensing.

The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for the purposes of protecting national security, public order and public safety, the basic characteristics

of the Republic and safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, preventing crime, punishing offenders, withholding information duly classified as a state secret, protecting the reputation and rights and private and family life of others, or protecting professional secrets as prescribed by law, or ensuring the proper functioning of the judiciary.

The formalities, conditions and procedures to be applied in exercising the right to expression and dissemination of thought shall be prescribed by law (“The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey”).

Freedom to express thought and opinion are fundamental rights guaranteed to everyone according to the constitution. However, the final two paragraphs of the constitution note that:

[t]he exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for the purposes of protecting national security, public order and public safety, the basic characteristics of the Republic and safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation.

This important stipulation is critical for understanding the current status and interpretation of Article 301 in Turkey. Free expression is guaranteed constitutionally, but so is the regulation of certain speech. The interpretation of what speech is justifiably regulated is so subjective that it has led to many problems associated with Article 301. Democratic institutions such as the European Council also have a similar double standard. Some rationale for preserving the right to prohibit speech on certain topics is especially important to countries born out of conflict or ethnic tensions. In the case of Turkey, perhaps during the early years of the country, some speech regulation may have been necessary to secure the preservation of the unity of the state. The interpretation of what constitutes a threat to national security or public safety is one of the paradoxes of free speech. Governments have to be willing to accept criticism and dissent for what constitutes appropriate grounds for regulating free speech.

Because of the justifications for regulating speech listed in Turkey’s constitution, the country has insult laws preserving national identity, and these laws have been used to stifle free speech. The government, ultra-nationalists, and ethnic minorities have struggled over what Turkish identity is and how to protect it. The embodiment of this battle has revolved around Article 301.

### **Evolution of Article 301**

The evolution of Article 301 began even before the Turkish Republic was established, with the insult laws of the Ottoman Empire and the early press regulations of Atatürk. Exactly when the law was first officially composed in the form it is now seen is not as important as what is said and how it has been applied in the last ten years or so. The progenitor of Article 301 was Article 159. This version of the law read:

Whoever overtly insults or vilifies the Turkish nation, the Republic, the Grand National Assembly, or the moral personality of the Government or the military

or security forces of the State or the moral personality of the Government of judicial authorities, or overtly engages in aggressive acts that arouse suspicion about the legitimacy of the Grand National Assembly, shall be punished by one to six years imprisonment (Walden, 45).

The phrase whoever “vilifies” the “Turkish nation” may be interpreted to mean that claiming the Ottomans (Turkish ancestors) were capable of genocide constituted a crime. Because the law did not explicitly define what the terms “vilify” or “Turkish nation” encompass, there is room for interpretation. If calling the progenitors of the Turkish nation murderers was interpreted as an insult or vilification to the modern republic, then calling the Armenian massacres genocide could be considered illegal. However, the law did not define that, so being tried by it would be very subjective. An interesting note is that the republic was not established until after the Armenian massacres took place.

#### *2005 Version of Article 301*

On 25 June 2005, Article 159 was replaced by Article 301 as part of a package of legislative reforms aimed at satisfying EU admission requirements. At that time, the phrase “Turkishness” replaced “Turkish nation,” and the prison sentence was reduced (Fowler, 12/10/07). An increased penalty for perpetrators outside of Turkey and an allowance for the expression of thought intended to criticize were also made. The expression of thought intended to criticize and intentional denigration were never successfully clarified or implemented in court cases. The court cases evaluated in this policy analysis will utilize the grounds of the 2005 version of Article 301, which reads:

Whoever publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and three years. Whoever publicly denigrates the Government of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial institutions of the State, the military or security organizations shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and two years. In cases where denigration of Turkishness is committed by a Turkish citizen in another country the punishment shall be increased by one third. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a crime (“Repeal Article 301,” 12/10/07).

Although some changes were made to the law, subjective terminology still gave way to open interpretation of the terms “Turkishness” and “denigrate.” The government and ultra-nationalists could still interpret the law to encompass debate over the Armenian massacres as “denigrating Turkishness.”

#### *2008 Version of Article 301*

Because of continuing controversy surrounding Article 301, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey submitted amendments to Article 301 that were approved by President Abdullah Gül on 8 May 2008, and posted on the Official Record (“President Gül,” 5/9/08). Amendments to the bill included changing “Turkishness” to “Turkish nation,” the “Republic” to the “Republic of Turkey” and reducing the maximum prison

sentence for denigrating the “Turkish nation” from three to two years. The increased punishment for out-of-state offenders was also eliminated, and complaints submitted to the justice department now require approval by the Minister of Justice before a case may be launched under Article 301 (“President Gul,” 5/9/08).

How the changes will affect the implementation of Article 301 will determine whether or not amendments to the law will suffice for EU admission requirements. The EU requires applicant countries to establish “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (“About EUTCC”, 5/23/08). Based on trends in other aspiring European democracies, Turkey will reevaluate how the law is enforced rather than revoke Article 301 in order to comply with EU requirements. The risk associated with these revisions is that subjective terminology is still part of the law. That is why this policy will require Turkish officials to redefine Turkish identity and how it can be insulted.

#### *Implementation of the Article 301*

The cases related to Article 301 evaluated in this policy analysis will draw upon the interpretation of Article 159 and the 2005 version of Article 301. Part of the scope of this thesis will be to predict the future implementation of the new version of Article 301. Discussing the past application of Article 159 and Article 301 will be important for understanding the cultural ramifications of the law. The judicial system of Turkey employs a complex mixture of Eastern and Western culture that may most closely be defined as a civil law code. A civil law code means court rulings are not used as precedent for other court decisions. Therefore judges hear cases based on their application of a certain law to a specific case. Because of a lack of recorded and published court rulings, an exhaustive evaluation of how Turkish courts have interpreted Article 301 is difficult to compile.

#### **Interpretation of Article 301**

As of December 2007, more than sixty journalists, authors, and intellectuals have been tried under Article 159 or Article 301 but few have been convicted (Fowler, 12/10/07). Inconveniences associated with court proceedings can still have a stifling effect on free speech. Most cases related to Article 301 involve discussion of controversial subjects involving minority groups (“Repeal Article 301,” 12/10/07). This thesis is specifically focused on problems related to discussion of the Armenian massacres. Before discussing the circumstances of several prominent figures and significant events related to Article 301, a brief summary of the Armenian massacres and the basic arguments surrounding the debate will be advantageous to understanding the interpretation and enforcement of Article 301 in Turkey.

#### *The Armenian Massacres Debate*

During the declining years of the Ottoman Empire in 1915, the “Committee of Union and Progress” (CUP) masterminded the relocation of the entire ethnic Armenian population of eastern Anatolia. One reason for the relocation may have been due to an Armenian uprising in Van. In an attempt to prevent further uprisings, the



Ottoman government relocated Armenians. Discussions in Turkish society have raged over whether or not additional secret orders were given to exterminate as many Armenians as possible during the deportation processes (Clark, 1). Indisputable is the fact that many died during the relocation. The official history sponsored by Atatürk blames war and political instability as reasons for so many deaths. Despite the official history, Ottomans held several large trials investigating genocide and ultimately hung Mehmed Kemal, a local governor of the Ankara district, for mass killings of Armenians; this execution attempted to appease British determination to punish supposed perpetrators. Soon thereafter, Atatürk seized control and eventually developed the Republic of Turkey, which was a separate and revolutionary entity from the Ottoman Empire.

Atatürk imposed a number of radical changes and modern movements in Turkey and also stressed Turkish pride and nationalism with Ottoman heritage as a part of that. Suppression of Armenian identity was a part of developing Turkish National Identity for people living within the borders of the new republic. Atatürk stressed that being Turkish is more important than ethnic or religious differences. He also commissioned an official history of Turkey that blames the death of so many Armenians on the chaos and confusion of times of war, perhaps in an effort to prevent divisions and ill-feelings within the republic. Disputation over what actually happened during the Armenian massacres has been a sensitive issue in Turkish society ever since. Debate and discussion of the issue have been suppressed because of the potential threat it is to uniting and establishing Turkish National Identity.

Recently, the debate has been rekindled as Turkey has made steps towards EU membership. Other countries have also decided to voice their opinion on the subject through legislation, which has heightened international tension and mounted external pressure on Turkish authorities to allow dissenting opinion on the subject (Clark, 1). Some suspect Armenian activists are pressuring foreign governments and parliaments to officially recognize an "Armenian genocide" in hopes that the Turkish Parliament will change its position (Clark, 1). On the other hand, Turkish nationalists consider statements of recognition of an "Armenian Genocide" an insult to "Turkishness" and have filed complaints of violations of Article 301 for any discussions related to the topic. Several Armenian and Turkish writers have been prosecuted under Article 301 for discussing the massacres in public venues or published materials. Their cases highlight important cultural and political aspects associated with the Armenian massacre debates.

### **Implementation of Article 301**

#### *Orhan Pamuk*

The most prominent figure tried for violating Article 301 is 2006 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Orhan Pamuk. A state prosecutor brought charges against Pamuk in 2005 for his comments related to the Armenian massacres during an interview with a Swiss newspaper *Der Tagesanzeiger* ("Repeal Article 301," 12/10/07). In response to the case, Pamuk said "thirty thousand Kurds and a million Armenians were mur-

dered. Hardly anyone dares mentioning it, so I do. And that's why I am hated" ("Repeal Article 301," 12/10/07). His renown as an acclaimed novelist and pressure from international human rights organizations led to Pamuk's acquittal. Although Pamuk was ultimately exonerated, he still endured the financial burdens and time constrictions of a trial in court.

Some argue that he was also indirectly made a target for ultra-nationalist verbal and physical abuse due to the public attention drawn to the case. During the first case brought against Pamuk, he was physically attacked. Throughout the trial, tabloid newspapers called him a traitor to his national identity ("Repeal Article 301," 12/10/07). Inconveniences such as these have been common among most trials related to Article 301. Even those not convicted are still estranged by public newspapers and nationalist supporters. The threat of these hardships suppresses others from speaking out on the Armenian massacres. Therefore, those initiating these cases, whether they are government officials or ultra-nationalists, have seriously stifled free speech even without convicting anyone. The international prestige of Pamuk served an important role in bringing Article 301 to the forefront of EU concerns and to the attention of the rest of the world. Increased pressure by human rights groups and surrounding countries led to closer surveillance of the ramifications Article 301 has on stifling free speech.

#### *Hrant Dink*

Another pivotal case involved the late Hrant Dink, journalist and editor of the Armenian-language weekly newspaper *Agos*. Dink stated, at a 2005 conference in Urfa, "I am not a Turk, but an Armenian of Turkey" led to a prison sentence for violating what was then Article 159 (Freely, 2). Although the prison sentence was dismissed, a second suit was filed against him for a series of articles he wrote on Armenian identity, which reportedly "encouraged Armenians of the Diaspora to abandon their blanket hatred of 'the Turk'" (Freely, 2). Similar to Pamuk, media coverage of these trials brought national attention to Dink and ultra-nationalists targeted him as an enemy to Turkish nationalism.

In January 2007, Dink was shot and killed in front of his news office by Ogun Samast, a seventeen-year-old, self-proclaimed "Turkish nationalist" (Freely, 2). Some suspect that Samast was merely a tool of higher-up ultra-nationalists who paid him to kill Dink because of his "troublesome" writings. Others blame Article 301 for Dink's death because of the national attention his court cases brought him which made him a target of ultra-nationalists. A crowd of an estimated 100 thousand mourners gathered at Dink's funeral, some carrying signs saying "Murderous 301" and "We are all Hrant, we are all Armenians" (Freely, 2). Debate over the circumstances surrounding Dink's death still continue, but his murder raised concern for those seeking to speak out on Armenian issues. Soon after Dink's death, Orhan Pamuk quietly left the country and Hrant Dink was acquitted posthumously on 14 June 2007.

#### *Elif Shafak*

The cases discussed thus far have involved public statements and written articles. The trial of novelist and university professor Elif Shafak presents another dimension

of the discussion of Article 301. Shafak's best selling novel, *The Bastard of Istanbul*, served as grounds for prosecution for a remark made by one of her characters (Fowler, 12/10/07). The specific remark is made by a man of Armenian descent who worries out loud about which version of history his niece will accept as she is raised by her Turkish stepfather—history told by the Turkish government or oral traditions of Armenian ancestors (Fowler, 12/10/07). The character lamented, "I am the grandchild of genocide survivors who lost all their relatives to the hands of the Turkish butchers in 1915, but I myself have been brainwashed to deny the genocide because I was raised by some Turk named Mustapha!" The first time the case was tried, the prosecution dismissed it on the grounds that her work was fiction. The trial was later reheard by a higher court, and she was acquitted.

Shafak's book deals with intriguing cultural ramifications of the Turkish nationalism. The discrepancies of official history and Armenian tradition are expressed by her fictional characters. Anguish experienced by those of Armenian dissent is real. However, on the grounds that the fictional characters were expressing the difficulties of negotiating ethnic identity crisis the case was dismissed. If the case had involved "real" people saying similar things, the verdict of the case might have been different. Ultra-nationalists claim that acknowledging such cultural and ethnic divisions disturbs public unity and therefore "denigrates" Turkish identity. Viewing the acknowledgment of ethnic differences as a threat to national unity is the traditional way of seeing minorities. The traditional approach to handling minorities in Turkey is to ignore cultural and historical differences for the preservation of the Turkish Republic. That Shafak was acquitted displays some reservation on the part of the government to stifle free speech. But the fact that the case was dismissed on the grounds the work was fiction shows Turkey has yet to accept that divisions within the country are a reality.

#### *Discussion of the Armenian Massacres at a University*

Another significant development in Turkey's progression toward freer speech was marked by a conference on the Armenian massacres held in Istanbul. Holding the conference was revolutionary in and of itself. A formal gathering seeking discussion of the massacres at a public venue in Istanbul was monumental in testing the limitations of free speech in Turkey. The conference was scheduled to be held at Bogazici University in Istanbul in September 2005, but due to political pressure instigated by ultra-nationalists, Bogazici and Sabanci Universities were barred from hosting the conference until information being disseminated at the conference and the credentials of the speakers and the financial sponsors could be collected (Grigoriadis, 16). In response to the ultra-nationalist requests, conference organizers moved the venue to Bilgi University without any further disruption or complication.

That the conference was postponed showed the lack of complete press freedom in Turkey. The conference was shifted and forced to be held at a private university instead of a state-sponsored school so as to alienate the discussion from state-associated institutions. Government interruption of the conference illustrates government disapproval of public conversation on the subject. However, because the conference did

take place in Istanbul, even after various complications and opposition to the conference arose from ultra-nationalists, does show some progression toward free speech. This academic conference represented an important movement by Turkish society toward the acceptance of public dialogue on the Armenian massacres.

#### *Analysis of Court Cases*

Although the government may have been responsible for enforcing many of these cases, most complaints related to Article 301 have been filed by Kemal Kerincsiz, a lawyer and member of the Greater Jurists Union. Kerincsiz considers himself a nationalist who is simply trying to preserve national unity and pride from "Western imperialism and global forces that want to dismember and destroy [Turkey]" ("Waving Atatürk's Flag," 12/11/07). Kerincsiz's ultra-nationalist beliefs are exactly why he has instigated so many court cases, all with the intention of preserving Turkishness. Kerincsiz explained that his reasoning for filing a complaint against the conference was that "the real aim of [the] conference was not academic but to push Turkey into chaos, break it up and create a (greater) Armenia" (Grigoriadis, 16).

Viewing discussion of the Armenian massacres as an attempt to divide and destroy the Turkish republic represents the ultra-nationalist interpretation of Turkish identity. The irony of Kerincsiz's complaint about the conference is that it could very well be turned on its head and argued that ultra-nationalists are the ones trying to create chaos. Some argue that ultra-nationalists feel that if they can instigate or at least project the image of chaos to the international arena, Turkey could be prevented from becoming a member of the EU. Ultra-nationalists disfavor EU membership, because it would make Turkey European instead of Turkish, thereby destroying Turkishness. Filing complaints and stifling speech on the massacres, which has the potential to lead to violence and disturbances, accomplishes the ultra-national goal of preserving Turkishness.

This theory is exemplified by the case of Hrant Dink. The crowds carrying signs at Dink's funeral accusing Article 301 of murdering Dink posed a provocative point. The role that 301 played in killing him may not be entirely provable because the events surrounding his death are unsure. However, it may be argued that Article 301 could have encouraged Dink's death. The law may have amplified media attention given to Dink's inflammatory writings and marked him as an ideal target for ultra-nationalists. Killing Dink, who had received substantial media attention already, would accomplish several advances for the ultra-nationalist cause at one time. Assassinating Dink could project an image of chaos in Turkey to the international community, which could complicate Turkey's EU bid. It also would stop his inflammatory writings and discourage other people from speaking out on the subject.

Regardless of who was behind Dink's assassination and what their motivations for killing him were, Dink was killed. His death stopped his writings, which scared others from discussing the massacres and projected an image of turmoil in Turkey. Ultra-nationalists were well aware of Dink's writings, and he was likely killed because of what he said and represented. Attributing his assassination to 301 is difficult

to prove even though there is a reasonable association. The cases of Hrant Dink and Orhan Pamuk represent how speech can translate into physical violence. For some, Dink is a martyr for the Armenian cause as well as for free speech; for others, he is seen as a rebel and traitor to his country. The opposition and polarization over the debate seem to be only further exaggerating or magnifying divisions in the country.

Ironically, the justification for having insult laws such as Article 301 is to preserve Turkishness, which as outlined in the constitution of the Republic of Turkey is related to national unity and public peace. The cases of Hrant Dink and Orhan Pamuk highlight the paradox of Article 301. The law that is supposed to protect national identity is failing to preserve unity and peace. In some respects, it may even be exaggerating divisions and violence among nationalists and ethnic minorities by bringing so much attention to the issue as speech is regulated. Article 301 has functioned as a means of reopening and redefining ethnic and historical differences among citizens of Turkey that have been ignored since the origination of the Republic of Turkey. The cultural divisions caused by debate over the Armenian issues are described by the characters in *The Bastard of Istanbul*. In the novel, a grandfather worries about what history his niece will be taught.

That Shafak was acquitted shows some governmental progression in recognizing differences and problems. But the reason for her acquittal shows a reluctance to embrace the reality of divisions in Turkish society related to the massacres. Shafak's case illustrates the progression Turkey has made as well as the progression it will need to make to eventually allow open discussion of the Armenian massacre. For this to happen, Turkishness will have to be redefined to include the recognition of ethnic minorities and the embracement of debate over the Armenian massacres. That a conference on the massacres was held in Istanbul shows some progression towards acceptance of democratic principles.

## **Recent Developments**

### *Ergenekon Investigation*

Earlier this year, more developments were made toward the greater free speech in Turkey. In January 2008, Kemal Kerincsiz was taken into custody for "alleged links to a weapons cache found in Ümraniye, Istanbul" in June 2007 ("Ergenekon arrests broaden," 3/22/08). Kerincsiz is found to have ties to an ultra-nationalist criminal gang known as Ergenekon. As the force behind most 301 cases, his absence could have dramatic effects on the future implementation of Article 301 and the admission of Turkey into the EU. More than thirty other prominent retired military generals, politicians, and reporters are now being investigated for being a part of Ergenekon ("Ergenekon arrests broaden," 3/22/08). The group has been linked to the murder of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink and is being investigated for planning the assassinations of several senior Kurdish politicians, as well as Nobel Prize winner Orhan Pamuk. The case against members of Ergenekon was in the court system during the same time that parliament was deciding whether to amend or revoke Article 301.

### *2008 Amendments to Article 301*

The Turkish Parliament recently decided to amend several parts of Article 301. Changes to the law were well received by the EU, but nationalist Turks vehemently opposed the new bill. Soon after the bill was approved, the Republican People's Party (CHP) threatened to challenge the amendments by bringing them to constitutional court ("CHP to not back," 5/13/08). Although the CHP relinquished aspirations for contestation, factions divided over the amendments to Article 301 show a reluctance to let go of the power to regulate free speech. Differing opinions in the government also demonstrates variance in interpreting Turkishness and how it can be insulted.

Others have disapproved the amendments to 301 for different reasons. Holly Cartner, director of Human Rights Watch for Europe and central Asia argued:

Article 301 should have been abolished a long time ago. The revisions proposed by the government will not change the fundamental flaws in the law. The government's half-hearted revision is a real disappointment. The government has missed an important opportunity to reinvigorate the reform process and underscore its commitment to free speech (Human Rights World Wide).

Although the government avoided completely revoking Article 301, the changes made to Article 301 combined with the arrests of leading ultra-nationalists could lead to a redefining of the interpretation of desecrating Turkishness. This could be a pivotal step for Turkey to be better prepared to embrace greater free speech.

As noted earlier, part of the recent reforms to Article 301 is that suits must be filed by permission of the Minister of Justice, which makes it more difficult to file suits and could lead to fewer cases. With the arrest of Kerincisiz and investigation of Ergenekon, the main force behind most 301 cases is at least temporarily detained. The relaxation of the enforcement of Article 301 is very feasible. Another influencing factor is that the Turkish government has a vested economic and political interest for EU membership. Some in Turkey see these events as opening a window for Turkey to satisfy EU admissions without completely revoking Article 301. The effect of this process would be a redefining of Turkishness, progression towards free speech and acknowledgement of ethnic and cultural divisions. Retaining insult laws while adjusting the enforcement of them is a similar pattern followed by western European countries.

In November 2007, commissioner for enlargement of the UN, Olli Rehn, said:

The EU should not open accession talks with Turkey on the key policy area of justice and human rights until Ankara had repealed or amended the infamous Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code that is used to prosecute individuals, especially journalists and intellectuals, for 'insulting Turkishness' ("Article 301 new benchmark," 11/7/07).

Turkey has since made amendments to Article 301 to comply with EU demands. These changes were commended by EU officials in April, but complete approval is pending a more complete understanding of how Turkey intends to implement of the law. Turkey therefore will have to revamp the way Article 301 is enforced, how Turk-

ish identity is interpreted, and the degree of discussion that is allowed concerning the Armenian massacres.

Although reforming the way Article 301 is enforced and redefining how Turkish identity is interpreted has the potential to improve the climate of free speech in Turkey, some negative consequences to this approach may arise. Turkish society may not be as accepting of a liberalized interpretation of Article 301, which could result in greater confrontations between ultra-nationalists and those speaking out about the Armenian massacres. If ultra-nationalists are not able to squelch via legal recourse what they consider inflammatory discussion, they may resort to violence to silence public commentary on the massacres.

### **Predictions and Conclusions**

With the revisions of Article 301 and the detainment of ultra-nationalists such as Kemal Kerincsiz, I submit Turkey will relax the enforcement of Article 301 instead of revoke the law. A strong tradition of nationalism and the precedent of other countries justify Turkey in holding onto Article 301. Keeping the law, however, will require Turkish officials to redefine how Article 301 is interpreted and Turkish identity is defined. Gradually Turkish society will become more accepting of discussion on the Armenian massacre and the recognition of ethnic minorities. Through this process, Turkey's identity will be redefined to accept cultural and ethnic differences that have previously been ignored. Although the divisions over the Armenian massacres may not be immediately recognized, circumstances related to EU aspirations will force Turkey to greater acceptance of dissenting opinions. The process of democratization in Turkey has had serious implications for the scope of Article 301 and on Turkish national identity.

The process of redefining Turkishness is a phenomenon that may be applied to understanding problems and issues related to the democratization of other insult laws as well. The experience of Turkey demonstrates the complicated process reforming insult laws can have in a country. Just as Turkey's journey toward embracing free speech and open criticism is gradual and complicated, so is the case with other European countries. Exceptions for regulating speech described in democratic principles allow countries to retain insult laws if they are enforced differently. As aspiring democracies reevaluate how insult laws are interpreted, they can advance towards free speech. Governments cultivate an environment of free speech by how insult laws are enforced and interpreted. This requires the negotiation of speech regulations and embracing dissent. As countries learn to enforce insult laws differently, they will be more susceptible to embracing criticism and dissent.

### **Questions for Further Research**

Based on research conducted on this topic, I have realized that there are many more interesting aspects of the topic that have yet to be discussed or evaluated. The future of Turkey as it seeks admission into the European Union and how government officials will interpret Article 301 will be interesting to watch.

1. Will the EU accept changes made to the Article 301 as sufficient for satisfying free speech requirements? Will Turkey comply with other stipulations of EU ad-



- mission? Could these deter Turkey from becoming a member of the EU?
2. What will happen if Turkey is rejected for EU admission? Will Turkey change its enforcement of Article 301 if it ceases to pursue EU admission? Will it change its policy after becoming a member of the EU?
  3. What will come of Kemal Kerincsiz and Ergenekon? Are there other ultra-nationalists groups willing to take such an aggressive role as Kerincsiz has with filing complaints of violating Article 301? How will the Minister of Justice choose to interpret and enforce Article 301?

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# What Influences Vote Choice In State Legislative Elections? A Case Study of the 2003 General Election

by Dustin Homer and Scott Riding

## Introduction

One of the most unique features of the American political landscape is the state legislature. Colonial assemblies were the first institutional organizations of democracy in the New World, and their modern counterparts function with similar objectives. State legislative bodies pass thousands of bills annually, governing every aspect of state government, including healthcare, welfare benefits, insurance laws, driving regulations, highway construction, public and private education, taxes, etc (NCSL 2008). There are few issues of interest to the public that are not debated in the various state assemblies, houses of representatives, and senates. Additionally, many budding politicians use positions in the state legislature as preparation to run for federal offices. If one is looking for the national leaders of tomorrow, he or she need look no further than his or her own state capitol; nearly 40 percent of the members of Congress initiated their political careers as state legislators (Fowler and McClure 1989). Clearly, state politics influence and inform political activities at the national level.

Yet, understanding of state legislative politics and elections is minimal. "All politics is local," stated longtime Congressional Speaker Tip O'Neill (1994). But local political stories are often eschewed by media coverage in favor of more dramatic national races. Most political researchers do not generally explore the dynamics of state legislative politics, with a few exceptions. This neglect is regrettable, because an understanding of politics at the local level will translate to a better understanding of the dynamics of elections at every level. State legislative politics matter, because they influence elections, candidate recruitment, and legislation across the country. Our study attempts to explore the dynamics of the state legislative election. We ask an important question: What affects vote choice in state legislative elections?

## Research Context

Relatively little time and few resources have been spent on studying state legislative elections across the country. Part of this literature gap is due to practicality. Various constraints complicate research attempts including lack of political data, demographic data at the legislative district level, funding to conduct full, sample surveys at the district level, and interest in lieu of more appealing state or national elections. What little research exists is largely based on aggregate historical data analysis at the legislative district level, focusing on institutional change over the last few decades (Rosenthal 1996), competitiveness in primary elections (Grau 1981), participation in state legislative elections (Patterson and Caldeira 1982), the effect of candidate spending (Gierzynski and Breaux 1991), gubernatorial coattail effects (Hogan 2005), and the effect of ethics laws on candidate recruitment (Rosenson 2006). Studies suggest state legislative elections are low information and low saliency contests to most voters and, therefore, generate little interest among the electorate (Jewell and Olsen 1988). When asked, voters cannot respond with relevant information specific to national electoral contests, therefore there is little to no expectation that they will cast informed votes in state legislative races (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). As suggested by Popkin, voters possessing minimal information about the contest overwhelmingly rely on decision heuristics, especially partisan identification, to inform their ballot (Popkin 1992).

Thus, the question naturally arises, do voters really pay attention to specific state legislative races? Quantitative studies are mute on the subject. There are some qualitative approaches, such as Keith Gaddie's five-year insertion into the campaigns of nine state legislative candidates (2004). He highlights the fact that nearly every candidate believes the electorate is responsive to the campaign. He wrote, quoting a young politician, "[voters in this district] have been contacted and contacted again, and they know who I am and they will vote for me. . . . You walk these neighborhoods and a lot of people feel like the incumbent has taken them for granted" (Gaddie 2004).

State legislative incumbents frequently affirm the belief that their district and their constituency largely know them and their political history. Are they misguided? Our study attempts to answer that question in the context of closely contested Utah state legislative races. We employ an individual level exit poll survey methodology rarely used in state legislative research to examine candidate and campaign effects on vote choice in two 2008 contests.

## Theory and Design

The primary challenge in studying vote choice is explaining how candidates and campaigns can affect voters when voters cannot recall basic information about the election. Historical models of vote choice relied on memory recall to explain voters' evaluations of candidates (Kelley & Mirer 1974, Enelow & Hinich 1984). These studies painted a bleak picture of the American electorate since subsequent explorations affirmed the collective ignorance of voters about candidate characteristics, race-specific issues, institutional characteristics, and consistent personal preferences (Delli Carpini

and Keeter 1996, Converse 1964). However Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau produced evidence supporting the theory that voters are influenced by campaign information even when they cannot remember the specific considerations that lead to a vote decision (1995). They hypothesized that citizens keep an "online score" or running tally of political actors. Voters update this affective score every time they receive information relevant to an individual or an election. On election day, some voters may have retained much of the campaign information, others not, but each vote is informed to some extent by exposure to candidates and campaigns.

The online candidate evaluation model is especially relevant in the context of state legislative races, because the likelihood of voter recall is relatively low due to a low information exposure. National campaigns attract thousands of hours of media coverage. Interested voters may easily inundate themselves with platform specifics, day-to-day campaign activities, issue debates, and press events. Local politicians do not have that luxury. Many voters may only be contacted once or twice, perhaps reading articles published in the local newspaper prior to the election. Without the repetition of media coverage to encourage memory, voters may not easily recall information relevant to a state legislative race. However, candidate attributes and campaign effects can still affect their vote choice by altering the running score in the minds of the voters.

Essentially, our hypothesis is that campaign and candidate effects do influence vote choice in state legislative elections, especially in close elections or among candidates who deviate from party norms (Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995). As stated before, research and logic suggest partisanship is the largest determining factor of vote choice, but we submit that it is not the only effect, and candidate and campaign factors do cause voters to cross party lines at the voting booth. Basically, we reassert the conviction, vocalized by V.O. Key, that "voters are not fools" (quoted by Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995). We argue that many voters are well informed enough to consider a variety of factors when making voting decisions, even in a state legislative race. Even if a voter is no expert in political issues, specific effects from candidate perceptions and campaign efforts are likely to influence the voter's decisions, and we hypothesize that these effects will affect the election outcomes of the races evaluated in this study.

In a state legislative election, campaign effects may include such factors as direct candidate contact, campaign literature, campaign contact (phone calls, canvassing, etc.), or media advertising (radio/local, TV/Internet). We argue that these efforts to educate voters on candidates and their positions often influence voter decisions on election day. Even if voters cannot regurgitate specific information from campaign efforts, the general impressions they receive from these efforts are likely to influence their decisions. Additionally, candidate effects may include any number of perceptions voters have about the candidates in question. For example, a candidate's popularity or "celebrity status" may play an important role in voting outcomes, with better-known candidates receiving a higher percentage of the vote. Perceptions of a candidate's morality, particularly in regard to a potential scandal or corruption accusation, may also bias a voter's opinion toward a certain candidate. Though related to party identification, candidate ideology may be an important deciding factor for voters,

particularly when regarding specific salient issues, such as abortion, gun control, or school vouchers. We expect these variables will, along with party identification, influence how many votes a candidate gets in a state legislative election.

For our dependent variable, we have chosen to look at vote choice for the democratic candidate. Our goal is to determine the effect that different factors, including campaign and candidate effects and party identification, have on the percentage of the vote the democratic candidate receives in each of these races. Since republicans generally dominate the vote in Utah, looking at how campaign and candidate factors influence a democratic candidate's vote percentage will best help us to see the true effects of these factors, as they will likely show deviation from party lines for republican voters. This dependent variable will help us evaluate the direction of changes the campaign and candidate effects cause in vote percentage, as well as the magnitude of these effects.

To evaluate candidate and campaign effects on vote choice, we use a number of independent and control variables. Our major explanatory variables for campaign effects are whether the respondent has heard of the candidates in question, whether they have received literature on the candidates, and whether they have met the candidates personally. We expect if a person has heard of, received literature from, or met the democratic candidate, they will be more likely to vote for him or her, while if they have received the same things from the republican candidate, they will be less likely to vote for the democrat. If these results are obtained, we will confirm our hypothesis that campaign effects influence vote choice. These are the only data on campaign effects available from the 2008 Utah Colleges Exit Poll. Since the legislative districts in question are small, media advertising is not often done, making data on these factors irrelevant. Literature and candidate contact are likely the most significant campaign effects in these state legislative elections, making our chosen explanatory variables quite valid.

For candidate effects, we will look at specific candidate quality variables that are relevant to the elections in this case study. These will especially include perceptions of the candidate's ethical standards and their support of the school voucher issue. This will allow us to evaluate the influence that different aspects of candidate effects have on vote choice. Specifically, we will look at candidate moral perception through the ethics variable and candidate ideology through the voucher variable. These issues are particularly salient to the Utah races in question, making them very relevant to this particular study. Should we find these variables have significant effects on vote percentage, we will confirm the second aspect of our hypothesis, that candidate qualities influence voter decisions. Party identification of the respondent and some demographic information will also be included as control variables in the study.

### **Case Selection**

We chose to study two Utah state legislative races due to their relative visibility and salience, specifically State House District 49 and State Senate District 8. Both legislative districts are competitive. However, Utah House District 49 was not always an election-day battleground. During the 1990s, Sandy City was a republican stronghold.

From 1994 to 2000, incumbent representative Greg Curtis won easy elections and reelections. In 2000, he won with a 14 percent margin. At the two-year mark, the margin increased to 18 percent. In 2004, the political landscape changed dramatically. In the first contest between Greg Curtis and newly minted challenger Jay Seegmiller, Curtis survived with a six-point win. Seegmiller ran again in 2006, and Curtis won by a mere twenty votes (Utah Elections 2008). What changed? In the intervening years, Sandy City had been rapidly expanding. State estimates approximate an almost 7 percent population growth between 2000 and 2006 (Utah Office of Demographic and Economic Analysis 2008). Additionally, a popular democrat successfully gained control of the region's congressional seat, winning by twenty-two points above the republican in 2006 (Utah Elections 2008). When Seegmiller announced his run against Curtis a third time in 2008, it was expected to be a very close race.

Senate District 8 is a different story. Every race since incumbent Senator Carlene Walker's first run in 2000 has been competitive (Utah Elections 2008). Her district, while encompassing most of House District 49, also cuts into the western edge of Midvale City, a democratic stronghold (Scottriding.com 2008). The key to reelection lies in the hands of unpredictable moderate voters from both parties. Senator Walker's 2008 reelection bid was especially interesting, because she was running against a well-known challenger, former representative in the Utah House, Karen Morgan.

Both districts have seen a shift in partisanship over the last decade. House District 49 and Senate District 8 are located in the most urban part of Utah: Salt Lake County. In the 2000 presidential election, Salt Lake County overwhelmingly voted for republican nominee George W. Bush. He took the region by 23 percent. However, in the 2008 presidential election, Barack Obama won the county by .10 percent (Utah Elections 2008). There is a large swath of voters who can be persuaded to vote for either ticket, and both parties work hard to control the capital county.

We collected data by sampling voters on election day in an exit poll. Volunteers from seven Utah colleges solicited voters as they left the polling place to participate in the survey. Respondents were asked a series of questions about campaign interactions, perceptions of candidates, and vote choice. Typical demographic measures were also collected. Exact question wording may be found in Appendix A. Our response rate was near 60 percent, but due to various election day complications, our sample size in both districts was just under three hundred observations. Despite low sample size, these data accurately predict the election results within four percentage points, so we believe the other measurements are helpful in analyzing the individual races.

## Results

### *Statewide*

Table 1: Legislative Vote by Party Identification/Statewide Election Results

	Democrat	Independent	Republican
Democratic Candidate	96 percent	52 percent	8 percent
Republican Candidate	4 percent	48 percent	92 percent

Before looking at the election results for the two specific legislative districts, we evaluated the statewide legislative vote. The exit poll asked voters for their party identification and which party's candidate they voted for in the state legislative election. As Table 1 shows, statewide results showed that most voters followed party lines. Thus, as we have stated earlier, partisan identification remains the major deciding factor in state legislative elections. However, our further analysis explores the effects of other factors, like campaign and candidate effects, on specific election outcomes.

*Greg Curtis vs. Jay Seegmiller*

To evaluate the state House race between republican incumbent Greg Curtis and democratic challenger Jay Seegmiller, we used a multivariate logistical model regressing democratic vote choice on various campaign and candidate effect independent variables. The results are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2: Vote Choice by Campaign Effects and Candidate Attributes  
Dependent Variable: Vote for Jay Seegmiller

Regressor	Coefficient (robust standard error)
Heard of Seegmiller	2.7* (1.4)
Received Seegmiller Literature	0 (1.1)
Met Segmiller	0.8 (0.6)
Republican	-1.86 (1.5)
Democrat	2.4 (1.8)
Heard of Curtis	-3.7** (1.6)
Received Curtis Literature	1.5 (1.3)
Met Curtis	1 (0.7)
Who is more ethical? (1=Seegmiller, 0=Curtis)	4.5** (0.9)
Voted for Obama	3.3** (1.4)
Regression Summary Statistics	
	0.74
n	151

Notes: Dependent variable is binary vote coded as 1 for Seegmiller, 0 for Curtis. The individual coefficient is statistically significant at the \*5 percent level or \*\*1 percent significance level using a two-sided test. Data from the Utah Colleges Exit Poll.

In this model, three phenomena stand out as particularly interesting. First, partisan identification is not significant in this race when we control for campaign effects and candidate attributes. That is a significant find, since most political decisions are heavily influenced by the voter's party affiliation. To better understand that effect, we examined the data and found that 12 percent of the voters who cast a ballot for Seegmiller had also voted for Republican presidential nominee John McCain. A large proportion of republicans crossed over and voted for the democrat in the local race. This switch was not done in ignorance. Of those crossover voters,



a high proportion identified Curtis as the more experienced candidate. However, 94 percent named Seegmiller as the more ethical politician. No party has a monopoly on ethical behavior, and, in this case, ethics triumphed over partisan issues.

That leads us to our second interesting find: candidate attributes, especially perceptions of personal ethics, were a large determining factor in this race overall. A prediction test indicates that republican voters who viewed Seegmiller as more ethical than Curtis were 58 percent more likely to vote for the democratic candidate. This aspect of the model is so strong that it overrides the dominant vote choice mantra that partisan identification trumps all other factors. This confirms that voters were paying attention to this race but refutes the portion of our hypothesis that states that partisan identification is always an important factor in these races. In an exceptional race, where a candidate deviates from party norms, personal attributes become particularly important.

Finally, there was a presidential coattail effect for the democrat in context of the national democratic landslide. Those who voted for Obama were much more likely to vote for Seegmiller over Curtis. Originally, we assumed this variable would be strongly correlated with party identification, perhaps skewing the regression. However, the party identification variables are not significant even when we leave the Obama vote variable out of the regression.

#### *Carlene Walker vs. Karen Morgan*

To evaluate the state Senate race between republican incumbent Carlene Walker and democratic challenger Karen Morgan, we used a model nearly identical to the one evaluating the Curtis and Seegmiller House race.

Table 3: Vote Choice by Campaign Effects  
Dependent Variable: Vote for Karen Morgan

Regressor	Coefficient (robust standard error)
Heard of Morgan	0.9 (0.6)
Received Morgan Literature	1.3** (0.5)
Met Morgan	1.8** (0.7)
Republican	-2.1** (0.5)
Democrat	1.7** (0.7)
Heard of Walker	-2** (0.6)
Received Walker Literature	-0.1 (.5)
Met Walker	-1.9** (0.7)
Support School Vouchers	-0.8* (0.4)
Voted for Obama	1.1* (0.6)
<b>Regression Summary Statistics</b>	
	0.55
n	279

Notes: This is a logistical regression, so interpretation of individual coefficients is not straightforward. Dependent variable is binary vote coded as 1 for Morgan, 0 for Walker. The individual coefficient is statistically significant at the \*5 percent level or \*\*1 percent significance level using a two-sided test. Data from the Utah Colleges Exit Poll.

The dependent variable, as explained before, was a binary variable for whether the respondent voted for Karen Morgan or not, with one for yes and zero for no. We used a logistic regression model to estimate the effects our various descriptive variables had on the probability someone would vote for Morgan. We found significant positive coefficients on the variables for whether the voter had received literature or met Morgan, for whether the respondent was a democrat, and for whether the respondent also voted for Barack Obama. We found significant negative coefficients for the respondent being a republican, for whether the voter had heard of or met Walker, and for the respondent being in favor of vouchers. Thus, it appears that people who were democrats, who received campaign literature from, or who had met Morgan, were more likely to vote for her. On the other hand, people who were republicans, who had met or heard of Walker, or who were in favor of school vouchers, were less likely to vote for Morgan.

We argue that these results make two significant contributions to our study. The first major point is that party identification has a substantial impact on this race, even though this particular Senate district has a reputation as a "swing" area. Clearly, the respondents' party identification had a significant influence on the probability that they would vote for Morgan, with democrats being much more likely to vote for her and republicans much less. Though we hypothesize that campaign and candidate factors influence elections, it is clear that partisan identification remains the primary influencing factor in vote choice, and the other factors are secondary, especially among strong partisans. We also see those who voted for Barack Obama were more likely to vote for Morgan as well, suggesting Obama may have had a coattail effect on this election. This suggests those who identified with or at least voted for Barack Obama, regardless of party identification, were more willing to vote for another democrat, Karen Morgan. Thus, it appears partisan effects, even those from outside of this particular race, played an important role in vote choice in this district.


Our other important conclusion is that despite the influence of partisanship, campaign effects likely had a real impact on this election. We see that those who received literature from or met Morgan were much more likely to vote for her, with our data showing positive coefficients significant at the 1 percent level. Receipt of campaign literature and candidate contact are two of our important variables for measuring campaign effects, making a real case that Morgan's campaign was at least somewhat successful at persuading voters in her favor. We also see people who had heard of or met Walker were significantly less likely to vote for Morgan, meaning Walker's campaign also had some favorable effects for her. In such a vigorously contested race, literature, canvassing, and other campaign efforts were likely quite prevalent, and the data suggests these efforts were not in vain.

Furthermore, it appears the campaigns were successful at making school vouchers an important issue in the election. We found a significant negative coefficient for the school voucher binary variable, telling us those who were in favor of vouchers were substantially less likely to vote for Morgan. Thus, it appears Morgan was effectively associated with being against vouchers, and Walker was profiled as pro-voucher.

Though our coefficient shows a negative effect on the Morgan vote for pro-voucher voters, it may be this association actually hurt Walker in the end. Exit poll data showed that 48.28 percent of republican respondents were against school vouchers. Thus, it seems likely that some of these republicans who were against vouchers chose to vote for Morgan instead of Walker.

To explore this possibility, we predicted the change in probability of voting for Morgan between a pro-voucher and an anti-voucher republican. We found that an anti-voucher republican was over 18 percent more likely to vote for Morgan than a pro-voucher republican. This makes the case that vouchers were a substantial issue in this election—important enough that people were willing to cross party lines to vote against it. With such a large proportion of republicans in opposition to vouchers, this may have been a critical deciding factor in this close election. Likely, vouchers became a large issue because of the campaigns and the efforts to publicize issue differences between the candidates, and it appears to have become one of the significant deciding factors in the election. Following our logic that campaigns influence state legislative elections, it seems this potent voucher issue, a salient campaign effect, had a real influence on the outcome of the election, confirming our hypothesis that campaign and candidate effects do affect vote choice.

*Figure 1: Republican Views on Utah Voucher Legislation in Senate District 8*




Source: Utah Colleges Exit Poll

Another interesting topic to address for both the Curtis/Seegmiller and Walker/Morgan races deals with campaign finances. Since we are only looking at vote choice in one election, it was not possible for us to include campaign data spending in our regression model. However, it is interesting to look at the differences in spending between the various candidates. Looking at the comparison between Curtis and Seegmiller spending (below), we see that Curtis spent over twelve thousand dollars

more than Seegmiller on the election, but still lost by a substantial margin. This is further evidence that effects besides partisanship and campaign spending—in this case, specific candidate perceptions—had a large impact on voter choice.


Figure 2: Candidate Spending in the 2008 General Election in Utah House District 49



Source: Utah Reporting System < <https://ucrs.utah.gov/> >

Looking at the comparison between Walker and Morgan’s spending (below), we see an even larger disparity. Incumbent Walker spent \$90,191.20, compared to \$43,073.36 from challenger Morgan. Though Walker’s spending more than doubled

Figure 3: Candidate Spending in the 2008 General Election in Utah Senate District 8



Source: Utah Reporting System < <https://ucrs.utah.gov/> >

her opponent's, Morgan still won the race with 52 percent of the vote, compared to Walker's 46 percent. This further confirms our hypothesis that factors besides the oft-mentioned party identification and candidate spending factors clearly influence election outcomes, even in local state legislative elections like these.

### **Limitations**

Though we have sought to build the most robust model possible, significant limitations affect the validity of our study. As our data is solely from the 2008 Utah general election, it may not have broad applications across other states. Behaviorally and demographically, Utah is quite different from many other states; data from Utah voters may not be representative of national voters. However, our argument that voters do consider many factors in state legislative vote choice is a compelling one that should be applied to a broad selection of states. As we stated before, our exit poll data has a fairly low number of observations, which results in higher standard errors than we would prefer. However, the data are still sufficient for making accurate predictions. Furthermore, our data are not historical and only contain information for the 2008 election. A study of vote choice over several elections would likely give a more accurate indication of how different factors truly influence voter decisions. Finally, the two legislative districts in our case study are not highly representative of the general Utah population. Both are swing districts with a higher proportion of democratic voters than the Utah norm. Also, both races were fairly high profile, competitive, and charged with issues such as school vouchers and corruption. There may have been more voter attention to these races than is common for the usual Utah election. However, our theoretical framework focuses on elections that break partisan norms and our hypothesis was specifically directed at these two interesting elections. Our significant results beg the question: How many other state legislative elections "break the norm," and what influences voter choice in these races?

### **Conclusion**

Clearly, much work remains to be done in the state legislative sphere. With their power to influence citizens' lives, it is surprising that such little effort has been made to understand state legislative election dynamics. Through our study, we sought to determine the factors that influence voter decisions in state legislature elections. Though party identification remains the dominant factor in explaining state legislative decisions, we find that campaign and candidate effects do influence voter decisions, especially in highly contested elections or when candidates break partisan norms. Specifically, we found robust evidence that corruption allegations significantly influenced the Curtis/Seegmiller race, and many voters' perceptions of Curtis as corrupt caused them to vote for Seegmiller, even when this meant voting outside of their party. We also found significant evidence the voucher issue was salient to the Walker/Morgan competition, and many voters may have based their decisions on this issue, again crossing party lines in certain situations. We also found significant effects for whether voters had met, heard of, or received literature from the candidates in question. We quite confidently assert that candidate and campaign

effects influenced the outcomes of these elections. Though only focused on one Utah state legislative election, our analysis suggests legislative vote choice is a relevant area that should be explored by further research.

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**APPENDIX OF SURVEY QUESTIONS**

(Identical questions were used for the Curtis/Seegmiller race with the names changed)

In today's election for Utah State Senate, did you vote for

1. Karen W. Morgan, Democrat
2. Carlene M. Walker, Republican
3. Someone else

Thinking about the Morgan/Walker State Senate race, please mark all that apply:

- a. I have heard of this candidate.
- b. I have received campaign literature from this candidate.
- c. I have personally met this candidate.

For each of the following statements, please indicate whether it best describes Karen Morgan or Carlene Walker. Please mark only one box per line.

- a. Has the better experience to be a representative.
- b. Has higher personal and ethical standards.
- c. Has a better personality and temperament to be a representative.
- d. Can be trusted to put our district's interests above personal interests.
- e. Shares my values.

Some people in Utah had a race for the Utah State

Senate. If you had a race for the Utah State Senate, did you vote for the

1. Democratic Candidate
2. Republican Candidate
3. I decided not to vote in that race
4. There wasn't a race for the Utah State Senate on my ballot
5. Don't know / Can't remember

In today's election for Utah's House of

Representatives, did you vote for the

1. Democratic Candidate
2. Republican Candidate
3. I decided not to vote in that race
4. Don't know / Can't remember

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# Cultural Preservation and Modern Development in the Amazon

by Eric Linton

## Introduction

In summer 2009, indigenous groups in the Peruvian Amazon headed a major grassroots movement against the national government in an effort to protect their lands and lifestyle. The protests brought due international attention to issues of human rights and land ownership that had previously been a local matter. Several months prior to the movement, a colleague and I ventured to the Putumayo region of the Peruvian Amazon in an effort to understand the issues being faced by the people of those regions. Specifically, we aimed to understand the importance of self-determined rights as a means to preserve tradition and culture. In addition, we wanted to understand what the threats to indigenous rights were and what the local people were doing to overcome those threats through political means.

The last decade has proven to be a very profitable one for Peru. The GDP has doubled as a result of new policies concerning land and water rights. Peru's Amazon has played a significant part in the economic success. However, the success has not come without cost. Increasing developments in the Amazon have brought indigenous rights to the forefront of the Peruvian political dialogue. Specifically, the increased development correlates positively with human rights infringement, and the policies used to implement the development are questionable.

The primary purpose of this article is to understand how the Yagua, Ocaina, Bora, and Huitoto tribes along the Ampiyacu and Yaguasyacu rivers in the Putumayo region of the Amazon have been influenced by modern developments such as mining, logging, and other external influences and what they are doing to preserve their traditional lifestyles. As we document the tribal lifestyle, we will focus on how the tribes preserve their culture and what role the tribal, regional, and national government play in the success of those endeavors. Two aspects of cultural preservation are



investigated: First, the political organization of each tribe, and second, the role the environment and land play in the cultural preservation of the tribes. The specific aspects of tribal culture will include traditional everyday knowledge of their habitat such as plants and animals, oral traditions, native languages, and the use of land.

Traditional languages, customs, and cultures are often altered as a result of development. The tribes of the Putumayo region of the Amazon have undergone definite cultural changes as contact with outside influences has increased. Certain aspects of tribal cultures have been preserved. The methods used to preserve these tribal cultures primarily emphasize land ownership, teach traditional languages, preserve traditional tribal governments, and maintain oral traditions.

Some indigenous groups in the Peruvian Amazon are protesting violently because contextual examples have proven that without proper democratic representation, another effective way to influence the government and protect land rights is through demonstrations. Many indigenous people feel the government is alienating and confrontational, and they do not feel as if they are a part of the dialogue that is taking place between the government and prospective industries concerning their lands and livelihoods.

This research will provide a perspective of the tribes' existence in the context of history and modernity. We will look at the vital elements of tribal society and what, if anything, is being done to preserve that society. The research will provide insightful information on how the tribal government functions within a state government.

### **History of Development in Putumayo**

Modern development has played a significant role in the history of indigenous groups in Peru, including the tribes in the Putumayo region. From the first interactions with outsiders during the rubber boom, the tribes in Putumayo have associated development with violence and suffering. For the tribes now located along the Ampiyacu and Yaguasyacu rivers in Putumayo, this introduction to modern society and development occurred fairly recently in comparison to other tribes in Peru.

In more accessible regions of Peru, like the Andes and the Selva Central, indigenous groups confronted colonizers and developers as early as the sixteenth-century. Because of the remoteness of the Putumayo region, many initial contacts were made by *couchos* (rubber tappers) around the turn of the century. Later contacts were made by soldiers during the Colombia Peru Leticia war from 1932–33 and also during a second insurgency of rubber tappers during the Second World War.

The first contact with the *couchos* was devastating for the tribes of the Putumayo. Tribesmen were exported like slaves throughout the region to tap the rubber trees. Older members of the Yagua, Ocaina, Bora, and Huitoto tribes still recall the punishments imposed on those who did not bring back enough rubber. Castration and foot and arm amputations were among some of the punishments. Others were killed by machete, burned, or drowned. Walter Hardenburg was a witness to the brutalities during the rubber boom and documented that Indians were exterminated or tortured for bringing insufficient amounts of rubber or at other times for mere

pleasure (Taussig 1984, 467–97). In addition to the couchos' brutality, small pox and other plagues took their toll, and entire villages were left desolate.

During this time, the population of the Bora tribe in the Putumayo went from nearly fifteen thousand individuals to a mere 450 (Pantone 2006). Four thousand tons of rubber were exported from the Putumayo in the first decade of the twentieth century, and the overall indigenous population in the region decreased by nearly 30,000. The introduction of the rubber industries did not only bring physical destruction. It also challenged the existence of traditional tribal culture by introducing competition and monetary usage which was previously foreign to the communities. In 1912, *The Contemporary Review* described the Indians of the Putumayo as more morally developed than their oppressors. The Indians were "socialist by temperament [and] habit" (Taussig 1984, 474).

Since the rubber boom, many of the tribes that did not assimilate to modern societies eventually relocated to their present location along the Ampiyacu and Yaguasyacu Rivers. The Yagua, Ocaina, Bora and Huitoto were among the tribes that moved south of the Putumayo River to establish new communities and rebuild their tribes. The devastating effects of the rubber boom did not completely destroy the traditional tribal culture because the tribes preserved the traditional connection with land, water, and natural resources which they found in abundance in their new locations. The tribes have maintained certain aspects of their socialistic lifestyle where each member of the tribe works for the well-being of the community.

### **Tribal Organization and Preservation**

The tribes have undergone certain changes because of the events during the rubber boom and subsequent developments like logging and mining. Because of the constant threats of squatters, industries, and development-oriented policies, the tribes have adapted by becoming more politically organized. The new political organization is an important part of the preservation of the culture and autonomy of the tribal government.

The tribes in the Peruvian Amazon, as in other places, are usually divided into smaller communities that may be very isolated from one another. This is the case with the Yagua, Ocaina, Bora, and Huitoto communities along the Ampiyacu and Yaguasyacu rivers. In each of the four tribes there are tribal community leaders and authorities that consist of the president, who is chosen democratically by the tribe to represent the tribe in external political matters, a chief, or *curaca*, who is chosen to guide the tribe in spiritual and traditional matters, and teachers who are educated and responsible for the education of the tribes' children and youth.

The president of the tribal community holds frequent meetings in the community to discuss matters from community law to external development issues. The presidents of the four tribes hold quarterly conferences in which they discuss matters that are relevant to their communities. The president represents the community before a non-government organization called the Federation of Native Communities of the Ampiyacu (FECONA).

The *curaca* is chosen in each community by its members. The *curaca* is responsible for teaching spiritual matters, traditional language, and other traditions like song, dance, and medicine. Although the *curaca* can be involved in external affairs of the tribe along with the president, his primary concerns are domestic issues. The *curaca* is a traditional position equal to a shaman, and many of the cultural traditions he teaches are intertwined with the land around his people.

The teachers in the community are usually members of the tribes that are employed by the state to provide formal elementary level education to the children of the tribe. The four communities of the Ampiyacu and Yaguasyacu have been provided by the state with a one- or two-room schoolhouse where the teachers teach basic reading, writing, and arithmetic. Teachers also share the responsibility to teach the native tribal language.

The president, *curaca*, and teachers play important roles in preserving tribal culture. Although the president and teachers are not traditional positions within the tribe, their influences help to perpetuate the tribal culture by giving it a degree of political legitimacy. The inclusion of presidents and teachers is a way in which the tribes have developed in order to become involved in local and national politics.

Although some tribes, including the Yagua, Ocaina, Bora, and Huitoto of the Putumayo region, have adopted basic forms of agriculture and farming, the majority of food still comes from the rivers and forest around them. Their basic agriculture has allowed them to maintain non-nomadic lifestyles. The water that is used for drinking, washing, and cooking is almost exclusively obtained from the rivers that flow around them. Many of these natural resources, including natural food and water supplies, would be negatively affected by the establishment of mines near the communities. Natural resources that the tribes depend on like the wildlife, plants, and the land itself are all variables that are affected by development. The prospect of development and the tribal dependence on natural resources have forced the tribes in the Putumayo to become more politically involved than ever before.

### **Contemporary Crisis**

In 2007 and 2008, President Alan Garcia of Peru passed legislation that had a significant impact on indigenous groups within Peru, especially in the Amazonia regions. The laws were made in conformity to the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) which eliminated restrictions on about 45 million hectares of the Amazonian lands for development. This was done without any consultation with the communities that occupied the lands. Law 29157, published 20 December 2007, by the Congress of Peru, delegated power to the executive branch with regards to subjects related to the Peru-U.S. Trade Promotion Agreement (*Foreign Policy in Focus* 2009).

With authority over TPA issues, Garcia issued a number of controversial decrees that opened up opportunities for private investments, including the privatization of land and water rights. Much of the newly accessible lands are used and inhabited by indigenous groups. In December 2008, a multi-partisan commission initiated an investigation into the dispute between the indigenous groups and Garcia's

administration. The final report that was published called the decrees made by Garcia illegal and unconstitutional. Regardless of the report, the decrees were put into effect (*World Politics Review* 2009).

"We know [the government and industrialists] are talking," says a teacher in one of the Bora communities, "but we don't have a part in the dialogue . . . They have us like animals. . . . They could come and kick us out of our lands . . . and what would we do?" (2009).

The teacher's concern is legitimate, especially since the Bora community in Pucaurquillo, like in most tribal communities, has no official title to its current land. Decrees 994 and 020-2008 AG provided a facilitated track for private developers to obtain a title for "idle and unproductive lands." The land is most often inhabited by indigenous groups that rely on it for the perpetuation of their cultures and livelihoods. At the very least, a title is required by law for legal protection against a state sponsored initiative, but the process for obtaining a title is not an easy one. In 2002, the Ombudsman's Office identified at least seventeen steps in the process of obtaining an indigenous land title. In *Indigenous Rights and Development: Self-Determination in an Amazon Community*, Andrew Gray reported as many as twenty-six steps in the indigenous title process and a timeline as long as fifteen years (Gray 2002).

President Garcia made the decrees with the purpose of increasing the level of economic competitiveness in the region. The tribes in the region understand the ways that their lifestyles would change should industries be permitted to develop their land and utilize their resources. More than the imminent threats of development, the main concern of the tribes is their ability to decide their own fate.

Peru has much to gain from the agreement as it promotes stronger economic relations between the United States and Peru. The agreement presents substantial opportunities for foreign investment in agriculture, lumber, mining, and livestock, thus generating more employment and increased competition in the region. For the four tribes of interest, the most pressing concern is the development of logging and mining industries. Currently, the largest oil producer in Peru is Pluspetrol, an Argentine company that turns out about 69 percent of Peru's crude oil production. In 2007, Peru was consuming 145.29 thousand barrels of oil a day but it only produced 113.8 barrels a day. Since 1993, Peru has been a net importer of oil and so there is increased pressure on the further development of the petroleum industry (MBendi Information Services 2010).

State-owned Petroperu is the largest source of concern for the four tribes of interest. The industrial refinery is located in Iquitos and is capable of producing 10,500 barrels of crude oil per day. The oil that is extracted from the region is exported throughout northeastern Peru including some locations in Ecuador and Brazil. Petroperu is an important contributor to the nation's overall oil supply, but its website states that in recent years "the quality of petroleum extracted in the northern jungle has decreased" (Petroperu 2010). Petroperu is the most prominent oil company in the region that pertains to the four tribes of the Ampiyacu and Yaguasyacu Rivers. Oil exploration is an increasingly important pursuit for Petroperu and all those that

are dependent on the oil from the region. Logically, with the quality of oil extracted and the current wells getting poorer, Petroperu has an incentive to expand their oil extraction into new regions like the Ampiyacu or Yaguasyacu areas.

Although the tribes recognize the benefits that are presented by the trade agreement, they are suspicious that whatever profit is made by the agreement will have little positive impact on the indigenous population. Ambitious prospectors have already undermined the legitimacy of tribal governments and their self-determined land rights in the Putumayo. The *curaca* of the Huitoto community said"

Yes, [mining] could change [our culture] because these resources in these lands are ours. And we can't let people that are cheating us come in. . . . for example, the oil drillers or the dredgers. The dredgers came in from the Amazon and up the [Yaguasyacu] tributary without us knowing (Curaca of a Huitoto community 2008).

According to the *curaca*, his major concern involves more than the environmental changes that mining would present to his community. Above all, the *curaca* is concerned that outsiders might cheat them out of their land and undermine their self-determined rights. Miners are not the only ones who have secretly intruded into the tribal territories. Loggers have also been a consistent problem. Nearly all of the large lumber trees along the Ampiyacu and Yaguasyacu rivers where the Yagua, Ocaina, Bora, and Huitoto communities live have been harvested. The logging that has taken place is sufficient to distinguish clear alterations in the forest canopy along the rivers from satellite images.

Decree 1090, the New Forestry Law, declares that deforested areas are to be removed from the control of the state, therefore opening up the land for private sale and agricultural use. For the Huitoto and the Bora tribes that share the village of Pucaurquillo, illegal logging is more than losing trees; it is the first step in opening the land for private retail and losing the land they live on (El Congreso de la Republica del Perú 2008).

President Garcia intends to create a spirit of competition under the authority of the TPA to overcome the "ideologies of laziness" that exist in areas like the Amazon (Garcia 2007). He addressed the opportunities in natural resources and the obstacles preventing their development:

There are millions of hectares of timber lying idle, another million of hectares that communities and associations have not and will not cultivate, hundreds of mineral deposits that are not dug up, and millions of hectares of ocean not used for aquaculture.

The rivers that run down both sides of the mountains represent a fortune that reaches the sea without producing electricity.

Thus, there are many resources that are idling untradeable, which do not collect investments or generate employment. And all for the taboo of ideologies overcome by laziness, by sloth, or the law of the dog in the manger which reads: "If I don't do it myself, may nobody do it at all" (Garcia 2007).

The ideology that I witnessed in the tribes was not "If I don't do it myself, may nobody do it at all." Instead, the tribes that I observed implied that they would not give their consent if they were not consulted.

Decree 1090, commonly called the "law of the jungle" by the indigenous people, overruled the protected status of 45 million hectares of the Peruvian Amazon. Decree 1064 facilitated changes in zoning permits for prospective investors. With delegated authority, Garcia made more than 100 decrees concerning the U.S.-Peru TPA, including a law in February 2009 that legalizes squatters on more than 250,000 locations on private lands that were settled before 2005 (*The Economist* 2009). In response to these free trade decrees, tribes across the Amazon rallied together and protested against the exploitation of their lands and water (El Congreso de la Republica del Perú 2008).

In March 2009, *The Economist* called Garcia's decrees a "recipe for conflict". The statement proved prophetic on 5 June 2009 when police open fired on a group of indigenous protestors that had blocked regional roads and rivers and shut down a major oil plant. Reports from the communities accused the police of dumping some of the dead bodies in a nearby river. The tribes reacted and killed dozens of the police officers and held others hostage. In the end, the confrontations between the indigenous protestors and police officers resulted in more than fifty deaths.

The violent conflict drew international attention to the events taking place in the region as well as to Garcia's decrees. Many organizations, including *El Comercio*, accused the government of failing to uphold human and indigenous rights as set forth by the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*. On 8 June 8 2009 Decrees 1090 and 1064 were suspended.

### **The Representation Problem**

The success of the indigenous protests and the complexity of their grassroots movements are indicators that the political representation for the tribes on a national level is weak. Through protests, the tribes have found a way to inject themselves into the dialogue that is so crucial for their lands and communities. The communities along the Ampiyacu and Yaguasyacu Rivers, like most indigenous communities, have not taken part in the public protests. They are, however, supportive and aware of them. Living along small tributaries of the Amazon, hundreds of miles from any type of paved highway, these communities are not in the forefront of the conflict between indigenous peoples and the government. But, they watch from afar and they are as concerned about their self-determined rights as any other communities. A young woman in the Bora tribe said that the national government is currently making arrangements to let other countries take oil from "their" lands (land that they have no title to but that they use and depend on for livelihood) (Young woman in the Bora tribe 2008).

Like all the indigenous communities in Peru, the tribes in the Putumayo region of the Amazon face significant problems due to the nature of their representation. The principal problem is a basic democratic process that overlooks minority groups like those isolated in the jungle. Public officials are not accountable because tribes

are often unable to vote in elections due to the remoteness of their communities. While the tribes enjoy the privileges of creating their own systems of government with the rights to create their own communal laws and processes, they have little ability beyond their communities to take part in the national democratic process. Their need for representation has been acknowledged by private organizations like the Federation of Native Communities of the Ampiyacu (FECONA). The tribes of the Putumayo are able to vote every three years to elect a representative that will represent them before the government.

FECONA represents the needs of thirteen tribes in the Putumayo, including the four along the Ampiyacu and Yaguasyacu Rivers. FECONA is only one of more than fifty-five similar organizations that represent distinct regions and report to the National Organization of the Amazon Indigenous people of Peru (AIDESEP). These organizations are not legitimate governmental entities, so ultimately the indigenous communities are left to find some form of representation even if it means doing it through the private sector.

The tribes in Putumayo, along with almost 1,350 other communities, depend on AIDESEP to represent their needs to the national government. AIDESEP played an important role in organizing the Bagua protests and lobbying for their rights before the national congress. Similarly, when the Huitoto tribe had issues with invading miners and loggers in 2007, AIDESEP was there to represent them in Lima and successfully removed the machines and developers that had invaded their land. But since then, the Huitotoes say they have not seen a representative from FECONA or AIDESEP even though there are supposed to be monthly visits. The curaca of the Huitoto tribe commented, "now it's as if we were abandoned like orphans without a father . . . without a guide to help us work" (Curaca of the Huitoto tribe 2008).

Organizations like FECONA and AIDESEP are strong lobbyists for the rights of indigenous people when there is a crisis, but they do not replace the need for consistent and official political representation before the national government. The fact that the tribes depend on monthly visits from these organizations implies a top down bureaucracy rather than a bottom up democracy. In addition, organizations like FECONA and AIDESEP have little accountability to their constituents since the tribes remain isolated in the forest with limited means of communication.

When we asked two women in the Yagua tribe what they would do if they had a problem or a complaint for the regional government, they had no idea. Eventually they determined that their chief could probably go to Iquitos to be heard, but they said that there is little money at their disposal for such a trip. Going to Iquitos is not an easy task. For passage to Iquitos, the entire community contributes funds to send one representative. Once the representative arrives in Iquitos, he or she struggles to find someone who will listen to his or her complaints.

Within each of the four observed tribes, a representative or president is elected by public vote. This representative may make occasional trips to Iquitos where FECONA has its office. The trips to the city most often prove to be unfruitful. Rumors circulate in the Bora community that the tribe's representatives are receiving bribes in cash and

alcohol from authorities in FECONA. Whether the rumors are true or not, in the end, the tribes feel like their voices seldom make it up the bureaucratic ladder to the ears of those who make the laws.

The tribes recognize their dependence on the land and rivers around them and they are aware of how speculative industries would affect them. They are aware that mining industries will have a significant effect on their traditional culture and they want to be recognized as legitimate governments that have the rights to dictate their future and to reject modern developments if they choose to.

During these times of political unrest and economic opportunities, these four tribal communities are not homogenous in their views of industrial development. They face the challenge of creating a cohesive identity that can span the distance between villages, tribes, and languages and give the people a solid voice at the table of national politics and policy making. For this reason, many indigenous protests, like those in Bagua, have been isolated and inconsistent. The views of individuals and collective tribes range from isolationism to assimilation. However, one thing that the tribes do appear to agree on is that the decrees made by Alan Garcia undermine their self-determined rights to dictate what happens to their communities and the future of their tribes. Long periods without contact and rumors of corruption have created a sense of distrust towards the very organizations that represent the Putumayo and the Ampiyacu communities—FECONA and AIDESEP. Whether these rumors are true remains a question, but the fact that the rumors exist and are perpetuated throughout the tribes implies that there exists a problem of representation.

### **Culture and Tradition**

The Yagua, Bora, Huitoto, and Ocaina communities have clung to their cultures by creating a tribal government that combines traditional hierarchal positions like the *curaca* with more modern positions like the tribe president and teachers. Like any society, these public positions are established for the purpose of protecting certain liberties that the community values. The most valued traditions within these communities are closely tied with the environment around them. The style of their homes, dress, song, dance, stories, medicines, and even languages are influenced by the environment. Much of the efforts of the officials in the tribe are spent protecting these commonly held values. The trips to Iquitos, the meetings with other tribal leaders, and the interactions with organizations like FECONA or AIDESEP are done with the mission of protecting the tribe's self-determined rights.

One way in which the tribes maintain traditions is with their uses for plants around them. The Ocaina tribe, for example, has infused the use of the coca leaf with the cultural identity of their tribe. Like the other three tribes, the Ocaina have what they call a *maloca*, or a communal meeting house. Inside the *maloca*, the Ocaina operate a type of factory. The coca leaves are dried by the fire and then placed in a hollow trunk and beat with a wooden rod. The leaves of the setico plant are burned and the ashes are mixed with the crushed coca leaf. Unlike the other fine powder produced by the coca leaf (cocaine), the coca powder is not a hallucinogen but a stimulant. The powder



is packed in the cheek and it allows one to work without becoming too tired or hungry. However, the coca leaf is more than a stimulant for the Ocaina, it is a tradition that has created a coherent identity for the Ocaina from one generation to the next. They are proud of their traditions because it distinguishes them from other indigenous tribes.

There are also traditions, knowledge, and history that are shared by a more broad demographic of indigenous peoples. Vicente of the Yagua community lives with his family on a small peninsula with the Ampiyacu River on one side and a lagoon that is left from the Ampiyacu's ancient rout on the other. Past the lagoon is a stretch of land that continues to the banks of the Amazon River. He took us on a hike through those woods and educated us on some of the plants and their uses. One particular tree looked well used. The bark was cut all around the base and Vicente explained that the sap that drips from the tree is used as a blood coagulant and it is useful for healing women after childbirth. The tamuri tree is also important to the Yagua and is used to treat the fever. The cumaseba tree is used as a general pain killer. The bark of the chanchama tree has been used for generations to make clothing for the Yagua and many other tribes. Continuing further, we came across another tree that appeared to have been cut so much that it was practically destroyed. He called it the caucho tree and explained that the thick sap of the tree could be boiled to create a tough material—rubber. It was this tree that began the rubber boom in the Amazon and led to the exploitation of the indigenous tribes to work as slaves for its production. Vicente explained that his ancestors were tortured and killed when they were unable to bring back enough of the sap to satisfy the demands of the *couchos* (Vicente Alvan 2008).

Vicente's knowledge of the plants of the forest and his understanding of the history of the rubber boom were passed to him orally from his parents and he passes the knowledge to his own children in the same manner. Conversations about the mysteries of the jungle are common in the evenings when people are talking around the firelight. Traditional knowledge, as well as suspicion of white people and outsiders, is perpetuated orally. Since much of the history of the rubber boom is recorded simply through oral stories, Hardenburg points out that, whether exaggerated or not, "the narratives are in themselves evidence of the process whereby a culture of terror was created and sustained" (Taussig 1984, 482).

The most recent generations have overcome extreme fear of white people and outsiders, but older members of the Yagua tribe along the Ampiyacu River recall being taught as children that white people were to be feared. These traditions are being overcome and the tribes are once again opening up to visitors, even encouraging tourism to their communities. However, one can still sense the paranoia of outside influences and the tribe's determination to remain immune from those pressures. When an outsider visits the tribe, he or she is expected to bring some kind of an offering to present to the tribe. If the individual is permitted to visit the community, the tribe will offer a drink of *masato*. The drink is made from the root of the yuca and when mixed with water it becomes milky and ferments easily. Some of the four tribes are more welcoming of visitors than others, but all of them are protective of their people and customs.

The tribes of the Ampiyacu and Yaguasyacu Rivers are, for the most part, self-sufficient and desire to maintain a degree of isolation. However, there are ever-increasing variables that encourage the tribes to rely less on isolationism and more on assimilation. Although the Yagua tribe on the Ampiyacu River is located near the town of Pebas, it relies more on hunting and fishing than trading in the market in Pebas. Their primary source of protein is from the fish they catch from the Ampiyacu. The fish they depend on are the piranha and the catfish. Primarily, the men in the community assume the responsibilities for fishing and hunting while the women do most of the cooking. The consensus among the men in the community is that the size and quantity of the fish in the river have decreased substantially just in the last decade. The average size of fish caught over the two-day period we observed was approximately six to eight inches. The tribesmen claimed that the fish were previously much larger in a greater variety. Large fish like the tungaro have become increasingly scarce. The sustainability of the natural reproduction of fish, plants, and animals is a determinant for the sustainability of tribal autonomy. As the natural resources of the jungle become increasingly scarce, the pressure for tribal assimilation into more modern societies increases.

The Yagua, Bora, Huitoto, and Ocaina are only a few of the tribes that have decided to maintain traditional lifestyles and resist assimilation into more modern societies. With a growing market for resources like oil and gas that are abundant in the Amazon, the tribes of the Putumayo region face an additional threat to their self-determined existence. President Garcia's initiative to develop the Amazon and the prospective gas and oil miners exploring deeper into the forest threaten some of the vital aspects of the tribal cultures—land, animal, and water resources. Tribes have responded to the changing environment and the impending developments by becoming increasingly politically involved, with aid from private organizations like AIDSEP and FECONA. However, the tribal political institutions lack direct involvement through democratic representation that is necessary for political legitimacy.

We sat with the presidents, *curacas*, and teachers of the Bora and Huitoto tribes in their maloca in Pucaurquillo. The dialogue between the two tribes was not one of anti-development or anti-government. The teacher of the Boras talked about the importance of educating their youth in the fields of engineering and agriculture so that they could come back and educate the elders in the community as well. An elder Huitoto talked about the importance of land and the need for sufficient land for their children and future generations. They talked about the future of their tribes and the circumstances that their children would inherit. They expressed their frustration with the difficult process that is required for obtaining a title for the land they currently live on. They understand that the repercussions for living on untitled and unproductive land could be devastating if the government or mining industries find their land to be rich in petroleum resources. They feel threatened. Their close neighbors, the Ocaina, actually have a legitimate title for their land. Nevertheless, just two months before our visit, they found out that petroleum exploration was taking place on their land. "It was a big hit to our community," said the president of the Ocaina village.

The tribes' concern about insufficient land for future generations is a legitimate one. If we were to consider the Bora community of the Yaguasyacu River as an autonomous nation and compare the people per square kilometer in the Bora nation to that in the Peruvian nation, the Boras would have about 33 percent more people per square kilometer than the Peruvian nation. In reality, the Boras are not an autonomous nation and they are under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Peru. Article 88 of the Peruvian Constitution guarantees the right of ownership *sobre* (over) the land. This means that the state owns all of the resources that are found beneath the surface of the land such as minerals, water, and petroleum. Ultimately, even with a land title, the indigenous communities feel threatened by the state.

## Conclusion

The Yagua, Ocaina, Bora, and Huitoto tribes in the Putumayo have been influenced by modern development since their initial contact during the rubber boom. One of the resultant effects is a more organized tribal society with presidents, teachers, and *curacas* that give the tribes more legitimacy in regional politics and the ability to preserve themselves.

Although major improvements in tribal representation were made with the creation of organizations like FECONA and AIDESEP in the 1980s, occasional representation is not sufficient for the needs of the communities. With the current system of representation, FECONA and AIDESEP have little accountability to the tribes when there is no major crisis. What the tribes want is to be recognized as a political self-determining entity. Until there is a more direct form of representation, conflicts like those in the Bagua province might arise when the tribes feel threatened. This occasional representation from private organizations encourages distrust among the already suspicious tribes.

With the new powers granted to the executive branch concerning the new Trade Promotion Agreement between the U.S. and Peru, NGOs like FECONA and AIDESEP are insufficient for proper representation for indigenous people in the Amazon. Decrees 1090 and 1064 were not sufficiently challenged until indigenous protests became violent and the attention of international organizations was drawn to the issue.

The successful suspension of some of Garcia's decrees does not mean that the tribes are being properly represented; rather, successful reform through violence only encourages more violence. The tribes in the Amazon continue to protest because the underlying problem of lack of representation still remains. Until there is a more efficient and legitimate form of representation than international organizations and NGOs, tribes will continue to feel victimized by the government and its policies. The violent protests that took place in the province of Bagua embody the sentiment of tribes across the Amazon in reaction to political segregation. The current system of representation is not conducive for the sustainability of tribal autonomy and livelihood. The development that is encouraged by the Garcia administration threatens the natural habitat that allows the tribes to remain autonomous. The balance between economic profit and tribal sustainability is a delicate one, in which the value of human rights,

human life, and culture should be considered. The current lack of representation of the indigenous community encourages policy makers in Peru to focus more on economic progress than on human rights advancement. According to the teacher in the Bora community, it is not about anti-development, instead it is about having the power to determine one's future.

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# The Cuban Embargo: Detrimental to Cuba, the United States, and Democracy

by McClain Napier

## A Brief History of U.S.–Cuban Relations

The U.S. and Cuba have a long and complicated history dating back to the colonial age. In fact, the U.S. played a key role in helping Cuba attain independence from Spain in the late-nineteenth century. Both before and after Cuban independence, the two countries enjoyed numerous trading privileges, mainly focusing on Cuba's abundant sugar production (Porter 2006).

However, this all changed in the mid-twentieth century, during a very tense time of the Cold War. In 1959, a group of leftist revolutionaries—led by Fidel and Raul Castro and Ernesto Guevara—toppled the dictatorial regime of Fulgencio Batista. Upon establishing a socialist government, Fidel Castro seized and expropriated all American-owned industries on the island. In response, President Dwight D. Eisenhower called for the first of many embargos against the island nation (Porter 2006). Seizing the opportunity to win a western hemisphere ally, the Soviet Union filled the trading gap left by American sanctions, promising heavy subsidies to Cuban products (Medland 1990).

Fearing the myriad of potential dangers from a Soviet-allied Cuba, President John F. Kennedy authorized the coup d'état of the new, Castro government through the ill-fated Bay of Pigs fiasco. The failed coup accompanied the 1961 comprehensive embargo against Cuba called the Foreign Assistance Act (Teegan 2002). These events were followed by the Cuban Missile Crisis, which ended with the U.S. promising to never invade Cuba (Medland 1990).

Modern developments have seen both relaxing and tightening of the sanctions against Cuba. President Jimmy Carter allowed U.S. travel restrictions to expire; however, those restrictions were reinstated under the Reagan administration. Other steps toward normalization taken by the Ford and Reagan administrations were also undone by the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act and the 1996 Helms-Burton Act (Teegan 2002).

In 2000, President Bill Clinton authorized the Trade Sanctions Reform and the Export Enhancement Act, which allowed the sale of agricultural and medical goods for the purpose of humanitarian aid (Teegan 2002). Finally, in 2003, President George W. Bush spearheaded the creation of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC). This commission called for the allocation of \$80 million annually to endeavors that would foster a democratic movement at the grassroots level through an increase in information technology (Hanson 2008).

### **Current U.S. Policy on Cuba**

In short, the embargo on Cuba has essentially remained the same for nearly half a decade. However, instead of existing for the purpose of containing communism, as was the case during the Cold War, the embargo against Cuba exists today for the purpose of promoting democracy in the remnant communist regime (Bush 2007).

In a speech given in October 2007, then-President Bush summarized the principal caveat that has kept America's sanctions against Cuba alive: "As long as the regime maintains its monopoly over the political and economic life of the Cuban people, the U.S. will keep the embargo in place." In response to critics of the embargo, Bush argued that Cuba's terrible economic condition is not a product of the long-lived American embargo but of the corrupt communist regime that has controlled everyday life on the island for the past fifty years. He applauded members of Congress who sought to provide "additional funding to support Cuban democracy efforts" (Bush 2007).

Therefore, current U.S. policy on Cuba is two-fold. First, the U.S. aims to preserve the embargo until Cuba makes the first transitional move to a democratic government. Second, the U.S. continues to provide funding to pro-democratic efforts in Cuba.

### **Why the Current Policy is Ineffective and Detrimental**

The primary reason the current policy against Cuba is ineffective is because it misses its intended target—Cuba's party leaders; instead, it punishes citizens with impoverishment (CATO 2008). Pope John Paul II vocalized the dilemma of these sanctions in 1998 when he visited Cuba, declaring that sanctions, like the ones against Cuba, are "always deplorable, because they hurt the most needy" (Griswold 2000).

Statistics show that a significant majority of Cuba's population live in poverty. The CIA World Factbook reported that the average GDP per capita in Cuba is \$4,500 (CIA 2008). Other sources have shown that the average monthly income of a Cuban citizen is a mere ten dollars, while pensioners receive a meager four dollars per month (Roberts 2008). As mentioned in Bush's 2007 speech, there are many who would argue that Cuba's poverty is a result of corrupt leadership and not solely of the embargo (Bush 2007). However, there are many studies that draw a clear correlation between Cuba's mass poverty and the longstanding embargo. For instance, a study performed by professors at George Washington University showed that active sanctions have disrupted from 17 to 27 percent of Cuba's possible imports due to the significant symbiotic relationship between the U.S. and Cuba (Teegan 2002).

Furthermore, medical studies have shown the negative personal effects of the embargo on citizens. In 1997, doctors from Columbia University found that because the embargo raised the prices of food and medical supplies, it was nearly impossible for the poorer classes—a substantial portion of Cuban society—to gain access to these essential commodities. The study examined the effects of economic decline, due to the fall of the USSR and the tightened embargo from 1992. The authors analyzed data from various sources, such as nutrition factors, disease increase, and hospital diagnoses. They reported that the economic changes of 1992 generally resulted in a much lower nutritional level among citizens, more widespread infectious diseases, and a higher rate of violent deaths (Garfield 1997).

In a similar medical study performed a year earlier, Anthony Kirkpatrick studied the effects of the American embargo on citizens' ability to obtain food and medicine. He found that even though the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act exempted the sale of food and medicine to Cuba from sanction, the reemphasized strictness of the 1996 Helms-Burton Act once again removed these items from the reach of the general populous. This, he showed, resulted in a manifestation of neurological diseases greater than any Cuba has seen the past century (Kirkpatrick 1996).

Second, the act is detrimental because it weakens the U.S.' standing abroad. For instance, one of the more controversial provisions of the Helms-Burton Act gave certain American businesses the right to sue foreign companies that trade with Cuban companies. The act argues that these American businesses are justified since a good portion of Cuban industry utilizes property that was expropriated during the Communist Revolution. Many nations and international organizations like Canada, the EU, and the OAS argue that this provision violates international trading law and condemn it simply as an attempt to influence governments to a foreign cause (The Cuban Experience 1999).

Despite threats from this provision, many world powers like Canada, the UK, Russia, China, and much of Latin America, still maintain trade with Cuba. This effectively removes the teeth from the embargo needed to really suffocate Cuban industry. The results are that Cuba makes just enough in international dealings to support its regime but still suffers due to the American embargo. Therefore, the people continue to suffer while the regime thrives (Griswold 2000).

Indeed, the U.S. is one of the only nations that observes the embargo. In 2006, the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly voted to end the embargo for the fifteenth year in a row calling it a "breach of freedom of trade and navigation." Of the 188 countries participating in the assembly, 183 voted to end the embargo. Only four countries (Israel, the Marshall Islands, Palau, and the U.S.) voted for the continuation of the embargo and one (the Federated States of Micronesia) abstained from voting (U.S. Fed News 2006).

Third, the embargo negatively affects U.S. interests. For instance, Daniel Griswold with CATO Institute found that the economic sanctions against Cuba "have cost American exporters fifteen billion to nineteen billion in lost annual sales overseas." He also stated that the embargo had "caused long-term damage to U.S. companies" from "lost market share and reputations abroad as unreliable suppliers" (Griswold

2000). This should come as no surprise since so many countries reject the Cuban embargo and oppose its continuation.

More important than the economic consequences of the Cuban embargo are the political ramifications that prove detrimental to American interests. As the U.S. continues its unilateral embargo, and as numerous other world powers skirt American threats, Cuban leadership more easily portrays the U.S. as a corrupt "bad guy," trying to use its power to force the rest of the world to do its bidding. In this way, Cuban leaders not only find a common enemy to use as a factor to rally domestic support from its own citizens, but they win the sympathy of the international community. Cuba becomes stronger as sympathetic countries add their economic aid to the "Cuban victim." Also, as Cuba is more widely seen as a victim surviving the American bully, countries like Venezuela and Iran become more emboldened in their own endeavors and jointly throw their support behind the island nation (Brookings Institution 2008).

Finally, the most telling indicator of the ineffectiveness of America's policy against Cuba is probably the most obvious. Despite nearly a half decade of continually staunch sanctions, the policy has not met its objective of unseating the communist regime. Whether or not the sanctions succeeded in preventing a further spread of communism in the Latin America-Caribbean area is a different subject for debate. However, the modern objective to effect democratic change in Cuba has gone unfulfilled. Considering Cuba rebounded, to some extent, and survived the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a future democratic transition as a result of the current embargo seems highly unlikely.

### **Policy Suggestions**

In order to remedy the obvious problems of the current policy against Cuba and to better promote democracy in Cuba, I offer three simple changes the U.S. government must adopt.

#### *Remove Communication Barriers and Restore Diplomatic Relations*

Carlos Pascual, of the Brookings Institution, summarized the dilemma of restricting communication with another country. Pascual referred to the U.S. interaction with numerous communist bloc countries during the Cold War and the success of their interactions:

What we've come to understand is that some of the most dramatic changes that have occurred in the international community have been linked with engagements. In the Eastern bloc it was in part that engagement with Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic, the then Czechoslovakia, that was so critical to the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 in keeping alive the aspirations of people there who believed in change (Pascual 2008).

Vicki Huddleston, also with Brookings, applied this history lesson to the current situation with Cuba:

If we remove the barriers to communication, we will speed the forces of change. Just as was the case in Eastern Europe as a result of the Helsinki agreement, the



Cuban people will be empowered by human contact, the free flow of information, and the support and encouragement of Americans and Cuban-Americans from Florida to California. Removing the barriers to communications and to normal diplomatic relations are not concessions as some would claim. Rather, they are practical initiatives that will reduce the dependence of the Cuban people on the Cuban state by providing them with alternative sources of information and resources to improve their daily lives (Huddleston 2008).

History clearly shows that communication is the key in creating any kind of substantial change, whether it be in relations between countries, or in a regime itself. If one wants to foster democracy, it must be grown from the bottom up and not forced to grow by sanctions. This can take place more easily as a country's populous sees for themselves how their lives could be better through a different government. One of the biggest flaws of the Bay of Pigs invasion was that Kennedy falsely believed that the exiles would be welcomed and that the coup would be popular among the people (Lynch 2007). However, most Cubans had not known democracy. Most had only known the American-backed dictatorship of Batista that had squandered the country's resources through corruption (Argote-Freyre 2006). If Cubans had realized the benefits of democracy and the downfalls of communism, the Bay of Pigs invasion might have been a success.

The same stands today. Until the Cuban people know the benefits of democracy, they will not be ready or willing to replace their authoritarian regime. Therefore, I suggest the U.S. establish greater engagement with Cuba by reopening the American embassy in Havana and by reopening the Cuban embassy in Washington, D.C. Furthermore, there must be regular engagements between the ambassadors and leaders of the two countries. This will effectively normalize relations between Cuba and the U.S. and make it possible to implement the next two steps in Cuba's democratic transition.

#### *Eliminate Travel Restrictions*

The second step goes hand in hand with the principle established in the first. Greater interaction prepares the soil for democracy to grow. However, this step moves communication and engagement from the realm of diplomats to the realm of citizens.

As citizens of both countries are allowed to move freely between the nations, there will be further sharing of ideas and culture. Cubans who come to the U.S. will see the high standard of living afforded by a democratic government. As the U.S. and its organizations travel en masse to Cuba, they will transport with them humanity and inspiration—humanity because Cubans will see Americans in person and see that they are not enemies but potential friends and inspiration because Americans will convey by simple communication and interaction the very essence of democracy, freedom.

The Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF) is an organization dedicated to serving the interests of Cuban exiles and to helping impoverished family members in Cuba. Traditionally, the organization has objected to removing the U.S. embargo against Cuba. However, this organization sees the obvious benefit of free travel be-

tween nations. In a 2007 policy recommendation to the White House, they promoted the idea of allowing Cuban-Americans free access to the island:

Visits to Cuba are essential to moving events on-island. Cuban-American family members can act as ambassadors of change, taking much needed assistance, but more importantly, helping to transmit that message of hope and support, as well as dispel the regime's propaganda intended to further divide the Cuban family and create fear of change. It is evident by the regime's actions to restrict access to Cuba, particularly by international media outlets, that it seeks to carefully select what the world is privy to. This is precisely why, a liberalization of Cuban-American travel is also crucial to learning more about the internal situation and helping to further destabilize the regime's hold on power (CANF 2007).

Even though CANF recommends granting free travel access only to Cuban-Americans, one can still see from their ideas the role that Americans in general would play in promoting a democratic change in Cuba.

#### *Reinstall Trade with Cuba*

Finally, after relations between the U.S. and Cuba have been normalized, and after a free flow of citizens exists between the two countries, Cuba will be ready for the finishing touch that will dissolve the regime's grip over the people, trade.

In *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, Thomas L. Friedman discussed the idea of "the golden straightjacket and the electronic herd," which illustrated certain principles of interdependence in the modern business world. To paraphrase Friedman, he explained that a country puts on the golden straightjacket when they adopt the principles of trade and capitalism, which means that they become bound to these principles and are richly rewarded for doing so. The electronic herd represented the gaggle of investors around the world. If a country chose to go against the principles of trade and capitalism that typically correlate to a healthy market—if the country chose to break free of the golden straightjacket—the electronic herd will avoid the country. This may happen because investors fear the country's recklessness in not obeying the rules will result in poor returns on their investments (Friedman 1999).

How do these ideas apply to American trade with Cuba? It is very simple. As of yet, under the communist regime, Cuba has not engaged in full trade with the U.S., as noted previously, this disrupts a projected 17 to 27 percent of potential Cuban imports (Teegan 2002). This number becomes more substantial as the U.S. becomes a more significant trading partner to Cuba. Cuba will slowly but surely realize the importance of binding themselves to the golden straightjacket. They will taste the sweetness of prosperity from increased trading with the U.S., and they will realize that this prosperity is linked to following the rules and not scaring away the electronic herd. They will perceive their interdependence on American trading. Therefore, little by little they will bind themselves in the golden straightjacket by adopting the strict observance of the policies that attract investors, such as an un-centralized economy and a free market. Once they are bound in the golden straight jacket, they will be more susceptible to U.S. influence that would compel them to switch to a democratic government.

More so, even if the communist regime in Cuba is unwilling to release their authoritarian grip over the country, the people will demand it. After so much cultural inflow from the U.S., the Cuban people will finally be convinced of the benefits of the freedoms afforded by democracy. Therefore, in order to avoid a bloody revolution (which could scare away investors), the Cuban government will make gradual concessions to the populous to not appear weak and will slowly transition to a democracy.

There are a few steps that must be followed for the plan to be implemented successfully. Most importantly, the trade must be re-instated gradually. In the previously mentioned study from George Washington University, the authors predicted that Cuban industries' capacity to produce has become atrophied over the years of economic depreciation. As a result, any increase in production of essential goods to meet U.S. demands would detract from the consumption needs of the Cuban populous (Teegan 2002). Therefore, in order to avoid any possible increase in citizen starvation, the U.S. would have to engage in trade with Cuba sector by sector. For instance, instead of permitting all American industry to do business with Cuba, the U.S. might allow only electro-domestic industries to trade. Each year, the U.S. would allow another sector to trade. All the while, the U.S. government would need to continue its current annual CAFC amount of \$80 million to Cuba for the continued purpose of improving Cuban industries and structure.

Some people believe there may be negative implications for U.S. agriculture by reinstating trade with Cuba. However, this is not the case. The authors of the study from George Washington University predicted that U.S. agriculture would actually benefit from trade with Cuba. They found that exports with Cuba alone would earn an estimated 400 million to one billion for the agricultural sector and would create around six thousand jobs as a result (Teegan 2002).

## Conclusions

The principal objective of the current embargo on Cuba is to foster a democratic government on the island nation. However, the current policy is clearly not achieving its objective. The embargo is ineffective and detrimental to the U.S. because it hurts the Cuban people—not the leadership. The policy harms U.S. world standing, gives the Cuban government a common enemy for which it can rally domestic support from other countries, and the test of time has proven that the policy is unsuccessful in removing the Cuban regime.

Clearly, the answer lies in change. By reopening diplomatic communication with Cuba, we reestablish our historic friendship. By allowing our citizens to travel freely between the countries, we permit the conveyance of American culture and ideals to the Cuban populous, which facilitates the growth of democracy from the ground up. Finally, by reimplementing trade with Cuba at a gradual pace, we slowly bind the Cuban leadership with the golden straightjacket and induce dependence on American trade. This policy would avoid all the pitfalls of the current policy and, more importantly, it will be successful.

In conclusion, I emphasize the need for the U.S. government to enact this policy as soon as possible. The Brookings Institution recently held a conference on policy

ideas toward Cuba. They discussed the fact that Cuba has a vast, untapped source of energy, both within natural oil reserves and ethanol production from sugar crops. Furthermore, the conference members found that once the Cuban government fully taps these energy sources, they will gain additional revenues of around three to five billion annually. All participants at the conference agreed that when Cuba reaches this point of production, they will be substantially less influenced by the U.S. (The Brookings Institution 2008).

Therefore, one hopes that President Barack Obama will make good on his campaign promises to ease restrictions against Cuba, as this will at least proffer some benefits. Ideally, the embargo must be lifted. If the U.S. truly hopes to transition Cuba from authoritarianism to democracy, then the time to make these changes is now.

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# The Ghost of Shaka Zulu: Using a List Experiment to Measure Xenophobia in South Africa

by Kennard Noyes

## Introduction

Shaka Zulu's reign of bloody supremacy over the part of South Africa that is now Kwazulu Natal was characterized by ruthless domination of neighboring tribes and cultures. Although his reign was cut short when he was murdered in 1829, his legacy of ethnocentrism and antagonism to outsiders has continued to haunt South Africa. Indeed, strife between tribes and cultures has been a tragic characterization of each stage of South Africa's history from the times of colonization by the British and the Dutch Voortrekkers to the injustices of apartheid and the modern waves of xenophobic violence. The internal strife of the "rainbow nation" has made it the proving ground for legendary humanitarians such as Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela. At the end of apartheid, Nelson Mandela led the African National Congress (ANC) era with the unifying slogan, "one nation, many cultures," and hopes for a new era of unity and equality throughout the country were high (Ross 1999, 1–15). Sadly though, incidents of xenophobic violence against immigrants, primarily from Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Somalia, have occurred with increasing regularity since the end of apartheid in 1994 (Misago 2009, 22–28). The xenophobic unrest came to a terrible crescendo in May 2008 when attacks and rioting resulted in sixty-two deaths, millions of dollars in collateral damage, and over 100,000 people displaced (Misago 2009, 2).

The ANC message of reconciliation and pan-Africanism appears particularly shallow when juxtaposed with the violence committed against foreigners and the accusations against ANC officials of making xenophobic remarks to further their own candidacies (Hudson 2009). Prior to the April 2009 presidential elections in South Africa, news reports indicated evidence that political parties were using xenophobic messages to drum up support for their campaigns (Berack 2008). This duality offers a second, and possibly even more troubling, facet to an already grim situation.

Current literature regarding xenophobia in South Africa focuses primarily on aftermath studies of areas affected by sudden eruptions of xenophobic violence. While these studies make important contributions by focusing only on the epicenters of the violence, they potentially fail to offer an accurate depiction of xenophobia among South Africans in general. Granted, ex-post studies of xenophobic violence are one of the few sure methods of dealing with inherent problems that come when measuring illicit behaviors and antisocial tendencies. Respondents have a high incentive to lie or hide their true feelings when confronted with questions regarding socially sensitive issues. Information gathered regarding commonalities in populations whose actions provide clear evidence of xenophobia provide one of the only sure methods of gathering information on demographics that are prone to these kinds of behavior. The puzzle remains as to the true levels of xenophobia within all sectors of South African society. This question is particularly poignant given the reports of political leaders exploiting these tensions. These actions allow individuals who may not participate in violent uprisings to empower leaders who will be more likely to push xenophobic policies.

This paper attempts to present a clearer representation of xenophobia in South Africa as well as provide some indications of its potential use in the 2009 presidential elections through strategic use of a unique survey method. While survey questions form a standard facet of almost any research design, regular survey methods are only effective insofar as the researcher can be reasonably sure that the respondents will give truthful answers. Problems arise when the nature of the question is overly sensitive or intrusive and provides an incentive for the respondent to answer in a way that they think is socially acceptable rather than give a response that represents their true feelings. Researchers have devised several methods to counteract this problem. This study involves several sensitive issues and uses list questions to avoid the bias that comes from these social expectations. In this paper, I apply this method to evaluate true levels of xenophobia and how they affect electoral decisions.

The recent xenophobic violence in South Africa and its possible exploitation by political parties in their 2009 presidential elections grants this study important implications for more than just analyses of xenophobia in Africa. Xenophobia is pervasive throughout many areas of the world, including Europe and North America, with the rapid influx of immigrants from Northern Africa and Latin America. The methods this study employs to uncover the true effect of xenophobia in society may be applied to gain better understanding of xenophobic violence throughout the world.

I will begin by reviewing relevant literature on xenophobia throughout the world and within South Africa and discuss various issues related to ethnic strength and its importance to this topic. Second, I present the causal logic between the mechanisms that result in xenophobic violence and the subsequent political exploitation of these events. Finally, I outline the experimental model, methodology, findings, and implications for further research.

## Literature Review

Xenophobia is a central issue not only in South Africa but throughout many

areas of the world. One study defines xenophobia as “the denigration of individuals or groups based on perceived differences” (Hjerm 1998). While this offers a broad definition to the issue of xenophobia, it is primarily associated with issues of tension or violence between an in-group of established residents of one state in opposition to newcomers, generally immigrants, from a foreign state. Tajfel attributes xenophobic tensions to the relentless tendency of individuals and groups to categorize their surroundings (1981, 1982). Peterson lists four separate causation models for ethnic violence that he sums up as fear, hatred, resentment, and rage. Each of these models entails one group as the alleged perpetrator of some offense to another group with the will and power to react violently (Peterson 2002). Toft includes the idea that infringement upon territory is also a common feature in ethnic and xenophobic conflicts (Toft 2003). Xenophobic and ethnic related disputes have played an unmistakable role in countless conflicts primarily because the strong feelings related to nationality and identity serve as powerful activation mechanisms. Also noteworthy in this section are the numerous studies regarding the role of xenophobic and ethnic pressures in democratic elections. Global studies regarding the role of xenophobia in elections have found strong commonalities between xenophobic tensions in the electorate and corresponding electoral outcomes (Alexseev 2006).

Research specific to the issue of xenophobia in South Africa has increased steadily in response to the rapid immigration of Zimbabweans and Malawians who saturate the already overloaded job market in South Africa, which has maintained a steady rate of well over 20 percent unemployment over the last decade (IMF External Relations Department 2009). Those who live in townships in the major cities of South Africa stand to suffer the most from this influx, because the immigrants compete for the same low-skilled labor positions that they would normally fill (Misago 2009).

The literature regarding ethnic violence and xenophobia within South Africa has focused primarily on identifying the trouble spots on an ex-post basis. Following the outbreak of xenophobic violence in South Africa during May 2008, researchers from the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg attempted to identify why certain areas seemed more prone to violence than others (Misago 2009). This study typifies South African research in general on this topic in that each major eruption of xenophobic violence gives rise to several subsequent studies that attempt to explain the occurrence. The results depicted in the aforementioned study out of Witwatersrand mirrored those of an earlier study conducted just after the transition from apartheid (Harris 2001). These articles carry a common theme of attributing the violence to a phenomenon that Harris refers to as scapegoating or blaming the foreign minority for perceived institutional losses such as low wages or poor job opportunities.

Scapegoating is a common feature in xenophobic literature dealing with subjects from outside of South Africa as well (Lake 1996). International studies of xenophobic violence also implicate local politics as another aggravating factor that contribute to xenophobic tension. One study actually indicated that politicians, especially—but not exclusively—in local contexts, would use the energy that came along with xenophobic demonstrations to garner more political support (Steinberg 2008). These



findings are mirrored by studies conducted throughout Europe that show similar tactics among even such notable European politicians as Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl (Thränhardt 1995). Other researchers have also indicated that ethnic violence in South Africa and elsewhere is precipitated by the media as well by reinforcing poor intercultural communication (Mogekwu 2005). Following this same vein, Heidi Hudson points out that the history of xenophobic violence within South Africa constitutes a significant disconnect between South African foreign policy and domestic politics. Since the end of apartheid, South African foreign policy has promoted a pan-African movement towards better integration and cooperation; however, as she points out, this could not contrast more with the steady recurrence of xenophobic violence that occurs on a more local level within South Africa. Hudson contends that this rift has the potential of leading to increased civil unrest and violence in post-apartheid South Africa (2009). This final analysis underlines the importance of ascertaining the depth of xenophobia in South African society and evaluating the commitment of leading political parties to their stated objectives of pan-African cooperation through proper statistical analysis.

In a study that comes closer to the approach that I advocate in this paper, researchers used survey data to evaluate common perceptions of which sectors of South African society are more prone to xenophobia. Common knowledge in South Africa previously seemed to indicate that Zulus and people of lower education were more likely to exhibit xenophobic tendencies, but this study showed, among other things, that people of the Xhosa tribe, along with more educated groups, were much more likely to admit to xenophobic feelings (Solomon 1998). Some of these conclusions are problematic, since they did not subject their findings to rigorous statistical analysis. When studying how levels of education affected xenophobic tensions, their criteria for measuring education could just as easily have been explained by the age of the respondents rather than their level of education. More importantly, the sensitive questions they asked respondents were very likely to have elicited biased responses. While these results are intriguing, my experiment will attempt to extend, evaluate, and possibly corroborate Solomon's analysis. The primary difference will be my attempt to improve upon its methodology through randomization techniques and the implementation of a list experiment.

## Theory

While there are many means by which xenophobia becomes a serious issue throughout society, the mechanism that this study investigates is what researcher Bronwyn Harris refers to as "scapegoating" or blaming the foreign minority for perceived institutional losses such as low wages or poor job market (2001). This effect seems to be most common in areas of the world that experience rapid immigrant influxes. Though this study focuses on the dramatic events taking place in South Africa, the scapegoat effect is readily apparent in many countries. The massive movement of Mexican immigrants into the U.S., African immigration into western Europe, and Haitian immigrants swarming into the Dominican Republic, are all examples of cases

that have resulted in scapegoating and have erupted into violent demonstrations against the foreign minorities that resident groups blame for their misfortunes.

Often, the increased competition for jobs and other resources that arises in response to a massive influx of immigrants result in violence. This violence is caused because resident groups believe they are more entitled to the resources that may have been more plentiful prior to the entry of the foreign group. Although differing from case to case, these violent demonstrations are often condemned by both foreign and domestic groups and are generally punished by law (excluding the cases in which they are instigated by governmental forces). Given South Africa's unique record in ethnic conflicts stemming from its tragic history of colonization and the legacy of apartheid, there is reason to believe the citizens are aware of public opinions and social norms regarding bigotry and xenophobia. These considerations indicate the necessity of a method to circumvent the social response bias. Even if we disregard the effect of the social norms and expectations within South African society itself, there is reason to believe that respondents in a survey experiment administrated by foreign researchers will be more reluctant to reveal views that they expect will make them appear xenophobic or bigoted.

Due to the highly charged nature of xenophobic conflicts, politicians have often appealed to public sentiment on both sides of this issue to further their own political interests. While sound immigration policies are certainly a defensible campaign platform for responsible candidates, problems arise when candidates attempt to jockey for more support by continually shifting to more and more dramatic positions in response to xenophobic riots in certain areas. These concerns give rise to two primary research issues regarding the evaluation of the true levels of xenophobia in South Africa and whether these latent xenophobic feelings evidence themselves in the electoral outcomes. Logic suggests that lower educated and lower income residents would be more vulnerable to displacement in employment due to influxes of immigrants with similar qualifications and backgrounds. Also, these same groups would be the most likely to respond to political candidates running with platforms that included anti-immigration measures or ethnocentric messages.

### *Hypotheses*

There are two main hypotheses associated with this paper:

Hypothesis 1: As education and income decrease, indications of xenophobia will increase due to greater employment vulnerability through encroachment by immigrants and other outsiders.

Hypothesis 2: The strata of South African society that show more xenophobic tension will be more likely to allow this tension to affect their voting behavior.

### **Experimental Design**

This experiment took place between June and August 2009 throughout three townships in South Africa. We selected the townships based on the highest probability of selecting a representative sample of the population of South Africa. The townships

we chose were Davyton, near Johannesburg; Mdantsane, outside of East London; and Umlazi, located near Durban. South Africa is populated by nine major native ethnic cultures: Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi, Sotho, Swati, Tsonga, Tswana, Ndebele, and Venda. By far the largest groups are Zulu and Xhosa. Umlazi is primarily a Zulu township, Mdantsane is Xhosa, and Davyton is as close to a representative sample of the other ethnic groups as is possible to find in one township. In all, our sample included 667 participants resembling the general distribution of ethnic groups generally seen throughout South Africa.

### *Recruitment*

To recruit a random sample within the townships, we hired research assistants from local universities who were familiar with the areas in the study and divided their respective townships into various zones and districts. We randomly assigned zones, districts, routes within the districts, and starting houses within the routes. Then we instructed the research assistants to knock on every third door starting from the house we randomly assigned (varying the times in which they conducted the recruitment each day). They then randomly selected an adult member of the household that they would invite to participate in the study. They would inform the potential respondent that he or she could earn up to R60 (about \$6) if he or she participated in a research study regarding South Africa's ethnic groups. If the respondent agreed, he or she was given an invitation to come to a local school where the experiment would take place. The invitation had his or her own name on it, which matched his or her scheduled time, to ensure that the correct person came at each time. When the respondents came in for their appointments, they were instructed in how to use the basic computer program that presented each respondent with an anonymous survey to ascertain basic background information and randomly assigned one of three conditions for each list experiment.

### *List Experiments*

As previously stated, problems associated with falsified responses to sensitive issues in survey questions have led researchers to devise several means of circumventing the problem to discover the true feelings of a respondent. When confronted with questions that the respondent feels uncomfortable answering truthfully for fear of self-incrimination, there is no perfect means of discerning whether or not the subject is lying. Apart from refining the wording of the question, researchers have attempted randomized response methods, implicit association tests, and bogus lie detectors to remove the response bias (Corstange 2008; 47, Kuklinski 1997; 327). One fairly recent method, "the list experiment," effectively removes the response bias by granting the respondent perfect anonymity while still allowing researchers to identify key factors in the experiment. The list method gives a control and treatment group at least two different lists that share three elements in common (Appendix 1). Each list typically contains two or three statements that are the same and the treatment list contains one extra test statement. The respondents indicate how many of the items in a list apply to them given the requirements of the question. In this experiment, respondents in both

the control and treatment groups saw the following question on a computer-based survey: How many of the following make you angry? This question was followed by one of two lists. The control list contains four items and the treatment lists contain five items, four of which match the items in the control list:

- Politicians who do not keep their promises
- The unemployment rate
- High prices (*i.e.*, food and gas prices)
- High crime rates

The final point was only included in the test groups: Immigrants moving into your community.

This method is much more unthreatening to respondents—feelings are kept anonymous and the response bias is avoided. Because they report the total number of issues that affect them rather than specifying certain issues, participants are less likely to feel compelled to give deceptive responses.

This table shows the arrangements of list questions to their various treatments.

List	Xenophobia treatment	Election treatment
List 1 How many of the following make you angry?	(Treatment 1-1) Immigrants moving into your community	(Treatment 1-2) Having a president who is not of the same tribal ethnicity
List 2 How many of the following influenced your vote in the recent presidential elections?	(Treatment 2-1) Promises made by candidates or parties to take measures to counter immigration	(Treatment 2-2) Ethnicity of candidate

Data may then be analyzed using simple comparison of means tests, because any difference between the mean numbers of statements reported as making them angry may be attributed to the addition of the test phrase. When we break these results down between different criteria on ethnicity, locale, age group, and various relevant socioeconomic factors, we will ascertain ethnic and xenophobic biases throughout a broad range of South African society.

In this case, we may use the results of these experiments to determine not only which groups of South Africans are more likely to show xenophobic tendencies but also whether these sentiments are strong enough to become a factor in their voting decisions. Since there were reports that some political parties may have attempted to use xenophobia as a means of securing more support in the townships, this method may be helpful in determining which parties the most xenophobic people were likely to support. Also, given the tendency toward violence against immigrants, this information may be helpful in identifying which sections of township society may be more prone to xenophobic demonstrations.

#### *Data Analysis*

The primary goal of this analysis is to evaluate the true level of xenophobia

throughout different stratifications of South African society through strategic use of list experiment data. We compared the mean responses of each stratification against the appropriate population mean value for the control group by using the responses from the survey section of the study regarding ethnic culture, political affiliation, etc. This allowed me to run multiple regressions using important control variables such as the aforementioned ethnic strength variable, as well as a welfare variable we constructed through questions about different appliances present in their respective households.

### *Results*

The results of the t-tests show the groups with statistically significant xenophobic biases, as well as those who indicate that this influences their political decisions.

The results from the first treatment of the first list question are recorded in Table 1. Recall from the earlier discussion that this question asked respondents how many items in the list made them angry. The treatment that is represented in Table 1 is the statement regarding immigrants moving into their community. The results from this table indicate strongly that residents of townships throughout South Africa are clearly biased against foreigners moving into their neighborhoods.

Table 2 shows the same question with the treatment statement regarding whether having a president who is not of their same tribal ethnicity makes them angry. These results are somewhat more interesting, because it approaches the issue of ethnic enmity between tribes rather than just the xenophobic issue that has been the focus of this paper thus far.

While the sample sizes of some of the underrepresented ethnic cultures prevents drawing strong conclusions from their implications, these results clearly indicate Zulus are very strongly biased against having a president who is not of their own ethnic culture. This finding is also fairly significant for the Xhosa group. This bears strong implications for the future of the ANC, particularly given the ascension of Jacob Zuma as president—the first Zulu leader since the end of apartheid.

The results in Table 3 are from the first treatment's second list question that asked respondents to indicate how many of the issues were relevant in their decisions during the recent presidential elections regardless of whether they actually voted or not. The treatment in this case was whether promises made by candidates or parties to take measures to counter immigration were influential in their vote.

Surprisingly, these results are more significant for the Xhosa Party and the ANC. Earlier reports had indicated that Zulus and the COPE Party were more commonly associated with xenophobic biases. Conversely, this table indicates that even though members of the ANC overall indicate that promises to stem the flow of immigrants were an important factor, this effect is not mirrored in the results for the Zulu people. The Xhosa tribe members, on the other hand, indicated strongly that promises to put an end to immigration were an important factor in their decision-making process.

The implications of these findings are particularly interesting with respect to the outcomes of the past presidential elections and subsequent rise of Jacob Zuma as

the first Zulu president of South Africa. The Xhosa response could be an indication of possible tribal discomfort from losing the prestige or possibly some degree of perceived trust or control from having a fellow Xhosa in the presidency.

Table 3: Treatment 2-1:  
Promises made by candidates or parties to take measures to counter immigration influenced vote (by subgroup) vs. control mean of population

TEST	N	Control Mean	List Mean	Difference of Means
Treatment 2-1	220	2.9498 (1.126)	3.218 (1.5638)	-1.955
Pedi	13	2.9498 (1.126)	3.23 (1.423)	-.772
Tsonga	11	2.9498 (1.126)	3 (1.732)	-.126
Xhosa	77	2.9498 (1.126)	3.3896** (1.46)	-2.5
Zulu	89	2.9498 (1.126)	3.067 (1.698)	-.662
Christian	148	2.9498 (1.126)	3.142 (1.494)	-1.314
Traditional	35	2.9498 (1.126)	2.971 (1.505)	-.093
Other Religion	13	2.9498 (1.126)	3.538 (1.127)	-1.6382
Male	117	2.9498 (1.126)	3.22 (1.526)	-1.7336
Female	102	2.9498 (1.126)	3.206 (1.619)	-1.528
Eastern Cape	60	2.9498 (1.126)	3.483*** (1.467)	-2.78
Kwazulunatal	76	2.9498 (1.126)	3.0658 (1.7075)	-.622
Guateng	93	2.9498 (1.126)	3.183 (1.518)	-1.39
Limpopo	11	2.9498 (1.126)	3.273 (1.191)	-.828
ANC	191	2.9498 (1.126)	3.361*** (1.473)	-3.013
Johannesburg	94	2.9498 (1.126)	3.255319* (1.4806)	-1.8463
Durban	72	2.9498 (1.126)	2.986111 (1.699155)	-.1920
East London	54	2.9498 (1.126)	3.462963** (1.5011)	-2.5577

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Standard Deviations in Parentheses. Deleted due to insufficient sample: Venda, Tswana, Ndebele, Sotho, Swati, Muslim, Hindu, Western Cape, Northern Cape, Freestate, Northwest, Mpumalanga, ACDP, IFP, Other Party.

Table 4 shows a logit regression indicating the likelihood that a member of any given tribe self-identifies as an adherent to the ANC. While the t-statistic chart for the second iteration of the second list question shows very little meaningful indication that the ethnicity of the candidate was an influential factor in their voting behavior, the regression analysis of this question did provide some intriguing results. The regressions indicate that the mother's schooling is the single most important factor in determining the likelihood that the individuals would consider ethnicity an important factor in determining their voting behavior. The inferred causal mechanism behind this is that as the primary caretaker of a child becomes more educated, they are better able to impart more cosmopolitan views into their children.

Table 4: Likelihood of membership in ANC by ethnicity

VARIABLES	ANC
Zulu	2.480** (1.127)
Xhosa	3.266*** (1.136)
Venda	2.996* (1.565)
Tswana	2.079* (1.225)
Tsonga	3.303*** (1.216)
Swati	2.821** (1.224)
Sotho	3.689*** (1.271)
Pedi	3.638*** (1.235)
Ndebele	2.890** (1.247)
Constant	-1.386 (1.118)
Observations	665
R-squared	

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Table 5: Dependent Variable: Treatment 2-2:  
Ethnicity of candidate (influenced vote)

VARIABLES	(1) list 2-2	(2) list 2-2
Father's Educaiton	0.049 (0.069)	0.061 (0.072)
Mother's Education	-0.274*** (0.074)	-0.285*** (0.080)
Age		-0.009 (0.010)
Gender		0.170 (0.230)
Cosmopolitan		-0.107 (0.077)
Uninformed voter		0.005 (0.043)
Income		0.011 (0.086)
Living Conditions		0.005 (0.078)
Constant	3.410*** (0.508)	3.575*** (1.156)
Observations	198	186
R-squared	0.072	0.085

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Missing values for dependent variable dropped

The regression analyses for the first list treatments show strikingly similar trends. Before the application of the interaction variable between the ethnicity and the strength indicator, the values are nearly all insignificant; however, when the interaction variable combining strength to identity is used, many more of the ethnicities are significant. In other words, as a people identify more strongly with their own culture, not only are they more likely to react angrily to foreigners moving into their neighborhoods, but they also report being less supportive of presidents who are not of their own tribal identity.

Table 6: Dependent Variable: Treatment 1-1:  
Immigrants moving into your community makes you angry  
Dependent Variable: Treatment 1-2:  
A president who is not of your tribal ethnicity makes you angry

VARIABLES	(1) list_1-1	(2) list_1-1 *strength	(3) List_1-1 *strength	(1) list_1-2	(2) list_1-2 *strength	(3) List_1-2 *strength
Zulu	-0.433 (1.036)	0.516** (0.212)	0.466** (0.219)	-1.893 (1.458)	0.408** (0.201)	0.368* (0.213)
Xhosa	-0.281 (1.039)	0.590*** (0.220)	0.546** (0.229)	-2.173 (1.459)	0.337* (0.199)	0.295 (0.210)
Venda	0.000 (0.000)	0.548* (0.313)	0.533* (0.319)	-3.000* (1.776)	0.080 (0.341)	0.048 (0.352)
Tswana	0.500 (1.255)	0.954*** (0.348)	0.927** (0.358)	-1.400 (1.588)	0.522* (0.273)	0.482* (0.284)
Tsonga	0.300 (1.123)	0.726*** (0.251)	0.678*** (0.259)	-2.727* (1.514)	0.188 (0.241)	0.175 (0.256)
Swati	-0.750 (1.146)	0.468* (0.283)	0.425 (0.294)	-2.000 (1.538)	0.404 (0.267)	0.358 (0.280)
Sotho	-0.682 (1.114)	0.475* (0.255)	0.432 (0.269)	-1.000 (1.528)	0.737*** (0.261)	0.698** (0.273)
Pedi	-0.200 (1.123)	0.587** (0.246)	0.560** (0.255)	-2.000 (1.494)	0.364 (0.247)	0.292 (0.262)
Ndebele	0.300 (1.123)	0.711*** (0.242)	0.671*** (0.250)	-1.200 (1.588)	0.650** (0.298)	0.607* (0.310)
Welfare			0.033 (0.054)			0.029 (0.054)
Age			-0.002 (0.008)			0.001 (0.009)
Gender			-0.186 (0.173)			0.000 (0.210)
Constant	3.500*** (1.025)	1.353* (0.697)	1.382* (0.803)	5.000*** (1.450)	1.734*** (0.661)	1.616* (0.843)
Observations	217	217	215	216	213	207
R-squared	0.033	0.062	0.065	0.063	0.066	0.063

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1  
Missing values for dependent variable dropped

## Conclusion

The implications of these findings are quite diverse. I have found evidence that many of the supporters of the ANC show strong xenophobic tendencies. This indicates that those people who would have been swayed by campaign speeches promising stronger stances on immigration would probably have granted their support to the ANC. While this does not conclusively attribute exploitation of xenophobia to the ANC candidates, it leaves that possibility open for further research.

This study also shows that the general populace of the townships throughout South Africa is likely to look negatively on foreigners who move into their neighborhoods rather than the extreme few as was previously thought. These



findings present avenues for future research to obtain more data regarding some of the underrepresented ethnic groups, religions, and geographic areas to discover their full effect.

Given that the purpose of this study was primarily the exploration of uncharted territory rather than an attempt to present a completed roadmap of xenophobic violence in South Africa, the results indicate the usefulness of this particular methodology in evaluating this issue. Perhaps, more importantly, the findings presented in this paper show that xenophobia in South Africa is not limited to the perpetrators of violent hate crimes against foreign immigrants. This conclusion leads to the possibility for future research to establish whether xenophobic feelings that are shared by the general population are more likely to encourage extremists to commit violent acts than situations where the extremists form a more marginalized segment of society that may feel bounded by expectations of public disapproval.

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## APPENDIX 1

List Question 1: Xenophobic and ethnic tensions in general

Please read the following statements and, in the space provided, note HOW MANY of them make you angry? DO NOT INDICATE WHICH ONES, only how many.

Politicians who do not keep their promises

The unemployment rate

High prices (*i.e.*, food and gas prices)

High crime rates

Number of statements that make you angry\_\_\_\_\_

The final point only included in the test groups:

Treatment 1-1: Immigrants moving into your community  
or

Treatment 1-2: Having a president who is not of your tribal ethnicity.

List Question 2: Xenophobic and ethnic tensions in the Election

Please read the following statements and, in the space provided, note HOW MANY influenced your vote in the elections? DO NOT INDICATE WHICH ONES, only how many.

Crime reduction issues

Your party affiliation

Poverty reduction promises

Housing issues

Number of statements that influenced your vote\_\_\_\_\_

The final point only included in the test groups:

Treatment 2-1: Promises made by candidates or parties to take measures to counter immigration.

Treatment 2-2: Ethnicity of candidate

**APPENDIX 2**

Remaining tables with results that were not discussed in the text

Treatment 2-2:

Ethnicity of candidate influenced vote (by subgroup) vs. control mean of population

TEST	N	MEAN	Standard Deviation	Difference of Means
List 2 Control	211	2.9498	1.186	.
List two treatment 2	200	3.16	1.521834	-1.5264
Ndebele	9	3.667	1.414	-1.658
Pedi	10	2.7	1.4181	-.607
Sotho	11	3.363636	1.62928	-1.0427
Swati	6	2.5	1.76	-.8498
Tsonga	12	2.583	1.676	-.9585
Tswana	2	3.5	2.12132	-.9585
Venda	3	4.33	.5773503	-1.889
Xhosa	72	3.278	1.54	-1.794
Zulu	75	3.1067	1.325	-.8805
Christian	148	3.14189	1.4938	-1.3141
Muslim	3	4.667	.57735	-2.3438*
Traditional	37	2.973	1.675	-.0977
Hindu	.	.	.	.
Other Religion	12	2.9839	1.37895	-1.6803
Male	97	3.2195	1.4522	-1.6394
Female	103	3.106796	1.5899	-.9471
Western Cape	4	2.75	2.061553	.3094
Eastern Cape	67	3.402985	1.45706	-2.4612*
Northern Cape	.	.	.	.
Freestate	3	3.67	1.5275	-.9729
Kwazulunatal	57	3.2982	1.4634	-1.7835
Northwest	.	.	.	.
Guateng	85	2.8947	1.551	.32
Mpumalanga	10	3.6	1.5055	-1.5753
Limpopo	8	3.375	1.5059	-.9273
ACDP	.	.	.	.
ANC	171	3.1228	1.5077	-1.2799
COPE	7	4	1.4142	-2.1542
IFP	8	3.25	1.58114	-.6532
PAC	2	2.5	2.12132	.4985
SACP	2	3	2.828	-.0554
UCDP	.	.	.	.
UDM	1	4	.	.
Other Party	8	3	1.773	-.1086

\*Indicates significance of 95 percent or better

Dependent Variable: Treatment 2-1:  
Promises made by candidates or parties to take measures to counter immigration  
(influenced vote)

VARIABLES	(1) list_2-1	(2) list_2-1	(3) list_2-1
Zulu	-0.933 (1.581)	-0.083 (0.244)	-0.177 (0.258)
Xhosa	-0.610 (1.582)	0.011 (0.250)	-0.113 (0.267)
Venda	0.500 (1.925)	0.171 (0.458)	0.087 (0.470)
Tswana	-0.143 (1.681)	0.156 (0.290)	0.038 (0.305)
Tsonga	-1.000 (1.642)	-0.054 (0.286)	-0.102 (0.305)
Swati	-1.111 (1.657)	-0.156 (0.303)	-0.264 (0.316)
Sotho	-1.429 (1.681)	-0.318 (0.328)	-0.451 (0.343)
Pedi	-0.769 (1.631)	-0.018 (0.296)	-0.129 (0.314)
Ndebele	-0.250 (1.758)	0.125 (0.325)	0.007 (0.337)
Welfare			-0.046 (0.059)
Age			0.010 (0.010)
Gender			0.038 (0.224)
Constant	4.000** (1.572)	3.340*** (0.803)	3.768*** (0.945)
Observations	220	218	213
R-squared	0.031	0.029	0.038

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Missing values for dependent variable dropped

Dependent Variable: Treatment 2-2:  
Ethnicity of candidate (influenced vote)

VARIABLES	(1) list_2-2	(2) list_2-2 *strength	(3) list_2-2 *strength
Zulu	-1.227 (0.898)	0.075 (0.231)	0.055 (0.248)
Xhosa	-1.056 (0.898)	0.114 (0.233)	0.074 (0.249)
Venda	0.000 (0.000)	0.414 (0.329)	0.389 (0.342)
Tswana	-0.833 (1.392)	0.169 (0.446)	0.157 (0.460)
Tsonga	-1.750* (0.984)	-0.054 (0.252)	-0.058 (0.265)
Swati	-1.833* (1.078)	-0.062 (0.320)	-0.070 (0.338)
Sotho	-0.970 (0.993)	0.161 (0.284)	0.134 (0.300)
Pedi	-1.633 (1.003)	0.018 (0.286)	-0.052 (0.305)
Ndebele	-0.667 (1.016)	0.223 (0.274)	0.201 (0.290)
Welfare			-0.037 (0.074)
Age			-0.001 (0.009)
Gender			0.069 (0.232)
Constant	4.333*** (0.880)	2.870*** (0.759)	3.248*** (1.044)
Observations	200	198	194
R-squared	0.037	0.026	0.027

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Missing values for dependent variable dropped

Table 1: Treatment 1-1:  
Immigrants moving into your community makes you angry vs. control mean

TEST	N	Control Mean	List Mean	Difference of Means
Treatment 1-1	217	2.54 (1.186)	3.194*** (.098)	-5
Ndebele	10	2.54 (1.186)	3.8*** (.359)	-3.282
Pedi	10	2.54 (1.186)	3.3** (.3958)	-1.97
Sotho	11	2.54 (1.186)	2.818*** (1.888)	-.7295
Tsonga	10	2.54 (1.186)	3.8** (.249)	-3.317
Xhosa	73	2.54 (1.186)	3.219*** (1.493)	-3.886
Zulu	89	2.54 (1.186)	3.0674** (1.491)	-3.21
Christian	165	2.54 (1.186)	3.1576*** (1.4977)	-4.38
Traditional	39	2.54 (1.186)	3.41*** (1.245)	-4.1486
Other Religion	12	2.54 (1.186)	3.083 (1.3789)	-1.5255
Male	113	2.54 (1.186)	3.15*** (1.434)	-4.037
Female	103	2.54 (1.186)	3.2524*** (1.46667)	-4.55
Eastern Cape	58	2.54 (1.186)	3.14*** (1.47)	-3.19
Kwazulunatal	78	2.54 (1.186)	3.089*** (1.47)	-3.2298
Guateng	83	2.54 (1.186)	3.289*** (1.366)	-4.61
Mpumalanga	12	2.54 (1.186)	3.583*** (.996)	-2.98
Limpopo	13	2.54 (1.186)	3.077 (1.875)	-1.5797
ANC	182	2.54 (1.186)	3.198*** (1.428)	-4.897
Johannesburg	86	2.54 (1.186)	3.279*** (1.402)	-4.5559
Durban	73	2.54 (1.186)	3.082192*** (1.507)	-3.0914
East London	58	2.54 (1.186)	3.2069*** (1.448)	-3.572
Other Party	10	2.54 (1.186)	3.1 (1.214)	-1.426

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Standard Deviations in Parentheses Deleted due to insufficient sample: Swati, Tswana, Venda, Muslim, Hindu, Western Cape, Northern Cape, Freestate, Northwest, ACDP, COPE, PAC, SACP, IFP.

Table 2: Treatment 1-2:  
Having a president who is not of the same tribal ethnicity  
makes you angry (by subgroup) vs. control mean

TEST	N	Control Mean	List Mean	Difference of Means
Treatment 1-2	216	2.54 (1.186)	3.019*** (1.47)	-3.63
Pedi	16	2.54 (1.186)	3 (.3873)	-1.455
Sotho	9	2.54 (1.186)	4*** (.408)	-3.6
Tsonga	11	2.54 (1.186)	2.273 (1.27)	-.756
Xhosa	75	2.54 (1.186)	2.8267* (1.519)	-1.642
Zulu	84	2.54 (1.186)	3.12*** (1.43)	-3.444

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Standard Deviations in Parentheses Deleted due to insufficient sample: Venda, Tswana, Ndebele, Swati.

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# Why do States Comply with Anti-Trafficking Norms? A Study In Eastern Europe

by Maren Reynolds Perkins

## Introduction

One of the most pertinent questions facing the international community is the efficacy of its human rights framework. International organizations have drafted numerous human rights treaties that do not necessarily correlate with practices in member states. A country may have ratified numerous agreements but this does not mean that the country abides by their precepts or even stops its current human rights abuses. Whether or not states comply with human rights treaties and why they choose to do so is a salient question in international relations with important ramifications for the future of treaties and international cooperation on human rights.

Human trafficking is one of the world's three largest illegal trades after drugs and arms (UNDP 2007, 10). *The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children*, was opened for signature in November 2000 as a supplement to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and it went into force in December 2003. It is a detailed model defining human trafficking and explaining what states must do to comply with anti-trafficking norms. However, ratifying it does not necessarily lead to better protection. The question must be asked, does ratifying a treaty lead to better compliance? And if not, what does? This paper tests the theory that in the case of the Protocol, eastern European countries that ratify will comply because of a value for women, not because of ratification itself. As an alternative hypothesis, the paper also looks at dependency on entities such as the U.S. and EU that oppose sex trafficking. This will be tested qualitatively using congruence tables and process tracing.

The results of this study show overall that a culture of valuing women's rights does not lead to better compliance with anti-trafficking norms. Instead the results of both the congruence tables and process tracing show that states are more likely

to comply because they are dependent on anti-trafficking entities. In particular, Romania points to a strong case for EU membership conditionality as a reason for compliance. Furthermore, this study shows as predicted that ratification itself does not lead to better compliance. In fact, the countries studied that had not ratified the Protocol had overall better compliance scores than those who had ratified early. Thus, this study proves the theories that ratification itself does not cause states to comply with anti-trafficking legislation but that dependency on anti-trafficking entities does, but it also disproves the theory that countries comply because they value women's rights.

## Literature Review

The literature surveyed for this review supports the theory that ratifying human rights treaties does not necessarily lead to the amelioration of human rights abuses, and indeed may even worsen them. Thus it is put forth in this paper that ratifying the Protocol does not better human rights, and the new theory proffered takes a different view of theories about compliance after ratification by incorporating a gender component into the discussion about human rights norms concerning trafficking.

### *Theories in Literature Review*

Before discussing the political literature concerning treaty ratification, the problem of sex trafficking will be set up in terms of theory of women's rights because it is necessary to understand the origins of the subjugation of women. Discrimination against women may not be as obvious in some societies, but this study shows that even rich western European countries like Switzerland have problems with trafficking, and it is important to know where the idea that women are objects to be traded and controlled comes from. In order to understand why women are not valued in society, it is necessary to look back to the very founding of states. States themselves are reflections of male power, since men tend to dominate both their creation and governance (Pettman 1996, 5). The concept of citizenship excluding females dates back to the Greek polis, which saw citizenship as bestowed by a blood sacrifice to the state, particularly in battle. Because of this, women were denied citizenship and a say in the running of the state from early on. Instead, women were relegated to the private sphere of the home, where they provided the support that allowed men to carry out their citizenship in the public sphere (Pettman 1996, 6).

According to scholars, V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, the way we see gender is based on two structures: socialization, or "how individuals are taught culturally appropriate attitudes and behaviors," and structural control, which is "how practices and institutions keep gender hierarchy in place by generating conformity and compliance" (Peterson and Runyan 1993, 19). Once again looking to the Greeks, Plato taught that instilling a sense of "natural" social hierarchy in subordinated peoples (that is, women) makes them less likely to rebel against the system and challenge their status in society (Peterson and Runyan 1993, 21). This further underlines the point that the subjugation of women is built into the state and societal systems that have developed in the world—making it harder to combat. If women

are devalued enough, they lose the status of human being and become objects to be traded and sold at will.

In addition to feminist theory, two international relations articles and two sociology articles were consulted that question the implementation of human rights measures in countries that have ratified international agreements. Eric Neumayer (2005) poses the questions of whether human rights treaties make a difference and whether ratifying them improves human rights. Oona Hathaway (2002) asks if states comply with the requirements of treaties they have signed and whether ratification leads to better practice than would be expected without ratification. Olga Avdeyeva (2007) examines the gap between states' promises and actions regarding human rights agreements. Finally, Emilie Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui (2005) look at the impact of international human rights norms on states' domestic practices.

#### *Theoretical Similarities and Differences of the Articles on Ratification*

The four articles listed above examined many of the same major schools of thought such as (neo)realism, institutionalism, liberalism, and regime theory in order to see if ratification improves compliance. Avdeyeva and Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui also looked at sociological explanations such as the world society approach, which argues that "models and norms that are institutionalized at the world level acquire assumed status over time and influence policy makers at the national level" (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005).

Interestingly, almost all of the authors opted not to agree with most of the expected outcomes from the theories they studied. Hathaway dismisses all her tested theories except liberalism, which she says correctly predicts democracies to have better human rights practices when they ratify treaties; however, it still cannot explain why all states do not do better. On the other hand, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) reject theories such as realism and liberalism as being too focused on power and actors. They favor a new explanation of compliance of their own; a mix of formal treaty systems and nongovernmental activism based on rational and world society theory. Avdeyeva (2007) also opts for the world society theory, which predicts that "the policy decision to ratify is often a symbolic gesture to signal that the government is not a deviant actor, and does not necessarily lead to compliant practices with the treaty" (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005).

#### *Similarities and Differences in Variables*

The articles focused on a variety of variables to test whether ratification increased or decreased compliance. Neumayer used civil and personal integrity rights to measure compliance with human rights agreements. Hathaway's test is similar, but she looks for compliance with different parts of the treaty and evidence of whether it is effective. Avdeyeva's approach was different as she was specifically measuring violence against women in post-Communist countries. She tests the regimes to see whether their compliance or noncompliance with UN requirements is based on "three mechanisms of social influence": coercion, persuasion, and acculturation, largely rejecting the first two in favor of the latter, which is more closely linked to the



world society model (Avdeyeva 2007). Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui measure government repression of human rights by looking at past practice, treaty ratification, INGO membership, democracy, and more.

Most of the authors focus on measuring civil and political rights as well as other similar ones such as democracy, which explains why they came, in general, to the same conclusion that ratifying human rights agreements does not lead to better human rights. They also had similar conclusions as to which variables helped compliance and which did not; for example, democracy was generally recognized as leading to better human rights observance and conflict predicted the opposite. However, there are distinctions within each theory that will be discussed further below.

#### *Similarities and Differences in Findings*

While the authors gathered some similar results, they also found differences. Neumayer found that higher levels of democratization and INGO participation in a country led to more compliance while regimes with no civil society showed no positive effects from ratification, and possibly negative ones (Neumayer 2005). Hathaway also found that human rights compliance was generally better in countries that ratified, but noncompliance was rampant even among them. Paradoxically, she found that democracies usually had better practices but tended not to comply just like non-democracies, which shows a different outcome than Neumayer predicted. Both authors found that ratifying can worsen human rights; in other words, countries with bad human rights records tend to ratify more treaties, which leads to overall lower compliance.

Avdeyeva found in her analysis of post-Communist countries that the majority did not comply with international standards for stopping violence against women. She found that persuasion and coercion, standard measures of theories such as realism, were not too successful but that acculturation, including social pressure from domestic and international actors, was an important factor. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) found a “decoupling between policy and practice” because governments often sign agreements even when they know they cannot or will not comply, which can worsen human rights as predicted by Neumayer and Hathaway. This leads to a “paradox of empty promises” in which governments make empty promises through ratification. However, they also found that INGOs are creating worldwide pressure for governments to comply with human rights. Links to civil society are helpful, but ratification does not necessarily better the situation and can even worsen human rights.

The overarching theme that can be seen from the authors’ results is that ratifying international human rights treaties does not translate into better domestic practice. The authors’ theories focus on ratification as a strategic symbol in response to pressure from inside and outside actors as well as international social norms. Ratifying a treaty, as Hathaway explains, is often not a sign of the internalization of human rights norms but rather a superficial placation. Furthermore, as Neumayer and Hathaway found, democracies tend to have better human rights norms, and a strong civil society was

universally acknowledged as a strong factor in determining compliance as it is helpful in building human rights through its actions and media attention.

### *New Hypothesis*

The hypothesis advanced by this author is that a country's ratifying of the Protocol will not in itself increase compliance with anti-trafficking norms but rather a value for women's rights will cause a country to comply. An alternative hypothesis is also tested, which is dependency on anti-trafficking entities such as the U.S. or EU. This hypothesis follows the reasoning of Judith Kelley (2004), who points to membership conditionality in organizations as an important factor in states' compliance with minority rights policy.

Based on the evidence provided by all the authors and particularly Avdeyeva, (2007) Hafner-Burton, and Tsutsui (2005), it can be predicted that ratifying the Protocol will not lead to a significant increase in domestic anti-trafficking progress. The issue of sex trafficking, like Avdeyeva's review of violence against women, is especially complicated because of the inclusion of gender in this situation. As Pettman explained, states are reflections of male power, because they tend to dominate their governance (1996, 5); for example, women made up less than one-third of every parliament in this study, and Peterson and Runyan (1993) further show that Western countries have incorporated the subjugation of women along with the democratic ideals of the Greek polis. The world will not make improvement in the area of women's rights and sex trafficking in particular until they overcome the implementation problems discussed in the articles above and begin to apply the human rights norms that many of them have supported through ratification.

## **Research Design**

### *Theoretical Expectations*

This theory includes four hypotheses to test whether women's rights or dependency leads to better compliance:

1. The higher the political power of women within a country, the more likely that country is to comply with anti-sex trafficking provisions in the Protocol, because then women are given a voice in policy formation.
2. The higher the social value of women in a country, the more likely that country is to comply, because the society is invested in its women's futures.
3. The more legal protections women have in a country, the more likely that country is to comply, because it shows dedication to protecting women's rights.
4. The more dependent a country is on powerful anti-trafficking entities such as the U.S. and the EU, the more likely that country is to comply because of trade, aid, and membership ties.

Goodliffe and Hawkins (2007) show that a country's trade network is very likely to influence its ratification behavior, and Kelley (2004) shows that membership conditionality in European organizations is another important factor in states' compliance with human rights norms.

This theory also states that ratification will not lead to better compliance, and this is tested through a combination of the average compliance scores based on the above hypotheses. The dependent variable is the level of compliance with the anti-trafficking norms laid out in the Protocol as described in the annual U.S. State Department Trafficking in Persons reports, coded on an original one to six scale. These reports have been criticized as a source of information, but as they are released on a consistent basis and are readily available, they are the most straightforward source for this study. The independent variables are the level of political power of women in a country, the level of social value of women, the legal culture of protection of women, and the level of dependence on the U.S. and EU.

### *Procedure*

The first part of this analysis was done through pattern-matching congruence tables. Each table is time-lapsed, with two entries for each country. The first showing its status on the independent/dependent variables before ratification and the other after ratification. The first table contains data on five eastern European countries: Albania, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, and Romania, that ratified the Protocol early (meaning before 2004). The exception is Moldova, which ratified it in 2005 and it is too early to be included in the second table. Two of Moldova's data points have an asterisk by them, indicating that the data shown is from the year of ratification or the year after; these two points must be analyzed with care as they do not allow for the post-ratification time lapse that the rest of the data does. The second table contains data from five countries that either ratified the Protocol late (2006 or later) or have not yet ratified it, which gives examples of states who are not bound to implement the Protocol's norms or who have not yet had ample time to implement it. These countries are the Czech Republic, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, and Switzerland. Greece and Switzerland are not eastern European countries, but they are included because Greece is near the region and has not developed as fast as many of the other EU countries, and Switzerland is an interesting case, because even though it has a very good human rights record, it tends to ratify women's rights treaties late. The data from these two tables was divided into levels of low, medium, and high for each variable to make it easier to see patterns. In this way the results may be compared to see if changes happening in the countries that have ratified are due to ratification or if they are a region-wide phenomenon.

### *Data*

There are many observable implications for each hypothesis:

1. Political Power: This will be measured by the percent of women in the legislative body. This can be found at [womanstats.org](http://womanstats.org) under the variable LBHO data 1 or from the Inter-Parliamentary Union's data on women's participation in politics. Another measure of women's power is whether they have the right of suffrage, which can be found under the womanstats variable VOTE law 1 or in the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights.

2. Social Value: A country that values its women and their input and potential should provide them with healthcare. Indicators such as maternal mortality and infant mortality show whether or not women are receiving good health care during one of the most vulnerable times of their life. Maternal mortality can be found in the annual World Health Statistics reports from the WHO and infant mortality can be accessed at the *CIA World Factbook* web site.

3. Legal Protection: There are many good measures of legal protection for women. One example is age of marriage laws because a country that values women will not allow them to be married underage. This information may be found at [womanstats.org](http://womanstats.org) under the variable AOM law 1 as well as in CEDAW and CRC reports. Another indicator is maternity leave because it shows that the state wants to take care of mothers economically. This is also found in the CEDAW reports, as well as in the GIC variable cluster at [womanstats.org](http://womanstats.org).

4. Dependence: The U.S. is known to be an anti-trafficking force because of the annual reports it releases. Furthermore, the U.S. began putting sanctions on and removing aid from countries that were in Tier 3, the lowest rating the report gives (U.S. State Department 2003). Countries who are dependent on the U.S. for trade or aid may comply with trafficking norms in order to continue to receive favor. Data on U.S. trade partners, including imports and exports, may be found at the U.S. International Trade Commission web site. Data on U.S. foreign aid may be found in the USAID greenbook and the OECD Stat Extracts. In the case of the EU, countries trying to join may have made efforts to comply with norms as an example of membership conditionality. This is observable through process tracing, such as through the annual European Commission reports on candidate countries, although not all of the states being studied are EU members or are trying to join.

It is also important to define the observable implications for the dependent variable (level of compliance). One measure of compliance with the anti-trafficking norms is the one to three scale used by the U.S. State Department in its Trafficking in Persons reports. These reports and the Protocol use very similar language, including a focus on the three Ps: prevention, prosecution, and protection. However, my measure will be an original one to six scale based on the information in the U.S. State Department trafficking reports, because it expands the one to three scale, showing more variation.

A note must also be made about the cases chosen for this study. States were chosen based on when they ratified the Protocol. This may lead to some selection bias but the ten countries include a good selection of eastern European states, and other countries could easily be added. Furthermore, these countries were chosen because they share some fundamental characteristics; they are predominantly Christian, except for Albania (*CIA Factbook* 2008), and many are former Soviet satellite states. Any differences will be taken into account during analysis.

All ten countries will be included in a congruence table and pattern matched to see which ones provide the best variation on the independent and dependent vari-

ables. Romania and the Czech Republic will then be process traced to see if their history matches the patterns found in the congruence tables and proves the hypotheses. I hope to see variation in many of the variables; indicators, such as maternal mortality and women in parliament, will likely vary greatly, while fundamental legal protections will likely be more regionally similar.

### *Criteria for Verification*

The questions of whether compliance with the Protocol is due to women's status and whether ratification leads to better compliance can be sufficiently answered by evidence obtained from the hypotheses. If the data shows that women have political power, social value, or legal protection and that country has a high compliance score, then the theory that countries comply more when they value women will be proved. If the evidence shows that women have power, protection, and value, but the country still does not comply, then the theory will be proven wrong. If the fourth hypothesis—compliance is based on dependence—proves true, then further research will see whether the value of women or the self-interest hypothesis holds more weight in states' decisions. Finally, if the countries' average ratification scores are worse after ratification than before, the theory that ratification does not lead to better compliance will be proved. Therefore, I will be satisfied that my thesis is correct if I find a convincing body of evidence to show that states do not have better compliance because of ratification but rather because they value women, or alternatively because they are more dependent on anti-trafficking entities.

## **Findings**

### *Results*

The results of the congruence table do not show many patterns although Moldova, Romania, and Georgia stand out for having many contrary results. The tables show the values in categories of low, medium, and high that were calculated according to the range of numerical values for each variable. After the results of the congruence tables are more tables that use averages to explore whether or not ratification of the Protocol itself has an effect on compliance. Also note when reading the tables that one is the worst compliance score and six is the best.

The percentage of women in the parliament did not show definitive results in either table. Ideally, an increase in the number of women in parliament should also show an increase in the dependent variable. The only country in the first table to change is Moldova, whose percentage increased from 8.9 percent to 21.8 percent from 2000 to 2008, but whose compliance score actually worsened from three to two. Furthermore, Romania's score stayed at low even though its compliance score increased. The only country to show the expected result is Albania, which stayed at low and whose compliance score stayed at two, a very low score. In the second table, both Georgia and Hungary remained at low even though both of their compliance scores increased. However Greece showed a favorable result, increasing from low to medium and from two to three on the compliance scale.

## Political Power

*Countries that ratified early*

Date of ratification	IV: Political Power percent of women in legislature (2000, 2008)	IV: Political Power date of suffrage for women	DV: compliance (1–6, worst to best) (2001, 2008)
Albania pre–8/02	LOW	1920	2
Albania post–8/02	LOW	--	2
Lithuania pre–6/03	MED	1918	3
Lithuania post–6/03	MED	--	4
Moldova pre–9/05	LOW	1978, 1993	3
Moldova post–9/05	HIGH	--	2
Poland pre–9/03	MED	1918	3
Poland post–9/03	MED	--	4
Romania pre–12/02	LOW	1929, 1946	2
Romania post–12/02	LOW	--	3

*Countries that ratified late/have not ratified*

Date of ratification	IV: Political Power percent of women in legislature (2000, 2008)	IV: Political Power date of suffrage for women	DV: compliance (1–6, worst to best) (2001, 2008)
Czech Rep	MED	1920	3
Czech Rep	MED	--	5
Georgia pre–9/06	LOW	1918, 1921	3
Georgia post–9/06	LOW	--	5
Greece	LOW	1952	2
Greece	MED	--	3
Hungary pre–12/06	LOW	1918	3

Hungary post-12/06	LOW	--	4
Switzerland post-10/06	HIGH	1971	6
Switzerland post-10/06	HIGH	--	6

The dates of suffrage cannot be measured through time but it is interesting that in the first table all the countries allowed suffrage fairly early except Moldova, whose compliance score is also among the worst. However, a look at the second table shows that Switzerland, the country with the best compliance score, did not give women the right to vote until 1971, so this variable does not correlate either. The results from this variable are too mixed and the hypothesis that giving women political power leads to better compliance has been proven false.

### Social Value

*Countries that ratified early*

<b>Date of ratification</b>	<b>IV: Social Value MM ratio (2000, 2005) /100,000</b>	<b>IV: Social Value infant mortality (2000, 2008) /1,000</b>	<b>DV: compliance (1-6, worst to best) (2001, 2008)</b>
Albania pre-8/02	HIGH	HIGH	2
Albania post-8/02	HIGH	LOW	2
Lithuania pre-6/03	LOW	LOW	3
Lithuania post-6/03	LOW	LOW	4
Moldova pre-9/05	MED	HIGH	3
Moldova post-9/05	LOW*	LOW	2
Poland pre-9/03	LOW	LOW	3
Poland post-9/03	LOW	LOW	4
Romania pre-12/02	HIGH	LOW	2
Romania post-12/02	MED	MED	3

The maternal mortality ratio shows more correlation. In the first table, Lithuania and Poland had low scores for each year and Romania decreased from high to medium. All three of these countries also showed improvement in their compliance scores.

Albania remained at high and its score stayed at two, also showing correlation. The only country that does not fit is Moldova, whose maternal mortality decreased but whose score worsened. The results of the second table were similar. Every country except Georgia remained low and all of their compliance scores got better. Georgia, however, went from medium to high mortality even though its score increased.

*Countries that ratified late/have not ratified*

Date of ratification	IV: Social Value MM ratio (2000, 2005)	IV: Social Value infant mortality (2000, 2008)	DV: compliance (1–6, worst to best) (2001, 2008)
Czech Republic	LOW	LOW	3
Czech Republic	LOW	LOW	5
Georgia pre-9/06	MED	HIGH	3
Georgia post-9/06	HIGH	LOW	5
Greece	LOW	LOW	2
Greece	LOW	LOW	3
Hungary pre-12/06	LOW	LOW	3
Hungary post-12/06	LOW	LOW	4
Switzerland post-10/06	LOW	LOW	6
Switzerland post-10/06	LOW	LOW	6

For infant mortality the results were mixed in the first table. Albania and Moldova decreased even though Albania's score stayed at two and Moldova's worsened, yet Romania showed an increase even though its compliance increased. The second table showed different results. Every country except Georgia had low mortality and better compliance (Switzerland's score remained a six, but as this is the highest score, it will be treated as an increase). Georgia drastically reduced mortality during the period and increased its compliance, showing very good results. Overall, maternal mortality shows correlation with the dependent variable and infant maternity shows some correlation, so the social value of women hypothesis still holds.

## Legal Culture

*Countries that ratified early*

Date of ratification	IV: Legal Culture laws on age of marriage	IV: Legal Culture policies on maternity leave	DV: compliance (1–6, worst to best) (2001, 2008)
Albania pre-8/02	16F 18M 1982	365 days partial pay 2000	2



Albania post-8/02	18 F/M 2003	--	2
Lithuania pre-6/03	18 F/M	70 +56 days 1998	3
Lithuania post-6/03	--	--	4
Moldova pre-9/05	16F 18M 1998	70 +56 days paid 2004	3
Moldova post-9/05	--	--	2
Poland pre-9/03	18F 21M 1964	16-18 weeks paid 2000- amended 2001	3
Poland post-9/03	--	--	4
Romania pre-12/02	16F 18M 2000	112 days, 50-94% pay 2000	2
Romania post-12/02	--	126 days 2003	3

*Countries that ratified late/have not ratified*

<b>Date of ratification</b>	<b>IV: Legal Culture laws on age of marriage</b>	<b>IV: Legal Culture policies on maternity leave</b>	<b>DV: compliance (1-6, worst to best) (2001, 2008)</b>
Czech Republic	18 F/M 2000	--	3
Czech Republic	--	Good coverage 2003	5
Georgia pre-9/06	16 F/M 1998	70 +56 days 1998	3
Georgia post-9/06	18 F/M 2000/03	--	5
Greece	18 F/M 1996	16 weeks 75% pay 2000	2
Greece	--	--	3
Hungary pre-12/06	18 F/M 2000	24 weeks 100% pay 2000	3
Hungary post-12/06	--	--	4
Switzerland post-10/06	18 F/M 1996	8-12 weeks mom and dad 100% pay 1998	6
Switzerland post-10/06	--	--	6

The age of marriage laws did not show a correlation in the first table. Albania is the only country to show an improvement, yet its compliance score did not increase. Both Moldova and Romania's unequal age laws remained unchanged, yet their scores did

change; this inequality cannot correlate with improvement in compliance. There is better correlation in the second table. Georgia changed its marriage law to make it equal; however, it did this around 2000—not around ratification in 2006. Every country in both tables showed acceptable maternity leave coverage no matter what their compliance score and many countries' policies were similar, so these results are inconclusive, and the legal protection hypothesis has been proven false for these countries.

## Dependence

### *Countries that ratified early*

<b>Date of ratification</b>	<b>IV: Development U.S. aid (2000, 2006) millions</b>	<b>IV: Development imports to U.S. (2000, 2007) millions</b>	<b>IV: Development U.S. domestic exports (2000, 2007) millions</b>	<b>DV: compliance (1–6, worst to best) (2001, 2008)</b>
Albania pre-8/02	MED	LOW	LOW	2
Albania post-8/02	MED	LOW	LOW	2
Lithuania pre-6/03	LOW	LOW	LOW	3
Lithuania post-6/03	LOW	LOW	LOW	4
Moldova pre-9/05	MED	LOW	LOW	3
Moldova post-9/05	LOW*	LOW	LOW	2
Poland pre-9/03	LOW	MED	LOW	3
Poland post-9/03	LOW	HIGH	HIGH	4
Romania pre-12/02	MED	LOW	LOW	2
Romania post-12/02	LOW	MED	LOW	3

### *Countries that ratified late/have not ratified*

<b>Date of ratification</b>	<b>IV: Development U.S. aid (2000, 2006) millions</b>	<b>IV: Development imports to U.S. (2000, 2007) millions</b>	<b>IV: Development U.S. domestic exports (2000, 2007) millions</b>	<b>DV: compliance (1–6, worst to best) (2001, 2008)</b>
Czech Republic	LOW	MED	LOW	3
Czech Republic	LOW	HIGH	MED	5

Georgia pre-9/06	HIGH	LOW	LOW	3
Georgia post-9/06	HIGH	LOW	LOW	5
Greece	LOW	LOW	MED	2
Greece	LOW	MED	HIGH	3
Hungary pre-12/06	LOW	HIGH	LOW	3
Hungary post-12/06	LOW	HIGH	MED	4
Switzerland post-10/06	--	HIGH	HIGH	6
Switzerland post-10/06	--	HIGH	HIGH	6

The three dependence variables show correlation as well. In the first table, Moldova went from medium to low aid and also declined in compliance, which could show correlation. This is countered by Romania, who also went from medium to low aid but whose score increased. In the second table, every country remained at the same level aid and all of their scores decreased. Only Georgia had high aid and it also increased in compliance. This variable is interesting because it shows an almost universal decrease in aid to countries that ratified early and an increase in aid to countries that ratified late/never. It will require further research and data analysis to explain this.

The second variable, imports from the country to the U.S., shows correlation. In the first table Albania and Moldova, the two countries that either stayed the same or decreased in compliance, both remained at low levels of exports. Poland and Romania increased exports and both also increased in compliance. In the second table, every country increased both in exports and in compliance except Georgia, which remained at low even though its score increased.

The last variable, U.S. domestic exports, also shows correlation. In the first table, all countries correlated except Romania. Every country in the second table increased in exports (and showed better compliance) except Georgia, who remained at low despite the significant increase in its compliance score. All three dependency hypotheses show correlation overall with occasional contrary results. The effect of this dependency and its source, whether the U.S., EU, or elsewhere, will be explored further through process tracing in the two case studies that follow.

## Ratification

In order to test whether ratification itself makes a difference, the average compliance score for each of the six quantifiable independent variables based on its level (low, medium, high) both before and after ratification were put into tables. Because the countries from the second table either have not ratified or have not had enough

time since ratification to show real change, both their pre- and post-ratification scores were included in the pre-ratification section. This means that only the five countries that ratified early are shown in the post-ratification column.

<b>% women in legislature</b>	<b>Pre-ratification</b>	<b>Post-ratification</b>
Low	3.625	2.5
Medium	3.4	4
High	6	2
Total average for all levels	4.34	2.83

<b>Maternal mortality ratio</b>	<b>Pre-ratification</b>	<b>Post-ratification</b>
Low	3.8	3.33
Medium	3	3
High	3	2
Total average for all levels	3.26	2.776

<b>Infant mortality rate</b>	<b>Pre-ratification</b>	<b>Post-ratification</b>
Low	3.75	3
Medium	--	3
High	2.66	--
Total average for all levels	2.136	2

<b>U.S. aid</b>	<b>Pre-ratification</b>	<b>Post-ratification</b>
Low	3.8	3.25
Medium	2.33	2
High	4	--
Total average for all levels	3.376	1.74

<b>Imports</b>	<b>Pre-ratification</b>	<b>Post-ratification</b>
Low	2.857	2.66
Medium	3	3
High	4.8	4
Total average for all levels	3.552	3.22

<b>Exports</b>	<b>Pre-ratification</b>	<b>Post-ratification</b>
Low	3	2.75
Medium	3.66	--
High	5	4
Total average for all levels	3.886	2.25

These tables show that for every variable the total score is higher before ratification. This is partially the result of including the late/non-ratifiers in the pre-ratification column; however, since their results are better even without ratification, this is the correct outcome. This shows that ratification alone does not lead to better compliance. In fact, the data results of the late/non-ratifiers (minus Georgia) were better in almost every instance, which further shows that ratification is not a critical part of compliance. Interestingly, just as Neumayer (2005) predicted, it seems that the stronger democracies like Switzerland and the Czech Republic had better results and consequently better scores than the countries that struggled such as Georgia and Romania.

## Case Studies

Process tracing was used on two of the states in order to see what factors were causing them to comply. The first case is Romania and the second is the Czech Republic.

### *Romania*

Romania applied for membership in the EU in June 1995 but did not officially join until January 2007 and even then was under restriction while its progress in fighting organized crime and government corruption was evaluated (BBC 2006). Each year the European Commission (EC) releases monitoring reports on candidate countries that highlight successes, failures, and further needs before joining the EU. In the 1998 Romanian report, no mention of human trafficking could be found and only brief mention was made in 1999. In 2000, it said that more women are being trafficked for prostitution and that no progress was being made in fighting domestic trafficking rings (EC 2000, 22). In 2001, it was noted that while trafficking remained a problem, some efforts have been made to curb it (EC 2001, 110, 86). The government ran an awareness program in October 2000, and in 2001, it appointed a commission over trafficking; however, the EU stated that this progress was not sufficient (EC 2001, 25). There is an obvious change in the prevalence of trafficking between the 2000 and 2001 reports, perhaps indicating increased concern by the EU, and in this time, Romania also made several efforts to combat it.

The 2002 report indicated further reform as well as further scrutiny by the EU (EC 2002, 20, 113). The 2003 report is similar and mentioned Romania's ratification of the Protocol (EC 2003, 105–106, 24). In the 2004 report, the words “trafficking in human beings” are in bold, indicating their importance. The report praises the increase in convictions but cites the need for more inter-agency cooperation. The section is longer than before, further indicating its importance for the EU (EC 2004, 24–25). The 2005 report is the most detailed of them all, actually giving the issue its own section. There is still some criticism, but it is evident that Romania is much more in line with the EU's standards (EC 2005, 15). From 2002–08, Romania was listed as a Tier 2 country by the U.S. State Department, indicating that it does not fully comply with legislation but that it is trying to, which mirrors the progress in the EC reports.

One recurrent issue in the EC reports is the treatment of children. Under communist rule, abortion was outlawed, which led to many unwanted children and a culture of abandoning them. This is a problem because international adoption has been used

as a ruse to traffic Romanian children. The EU set a moratorium on it in 2001 after working with Romanian officials (Rosenthal 2005). However, the *New York Times* said in 2001 that the U.S. was pressuring Romania to ignore it. The adoptions continued into 2004, according to the *New York Times*, “Emma Nicholson, of Britain, a senior member of the European Parliament’s foreign affairs committee, has urged European governments to suspend entry talks with Romania (2004).

Then Romanian newspaper, *Nine O’Clock* ran an article in June 2004 in which EU officials “commended the cease of ‘trafficking in children’ by Romania” (Dumitriu 2004). By 2005, Romania had introduced a full ban. This time the *New York Times* wrote, “Would-be parents in the United States and other western countries have repeatedly called on Romania, which wants to join the European Union next year, to rescind the law” (*New York Times* 2006). This shows that the EU played a bigger role in Romania’s decisions than the U.S. and this correlates with the dependency data, which shows that Romania does not rely heavily on U.S. aid or exports.

The EC reports show a growing concern about trafficking from year to year. As can be seen, Romania made progress each year along with the EU’s recommendations, and by the 2005 report, the situation in Romania was much better than it had been a few years earlier. The example of child protection shows that Romania formed its policy around the EU’s wishes, flouting the United States. This case study shows that for Romania, EU membership conditionality was an important and determining factor in its anti-trafficking compliance, proving the fourth hypothesis.

### *Czech Republic*

The Czech Republic is better off than Romania, but it has yet to ratify the Protocol, although it signed it in December 2000. It is obvious that ratification is not the reason why this state complies with anti-trafficking legislation, but it nevertheless complies. From 2002–05 and 2007–08 it was ranked as a Tier 1 country by the U.S. State Department. The Czech Republic joined the EU in 2004. In its 1998 and 1999 EC reports, trafficking was briefly mentioned as a problem to be addressed (EC 1998, 33; 1999, 15). In 2000 and 2001, the EC noted that trafficking was an ongoing problem and an area of concern for the EU (EC 2000, 23; 2001, 15, 104). The 2002 report was similar and notice was drawn to some improvements (EC 2002, 19, 146, 115).

The issue of human trafficking does not command as much attention in the Czech Republic’s EC reports as it did in Romania’s. In 2004, *The Prague Post* ran an interview with John Miller, the director of the U.S. State Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. It discussed the successes and failures of the Czech Republic’s efforts and also touched on some interesting points, such as the U.S. being a moral bully. The question was asked whether the U.S. influences other governments’ compliance. Then-Ambassador Miller’s answer implicated Greece, another country in this study:

A year ago, in our Trafficking in Persons Report, we listed a host of countries in Tier 3, those not making significant efforts to stop trafficking. Included were some friends of ours, Greece and Turkey. In the three months after the report

came out . . . you found increased efforts at education, public service announcements directed at potential victims. You found law-enforcement training courses sensitizing police to look for victims, not just treating them as illegal immigrants. You found more arrests and prosecutions; you found more funding for NGOs helping victims. The point is to see progress (Spritzer 2004).

The example of the Czech Republic shows that EU membership conditionality was not hugely important, and the country is still making efforts to combat trafficking despite not having ratified the Protocol. However, the interview showed that the U.S. believes that other countries like Greece are dependent enough on it that they will change their behavior. For countries like Greece, the dependency hypothesis holds.

## Conclusion

This study set out to see why eastern European countries comply with anti-trafficking legislation as described in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons. It put forth the theory that compliance is not based on ratification but rather on a value for women and also tested an alternative hypothesis of dependency. The results of the congruence tables disprove the theory that states comply because of women's rights. However, it would be interesting to see the results if the analysis was performed on another part of the world.

Despite disproving this theory, the results did prove that ratification itself does not increase compliance, since the tables of averages clearly show that the total compliance scores were better before ratification than after. The fact that the countries that ratified late/ never had such good scores also shows that ratification is not important. It is interesting to note that compliance actually decreased after ratification as the articles in the literature review predicted. Also, Neumayer (2005) found that democracies were more likely to comply, which seems to be true of the countries in this study no matter when they ratified. This study also proved the alternative theory that dependency is important for compliance. Romania clearly showed that membership conditionality was very important. This proves the theory of Kelley (2004) as well as the socialization arguments of Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005). At the time of application to the EU, Romania was making few efforts, but by the time of accession, it had made many—guided by the EU. The Czech Republic neither proved nor disproved the dependency hypothesis, but it showed that the U.S.'s efforts to stop trafficking do have an effect on countries such as Greece.

It is interesting to note as well that the existence of the Protocol itself may be a sign that countries do not ratify because of concern for women. CEDAW includes a section about trafficking, yet since this treaty took effect the problem of trafficking has grown and become more complex. This new Protocol, by being part of a treaty on transnational organized crime, reframes the issue of trafficking as a criminal matter. This moves the focus from the victim to the perpetrator, and time will show if this change is working.

Just as the emphasis on the protocol instead of CEDAW shows a shift in framing, the results of this study show that compliance is not so much a human rights issue as it is an economic and national self-interest issue. Since increased trade or

inclusion in the EU leads to a better economy, it seems that compliance becomes more feasible when countries have more wealth, a better economy, and more power. This provides the funds needed to fight trafficking, and a better economy may shift jobs away from black market activities to legal professions. Therefore, based on the results of this study, dependency ties with states that suffer from trafficking should be increased in an effort to persuade them to comply more, because ratification, while a symbolic gesture, is not enough to increase compliance alone. Finally, although countries do not comply because of a value for women, this should still be strived for as it is an important foundation for eventually solving the international problem of sex trafficking.

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# The Hostile Media Perception, Education, and Differences between the Local and National Media: A Look at 2008 Utah Voters

by James Phillips and Preston Nate

## Introduction

Media bias has long been a charge in American politics. The 2008 campaign was no exception. This time however, some journalists echoed the sentiments that media bias exists (Howell 2008), with the Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism (2008) noting that negative stories about John McCain outnumbered positive stories by more than a three to one margin (57% to 14%), and negative stories about the GOP presidential candidate outnumbered negative stories about Barack Obama by about two to one (57% to 29%). Such findings support previous research by political scientists and economists that the media seems to have a liberal tilt (Groseclose and Milyo 2005; Hamilton 2004; Sutter 2002), and journalists' personal views influence their news decisions (Patterson and Donsbach 1996). However, just as important as potential media bias is, the American electorate's perception of media bias can be as damaging as realities. An October 2008 poll by Pew indicated that Americans thought the media favored Obama in the presidential election by nearly an eight to one ratio (70% to 9%). Furthermore, a poll conducted by the Harvard Kennedy School of Government just a week before the election indicated that 77% of Americans viewed the news media as politically biased in its election coverage (McKiernan 2008). To further breakdown those numbers, 45% of respondents saw news coverage as both liberally and conservatively biased, 25% believed the news media is liberally biased, and just 5% responded that the news media was conservatively biased.

Given that the overwhelming majority of political information received by Americans, particularly regarding non-local campaigns, is filtered through the media, the degree that Americans trust the media, or conversely see the media as a biased information source, has tremendous implications for American democracy. An electorate that views the media with suspicion or downright hostility may severely attenuate

the democratic foundations of an increasingly polarized and stagnant political system. While 2008 may have given credence to cries of media bias, longstanding findings from media psychology studies indicate that even neutral content may be seen as biased when such content is viewed or read by strongly partisan voters—regardless of the direction of their ideology. Thus, regardless of media content, media mistrust due to perceptions of media bias pose a potential problem to American democracy. Hence, further determining the types of individuals prone to media mistrust may provide clues into ways in which this potentially harmful phenomenon may be reversed. Additionally, observing differences of perceived media bias at the local and national levels might increase understanding into the causes of these perceptions.

## Literature Review

The hostile media effect, or hostile media perception (HMP), posits that as individuals increase in levels of partisanship, they also increase in the perception that the media is hostile toward their group or position (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper 1985; Gunther and Schmitt 2004). HMP can occur not only with political partisans but with individuals strongly attached to religious groups (Arivanto, Hornsey and Gallois 2007), citizens from opposing countries (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken 1994; Perloff 1989), and people on opposing sides of a labor issue (Christen, Kannaovakun, & Gunther, 2002). Even if the media content is apparently neutral, partisans from both sides exposed to the same information will perceive the media as biased against their side (Christen, Kannaovakun, and Gunther 2002; Richardson, Huddy and Morgan 2008).

The cognitive mechanisms behind HMP are still under debate. Some have argued that HMP is caused by selective categorization, wherein opposing partisans exposed to the same material will mentally code the information with different valences, finding neutral or supporting information as hostile (Schmitt, Gunther and Liebhart 2004; Gunther and Liebhart 2006). Others have posited that HMP results from selective recall, with partisans focusing more on media content opposing their position, increasing the content's salience, and resulting in the hostile content as having a more dominant place in memory (Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken 1994). A third proposed avenue for HMP is termed different standards, which contends that partisans of opposite sides will agree on the content's proportions and valence but view opponents' claims as invalid or lacking in relevance and unworthy of inclusion in news content. Because opponents' invalid and irrelevant views are included, the content becomes biased and hostile (Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken 1994). A fourth suggestion for how HMP may be explained is the perceived reach of the information, with partisans less likely to experience HMP if they don't feel that the content will be wide-reaching and influencing the broader public (Christen and Huberty 2007; Gunther and Liebhart 2006). In attempting to explain this fourth potential causal mechanism of HMP, scholars theorize that:

When viewing mass media, partisans may don a particular set of lenses—lenses with a social-level focus. If the mass media context causes partisans to think about the influence of content on a broader audience . . . that audience perspective may

steer their interpretation and evaluation of content toward hostile latitudes. The media channel may prompt partisans to consider interpretations or implications they think could be misleading to a naïve and vulnerable audience of others. Hence, they interpret the same information in a different, and more disagreeable, way. (Schmitt, Gunther, and Liebhart 2004, 638)

Given the difficulties of investigating the first three proposed explanations of HMP with only survey data, our first research question focuses on the perceived reach of information. Respondents were asked about their opinion on the degree and direction of media bias in local and national news. It seems intuitive that respondents would consider national news to have a greater reach than local news in a general sense, meaning that more people are likely to be exposed on a national level to national news than to local news. Given the greater the perceived reach, the greater the perception of media bias (Gunther and Liebhart 2006), it would seem this would lead to less perceived media bias at the local level compared to the national level. Additionally, local news is more likely to reflect local viewpoints and ideological leanings, increasing the probability that people would see their local news media content as more accurately reflecting their personal political views and not be biased. Therefore, our first two hypotheses are:

H1a: Examining Utah voters based on party identification, less media bias will be perceived at the local level compared to the national level.

H1b: Examining Utah voters based on ideology, less media bias will be perceived at the local level compared to the national level.

Numerous normative implications for democracy have been found by scholars studying HMP. Partisans who experience HMP tend to gravitate toward news programs that support their ideological leanings, creating isolated factions of the public that are decreasingly exposed to other points of view (Coe, *et al.* 2008). This, coupled with the tendency of those experiencing HMP to suffer “media indignation,” which subsequently leads to increased willingness to engage in discourse with others over the issue perceived to be treated with bias by the media (Hwang, Pan, and Sun 2008), could lead to a proliferation of citizen encounters wherein both sides feel wronged and the need to correct media bias, but both sides also have only limited exposure to opposing viewpoints. Additionally, researchers have found that those holding minority group opinions often deem less credible sources as trustworthy, such as the Internet, in order to find viewpoints similar to their own, which reinforces their existing opinions (Choi, Watt, and Lynch 2006). Also, HMP can lead to an erosion of trust in the media, which can then cause a decreased trust in democracy, leading to increased reticence in accepting democratic decision contrary to one’s own opinions (Tsafti and Cohen 2005).

Given the importance of media trust in diverse democracy, we will furthermore explore what other factors may be causing HMP. Although partisanship and ideology are well established predictors of HMP—religion can also be a factor when it is salient to the media content, no other factors have been previously posited as influencing

HMP. We would like to explore one additional possible predictor of perceived media bias: education.

Some scholars advocate the need for an increase in media literacy skills for Americans (Singer and Singer 1998; Scharrer 2002) to improve critical analysis (Brown 1998) of not only what is included in media content but what has been excluded (Thorman 1999); to improve awareness of the potential impact of media content on one's opinions and actions (Silverblatt 1995); and to improve the ability of the American public to distinguish between media-created reality and facts (Matsaganis and Payne, 2005). While increasing levels of education may not include specific media literacy training, the skills of critical analysis necessary to detect media bias are repeatedly taught in various classes in university education. It would make sense, therefore, that the more formal education one receives, the more likely they are to detect media bias, potentially differentiating more educated citizens' perceptions of hostile media from those of less-educated voters. We are, therefore, curious as to what role education levels might have on HMP.

RQ1: To what extent do education levels influence HMP?

When religion is salient to news media content, religion takes the place of partisanship in driving HMP (Ariyanto, Hornsey, and Gallois 2007). However, when religion is not the main issue, it is unclear what contribution it may make in perceiving media bias. Clearly, religion is not excluded from politics, and campaigns often try to increase the importance of religion when they feel it will aid them (Monson and Oliphant 2007). Additionally, Utah is a unique political environment given that a majority of the state's residents belong to one religious denomination—The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints—creating the potential for an “us versus them” mindset, though Latter-day Saints, or Mormons, while heavily Republican, also make up the ranks of the state's Democratic Party. Therefore, religion's possible influence on HMP is unclear, but given the fact that the Church owns one of the state's two major newspapers (*Deseret News*), as well as one of the state's most important television and radio broadcasting stations (KSL), it is likely that LDS voters will see the local news as unbiased and non-LDS voters will see local news as conservatively biased. However, as previously mentioned, since Latter-day Saints also make up the ranks of the Democratic Party in the state, religion may have no effect on HMP once party identification and ideology are controlled for. Thus, we will seek to answer the following question:

RQ2: To what extent does religion influence HMP?

## Methodology

Data was collected via the 2008 Utah Colleges Exit Poll. Two questions, one for local media and one for national media, were used to measure voter perceptions of media bias:

Which of the following do you feel best describes your local (or national) news media overall?

1. ☐ Very biased in favor of liberals
2. ☐ Somewhat biased in favor of liberals

- 3. ☐ No bias
- 4. ☐ Somewhat biased in favor of conservatives
- 5. ☐ Very biased in favor of conservatives

Coding of the responses follows the numbers next to the answer choices. Partisanship was measured on the following nine-point item:

Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n)

- 1. ☐ Strong Democrat
- 2. ☐ Not so strong Democrat
- 3. ☐ Independent leaning Democrat
- 4. ☐ Independent
- 5. ☐ Independent leaning Republican
- 6. ☐ Not so strong Republican
- 7. ☐ Strong Republican
- 8. ☐ Other
- 9. ☐ Don't know

The last two categories were not included in statistical analysis in order to preserve the item's continuum of increasing GOP attachment. Ideology was measured with the following five-point question:

On most political matters do you consider yourself

- 1. ☐ Strongly conservative
- 2. ☐ Moderately conservative
- 3. ☐ Neither, middle of the road
- 4. ☐ Moderately liberal
- 5. ☐ Strongly liberal
- 6. ☐ Don't know

The last category was not included statistical analysis in order to preserve the item's continuum of increasing liberalness. The following item measured education levels:

What was the last year of school you completed?

- 1. ☐ Some high school or less
- 2. ☐ High school graduate
- 3. ☐ Some college
- 4. ☐ College graduate
- 5. ☐ Post-graduate

Finally, respondents were asked the following regarding their religion:

What, if any, is your religious preference?

- 1. ☐ Protestant
- 2. ☐ Catholic
- 3. ☐ LDS/Mormon
- 4. ☐ Jewish

5. ☐ Other  
 6. ☐ No preference/No religious affiliation  
 7. ☐ Prefer not to say

Given that the majority of Utah voters are LDS, for statistical analysis a dummy variable was created with one indicating LDS and zero indicating non-LDS. Unfortunately, the exit poll did not contain any measures of how much and what type of media exposure individuals were receiving, except that of Internet usage.

### Findings & Analysis

An initial look at the means for each level of the four variables of interest on both local and national media bias reveals several patterns. First, the mean for local media bias and the mean for national media bias are statistically speaking, significantly different at each level for all four variables (see Table 1), with the means higher for local media than national media (scores above three indicating a conservative bias and scores below three representing a liberal bias). As HMP would predict, strong Democrats and strong liberals had the highest mean score, meaning they viewed media bias as leaning toward conservatism, and strong Republicans and strong conservatives had the lowest mean score, indicating they viewed media bias as slanting in favor of liberals.

Table 1: Means and 95% Confidence Intervals

Variable Party ID	Local Media Mean & Conf. Inter.	National Media Mean & Conf. Int.	Observations
Strong Democrat	3.53*+ (3.26–3.81)	3.07 (2.80–3.33)	60
Weak Democrat	3.24+ (2.93–3.55)	2.43* (2.23–2.63)	37
Democrat Leaning Independent	3.75*+ (3.56–3.94)	2.79* (2.60–2.98)	114
Independent	3.18+ (2.95–3.42)	2.43* (2.24–2.62)	98
Republican Leaning Independent	2.93+ (2.74–3.12)	1.68* (1.54–1.82)	130
Weak Republican	2.92+ (2.72–3.12)	1.65* (1.51–1.79)	122
Strong Republican	2.67*+ (2.54–2.80)	1.41* (1.32–1.50)	237
Ideology			
Strong Liberal	3.9*+ (3.62–4.17)	3.14 (2.83–3.45)	49

Weak Liberal	3.65*+ (3.46–3.84)	2.64* (2.46–2.82)	103
Middle of the Road	3.23*+ (3.12–3.43)	2.4* (2.26–2.54)	160
Weak Conservative	2.92+ (2.80–3.04)	1.72* (1.62–1.82)	318
Strong Conservative	2.51*+ (2.35–2.67)	1.35* (1.24–1.46)	167
Education Level			
< H. S. Grad	3.00 (2.23–3.77)	2.67 (2.17–3.16)	
H. S. Graduate	2.79+ (2.57–3.02)	2.14* (1.93–2.34)	96
Some College	2.98+ (2.85–3.12)	1.98* (1.86–2.10)	286
College Graduate	3.15*+ (3.03–3.28)	1.92* (1.80–2.04)	265
Post-College Graduate	3.22*+ (3.03–3.41)	1.98* (1.81–2.15)	141
Religion			
Latter-day Saint	2.94+ (2.85–3.03)	1.71* (1.63–1.78)	512
Non-LDS	3.27*+ (3.13–3.41)	2.49* (2.36–2.62)	284

Note: \*Statistically significantly different than “no bias” (3); +local media mean score is statistically significantly different than national media mean score for that particular level of a variable (*i.e.*, Strong Democrat, etc.).


Turning to each variable specifically, the mean score for local media broken down by party identification shows only three levels having scores statistically significantly different than three (no bias): strong Democrats, Democratic-leaning Independents, and strong Republicans (see Chart 1). There is a clear direction, except for an uptick for Democratic-leaning Independents, toward liberal bias perceptions as partisanship grows more Republican.

Examining national media bias at the various levels of party identification shows all but strong Democrats having means statistically significantly different than three (no bias), and with increasing Republican partisanship resulting in higher perceptions of liberal media bias, except for moving from weak Democrats to Democratic-leaning Independents (see Chart 2). Interestingly, except for strong Democrats, all levels of party identification see the media as liberally-biased to some extent.

Comparing local and media bias side-by-side (see Chart 3) shows several interesting patterns. First, local and national media bias scores are different at the .05



Chart 1: Confidence Intervals and Means for Local Media Bias based on Party ID



level of statistical significance for every party identification sub-group. Second, local media bias is perceived as more conservative (or less liberal) across the board. Finally, the difference between the means of the far ends of the party identification spectrum—strong Democrats and strong Liberals—for local media bias scores is about half of the difference between the same levels for national media bias scores (.86 for local compared to 1.66 for national), indicating a much quicker change in perceptions across the same groups for national media bias.

Thus, the answer to H1a appears to be that HMP is less at the local level, though in accepting the hypothesis there are a few caveats. On the one hand, more levels of party identification reported levels of local media bias that were not statistically different than no bias compared to national media bias. Furthermore, the difference between the far ends of the partisanship spectrum was much closer for local media than national media bias. Both of these trends would seem to support H1a that people perceive less media bias in local media than in national media. Still, the extreme ends of party identification did perceive differences in media bias that were on opposite sides of the no bias baseline and were statistically different. Thus, partisanship does still seem to be driving HMP, although the influence of partisanship on the perception of media bias seems attenuated at the local level.

Turning to ideology we see patterns similar but not identical to partisanship. This may be due to the fact that in Utah even Democrats tend to see themselves as more conservative than Democrats nationally, meaning the two measures are not perfectly correlated. For local media bias, all levels of ideology except weak conservatives were statistically different than no bias, with strong liberals, weak liberals,

Chart 2: Confidence Intervals and Means for National Media Bias based on Party ID





Chart 3: Mean Scores for Local and National Media Bias by Party ID



and “middle-of-the-roaders” all viewing the local media as biased in favor of conservatives. Strong conservatives, not surprisingly, viewed local media as liberally biased (see Chart 4).

Regarding national media an unsurprising linear pattern emerged with strong liberals viewing the national media as essentially unbiased and every level of ideology afterwards perceiving national media has increasingly liberal in its bias as ideology approached strong conservative (see Chart 5).

In comparing local and national media bias scores based on ideology, the slopes look almost identical, with local media experiencing a drop of 1.39 units from the liberal end of the ideological spectrum to the conservative end, and national media dropping 1.79 units from strong liberals to strong conservatives (see Chart 6).

The findings from examining ideology and media bias would indicate no real difference between local and national media bias perceptions other than the starting point, with Utah voters seeing local media as more conservatively tilted than national media. This, of course, leads to the rejection of H1b, and, when considered along with the acceptance of H1a, leads to no clear conclusion on whether local media is perceived as less biased than national media.

In looking at RQ1, the relationship between education and media bias, dealing with local media Utah voters could be differentiated between whether they had graduated from college or not, with college and post-college graduates perceiving a slight conservative bias and less than college graduates with media bias scores not statistically different than no bias (see Chart 7). People with less than a high school diploma were not included given the small sample size (n=12).

Chart 4: Confidence Intervals and Means for Local Media Bias based on Ideology




Chart 5: Confidence Intervals and Means for National Media Bias based on Ideology





Chart 6: Mean Scores for Local and National Media Bias by Ideology



On the other hand, there is not statistical difference between the four education groups when it comes to national media bias perceptions, with all of the groups viewing national media as liberally biased (see Chart 8).

Thus we see a pattern wherein increasing education levels is related to increasing perceptions of conservative bias at the local level, but increasing levels of education is related to no real change in perceptions of media bias at the national level (see Chart 9).

Interestingly, across all education levels Utah voters perceive substantively less media bias (regardless of direction) in local media than in national media, similar to findings with partisanship but not ideology.

Finally, in examining RQ2 regarding media bias based on religion, Latter-day Saint voters did not view local media bias as statistically different than no bias, whereas non-LDS voters did perceive a slight conservative bias. Both groups considered the national media as liberally biased (see Chart 10 on page 16).

Similar to education and partisanship, when looking at media bias scores based on religion, Utah voters viewed national media as much more biased than local media.

Since difference of means testing does not control for other factors, an ordinal probit regression was run to determine which factors are potentially causing perceptions of local and national media bias among Utah voters in 2008. Two models for both biases were run, one with religion and one without (see Table 2).

In both local media bias models partisanship, ideology and education were statistically significant, as were the regression models overall. Religion, at least as it was operationalized in this study, was not a statistically significant predictor of local

Chart 7: Confidence Intervals and Means for Local Media Bias based on Education




Chart 8: Confidence Intervals and Means for National Media Bias based on Education




Chart 9: Mean Scores for Local and National Media Bias by Education





Chart 10: Mean Scores for Local and National Media Bias by Education



media bias. Partisanship and ideology operated as expected, with more Republican or conservative values leading to scores on the media bias scale in the direction of liberal bias. Education’s affect on local media bias perceptions, as hinted in previous charts, was that as education levels increase, so do perceptions of conservative bias (or less liberal bias) at the local level.

The national media bias models were no different in the variables that achieved statistical significance, with religion the lone variable apparently not predicting perceptions of bias in the national media. Also, partisanship, ideology and education are more precise estimators of media bias at the national level compared to the local level given the higher pseudo R-squared score the national models achieved (.1644–.1649) compared to the local models (.0571–.0581). One reason that religion is not relevant in either of these models when past researchers have found religion to be relevant is that the question wording for both questions focused on politics rather than religion. It is likely that if the questions asked whether the media was biased toward religion, then religion would have been more salient in predicting media bias perceptions. Additionally, given that Latter-day Saints in Utah are predominantly Republican, and those that are not tend to lean conservative in their political ideology, the partisanship and ideology variables likely absorbed any potential impact religion may have made in the ordinal regression models.

One unexpected finding in comparing the national and local models is that the sign on the coefficient for education switches. Increasing levels of education lead

Table 2: Ordinal Probit Regression of Factors Affecting Voters' Perception of Media Bias

	Local Bias	Media Model 1	Local Bias	Media Model 2	National Bias	Media Model 1	National Bias	Media Model 2
Variable	Coefficient (Rob. Std. Err.)	p value	Coefficient (Rob. Std. Err.)	p value	Coefficient (Rob. Std. Err.)	p value	Coefficient (Rob. Std. Err.)	p value
Party ID	-.065 (.025)	.011	-.068 (.026)	.007	-.248 (.030)	<.001	-.237 (.031)	<.001
Ideology	.300 (.045)	<.001	.300 (.045)	<.001	.341 (.051)	<.001	.325 (.052)	<.001
Years of Education	.128 (.038)	.001	.129 (.039)	.001	-.134 (.038)	<.001	-.127 (.039)	.001
LDS	--	--	-.005 (.028)	.852	--	--	-.144 (.095)	.129
Cut Point 1	-.546		-.579 (.282)		-1.221		-1.273 (.287)	
Cut Point 2	.333		.295 (.283)		-.068		-.127 (.285)	
Cut Point 3	1.140		1.102 (.287)		.850		.791 (.291)	
Cut Point 4	2.413		2.377 (.302)		1.778		1.729 (.309)	
n	808		803		824		817	
Log likelihood	-1132.03		-1124.59		-901.51		-893.60	
Pseudo R2	.0571		.0581		.1644		.1649	
Wald X2	132.99	<.0001	134.48		324.07	<.0001		<.0001

Notes: Media Bias was measured on a scale of one to five with one indicating that the media is very liberally biased and five indicating the media is very conservatively biased. Party ID was scaled from one to seven with a one indicating a strong Democrat and a seven indicating a strong Republican. Ideology was scaled from one to five with a one indicating a strong conservative and a five indicating a strong liberal. Education was scaled from one to five with a one indicating some high school education or less and a five indicating post-college graduate education. LDS membership was a dummy variable with a one indicating membership in The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and a zero indicating someone who was not LDS.



to an increased probability of perceiving local media as conservatively biased, but higher education results in an increased probability of perceiving national media as liberally biased. As education has never before been determined as a predictor of media bias perceptions, the reason for this finding is unclear. Since media literacy training increases individuals ability to critically analyze media content, the simple explanation might be that people with higher levels of education can more easily detect media bias, that Utah media is conservatively biased, and national media is liberally biased, though this study only examines perceptions and not news content.

As interpreting probit regression coefficients is not a straightforward affair, the change in predicted probabilities for moving between levels in the various statistically significant variables was calculated for local (see Table 3) and national media bias (see Table 4). A baseline voter was created who was an Independent with middle-of-the-road ideology and had graduated from college.

Table 3: Change in Predicted Probabilities for Local Media Bias  
for Moving from One Group to Another

	Very Liberally Biased	Somewhat Liberally Biased	No Bias	Somewhat Conservatively Biased	Very Conservatively Biased
Strong Dem → Strong GOP	.038	.074	.043	-.083	-.070
Strong Liberal → Strong Conservative	.125	.210	.116	-.228	-.222
H. S. Graduate → Post College Graduate	-.041	-.074	-.036	.095	.063

Note: The baseline voter from which the predicted probabilities were obtained was Party ID=Independent, Ideology=Middle of the Road, and Education=College Graduate. The LDS variable was not included since it was not statistically significant in the regression models.

As expected, moving from a strong Democrat to a strong Republican increases the probability of seeing the local media as either liberally-biased or having no bias, whereas it decreases the probability of viewing the local media as having a conservative bias. Similar, though stronger findings, occur when moving from a strong liberal ideology to a strong conservative ideology. Looking at education levels, moving from a high school graduate to someone who has a graduate degree shows a decreased probability of perceiving local media as liberally biased or unbiased, and an increased probability of viewing local media as conservatively biased. Thus, increases in education act similarly to increases in liberal ideology or Democratic partisanship

in regard to local media bias perceptions. National media bias is a somewhat different story, however, as the ordinal regression models previously indicated.

Table 4: Change in Predicted Probabilities for National Media Bias  
for Moving from One Group to Another

Moving from one group to another	Very Liberal Biased	Somewhat Liberal Biased	No Bias	Somewhat Conservatively Biased	Very Conservatively Biased
Strong Dem → Strong GOP	.440	.062	-.249	-.191	-.061
Strong Liberal → Strong Conservative	.407	.059	-.235	-.176	-.053
H. S. Graduate → Post College Graduate	.118	.031	-.078	-.056	-.014

Note: the baseline voter from which the predicted probabilities were obtained was Party ID=Independent, Ideology=Middle of the Road, and Education=College Graduate. The LDS variable was not included since it was not statistically significant in the regression models

Looking at the national media, moving from a strong Democrat to a strong Republican in Utah leads to a significant increase in the probability that a voter will perceive the media as liberally biased, and a healthy decrease in the probability that national media will be seen as unbiased or conservatively biased. The findings are nearly identical for moving from a strong liberal to a strong conservative ideology. Education, though, unlike local media bias, shows an increased probability of perceiving liberal bias in the national media when moving from a high school graduate to graduate degree level, and a decreased probability of viewing national media as unbiased or conservatively biased. Hence, for national media bias perceptions, increasing levels of education act similarly to increasing levels of conservative ideology and Republican partisanship.

## Discussion

This study, while attempting to add to the literature in two areas relating to media bias—the perceived reach of source causal mechanism hypothesis and the role of education—only probably does so in the latter’s case. The findings were mixed regarding whether local media would be perceived as less bias than national media because of its perceived lesser reach. In other words, local media is perceived as not having as extended of influence as national media because it reaches a smaller audience. While looking at partisanship, education and religion seemed to indicate less perceived media bias at the local level, ideology did not support such a conclusion.

Furthermore, there may have been too much ambiguity in the question wording. Since no measure of media reach was included in the survey, it is unclear if respondents actually thought local media had a lesser reach than national media overall, or if respondents determined that local media's reach was just as extensive at the local level as national media's reach at the national media. Further research should rectify this conceptual ambiguity.

This study does add to the scholarly debate over HMP the new variable of education. Clearly for Utah voters in 2008, education played a role in predicting media bias perceptions. Somewhat quixotically, that role is not consistent at the local and national levels. The cause of this finding is still uncertain. As already noted, the simplest explanation is that increasing levels of education increases media literacy skills, allowing the educated to more accurately perceive and categorize persuasive arguments, attempts to influence, and unintended bias in media content. Thus, the reason more educated voters are more likely to see local media as conservatively biased and national media as liberally biased after controlling for partisanship and ideology is because the media is in reality so biased at those levels. Admittedly, while the most parsimonious explanation, it is not necessarily the only one or the most correct one. Future research will need to explore education's link to media bias perceptions.

However, this study does raise possible implications for public policy—if education improves voters' ability to accurately perceive media bias, then studies could be undertaken to see if a focused media literacy program aimed at high school students could create the same bias detection analytical skills found in college and post-college graduates. Such a program would be more practical and cost effective than trying to get every high school student in the country to obtain a graduate degree.

Finally, two other caveats exist with this research. Survey methodology is always less rigorous in determining causality than experimental design, and so future explorations of the difference between perceptions of local and national media biases, as well as the impact of education on media bias perceptions, should seek a tighter research design. The ability to generalize these results to other states or the nation as a whole is limited. Utah is arguably a unique state. It is considered by many to be the most conservative state in the Union. Looking at a state on the other end of the political spectrum, such as Massachusetts, would be illuminating and would possibly provide quite different results.

## Conclusion

This is the first known study to examine perceived differences between local and national media bias at the state level, as well as investigate the role of education predicting perceptions of media bias. While potential instrument and design problems limited the ability to convincingly determine whether local media is perceived as less biased than national media, and while this study's findings were mixed in that area, there is enough initial evidence to indicate that this vein of research may provide fruitful. Previous studies examining the impact of the perceived reach of an information source on the perception of bias did not compare local to national media, but

instead compared non-mediated communication with media content (Gunther and Liebhart 2006). The only other study to compare local and national media looked at perceptions regarding the impact of the media content, not media bias (Christen and Huberty 2007). This study shows that further research investigating the possible difference between local and national media bias perceptions is warranted.

Additionally, this is the first study to find that education does impact media bias, though differently at the local and national levels. Further research needs to clarify this finding as well as explore the possible role media literacy programs could have in benefiting the electorate.

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# **I've got the Power: War, Rational Perceptions of Power, and Military Emphases; how disagreements about relative power stem from the relationship of the dyadic partners' military emphases**

by Patrick Scott

## **Introduction**

In 1937, the Imperial Army of Japan attacked the single most populous nation in the world, the Republic of China. The resulting war lasted about eight years and resulted in the deaths of well over twenty million people, the majority of whom were civilians (Anderson 2005). Japan arguably had the best equipped, and most advanced army in the world, and spent more than twice as much money on their military as China did (Bennett and Stam 2000). Initially, the Japanese trampled the Kuomintang Army (KMT), their air strikes and artillery wreaking havoc on the underprepared, underfunded Chinese. Rebellions, corruption, and pervasive foreign influences had severely weakened the Chinese state, hampering any real progress toward industrialization and modernization. Moreover, the size of China's total armed forces was split at the time the war broke out, due to the ongoing communist revolution led by Mao Zedong. After a string of initial victories at Shanghai, Nanjing, and Wuhan, the magic of the Japanese offensive began to wane, and the war began to equalize.

After the seriousness of the Japanese threat became apparent, the communist forces began to coordinate (a sort of hostile cooperation) with the KMT to turn back the invasion. In spite of its large and well-armed forces, the Japanese began to lose an astonishing amount of manpower and equipment to a massive guerilla warfare campaign by the Chinese defenders. By 1941, the Japanese and Chinese were locked in a stalemate, with neither side making much ground. The Japanese had more advanced weapons and technologies, but the massive number of their enemies and a correspondingly efficient guerilla strategy by the Chinese hampered any success. Conversely, in spite of their overwhelming numbers, the advanced technologies of the Japanese air and ground forces decimated economic and military production which appeared to have neutralized any real manpower advantage that the Chinese

might have had. Only once the U.S. and the USSR became involved in the war against Japan, and a large amount of military aid was given to the KMT and the Red Army, respectively, was progress made to slowly take back their nation. Ultimately, it was the U.S. atomic attacks that brought the Japanese to unconditional surrender, forcing them to give up their bloodstained conquests in China and elsewhere (Jansen 1975).

Japan, as an insecure island nation with few natural resources, obviously had a powerful incentive to start war with China and invade its territory. However, Japan's pursuance of war did not lead to an accomplishment of its goals and was very costly in terms of human lives, military equipment, and other expenditures, making the war severely counterproductive. But in the decade leading up to 1937, through Japan and China's quarrels and skirmishes, it became very evident that Japan had the larger (enlisted at the time) and better-equipped army. Since Japan was clearly militarily preponderant, why did Japan and China fight instead of coming to some sort of agreement that reflected the balance of power? What is the cause of this disagreement? Could something be done to prevent similar disagreements in the future?

### **Perceptions of Relative Power as a Rational Cause of War**

To answer consequential questions like these, I look to current theories on international conflict, specifically those based somewhat on the tenets of neorealism. According to neorealism, in the international system, states are responsible for their own survival. Though liberal theories and research have abounded, they have great difficulty explaining what about democracies make them uniquely noncombative (at least with each other), whereas neorealist explanations for war have both a consistent casual logic and empirical foundations that provide them a large degree of real-world accuracy (Geller and Singer 1998).

States may participate in IGOs and NGOs and vote in the UN General Assembly, but when the chips are down, they cannot count on help from others for protection; each state must provide their own base of power by which to defend its territorial sovereignty (Waltz 1979). For this reason, every autonomous nation in the world has some sort of military organization that it uses for defense and that they use as a deterrent to prevent other states from taking advantage of their resources. Having a military gives a state power, and power means survival. Each state, however, has a comparative advantage of one of two types of military power: manpower or technology. Although this might seem like an oversimplification, in terms of overall military doctrine, manpower and technology are the two basic sources of military power, and doctrine and emphasis is primarily focused on one or the other.

Generally speaking, states with good economies tend to have an advantage in and, therefore, specialize in, producing military technology, and those with an advantage in human capital tend to specialize in armies that are well populated. These emphases allow a state to build its power in the most efficient way and to gain the most utility from its expenditures. While states may develop both aspects in their military buildup, when developing power and, consequently, when engaging in conflict, a state has a comparative and primary advantage in one of the two emphases.

When states find those around them engaged in military buildups, the natural inclination they have is to balance against them; in other words, they increase the size or strength of their armies accordingly. If a state sees another increasing its power, it will most likely escalate according to its comparative advantage. It is generally agreed among political scientists that balance between dyads is safer than any imbalance, since states with larger militaries may take advantage of smaller states (Berohn and Blimes 2008). As with the Second Sino-Japanese war, full-blown conflicts are costly, and there is always more to lose by going to war as compared to negotiating terms that are marginally acceptable to both sides (Fearon 1995). This concept, as entailed in the bargaining model of war, dictates that states will pursue war only when they believe that they have some advantage in doing so over what they might gain in negotiations.

Many international and game theorists have discussed reasons why two states might decide to go to war over the possibility of some sort of settlement, but none have addressed the effect of the military emphasis in this context. These military emphases relate directly to how power is viewed and how dyadic partners perceive each other's power. Perhaps two states with manpower emphases might accurately gauge one another's relative power, as will two states specialized in technology. What of the dyad where one has a technology emphasis and the other a manpower emphasis? How do dyads view the advantages in military power? Is one emphasis seen as better than the other? Will one emphasis encourage a state to be more aggressive?

These questions of disagreement over relative power are particularly interesting when viewing the relationship that the U.S. currently has with many of the military powers in the world. In sharp contrast to its forces in 1937, as of 2007, China has the world's largest military, with about seven million total troops at their disposal. The U.S., on the other hand, if necessary, could have about three million soldiers available in case of a large-scale conflict. Obviously, in that dyad, China has an absolute manpower emphasis. As one might expect, however, in 2007 the U.S. spent about ten times more than China did on military spending, clearly giving the technology emphasis to the U.S. (CIA 2008). Unfortunately, these figures do little in determining who would win a conflict should one occur. Would the U.S.'s technology beat China's vast troops? Alternatively, would China's incredible numbers overwhelm the more advanced but far fewer U.S. forces, as they did in 1937–41 to Japan? Because it is difficult to equate the technology and manpower balance, conflict could arise over each side thinking that they have the advantage. By creating a model that shows how differing military emphases increases the likelihood that a state will be aggressive, policymakers may determine which countries might go to war based on their emphasis and then work to prevent it.

## **Literature**

My model is closely related to much of the work done regarding the importance of military doctrines and to the rational causes of war. The first aspect of my model, that of divergent military doctrines upon which an emphasis is built, is based on the



classical work done by Barry Posen on military doctrines and why nations adopt them. Posen (1984) argued that nations develop grand strategies as their long-term goals for security, and then they develop military doctrines that give them the plan on how to go about meeting that strategy. Military doctrines may be offensive, defensive, or deterrent based. Offensive doctrines rely on destroying an opponent's armed forces—traditionally, as quickly as possible, while defensive doctrines tend to emphasize the determination to deny an opponent a particular goal. He argued that offensive doctrines tend to cause more trouble, if only because a state looks like it is going to fight, and its advantage often lies in doing so first (Van Evera 1999). Military doctrines and force sizes are not easy to hide, so the uncertainty about when a nation will fight derives from their private intentions. My model suggests that military doctrines tend to be created based on the comparative advantage that a state has in conjunction with its grand strategy and will tend to be offensive or defensive mainly according to whether it has a technology emphasis or a manpower emphasis, respectively.

The other tenet of IR theory that my model rests upon is neorealism; namely, that states are the major actors in the international system, that states are unitary and rational, and that states' primary concern is security. By creating the supposition that states are unitary, I may observe and predict how states as a whole respond to situations, allowing my theories to be more generalizable. Obviously, leaders run states, but, according to Waltz, states may also be viewed as entities that make decisions and execute them, more or less as a whole, without sacrificing accuracy in describing their behavior (Waltz 1979). Neorealists assume that security is the most important factor when a state is making decisions because the system in which the international community exists, intentionally or unintentionally, is anarchic. As I mentioned before, if states want to exist, they must make that happen through their own actions and precautions.

Neorealists also assert one particular reason that might lead to war is the misperceptions that states have about relative power. Van Evera (1999) states that false optimism on the outcome of war is a major cause of states engaging in conflict with one another. For example, country A might think its power balance with country B lies greatly in its favor, while in reality they do not have an advantage. Country A could then start a conflict based on an imaginary view of the balance of power between the two, and war commences. Whether or not country A was right, conflict was initiated because A perceived itself stronger and their chance of success greater. Country A, instead of negotiating, saw itself capable of getting what they wanted through force. Where this argument is left lacking is in the exclusion of rationality as a factor in the decision-making of the state, and the influence that it has on the perception of the balance of power.

The principle of rationality is the keystone to neorealism, and it is essential because it allows for consistency in the predictive power of a theory. Rationality signifies that states are capable of a cost-benefit analysis of their position with the information available to them, allowing them to consciously and dispassionately rank and choose the best option. If A can look at two courses of action and decide that action X is in its

self-interest more than action Y, then we could rightly call A rational. This concept is uniquely tied to the bargaining model of war, as established by Blainey (1988), built upon by Fearon (1995), and many others. Though none have directly investigated how the bargaining model explains what causes misperceptions to arise, they have established the logic of war as a rational choice and why states would choose it.

Like Van Evera, Blainey asserted that wars begin because of a disagreement about relative power, with each assuming that they have a better chance of getting what they want through fighting. If A thinks that B is significantly weaker, yet B demands more than A thinks that they should, A might go to war with a reasonable expectation to come out as the victor. However, if B is stronger than A had previously supposed, then B is right to have high demands, and B will bargain with the assumption that they can beat A. This leads to both sides overestimating their own relative power (Blainey 1988).

Fearon argued that this possibility can only be rational in certain circumstances. He held that if two states, A and B, both have the same information about the predicted outcome, then they should both come to the same conclusion. He cited Blainey's reasons for the conflicting expectations of bargaining dyads, and concluded that the only rational explanation he gave is that states have private information, or the real intentions or capabilities about the outcome of a conflict. Therefore, according to Fearon, disagreements about power may only be rationally explained by one side having private information. Moreover, states usually have an incentive to have private information, because states do not want their military limitations to be public knowledge, as such could lead to exploitation by larger powers. He also argued that bounded rationality (or the differential ability of states to cope with the complexities of a situation) contributes to a lack of information, and therefore could lead to conflict, but he asserted that this is not entirely rational either (Fearon 1995). These conclusions, however, fail to consider that variables such as manpower and technology do not easily equate to each other. If two states are considering war, and they have different military emphases, both sides will judge the probable outcome by their own emphasis. Therefore, the rational decision made by each side cannot be assuredly equivalent.

Smith and Stam's bargaining model of war addressed this problem, as it takes a different approach than Fearon and other's by eliminating the "common prior" assumption (Smith 2004). A common prior is information that is shared by all of the actors in a game before it starts. It has been commonly argued that if all actors have the same information about a situation and are both rational, they will come to the same conclusion about what that information means. According to the model suggested by Fearon, both A and B have the same prior information about a possible conflict, so the probability of success for each is the same in both player's minds. The distinction in Smith and Stam's model is they excluded this prior common knowledge that A and B supposedly have. The basis for this exclusion is that such a model more accurately reflects reality, in which no two states actually possess the exact same data (and therefore interpretation) on the other that they have for themselves. In

other words, A has the same intelligence on B as what B knows about itself, and vice versa, with the caveat that B also knows what A knows, and A what B knows. This means that both sides are aware of what the other side knows about them.

For example, China knows the same about their own capabilities as the U.S. does, and China knows this. The same holds true for the United States. However, even though both sides might have the same intelligence about each other's capabilities, both still might very well disagree on the impact of that information, or, as in the above example, who between the U.S. and China would be the ultimate victor if the two were to fight. I assert that this is because of their differing military doctrines that stem from their divergent emphases of military power. This is what Smith and Stam called the international equivalent of "agreeing to disagree." There are concerns that this model is not rational; however, logically we can see how that is not the case. If two states do not have common prior assumptions, we could accurately predict that those states might choose different actions based on the same information. The key is that those choices themselves are still rational, as they have been selected from a group of possible alternatives and have been ranked as being the best.

Reiter, along similar lines as the above arguments, determined that one of conflict's goals is to resolve the ambiguity surrounding who has the most relative power. He asserted that since limited conflict reduces the uncertainty of the outcome of a hypothetical absolute war, it is useful to determine the real balance of power between dyads (Reiter 2003). He quoted Rosen, who compared antebellum bargaining to two men fighting in a darkened room, unable to see the true strength of the other until they engage in some limited combat. Then, the weaker of the two will be quite aware of his shortcomings and will try to settle the dispute (Rosen 1972). This concept reiterates the idea that two rational agents are unable to have the same prior information about a conflict before it occurs. My hypothesis is to successfully explain why it is that these rational agents cannot come to the same conclusion.

Berohn and Blimes come from a slightly different angle, contending that disagreements over balance of power and resolve are unlikely to be responsible for the causation of war (2008). They hold that military power is not hard to discern, and disagreements about relative power are not likely to be responsible for conflicts, although there does exist some minor vagueness. They quickly observed that such vagueness does not extend far enough to cause states to grossly overestimate their fighting power to the extent that they are bargaining for what they cannot hope to obtain through force. Their main argument is nuanced and careful in its distinction, asserting that instead, disagreements will occur between states when they each focus on divergent determinants when considering relative power. This key distinction is what gives weight to my hypotheses: disagreement about the distinction between military emphases is what makes bargaining between states, based on their relative power, difficult to reconcile. Country A and country B do not misunderstand the fact of each other's military power, rather, they disagree as to the strategic impact of that power. Such disagreement will cause A to miscalculate

the efficacy of B's power, and vice versa, each misreading the impact of the other's military power.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The differences between estimations of power as a result of divergent military emphases create dangerous misperceptions of the relative balance of power. These different emphases and the resulting misinterpretation of relative power will lead countries to forego possible bargaining scenarios to engage in conflict. Therefore, I postulate two hypotheses based on this uncertainty that differing military emphases bring. My first hypothesis states:

H<sub>1</sub>: States in emphasis-oppositional dyads have greater probability of engaging in conflict, *ceteris paribus*.

An emphasis-oppositional dyad is a pair of states where one has focused their emphasis, in either manpower or technology, differently than their dyadic partner. The hypothesis states that the military emphasis a state pursues creates the uncertainty about the outcome of war when in an emphasis-oppositional dyad.

In addition to the basic assumptions of neorealism and bargaining models, there are two additional assumptions upon which this hypothesis lies. The first is, as argued by Berohn and Blimes, that states can have a relatively approximate estimation of another state's military power, and will not grossly under- or over-exaggerate their opponent's actual forces. This means that misperceptions about relative power are not coming from lapses in one country's intelligence network or in one side's possession of a secret army of which no one knows. Besides the incentive that states have to spy on their neighbors and enemies, states also have a large incentive to disclose knowledge of any weapons or armies that might give them greater bargaining power; therefore, it is not likely that any nation would keep any secret that might greatly affect the outcome of a conflict. Consequently, it is not disagreement over actual power that leads states to war but a misperception about what that power equates to on the battlefield.

The second assumption that I use to support my hypothesis is that because manpower and technology emphases have different strengths and weaknesses, it is virtually impossible to know, prior to any conflict, which one of those emphases will prove to be superior. This stems from the fact that wars have been won using both superior technology and superior manpower.

One might argue that if the U.S. fought China, their technology would win them the war. However, going back to the example I gave in the introduction, Japan clearly had a far more advanced army than did the Chinese in 1937. The Chinese however, had hundreds of millions more people at their disposal and, accordingly, did not negotiate a settlement because they obviously felt that they possessed the strength in numbers sufficient to withstand invasion. Their ability to quickly turn their large population in to a massive army changed the way in which they viewed the bargaining process with Japan, preventing agreement. Moreover, the Japanese, from their recent experiences against the Chinese and the Russians, believed that

technology was what was vital to military success, and they believed that their technologically superior forces would quickly trump the numerous but poorly-armed Chinese armies. The Assessment of Chinese Resistance Potential report issued by the South Manchurian Railway Company in 1940, a report designed to evaluate military, economic, and political resistance to Japanese invasions, indicated that while the Japanese were fully aware of the capacity for mass mobilizations of the Chinese armies, these were not seen as a sufficient deterrent to prevent or refrain them from using military action (Li 2008). Since both sides disagreed with the others' conclusions about the outcome of war, they did not feel that bargaining was in their interest.

From this example, it is important to note that though both sides disagreed over the outcome, the technology intensive state was the more confident of victory and were the aggressors in that conflict.

From this observation, I draw the second hypothesis:

H<sub>2</sub>: In an emphasis-oppositional dyad, the state with a technology advantage has a higher probability of initiating conflict than will the manpower state, *ceteris paribus*.

In a given dyad, a state's military emphasis in technology leads to increased aggression against a manpower-based state. This comes as a result of two logical reasons. The first point has its origins in a rational understanding of a technological advantage: one on one, technology beats no technology. The soldier with a club will likely lose to the soldier with a steel sword, just as a soldier in a tank will beat the soldier on a horse. This rational perception of military advantage encourages many countries to invest in military technology. There is considerable evidence that one of the major contributors to Germany's optimism for war against Russia in both world wars stemmed from their leaders' rational beliefs that Germany's enormous investment in technological superiority would (and actually did) give Germany the chance of defeating Russia's larger armies (Van Evera 1999, 19–21).

Japan's techno-nationalization emphasized that state security could only be achieved by having a military technologically superior to its foes. The victories attained in the Russo-Japanese War only served to reinforce these policies and led to continued aggressive behavior against China (Jacoby 2008). It could be that the U.S.'s losses to Japan during the first years of their involvement in WWII taught the U.S. a lesson on the technological emphasis, if the manpower ratios are 1:1, the more advanced force will win. This leads many developed nations to the rational assumption that technology always beats manpower. They will see their advantage as being superior to a manpower emphasis and will enter bargaining processes with a manpower state garnering this expectation. This will lead to a decreased incentive to negotiate with manpower states and will increase the likelihood for aggressive activity on the part of the technology state.

The second point is that technology-based militaries often have an increased ability to project their power. Whereas a manpower-based military must mobilize

vast numbers of soldiers and transport them along with munitions and supplies, technology-based militaries may often travel faster and attack more effectively, requiring far less time and support to prepare the strike than the first. Therefore, not only will the technology state generally call the advantage to their favor strictly because their weapons are more advanced, they will also perceive the natural advantage they have in moving attacking forces to the target quicker, and the advantage they have in first strike and surprise attacks (Van Evera 1999).

To see an example of this difference, we can look to the differences in the Chinese armed forces and the U.S. armed forces. The U.S. has a massive and powerful navy, numerous military bases abroad, and relies on a vast array of transport and attack helicopters and aircraft to project its power. The Chinese military, on the other hand, though far more numerous, lacks the numerous air and sea fleets that the U.S. depends on to maintain its hegemony.

Moreover, nations that develop a technology-based military also do so because technology will reduce the number of soldiers exposed to harm and maximize opponent casualties. States that rely on technology do so because of a certain human cost sensitivity that manpower states do not share. This would lead them to view a possible victory in terms of the highest kill-ratio (enemy casualties to friendly casualties), whereas a manpower-based state relies on its ability to throw as many people into the fight as necessary to overwhelm their opponent. As a result, the technology state overestimates its ability to get to a perceived acceptable bargaining space, forcing them to comply by driving the other side's casualties high, while the manpower-based state does not attach the same level of acceptance for losses in manpower, and does not consider the fight lost. A technology-based state is also more likely to initiate the conflict, because it relies on a different cost-assessment metric than does a manpower-based state.

In other words, technology-based states tend to view themselves as more powerful and will inflate how much they deserve in a bargaining situation. Manpower-based states, on the other hand, will tend to view themselves as having great power, but in such a way that they will undervalue the power of their technological opponent, and will not give in to the demands of their foe because they perceive them to be over inflated. The technology state will try to start a fight, because they think they will win, but the manpower state will simply not back down, because they think they can win.

An important assumption for this hypothesis is that a military technology emphasis gives more advantage to offensive tactics when facing a manpower-based foe. Accordingly, I would contend that a manpower-based military would be far more effective as a defensive force against an aggressive technology-based opponent. A technology-based military requires heavy infrastructure and strong economic support for its fight, favoring a scenario where the fighting is done abroad, far away from production facilities and civilian workforces. Moreover, advanced weaponry is far more specialized and accurate than older weaponry in general, providing a greater advantage for planning out offensives against enemy forces and executing first strikes. Conversely, a manpower-based military has its advantage at home, using

their knowledge of terrain, local customs (to avoid detection), and partisan or guerrilla warfare to grind down a technologically superior force. Engagements in WWII between the massive yet poor Soviet army with the technologically advanced German armies illustrated this point well. Germany's technology favored aggressive, offensive tactics, while the large, ill-equipped forces of the Soviets eventually fought off their invaders with sheer numbers.

My hypotheses imply that if two nations share the same specialization, their likelihood of starting conflict will be less than those dyads that do not share the same emphasis. This is due to a diminished uncertainty about who would be the victor. If both states are manpower intensive, then the states can gauge the manpower of the other through normal means and decrease their uncertainty of the probability of victory. Because they will have a more accurate gauge, the balance of power will be clearer, and bargaining will be far more profitable for both sides.

### **Alternative Hypothesis**

The assumptions that I have outlined in my hypothesis are based on a perspective of war as part of the bargaining process. It is possible to argue that war is not explicitly bargaining, and that once armed conflict begins, bargaining is at an end. Whereas bargaining occurs on two sides, war is started by one and is reciprocated by the other out of necessity. States are not generally inclined to allow other states to take their territory or resources, and they are compelled to fight back, even when it means fighting solely out of desperation. This means that the target nation's response has nothing to do with misperceptions of relative power, rather from a view of the state as an indivisible entity with a nationalistic need to preserve its borders, resources, and identity. In other words, and using my first case, this hypothesis would argue that China had no choice but to fight Japan, in spite of any perception that they might have had about Japan's relative power. They were constrained to fight because it was their land, their nation, and their home, and it was not something that they could or would simply turn over to their aggressors.

This alternative to my theory reflects solid logic and is largely upheld by historical record, at least, on the surface. But underlying this argument, there exists some inconsistencies. Does bargaining really end once armed conflict breaks out? If this were the case, then why would aggressor states stop their attacks until obtaining their optimal outcome using their military force—regardless of what the target nation is doing? I would argue that states only fight until the ambiguity of relative power is resolved. In some cases, such conflict can last a long time; in other cases, only a few hours pass before the victor becomes apparent. Whatever the case, once the mystery over the balance of power is gone, states almost always agree in the short term on what the agreement should look like based on that balance. If one state invades another, the target state fighting back is simply a rejection of the aggressor's attempt to coerce a more favorable agreement than could be agreed upon without fighting.

That leads to the next problem, or why attacking nations have not learned by now that target nations almost always defend their homeland. If war is ex-post ineffi-

cient, as Fearon suggested, the aggressor state should seek to find some sort of agreement with the target state that avoids war (1995). According to this same paradigm, if that aggressive state perceives that it is unable to find an agreement with the target nation that is less costly than invasion, they will certainly count on the other nation fighting back, mainly as a rejection of that means of bargaining. It is reasonable to say that Japan did not expect China to back down once the main invasion commenced but was counting on its military preponderance to allow for a better outcome—even after measuring the costs of war—than without it. Therefore, Japan's perception of what its military emphasis meant on the battlefield was precisely relevant to their hopes of an easy victory and their decision to go to war.

The last problem with the alternative hypothesis is that it implies that target nations will fight when they have no hope of gains of any sort. However, Reiter and Stam (2002) addressed this perspective by asserting that target nations always fight back, and they provide three reasons to support this hypothesis. They argued that leaders' domestic reputation, national pride, and international reputation; view of their state as indivisible entities; and their state is not something that they can or would bargain off to another sovereign, are all rational reasons to fight an invader. Obviously, target nations do not fight when they have a zero-percent chance of gain—they surrender.

A nation that hopes to achieve some goal, dealing with either domestic or international reputation, will fight even in the face of an overall loss. I argue that this mentality that target nations develop is what I call the hope of denial. This harkens back to Posen's assertion that defensive military doctrines focus on denying the attacker their goals (1984). On some level, the target nation, which is most probably a manpower emphasis state, hopes to use its military to deny their attacker its aspirations—that hope comes from the disagreement over relative power based on oppositional emphases. The target is after some strategic goal whenever they provide resistance to invasion, and it generally relies upon the disagreement of power as the basis of that resistance. The goals might be to retain domestic popularity, or to prevent a strategic territory or resource from being taken, or even to bravely lose in the face of an impossible onslaught, but they entail a cost-benefit analysis that indicates that fighting and obtaining a smaller goal (short of victory) is better than surrender. It is that hope, or determination, that the state can obtain their goals that relies on the perception of relative power stemming from their military emphasis. The target state does not judge the technology state getting what they want as easily as they think, and the perceived benefit from denial and obtaining whatever other smaller goals is determined to be preferable to surrender.

Again drawing upon the first case I gave, China clearly had hope for strategic objectives by fighting the Japanese, and history bore out that they had good reason to, as the Chinese eventually held the Imperial Army back until Western help could arrive. Reiter and Stam argued that the Finns fought the Soviets in the 1939 Winter War for reputational reasons, and the leaders of Finland did not suffer politically, because they stood up to a much larger enemy that eventually beat them. These cases indicated



by Reiter and Stam are explained better by the logic of war as an extension of bargaining and the hope of denial rooted in oppositional emphases. Moreover, it also has the advantage of explaining for some nations' instant surrender better than does the alternative. These responses tie directly in to the hypotheses that I have given, and, though in hindsight, the historical record supports the outcomes that they expressly predict. Thus, it is less likely that target nations simply fight out of pure despair and more likely that they still hope to obtain goals and deny their enemies, indicating that their decision is rational, and largely based on their perception of relative power in the dyad.

## Methodology

For the quantitative analysis of my two hypotheses, I have used the same data set testing for two different dependent variables. The unit of analysis is conducted at the dyadic level, so the data I employed is a directed dyad-year dataset, which allowed me to analyze the data on all dyads at yearly intervals to determine if there is statistical significance in the correlations between my two independent variables and my two dependent variables. The data I used came from the EUGene program, version 3.203, as developed by Bennett and Stam (2000). I used this program to create a data set that ranged from 1816 to 1990, and across all likely dyads, including major powers. The differentiation over which dyads are used is based on a reasonable logic. It is rather useless to see if Uruguay and Tajikistan ever come into conflict considering their minute military projection capability and the great distance between them. However, major powers are capable of fighting any nation anywhere in the world. This dataset takes such considerations into account, including only contiguous states and major world powers. The data that the program uses derives from the Correlates of War 2 data and its subsets, the National Material Capabilities data, and the Militarized Interstate Dispute data. The NMC data includes yearly statistics such as a state's military personal, population, certain industrial capabilities, energy production, urban population, and total population. The MID data contains the yearly numbers for the types of disputes between countries, when they occurred, and their severity.

To operationalize my two hypotheses, I have recalculated some data to create accurate measures for my dependent and independent variables. My first dependent variable is interstate conflict with over a thousand casualties, with consistent military engagements between at least two states, in others words, what we might consider a state of war. I created the dependent variable war to account for the MIDs that were ranked over twenty (coded as "Begin interstate war") on the "highest level of action of the dispute" variable (cwhiactd) (Ghosen 2003). If having uncertainty about outcomes due to an emphasis-oppositional dyad statistically increases the likelihood of the outbreak of major war, then this would affirm  $H_1$ . The other dependent variable, per  $H_2$ , the initiation of conflict, comes straight from the MID data as cwinit. This accounts for one state initiating the conflict with the other state in the dyad. If having a technology advantage correlates to the likelihood that a state initiated conflict, this evidence will support my second hypothesis.

The main independent variable for  $H_1$  is whether or not a dyad has an emphasis-oppositional (one has the larger army and the other has the advantage in technology, or vice versa), resulting in a misunderstanding of relative power. To operationalize this, I created two sets of variables, tech and man. Tech<sub>1</sub> and tech<sub>2</sub> create a ratio of relative military technology by measuring the military expenditures in relative British pounds (from 1816–1913) and U.S. dollars (from 1914–99), and dividing each state's spending by the sum of the dyad's total expenditure. Similarly, man<sub>1</sub> and man<sub>2</sub> were created by dividing the total number of active military personnel of each partner by the sum of personnel in the dyad. The next step was to change those ratios into binary variables by running a test to create a new variable that tests if the ratio of tech or man for the first partner in the dyad was greater than that of the second partner's, and was assigned a one or zero if it was or was not, respectively.

I found it best to operationalize these advantages through binary variables where fifty one percent equals the advantage, because the important indicator here is not by how much a nation's military is that another's, but whether that state considered themselves technologically or numerically superior to their rival. Along these same lines, two states might not know the precise extent of military development or the exact number of soldiers at their dyadic partner's disposal (not that might even matter). However, they will have a reasonably accurate understanding of who maintains general superiority in both categories. History maintains that in almost all cases, leaders were not surprised at the size of the army or the weapons they used but only at the way those variables interacted on the battlefield. How leaders rationally conceive how these two factors interact will be a significant influence on the miscalculation of relative power.

To specify an emphasis-oppositional dyad, I set the variable mixed-emphasis, which is represented by a one if each partner has an emphasis separate from his counterpart. Not counted were the cases in which one partner had both advantages and where the other had none. This ensured that I did not account for states that are superior to others in every way, which could lead to spurious results from a correlation between absolute military power and war. The only cases that are measured by mixed-emphasis are those where the military emphases are mixed and will be indicative of the situation I was seeking to test.

In addition to mixed-emphasis, a standard set of control variables commonly used in similar studies includes the distance between dyadic partners, a joint polity score to control for any effects of democratic peace<sup>1</sup>, the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score, and major power status. These control variables should be sufficient for the purposes of this analysis to show an initial correlation between the dependent and independent variables to support my hypotheses.

For hypothesis  $H_2$ , the independent variable is whether or not a state in a dyad has the technology advantage only—meaning that it is faced with a partner with a larger army. This variable derives from techdummy, and is aptly called techonly; only if the first partner in the dyad has an advantage in technology and not in manpower is techonly counted as a one. In this way, I can account for whether or not the initiating

partner had only a technology advantage, accurately testing my  $H_2$  that a technology emphasis increases the probability that a state will be the initiating aggressor.

Unfortunately, there are some limitations on the actual data that bias against my hypothesis. Whereas measuring military expenditures is a good way to measure the military mindset of focus on technology, the data for measuring an emphasis on manpower only measures the actual size of the army. Nations that have a comparative advantage in manpower may or may not have a large army because the capacity always exists to expand the army with the large population they have available. Using the population would also lead to the same bias, since the size of population is not itself indicative of any particular military doctrine or emphasis. The example of the Second Sino-Japanese represents one of these cases, where the data shows Japan as preponderant in both expenditures and total manpower, though we know that the Chinese armies became much larger, and the official data does not include the Red Army, since it was a rebel army at the time. Also, in WWII, the data shows Germany having a larger army than Russia until 1945, even though it is well documented that Stalin simply conscripted more soldiers to replace those that were slaughtered by the Germans—an ability fueled by Russia's massive population. Since this insufficient data presents a bias against my results, any significance represents a legitimate correlation which would stand to confirm my hypotheses.

## Results and Implications

For  $H_1$ , the results from the empirical analysis indicated that a correlation indeed exists between war and emphasis-oppositional dyads. As seen in Table 1 (see Appendix), mixed-emphasis does prove to be statistically significant at the 1 percent level, even when controlling for the other variables, such as total state military capacity and the effects of democratic governments. The substantive significance is difficult to ascertain specifically, due to the rare nature of war. However, employing year and state fixed effects as control variables, which take into account any other variables that might be unique to individual states or occurrences over time, showed that the correlation between my independent and dependent variables remains strong.

Although many variables are dropped due to autocorrelation when state- and year-fixed effects are used, we can be sure that since the predicted correlation is there, the relationship is not a spurious one. These results represent a strong indication of a significant and positive correlation between my independent and dependent variable, in the direction I predicted. The analysis presents us with a high likelihood that  $H_1$  cannot be empirically ruled out, and it must be seriously considered as affecting the likelihood of war.

The test for  $H_2$  produced similar results, shown in Table 2 (see Appendix), though this time the analysis involved testing the technology variable against the variable of the initiation of war. In this case, technology proved to be statistically significant, controlling for the other variables. This includes controlling for the fixed effects associated with the previous years and fixed effects across states. While the control variables and fixed effects explain the majority of the variance in war, so does having a technology-only

advantage, and its statistical significance means that we also cannot dismiss either hypothesis based on the empirical analysis. Specifically against  $H_2$ , one might argue that any larger nation (and larger military budget) will naturally attack another nation just because they are bigger. The CINC score accounts for this possibility, but leaving it out I was unable to fully explain the amount of conflict started by technology-only dyadic partners. Equally as important are the democratic peace control variable. The variable controls for the effects of a nation not fighting or fighting due to norms or institutions of advanced democratic countries, so we know that these results are not influenced by effect of democracy. Therefore, both  $H_1$  and  $H_2$  have been confirmed inasmuch as there exists a correlation exactly as the hypothesis says that there should be.

The implications for the empirical confirmations of these hypotheses present some interesting problems. Because  $H_1$  predicts that dyads with mixed kinds of militaries will be more likely to fight, this means that war is more likely between wealthy, developed nations that focus on military spending and advanced technology and poor, less-economically developed nations with armies focused primarily on the size and strength of their numbers. Although many political scientists might argue that those sorts of wars are initiated based on a misunderstanding of resolve, I would argue that resolve could only exist with a hope of inflicting damage. This resolve ultimately stems from a hope that out-manning a more advanced army will help them to hold out for longer than the advanced army desires. Smaller nations with larger armies will suppose that they can hold out longer against technology nations because of their manpower, ruining the advanced army's spirit, and causing them to bargain for perhaps less than before.

Due to a partial confirmation of  $H_1$ , additional data on possible projections of military power of major powers should also be further developed. For example, although the U.S. has a standing army of three million soldiers, they could not all be pooled together into one location, unless perhaps the U.S. were to be invaded. Barring that possibility, the U.S. will not pull its troops out of South Korea, Germany, Japan, and all of the other bases in the world to feed them all into a single country, since this would hurt its global military projection. As it stands, this is not something that the empirical data take into consideration. In future research, additional thought should be taken for the amount of soldiers that a major nation may safely project without leaving itself or its military bases abroad defenseless. I would predict that once the limited projection of military power is taken into consideration, it will show  $H_1$  and  $H_2$  to be far more significant, since these militaries would have far less manpower and be more easily fooled by their technological might into starting a war.

## **Conclusion**

Although a great deal more research needs to be done on this topic, the results have shown that this area of political science, understudied to be sure, merits additional scholarly investigation. The empirical analysis fails to discredit my two hypotheses, and the logic clearly has shown why states suffer from a rational misperception of military power based in the individual distinction that specific nations place

on them. A nation with a manpower advantage naturally sees manpower as the more important distinction and vice versa. This misperception is rational because no two nations start with the same information; any discrepancy in rational conclusions is to be generally expected.

Moreover, states with technology advantages will see their army as superior to any less-technical armies, their manpower notwithstanding, due to the natural superiority that technology provides on the battlefield. The predictive power of these hypotheses rest in their ability to generalize situations and create rational observations. If two countries come into dispute, and they have mixed emphases, war is more likely to occur, so alternative courses of action should be taken to prevent it. By identifying how wars are initiated, we may begin to create a world that ceases being a victim to war and may take appropriate action to save nations and people from its devastating effects.

## APPENDIX

Table 1  
Logit Analysis for Dependent Variable: War

Mixed Emphasis	.2465** (.0496)	.1729** (.0504)	.2208** (.0571)
Joint Democracy	—	-.9310** (.0842)	-.6548** (.1139)
Major Power	—	.4463** (.0794)	.6298** (.1926)
National Capabilities	—	2.1112** (.4308)	1.2001 (.7820)
Capabilities of Opponent	—	4.5797** (.3144)	3.8304** (.3610)
Distance	—	-.0001** (.0000)	-.0002** (.0000)
State and Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes
Intercept	-4.6788 (.0320)	-4.6597 (.0582)	-1.7164 (.7422)
Statistical Summary			
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.0013	.0349	.2771

Table 1 Notes: Dependent variable *war* is a binary variable that represents all interstate disputes at the highest level of hostility according to MID v3.0 data. State and year fixed effects include dummy variables for each country and year of observation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses under estimated coefficients. Coefficients are significant at the \*10 percent, \*\*5 percent, \*\*\*1 percent significance level.

Table 2  
Logit Analysis for Dependent Variable: *Cwinit*

Techonly	.5063** (.0535)	.3133** (.0583)	.2018** (.0618)
Joint Democracy	—	-.3975** (.0631)	-.4962** (.0986)
Major Power	—	-.3094** (.0712)	-.0963 (.1738)
National Capabilities	—	3.9555** (.3546)	4.0814** (.6940)
Capabilities of Opponent	—	-.2174 (.3965)	1.9859** (.4361)
Distance	—	-.0003** (.0000)	-.0004** (.0000)
State and Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes
Intercept	-4.4790 (.0251)	-3.7494 (.0423)	-3.034 (.9345)
Statistical Summary			
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.0037	.0579	.1341
n	166872	166522	146933

Table 2 Notes: Dependent variable *cwinit* is a binary variable represent all interstate disputes that are initiated by the first dyadic partner, according to MID v3.0 data. State and year fixed effects include dummy variables for each country and year of observation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses under estimated coefficients. Coefficients are significant at the \*10 percent, \*5 percent, \*\*1 percent significance level.

## NOTES

1. The Polity Score uses several generally accepted standards to rate nations on a scale from negative ten to ten in terms of their level of democracy. To control for the effects of the democratic peace, I created a dummy variable that indicated if both nations in the dyad had a polity score of seven or higher.

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# The Upside Down Pyramid: Declining Populations Mean a Demographic Crisis for Europe

by Lauren Soelberg

## Introduction

The declining birthrate in Europe has become a major concern for politicians and citizens alike. When President Kennedy gave his “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech in 1963, Europe accounted for 12.5 percent of the world’s population. Now that number has dropped to 7.2 percent, and by 2050 it is predicted to drop to only 5 percent. A major source of the problem is found in southern Europe. The fertility rate of women in Italy is 1.2, among the lowest in the world (Krause 2005, 1). The declining population has had negative ramifications on many aspects of European life, such as employment, social benefits, and a continually shrinking workforce. In order to find a solution, it is critical to examine the causes of the population decline and to identify the effect policies have had on fixing it.

## Literature Review

Many scholars and politicians, including Ann Crittenden, attribute the demographic crisis to an increase of women in the workforce. This claim has caused controversy in the subsequent policy-making of both the EU and individual member states. However, Elizabeth Krause and Russell Shorto disagree with Crittenden, attributing the crisis more to cultural and social changes. In comparing Italy and Sweden, policy changes in favor of mothers have had a marginal impact on birthrates in Scandinavian society, but incentivized policies in Italy have not had the same effect. The same comparisons may be drawn between Europe and the United States. Clearly, it will take much more than policy implementation to shift the population decline in Europe. However, policy implementation is intrinsically linked to many parts of society; thus, drastic shifts must occur in nearly every aspect of European culture and society.



Krause claims the main problem stems from the fact that women fear they cannot reach society's expectations, so they opt not to have children. In Italy, she claims there is a culture of responsibility, making women feel they must live up to a certain stereotype of the perfect mother, but women fear they cannot or will not reach those expectations. Similarly, she admits high expectations may prevent women from having more than one child, not because they are afraid, but because they are resisting the mold society has formed. Krause argues there is another element that could be at play here, one based more on perceptions and appearances. Younger women find it unfashionable to fit into the stereotypical mother figure, which is a complete cultural shift among the younger population of Italy and in Europe as a whole. She relates an example of a group of childless women out to lunch in Italy, who raise their glasses to a toast, exclaiming, "to us ultra-cool women because we don't think about cleaning" (Krause 175). However, she also acknowledges the cause for the crisis could simply be that for women, the costs of having children outweigh the benefits both economically and rationally. Women are choosing to gain an education and enter the workforce in much greater numbers, which means they are having children later and consequently less total children.

Shorto fundamentally rejects the idea women in the workforce have a large impact on birthrate. He argues that in "the Netherlands, there are a greater number of women in the workforce, but at the same time the birthrate in the Netherlands is significantly higher than in Italy, (1.73 compared to 1.33)" (Shorto 2008). According to Shorto, social conservatives tie the low birthrate to secularism. The attachment to God in Europe has been waning for years, and the acceptance and rise of birth control teamed with decreasing religious attendance has exacerbated the problem. Yet, he also admits there could be other factors at work here, the largest being economic (Shorto 2008).

Aside from religious concerns, the economy is a major problem facing Europe, and, in addition, to declining birth rates, the population is growing older and living longer than ever. The expected lifespan has risen dramatically all over Europe in recent years, contributing to the stress on the economy and society as a whole. The problem is especially daunting for youth who will have to cope with supporting a continually aging population without the hope of someone doing the same for them in the future. Shorto also claims low wages for starting employment in Italy have caused young people to delay leaving their parents' homes and security nets in favor of entering the workforce later. This relates to the fact that parents are having children at a much later age. If young people delay moving out, they also delay getting married and starting their own families. A late start in child bearing usually limits parents to one or two children. (Shorto 2008).

Shorto contrasts several places to further illustrate his point. He claims there are two models to achieving higher fertility. The neo-socialist Scandinavian model promotes generous social benefits, whereas the laissez-faire American model is more flexible with demands. Italy adheres to neither model and has had a much greater struggle. Krause uses another comparative approach to digest the demographic information available. He compares women in the labor force over time to determine if the number of women who work affects fertility. Like Shorto, Krause believes the

impact is minimal, and the problem is more indicative of a set of cultural and societal norms that have changed over time.

Many Italians are quick to place the blame upon young people and women, but Krause maintains young people and women are not the problem. Meanwhile, Shorto addresses the commonly held assumption that population is correlated with economic growth. He contends this correlation is incorrect and refutes the endogenous theory of growth. The accepted wisdom on the demographic problem is that as women enter the job market, the fertility rate drops. Shorto, however, stresses that in reality the opposite has been the case. Hans-Peter Kohler from the University of Pennsylvania proved that "high fertility was correlated with high female labor-force participation" (Shorto).

From a completely opposing perspective, Crittenden feels birth rates are indeed connected to women. She claims motherhood is the single greatest obstacle left in the path to economic equality for women. All women who leave the workforce with a college education to become mothers are faced with a "mommy tax," which is estimated to be greater than \$1 million. The mommy tax is an estimation of earnings a woman would have made if she did not have children. This tax discourages many women from having children at all. Crittenden argues that in the U.S. many women are unaware of the high opportunity costs of being a mother. Therefore, they are less aware of the choices between a career or a family. This limits American women in comparison to their European counterparts. Crittenden illustrates this point further by stating that Swedish women have higher benefits, such as a year's paid maternity leave, the right to work shorter days and still receive full benefits, and a government stipend to cover costs associated with childcare. Crittenden claims these benefits "enable a higher percentage of Swedish women, *vis a vis* Americans, to have children" (Crittenden 2002, 108). She contrasts this with the case of Germany, where before the fall of the Berlin wall, mothers received similar benefits to the Swedish system. Almost every woman had a baby and worked. Since the German reunification, however, "subsidized jobs and subsidized childcare were eliminated in East Germany. As a result, birth rates plummeted. Berlin now has one of the lowest birthrates in the world" (Crittenden 109). Crittenden attributes the population decline to a lack of rights for women who leave the workforce. However, it has been proven that the population is actually higher in areas where women are more integrated in the workforce (Shorto 2008). Additionally, she claims France and Sweden have more effective policies regarding women who decide to become mothers, so they should have increasing birthrates. The fact is these countries still rank among the top nations in terms of population decline.

Although Crittenden has excellent arguments for policy amendments to recognize the importance of motherhood and improve the welfare of mothers, it does not seem that policy is the most significant cause for the population decline. Rather, Shorto and Krause attribute the decline to cultural and social causes. The claim that women's policy affects birthrates is highly controversial; Europeans are more prone to believe current trends in European society such as secularism affect birthrates. Crittenden is correct

in assuming policy can affect birthrates but only in countries where a demographic crisis already exists. The causal mechanisms are backwards in her argument. While she claims policy favoring mothers leads to higher birthrates, it is more plausible that low birthrates lead to policy changes, and the occasional upward slopes in population are merely a sign of natural population swings.

It is also important to explore immigration, which greatly affects the demographic crisis. There are claims that a larger influx of non-European immigrants may lead to increased xenophobia (Shorto 2008) and a desire to increase the number of white Europeans. Immigration raises concerns for native Europeans, because immigrant populations are not affected by the population decline of their European host country and continue to have more children than European counterparts. If this argument is true, then immigration laws should increase and attitudes toward immigrants shift in a negative direction as immigration increases. It would also lend more credibility to the secularist argument, because Muslim immigrants are much more religious than Europeans and have much higher birthrates. Shorto and Krause claim that if Europeans were more religious, birthrates in Europe would not be dropping so rapidly.

One theme in demographic theory is that as society changes, human fertility levels remain high because of the continuing influence of outdated props that maintain existing birthrates. Caldwell argues that social upheavals might change these props, leading to a fall in fertility. He examines thirteen social crises ranging from the seventeenth-century English Civil War to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in the late-twentieth century. All cases show marked falls in fertility "arising from deferred female marriage, declining marital fertility, or both" (Caldwell 2004, 382). The evidence is that this change did not originate from existing social conditions but from temporary adjustments to a new period of uncertainty resulting from new socioeconomic and legislative conditions. Thus, changes in policy regarding families or mothers could work similarly to change conditions and affect fertility rates.

## Significance

Since demographics affect immigration policy and xenophobia, the declining population trends in Europe have been labeled a demographic crisis. The demographic crisis has created an upside down pyramid economy in Europe, where a small proportion of people at the bottom must support a large group of people at the top. These conditions are unsustainable, and Europe will face serious economic catastrophes if the population trend continues so rapidly. Increased incentives and policy implementation in favor of mothers may help stimulate the growth rate initially, but the effects of policy will be unable to solve entirely the demographic crisis in Europe. Change is necessary on a much broader scale. The scope of this problem reaches into nearly every area of European society: culture, religion, economic issues, immigration, and EU integration. Women's rights are certainly an influential component, but simply imposing change at the policy level will not inspire visible results. It is possible the demographic crisis in Europe may never improve, and Europe's population will shrink to 5 percent of the world's total population by 2050


and then to 2.5 percent fifty years after that. Perhaps it is simply the natural flow of demographics in the world that the minorities, immigrants, and impoverished citizens will become the majority, with Caucasians and others from developed countries an extreme minority. Current trends suggest such a future.

**Hypothesis**

I hypothesize that greater amounts of government expenditures allocated to social benefits, specifically for families, will increase the fertility rate in a country over time. If social policies for families are effective, they should increase the quality of life for mothers and children. Therefore, these politics will increase the total fertility rate. Since Europe has the lowest fertility rates in the world and faces a demographic crisis, I will only use European countries in this study. If family contributions are shown to have a statistically significant impact on fertility rates, I will conclude the policies targeting families are effective.

**Methodology**

I examined the relationship between family contributions and fertility rates by using regression analysis. I began by compiling a simple regression to determine the relationship between family contributions and fertility rates (see Figure 1). Figure 1 is a scatter plot of the relationship between the family contributions in each country and the fertility rate in each country. The relationship has poor fit as shown by the wide variance in the data and signals heteroskedasticity. However, the relationship is positive, which helps confirm my hypothesis that greater family contributions increase the fertility rate.



*Figure 1: Family Contributions and Fertility Rates*

I chose to use panel data in this analysis and controlled for both time and state fixed effects, which operate under the assumption the variable will change either over time and state or both. The regression shows the coefficient for each of the thirty countries for 1997, 2000, 2005, and 2007. These coefficients are what affect the fertility

rate. When including these effects, we can be sure that our results accurately show the relationships across both time and states. The state fixed effects control for factors such as state culture (*i.e.*, political affiliation, alcohol consumption, urban percentage, etc). Time fixed effects account for changes over longer periods of time, like the implementation of policy.

I have included one independent variable and four control variables. These control variables isolate the effects of family contributions on fertility rates and control for any possible omitted variable biases. I have used the fertility rate in European countries for 1997, 2000, 2005, and 2007 to assess the effect of government expenditure on family over time. I am interested in the effect of family contributions on fertility rates, which is measured annually in the World Development Indicators database as well as the Eurostat database. I have used the social benefits toward family data from Eurostat as my main independent variable to assess how much of social benefit funds are allocated toward the family. From this I will have determined its effect on fertility rates. In order to isolate the effects of family contributions, I have controlled for other variables that could be affecting the fertility rate. According to researchers who have studied the demographic crisis, there are many factors that contribute to the increase or decrease of birth rates. First, the refugee population may be having more kids than domestic citizens. Second, is the population growth. If the population is growing due to other reasons, such as immigration and emigration, birthrate will likely be affected. Third, other indicators such as life expectancy and income inequality will certainly affect birthrate, which I have included as control variables in the regression.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<b>Independent Variable</b>					
Family Contributions	113	9.375	3.25	2.3	16.9
<b>Control Variables</b>					
Refugee Population	118	58,043	155,762	4	1,049,000
Population Growth	120	.345	.698	-1.82	2.44
Life Expectancy	120	76.8	3.31	69	81.72
Income Inequality	97	4.56	1.153	2.9	7.8

I hypothesize there is endogeneity between family contributions and the total number of births per woman. I believe endogeneity exists because of omitted variables and reverse causality. It is impossible to control for all variables that affect fertility rate. In order to reduce the endogeneity due to omitted variable bias, I used fixed effects. This data allowed me to remove the differences due to variables unique to each country and the variables unique to 1997, 2000, 2005, and 2007. For example, a country's implementation of individual policies regarding women, families, and children would be more likely to increase the fertility rate; however, applying entity fixed effects for each country reduces this potential bias. The rate at which new policies are implemented is another variable that may affect fertility rate, because often it

takes significant time for legislation to be enforced from the time it is passed to actual implementation. The error from omitted variable bias is reduced through using both entity fixed effects and time fixed effects.

Table 2: The Effect of Public Expenditure for Families on Fertility Rates:

Regression results

Dependent variable: Fertility rate (total births per woman)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Coefficient on Family Contributions	.0323** (.0063)	.0305** (.0080)	.0034 (.0121)	.0314** (.0083)	.0035 (.0121)
Country characteristic control variables <sup>a?</sup>	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
	—	-8.51 (1.18)	-1.10 (1.06)	-1.01 (2.22)	.4884 (1.29)
Population Growth (annual)	—	.0743 (.0604)	.1202* (.0475)	.0702 (.0550)	.1075* (.0470)
Life Expectancy	—	.0314** (.0112)	.0077 (.0128)	.0331* (.0128)	-.0167 (.0273)
Income Inequality	—	-.0142 (.0177)	.0014 (.0183)	.0116 (.0218)	.0004 (.0189)
Country fixed effects?	no	no	yes	no	yes
Year fixed effects?	no	no	no	yes	yes
F-statistic testing the hypothesis that the state fixed effects are zero	—	—	14.263 (.0000)	—	15.016 (.0000)
F-statistic testing the hypothesis that the year fixed effects are zero	—	—	—	.381 (.767)	15.016 (.0000)
$\bar{R}^2$	.1558	.4233	.8875	.4112	.8932
$R^2$	.1634	.4537	.9266	.4608	.9336
SER	.2393	.1934	.0854	.1954	.0832
n	113	96	96	96	96

Notes: All regressions include an intercept. For regressions (1)–(4), heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors appear in parentheses below estimated coefficients; for regression (5), the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the state level, so as to allow for serial correlation in the error within a state. *p*-values appear in parentheses beneath heteroskedasticity-robust *F*-statistics (or, for regression (5), heteroskedasticity-robust-clustered *F*-statistic). Coefficients are significant at the \*\* $\alpha < .01$  and \* $\alpha < .05$  levels.

## Results

According to the regression results (shown in Table 2), the family contributions variable does have a statistically significant effect on fertility rate. The first regression shows the family contributions coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level because the *p*-value (.000) is lower than .01. The *R*-squared value, however, is only .163, indicating that family contributions only explain 16.3 percent of the

variance in fertility rates. In the following regressions, the coefficient for family contributions is significant at the 5 percent level when not controlling for state fixed effects and also significant when controlling for other variables. In regression (2), life expectancy is also statistically significant. The p-value is .006, indicating significance at the 1 percent level because the p-value is smaller than .01. The other coefficients are not statistically significant indicators of fertility rate.

Regression (3) shows the family contributions variable is no longer statistically significant when also controlling for state fixed effects. The R-squared value of this regression, however, is very high while none of the coefficients are individually statistically significant. This shows us that state fixed effects are a significant indicator of fertility rates but that only population growth is significant when state fixed effects are included. Regression (4) controls for time fixed effects, and the results are very different from regression (3). It appears family contributions are significant over time when controlling for important factors. In regression (4), however, the R-squared value again drops to .46, signaling that time fixed effects with these variables only predicts 46 percent of the variance in fertility rates. In regression (5), the most comprehensive, I have controlled for time and state fixed effects and have included all control variables. When controlling for both time and state fixed effects in the last regression, I found that the R-squared value is highest. These two fixed effects variables do explain most of the variance in fertility rate, though only the population growth variable is statistically significant. The F-statistics for regressions (3), (4), and (5) show us that the time fixed effects are insignificant unless also tested with state fixed effects. In both regression (3) and regression (5), the F-statistic is higher than 10 with a p-value of .0000, proving significance at the 1 percent level.

## Limitations

There is a high probability the independent variable family contributions is highly correlated with an outside instrumental variable that it is affecting the family contributions of each country. There may also be an issue with simultaneous causality, where one or more of these variables may be influenced by the fertility rate rather than the other way around. Unfortunately, I was unable to find a measurable and consistent enough instrument to control for simultaneous causality, so there may be some bias in my information. However, this bias should tend toward an underestimation on the family contribution coefficient, so any substantive significance found for the fertility rate would likely be correct.

There are several external validity violations present with this research and analysis. With regard to external validity, there is an endogeneity issue with reverse causality. A positive correlation was found for the relationship between fertility rate and family contributions, but it could be true that fertility rates are affecting the amount of social benefits allocated to family contributions. This problem could be fixed with an instrumental variable; however, I was unable to find a good instrument for this analysis. Another endogeneity problem in this analysis is omitted variable

bias. Omitted variables could include the immigrant population, secularism and religious attitudes, or cultural and social attitudes. The data for these variables is more difficult to locate, but these omitted variables should be addressed for further studies in this topic area.

An experiment would also be useful for finding more accurate results. With more time and resources, a randomized controlled trial would help to show precisely the effect that policy has on fertility rates. If we were able to randomly assign which regions would receive social benefits for the family, which would not receive benefits, and then measure the fertility rates accordingly, we would see the effects more accurately. An experiment such as this, however, is unethical and highly implausible. Therefore, we are forced to either use a natural experiment or use available non-random data to test the effect.

The sample size of the data could potentially be larger, but a size of ninety-six is large enough for purposes of regressions, *f*-tests, and predictions.

Another potential problem is using the wrong function to perform the regression. Because my dependent variable is continuous, I could compare the independent variables to the fertility rate with scatter plots. From these plots, I discovered that most of my variables were heteroskedastic. To fix this, I decided to run the regression with robust standard errors to control for the heteroskedasticity. Then I tested each variable to see if a log or quadratic function would improve its statistical significance. However, none of the variables seemed to improve with the other functions. Since I tested for the best forms for each of the variables, the biases that normally may have been in my OLS regression were controlled for.

Factors that may skew my results are errors in the data I collected or in the actual sample selection. Some of those measurements may have been incorrect or biased due to an incorrect survey, nonrandom samples, or other issues that might have altered my results. To control for this, I used the most reliable sources available. The World Development Indicators (WDI) database is well known for its accuracy, as well as Eurostat. Both of these sources gave me the majority of my data and provided what I believe to be accurate measurements, superseding any need for an instrument, getting data from another source, or performing my own randomized experiment.

## **Conclusion**

My findings show my hypothesis was correct. When time and state fixed effects were included, the results were much more significant overall and, as shown by the high R-squared values, explained more of the variance in fertility rates. Government expenditures in the area of family contributions do show a significant impact on fertility rates when tested alone and with other control variables. However, when also controlling for time and state fixed effects, the results are more significant. This means the results change over time and place and are much stronger indicators of the effect on fertility rates. Since regression (4) was not significant overall (shown in Table 2), we can rule out the assumption that the change in fertility rate is a product of time between the years 1997–2007. There is, however, a significant difference across countries. This means



differences by country are much stronger indicators of changes in fertility rates, further proving that policy may be a large factor in that variance.

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