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EDUCATION INEQUALITY IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: MEASUREMENT AND CAUSES

MATTHEW BURT

INTRODUCTION

The Republic of (South) Korea is one of relatively few developing states to have experienced consistent, significant success in economic, social, and governmental development. Although it began its post-civil war history with a real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of about \$1,459 in 1955, South Korea is now considered a high-income country by the World Bank with a per capita income of \$15,876. With the exception of the 1980 recession and the 1997 Asian financial crisis, South Korea has maintained some of the highest GDP growth rates in the world for the past forty-five years (see *Table 1*). Today it is a global leader in industries ranging from shipbuilding to cellular phones and stem-cell research. The country has likewise experienced remarkable improvements in key indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality, and education attainment. In addition, although the country was controlled by authoritarian governments from its establishment in 1948 up to the late 1980s and during its most extraordinary periods of economic growth, South Korea today is considered a politically stable, liberal democracy.

Table 1: Key Economic Indicators of South Korea

Year	Population (in 100s)	Savings (%) in current prices)	GDP/Cap. (constant 1996 \$US)	GDP/Cap. Growth Rate (%)
1955	21674	3.98	1458.67	8.05
1960	25252	1.06	1495.24	-1.15
1965	28814	7.33	1802.65	2.67
1970	32241	13.86	2715.58	5.9
1975	35281	19.74	3656.55	4.44
1980	38124	25.82	4789.83	-4.88
1985	40806	34.03	6568.89	5.33
1990	42869	37.91	9952.39	8.3
1995	45093	39.03	13551.57	7.69
2000	47275	33.56	15875.84	7.2

Source: Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2002

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Although its development experience was facilitated by cultural, geographical, and historical contexts that cannot be duplicated in today's developing countries, South Korea provides many insights into the question that state leaders, economists, humanitarians, and development experts have struggled with for decades: why are some countries rich and others poor? General explanations for South Korea's success include: effective government policies, high rates of saving, a relatively egalitarian distribution of income, large infusions of foreign aid, and East Asian, Confucian values that emphasizes thrift, diligence, and discipline (Weil, 2005, p. 347). A key piece in South Korea's development puzzle is the dramatic improvement in human capital through mass education (McGinn et al., 1980; Morris, 1996; Lopez et al., 1998). This contrasts with the experience of most developing countries, where investments in education have not reached expectations (Holsinger, 2005; Pritchett, 2001); several scholars have suggested this may be due to levels of inequality in the distribution of education (Holsinger, 2005; Lopez et al., 1998; Thomas et al., 2001; Dessus, 2001).

To test this proposition, I will use the education Gini coefficient to analyze the distribution of human capital in South Korea from 1970 to 2000. The aggregate, national level of education inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient has fallen significantly over the past thirty years (see *Figure 1*). This paper will identify the patterns of education inequality across South Korea's administrative divisions from 1970 to 2000; it will then trace the development of South Korea's education system and suggest possible causes for the rapid decline in education inequality that occurred in all areas of the country and thus provide an example of success that can be used by policymakers in other developing countries struggling with the problem of education inequality.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH KOREAN EDUCATION SYSTEM

The people of this country are very enthusiastic about [education] and the method they use is gentle and ingenious. Teachers offer their students the teaching of earlier scholars and constantly cite the example of those who attained fame through high scholarship. The boys devote their time to study day and night (Choe, 1987).

... the tragedy of higher education in Korea is not in the lack of textbooks, laboratory equipment, or even faculty; the real tragedy is in the lack of realization on the part of both students and staff that no education is taking place under present conditions (Kehoe, 1949).

Education has been one of the major sources of economic growth and social development in Korea. In three decades, Korea has been able to accomplish nearly 100 percent coverage for primary and secondary education. Moreover, Korea now has a tertiary education sector that is as large as those in developed countries (Kim, 2002).

The statements above were made, respectively, by a shipwrecked Dutch merchant from the seventeenth century (in the first Western account of Korea), an educational

specialist in the U.S. War Department in the 1940s, and an education specialist from the World Bank in 2002. These widely varying statements likely have much to do with individual perceptions, but they are indicative of the extreme changes, both positive and negative, the South Korean education system has undergone in the last century. This section will examine developments in the South Korean education system encompassing all three of the above periods of critical change: early developments from the Koryŏ dynasty in the 900s to the end of the Chosŏn dynasty in the early 1900s, Japanese colonization from the early 1900s to 1945, and post-liberation from 1945 to the present. Specifically, it will address developments that help explain the rapid decrease in education inequality following liberation observed in the education Gini coefficients as discussed above.

Pre-Colonialism & the Influence of Confucian Culture

For the past millennium and up to the late 1800s, the Korean education system was largely derivative of the traditional Chinese model, and its orientation was likewise humanistic and liberal (Kim, 2000, p. 10); technical training for doctors, interpreters, or merchants was considered inferior to literary education in history, art, and philosophy, for example. In 958 during the Koryŏ dynasty, a civil service examination based on Chinese classical texts and Confucian moral training, much like that developed in China during the Tang dynasty, was established in Korea as a means to recruit qualified men into the government bureaucracy (Seth, 2002, p. 9). Not only did this mark the beginning of a period in which the demand for education grew as a result of the prestigious position of government bureaucrats and associated economic advantages, it established a system of education focused on exam preparation that has been carried to the present in South Korea. Access to this exam and the schools established to prepare students for it, however, was mostly limited during the Chosŏn dynasty to the ruling *yangban* aristocracy, a hereditary class that made up about 15 per cent of the population at most (Sorensen, 1994, p. 12); education among the peasant commoners was considered unnecessary.

Education during this period normally began at *sŏdangs* – small, private schools located within villages and taught by local Confucian scholars. Students would spend most of their time committing the Confucian classics to memory or practicing art, calligraphy, or poetry. Success in a *sŏdang* would lead to admittance to larger state-run schools called *hyanggyo* and an opportunity to take the civil service examination (Seth, 2002, p. 10). A high score on this exam would qualify one for service as a government bureaucrat or a teacher in a Confucian school.

Education in Korea during this period was a mark of advancement and sophistication; indeed, it was one of the only paths of upward social mobility, particularly during the Chosŏn dynasty from 1392 to 1910. Status as a Confucian scholar implied moral authority to be respected by all social classes and institutions, including the government itself; this distinction has largely persisted in South Korea today (Seth, 2002, 13). Besides the abstract benefit of moral authority, however, the intentions of Koreans seeking education were likely much the same as those in other countries today; a

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successful Confucian education was the surest culturally-approved means of power, prestige, and wealth.

As the Chosŏn dynasty began to founder in the late 1800s in the face of challenges presented by Western powers and a quickly rising Japan, the government made several desperate attempts at reform to salvage Korean independence. These reforms included abolishing the civil service examination in 1894, allowing for a rapid increase in private educational institutions (Seth, 2002, p. 17), and ultimately permitting the swift decline of traditional Confucian educational institutions. One particularly interesting development in line with this decline is an increased use of *hangul*, a phonetic alphabet developed indigenously in the 1400s that is easily learned by scholar and peasant alike. Most Confucian scholars derided this writing system as uncultured and persisted in using Chinese characters adapted to the Korean language; only members of the *yangban* aristocracy, however, had the time and resources necessary to learn this cumbersome writing system. The increasing use of the *hangul* writing system during the decline of the Confucian education system can be credited with a rapid increase in Korean literacy and the subsequently widening availability of education in the early and mid-1900s.

At this point, one particular aspect of Confucian culture in South Korea's development and its role in the increasingly egalitarian distribution of education in the decades following liberation should be identified. In studies concerning the rapid development of East Asian states such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, one thread is remarkably common: the influence of East Asian values associated with Confucian culture. The concept of East Asian, Confucian values, however, is flawed as the societies of East Asian states vary widely (In, 1999, p. 194) and Confucianism has evolved extensively since its beginnings several millennia ago into an ideology that today encompasses countries with vastly different cultures. Moreover, studies attempting to correlate culture with economic success are subject to observer bias as values associated with a particular culture are easily reconciled with newly observed facts (Sen, 2000). For example, many, especially Koreans themselves, attribute East Asian economic success with Confucian values such as thrift, discipline, and diligence (Berger, 1988; Choi, 1998; Kim, 1994); this same culture, however, was blamed for laziness, apathy, and stagnation in Korea and China previous to the success of the recent decades (Sorensen, 1994, p. 11; Weber, 1952).

To avoid such problems with a cultural explanation of decreasing inequality in education, this study focuses on the specific fit of a particular value within the problems of a given situation rather than attempting to establish the superiority of a general set of values over another (Sen, 2000). One specific aspect of Confucian culture in South Korea is clear: its emphasis on education. It is not general Confucian ideology or values that must be examined; Confucianism's emphasis on human capital accumulation and the designation of education as one of the only culturally-approved means of upward social and economic mobility, however, help explain the Korean population's generally consistent demand for education. Although this popular demand was stifled by restrictions in class mobility in the Yi dynasty and policies of the Japanese colonial rulers, it eventually drove the education explosion following liberation as former aristocrats and peasants alike sought opportunities in the new, more economically open society of modern South Korea. The wide availability of educational opportunities coupled with

effective government policies, which will be addressed in detail below, contributed to the increasingly egalitarian distribution of education in South Korea as Confucian ideals drove average people to take advantage of increasing educational opportunity, thus increasing mean years of education in all segments of society while decreasing education inequality as observed in the education Gini coefficient dataset.

Colonization

With the arrival of imperialist Japan in the late 1800s and colonial status by 1910, Korea and its population was largely organized and used to serve the interests of the Japanese empire, and the education system was no exception. The Japanese imperial government saw little benefit in an educated Korean populace and thus limited the ability of Koreans to gain much beyond primary education; fourteen years of education was available to Japanese while Koreans were limited to eight (Seth, 2002, p. 20). The purpose of the limited education that was available to Koreans was “to give the younger generations of Koreans such moral character and general knowledge as will make them loyal subjects of Japan” (Government-General of Chosen, 1911).

Nevertheless, it is in the colonial period that South Korea’s modern education system has its roots. The old Confucian system that limited education to upper classes was completely dismantled, primary education was made compulsory and 45 per cent enrollment was achieved by 1945, a public school system was rapidly expanded, and physical facilities were constructed that would provide a jump-start to the education explosion following liberation in 1945 (McGinn et al., 1980, pp. 81-82). Characteristics of the colonial education system that largely persist to the present include a high degree of centralization, strict, military-like discipline among students, emphasis on moral and academic training, disdain for technical education and occupations, and reliance on competitive entrance examinations.

The limitations placed on Korean educational attainment during the colonial period had two results particularly important to the study of education inequality in South Korea. First, they caused a shortage in the supply of education to Koreans and a pent-up demand that would explode into a rapid expansion following liberation in 1945 (Seth, 2002, 19). As discussed previously, educational opportunities for most Koreans were limited due to class structures in the Yi dynasty and policies of the Japanese occupational government. With the dismantlement of aristocratic structures by the colonial government and liberation from Japanese policies following World War II, the newly emerging education system was largely open to the entire population; this openness was maintained and enlarged by succeeding governments in South Korea, thus allowing increasing equality in the distribution of education for the next fifty years. Second, the lack of educational opportunity in Korea during colonization led a large portion of the population to seek education and better employment opportunities in other Japanese colonies such as Manchuria or in Japan itself; Cummings (1997, p. 177) estimates that 40 per cent of the adult population of the Korean Peninsula took part in this demographic uprooting. This mass movement of people from Korea and their return following World War II significantly altered previous institutions and routines and provided new opportunities and experiences to millions of Koreans (Seth, 2002, p. 33), thus breaking down previous

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barriers and permitting upward social and economic mobility for a much larger segment of the population in the decades following liberation.

Early Independence & Economic Takeoff

Immediately following the Japanese surrender and withdrawal from the peninsula, Koreans' pent-up demand for education resulted in an explosion of both private and public educational institutions. As will be explained below, this demand initially lacked direction, but it forced the government to address the issue of education early in the development process and provided the impetus for South Korea to accumulate human and physical capital simultaneously throughout its era of remarkable growth from the 1960s to the 1990s. This contrasts with early development scholars' emphasis on the importance of accumulating physical capital in the initial decades following World War II and the associated policies of many developing countries that led to little or no economic success.

Although the first government under Yi Süngman allowed educational institutions to expand without significant limits in response to popular demand, the government under Pak Chõnghì attempted to limit expansion in the early 1960s and channel demand according to the country's development needs (McGinn et al., 1980, 35). Thus, in sharp contrast to the experience of most developing countries, efforts by the new South Korean government focused more on controlling the growth of education than promoting it. Three characteristics of government attempts to control the expansion of educational in the decades following independence are particularly important to understanding the increasingly equal distribution of education in South Korea: centralization of control of the education system in a strong state, the channeling of educational output to meet the economic needs of the country, and the development of public education.

Liberation from Japanese imperial rule began with division of the peninsula into north and south with a caretaker government under the US military in the south. Despite attempts by this government to establish a decentralized system following World War II, control of education, among other things, was centralized by Yi Süngman's government, particularly following a civil war in the early 1950s and the rise of a rival government in North Korea as a serious threat to South Korean security. Centralized, authoritarian control was maintained until the late 1980s by the governments of Pak Chõnghì and Chõn Tuhwan. Although the military dictators of this period used education for political purposes such as instilling loyalty to the leader and demonizing the rival northern neighbor, control by a strong, stable government allowed for the intentional formation of a uniform system open to all segments of society. The Pak government in particular promoted wide access to education to prevent the formation of a poor class that might generate discontent and instability.

Centralized control enabled the government to match educational output to particular economic needs. As mentioned above, Koreans have generally preferred academic over technical education. Mostly unbridled expansion during the government of Yi Süngman allowed educational development to take on "a momentum of its own, driven by public demand for schooling and degrees" (Seth, 2002, p. 5) rather than the technical needs of fledgling economy. Near the end of the Yi government in 1960, the number of students in

academic schools grew to 164,492 while enrollment in vocational schools fell to 99,071 (Seth, 2002, p. 112). The result was a large number of unemployed college graduates that could generate more discontent than a poor class; it is estimated at the end of the Yi government in 1960 that 60 per cent of college graduates failed to find employment within three months of graduation (McGinn et al., 1980, p. 38). The Pak government quickly began promoting technical and vocational training and limiting the number of advanced degree holders (Seth 2002, 84). The First Five-Year Educational Development Plan of 1962 decreed cuts in academic subjects, the addition of technical subjects to entrance examinations to encourage greater study in these fields, quotas on the number of post-secondary students, and a goal of a 7:3 ratio of vocational to academic students to be achieved by 1966. Most of these policies were initially ineffective in altering the popular demand for academic education, but the Pak government eventually forced changes through, particularly after its turn to heavy-handed authoritarianism in 1971 (Seth, 2002, pp. 120-139). These policies effectively placed a cap on the ability of a minority of the population to advance in academic education much beyond those of the majority in technical education. A decentralized, democratic government would have found such a task impossible as popular demands ran counter to policies of the Pak government.

The US caretaker government attempted to promote an American-style education system with decentralized control, open access for the entire population to publicly-funded institutions, and emphasis on all levels of education. Although many facets of the American model were maintained, emphasis on all levels was replaced with a program of development beginning with primary education during the Yi government and continuing into the Pak government during the 1960s and 1970s (Seth, 2002, p. 75). After achieving universal elementary education by the mid to late 1960s, the government expanded its focus to nine years of universal education; this was accomplished within a decade, and resources were subsequently shifted to achieve universal secondary education (Seth, 2002, p. 83). Focus was again shifted to tertiary education after universal secondary education was completed in the early 1990s. This sequential devotion of government resources to increasing levels of education is illustrated in *Table 3* by the percentage of the government's total education budget devoted to different levels, and *Table 4* shows the results of this policy in the rapid, sequential increases in enrollment ratios beginning with primary education. This policy of sequentially promoting education attainment within the entire population rather than an elite class led to the decreases in inequality of the distribution of education observed above. As a result, South Korea has consistently maintained enrollment ratios significantly higher than countries with similar levels of income per capita (McGinn et al., 1980, p. 62).

The policies of a strong, centralized government from the 1950s to the 1970s thus promoted an equal distribution of education by squeezing the vast majority of the South Korean population between a lower educational limit that was gradually raised and an upper limit that restricted access to tertiary education. South Korea was thus able to avoid many of the problems many developing countries are still grappling with today: gaps in the development of an education system and concentration of resources on an elite segment of society (Seth, 2002, p. 4).

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Educational Equality and Democracy in South Korea

As annotation to the above discussion of educational development following liberation, an interesting subject and possible area of future research is the role of an increasingly egalitarian distribution of education in the rise of democratic governance in South Korea. As discussed above, the Confucian culture of Korea designated education as one of the only means of upward social mobility and linked education with moral and institutional authority and duty. Seth (2002, pp. 6-13) points out that this aspect of Korean Confucianism has persisted to the present and that the effective, modern school system developed following liberation unwittingly produced the dissident teachers and students that haunted all three South Korean dictators and helped caused the downfall of two of them.

Table 3: Key Education Indicators – Expenditures on Public Education

<i>Year</i>	<i>Public Education Expenditure (% of GDP)</i>	<i>Public Education Expenditure (% of govt. spending)</i>	<i>Primary Ed. Expenditure (% of total ed. budget)</i>	<i>Secondary Ed. Expenditure (% of total ed. budget)</i>	<i>Tertiary Ed. Expenditure (% of total ed. budget)</i>
1970	3.51	--	--	17.78	6.37
1975	2.15	15.5	--	18.94	9.04
1980	3.64	--	--	27.99	7.34
1985	4.34	--	37.21	29.2	8.69
1990	3.33	22.43	39.51	30.45	6.62
1995	3.4	--	44.48	36.64	8.01
2000	3.44	11.73	41.42	37.28	13.54
2002	4.22	15.48	33.96	43.41	8.07

Source: World Bank Group, 2002

The role of students and instructors of educational institutions in the fall of authoritarianism and the eventual rise of democracy in South Korea is well documented (Seth, 2002; Cummings, 1997; Oberdorfer, 2002). These modern scholars of Korea were essentially exercising the Confucian-implied authority and duty to criticize and demonstrate against the government's immoral, undemocratic practices. Perhaps the establishment of an education system that successfully brought the vast majority of the population to significantly higher levels of education inadvertently generated a large number of people culturally qualified to criticize South Korea's authoritarian leaders. The increasingly equal distribution of education may be linked to the enormous student demonstrations of the 1970s that beleaguered Pak Chŏnggi and those of the late 1980s that forced Chŏn Tuhwan to step down and thus may be an independent variable in the rise of democracy in South Korea.

Table 4: Key Education Indicators – Enrollment Rates

<i>Year</i>	<i>Gross Enrollment Rate, Primary (% of age group)</i>	<i>Gross Enrollment Rate, Secondary (% of age group)</i>	<i>Gross Enrollment Rate, Tertiary (% of age group)</i>
1970	103.41	41.61	7.43
1975	106.86	56.35	8.8
1980	109.91	78.13	14.67
1985	97.02	91.65	34.05
1990	104.94	89.83	39.1
1995	95.25	100.87	52.03
2000	100.07	94.17	77.6
2002	103.86	89.84	84.73

Source: World Bank Group, 2002

METHODOLOGY

The Education Gini Coefficient

The education Gini coefficient, an adaptation of the Gini coefficient originally developed by Corrado Gini to measure income inequality (Gini, 1921), is an effective method of measuring and comparing the distribution of education within a particular geographic area. For the most part, it has been used to compare education inequality at aggregate levels across countries. A single, national indicator of education inequality, however, is relatively useless to governments attempting to establish effective domestic systems of education. Also significant, therefore, is the education Gini coefficient's utility as a statistical comparison of inequality in the distribution of education across the domestic administrative divisions of a particular country and between specific time periods in that country's history. This provides policymakers with a tool to understand the distribution of human capital within the country at different time periods, identify areas with high levels of inequality, and effectively target government policies and programs in specific areas. If the government is unaware of the distribution of education within lower-level administrative divisions, educational policies can have unintended consequences by benefiting a small segment of the population in areas with high levels of education inequality (Psacharopoulos, 1989; Grootaert, 1994).

This study employs the direct method of measurement of the education Gini coefficient as developed by Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2000; 2001), altered slightly to accommodate the organization of South Korean census data as explained in detail below. The mathematical formula shown in *Equation 1* generates a single number bounded by zero and one, zero representing perfect equality and one representing perfect inequality in the distribution of education within a particular population. Thus a coefficient greater than 0.5, for example, would be considered relatively unequal, and a coefficient less than 0.2 would be considered relatively equal.

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(1)

$$E_{gini} = \left(\frac{1}{\mu} \right) \sum_{a=1}^9 \sum_{b=1}^{a-1} x_a |z_a - z_b| x_b$$

Equation 1 consists of three components: μ , x , and z ; μ represents the average years of schooling for the population of analysis, x represents the proportion of the population with n levels of schooling, and z represents the number of years schooling at each level of education.

Although the education Gini coefficient does not address the level of value for the measured variable and fails to specify the location of inequality within the distribution of the measured variable, it provides a single indicator that can be used to compare the distribution of education in one population with that of another. Also, like the original income Gini coefficient, the education Gini coefficient can be graphically illustrated with the Lorenz curve.

The Education Gini Coefficient for South Korean Census Data

Data from the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses of the Republic of Korea for the population age six and older were obtained from the Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO) and used to calculate education Gini coefficients for each province (*do*) and metropolis (*tüpyölshi*, *kwangyökshi*, and *chikalshi*) and each county (*gun*), city (*shi*), and ward (*gu*) within them.*

In the 1970, 1980, and 1990 census data, levels of education attainment were divided into three categories: “graduated,” “not completed,” and “never attended.” As South Korea has used a 6-3-3-4 system of education since 1961, “graduated primary” was assumed to indicate six years of education, “graduated middle school” nine years, “graduated high school” twelve years, “graduated junior college” fourteen years, and “graduated college or higher” sixteen years. With the exception of the primary level, an incomplete education was assumed to indicate the number of years of education for the next lowest level completed; this is because a partial high school or college education, for example, will have little actual value in South Korea due to the lack of official credentials in the form of a diploma or a degree. Thus “not completed primary” was assumed to indicate three years of education, “not completed middle school” six years, “not completed high school” nine years, “not completed junior college” twelve years, and “not completed college or higher” fourteen years. “Never attended” was assumed to indicate zero years of education. Unlike the 1970 and 1990 census, data in the 1980 census for secondary education was divided into two levels: “general high school” and “vocational high school.” These two levels were assumed to indicate the same number of years of schooling for all three categories mentioned above.


* Due to the large amount of data, actual education Gini coefficients for specific administrative divisions for these four years is not available in this article but can be obtained by contacting the author directly.

In the 2000 census data, levels of education attainment were divided into four categories: “graduated,” “dropped out,” “completed,” and “no schooling.” Assumptions concerning the first two categories are the same as those of the 1970 census data with the additions that “graduated master’s course” was assumed to indicate eighteen years of education, “graduated doctor’s course” twenty years, “dropped out master’s course” sixteen years, and “dropped out doctor’s course” eighteen years. The “completed” category was available for tertiary education only; it indicates students that finish required coursework for a particular program but fail to complete required theses or pass necessary exams in order to receive a regular degree. Such students often enter specific programs available in certain educational institutions with the intention of completion rather than graduation. Although these students technically attend school for the same duration as graduates, their credentials are not as highly recognized. Thus “completed” was assumed to indicate one year of education less than the “graduated” category for the four tertiary education levels specified in the census data: junior college, university, master’s course, and doctor’s course. “No schooling” was assumed to indicate zero years of education.

Findings in the South Korean Education Gini Coefficient Dataset

The pattern in the data most important to this study is the significant decrease in education inequality in all areas of South Korea from 1970 to 2000 as measured by the education Gini coefficient; this pattern is clearly illustrated in *Table 2* and in *Figure 1*. Although *Figure 2* and *Figure 3* illustrate continuing high levels of inequality in many areas of the country, the 2000 provincial coefficients indicate a remarkable increase in educational equality overall from 1970 to 2000. A coefficient of 0.29, the highest provincial coefficient in South Korea in 2000, is considered relatively equal compared to most areas of the world. The most significant decreases in most areas occurred between 1970 and 1980. Decreases between 1980 and 1990 and between 1990 and 2000 began slowing down as the Gini coefficients approached zero.

Figure 1: Comparison of Provincial Education Gini Coefficients, 1970-2000*




Source: Republic of Korea, 1970; Republic of Korea, 1980; Republic of Korea, 1990; Republic of Korea, 2000; author's calculations and illustration.

* 1990 and 2000 data from some provinces were combined with that of metropolises not existent in 1970 or 1980 in order to maintain continuity of administrative divisions across time and allow consistent comparison.

Although less relevant to the present study, two other patterns deserve mention as they may merit future, more specific research. First, higher levels of education inequality in rural areas as compared to urban areas have persisted to the present; this pattern is shown in Figure 3 and its geographical illustration of the Gini coefficients of major metropolitan areas compared to those of other parts of the country. Second, as shown in Figure 4, higher inequality among females continues in all areas of South Korea's largely male-dominated society.


Figure 2: Geographical Representation of Provincial & Metropolitan Education Gini Coefficients (2000 data)



Source: Republic of Korea, 2000; author's calculations and illustration.


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Figure 3: Geographical Representation of County, City, & Ward Education Gini Coefficients (2000 data)



Source: Republic of Korea, 2000; author's calculations and illustration.

Figure 4: Comparison of Female and Male Provincial Gini Coefficients, 1970 and 2000*



Source: Republic of Korea, 1970; Republic of Korea, 2000; author's calculations and illustration.

* 2000 data from some provinces were combined with that of metropolises not existent in 1970 in order to maintain continuity of administrative divisions across time and allow consistent comparison.

CONCLUSION

Inequality in the distribution of human capital is one possible reason for the lack of improvement in development prospects of many countries that have shifted resources from investment in physical capital to investment in human capital in the hope of

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increasing economic growth (Holsinger, 2005). This paper's documentation of South Korea's remarkable success in increasing equality in the distribution of education during its period of extraordinary economic growth provides a case study for comparison with similar studies in less-developed areas of the world. This remarkable reduction in inequality can be explained by two key factors: the existence of a strong, centralized government able to implement policies that emphasized human capital accumulation early in the country's development, established an education system sequentially beginning with primary institutions, and attempted to match educational output with national economic needs; and the universal demand for education in a culturally homogenous society with Confucian roots that emphasizes education as a means of upward social mobility.

Thus this study suggests that despite the importance of historical or cultural factors in South Korea that cannot be duplicated, educational policies in less-developed countries that focus resources in a sequential manner on successive levels of educational institutions and seek to bring a majority of the school-age population to gradually higher levels of attainment will be more successful than those that simply devote a larger share of resources into a general, nation-wide education sector.

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*Table 2: Comparison of Education Distribution in Provinces, 1970- 2000**

<i>Location</i>	<i>1970 Mean Years Schooling</i>	<i>1970 Gini Coefficient</i>	<i>1980 Mean Years Schooling</i>	<i>1980 Gini Coefficient</i>	<i>1990 Mean Years Schooling</i>	<i>1990 Gini Coefficient</i>	<i>2000 Mean Years Schooling</i>	<i>2000 Gini Coefficient</i>
Nationwide	5.71	0.414	7.57	0.328	9.51	0.253	10.56	0.225
Seoul Metropolis	8.21	0.288	9.56	0.241	10.94	0.189	11.70	0.178
Busan Metropolis	7.31	0.304	8.57	0.253	10.11	0.205	10.78	0.200
Gyeonggi Province	5.82	0.376	7.74	0.292	9.90	0.219	11.01	0.193
Gangwon Province	5.24	0.411	6.57	0.354	8.34	0.301	9.44	0.274
Chungcheongbuk Province	4.48	0.475	6.15	0.386	8.17	0.319	9.51	0.272
Chungcheongnam Province	4.80	0.445	6.37	0.372	8.45	0.301	9.81	0.267
Jeollabuk Province	4.58	0.486	6.21	0.397	8.11	0.329	9.31	0.296
Jeollanam Province	4.74	0.454	6.29	0.383	8.34	0.312	9.46	0.287
Gyeongsangbuk Province	5.05	0.443	6.83	0.363	8.73	0.294	9.89	0.257
Gyeongsangnam Province	4.75	0.474	6.77	0.372	8.85	0.284	10.01	0.242
Jeju Province	5.15	0.468	6.98	0.363	9.03	0.281	10.04	0.257

Source: Republic of Korea, 1970: Republic of Korea, 1980; Republic of Korea, 1990; Republic of Korea, 2000; author's calculations.

*1990 and 2000 data from some provinces were combined with that of metropolises not existent in 1970 or 1980 in order to maintain continuity of administrative divisions across time and allow consistent comparison.

HOW CAN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AID AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ASSIST DEVELOPING DEMOCRACIES? *

STEVE KAPFER

Assisting fledgling democracies is important but also very problematic. Research on the subject has failed to produce any effective strategies or techniques to help new democracies succeed (Quigley 1997, 564-567). Many policy makers from democratic countries try to export their notion of democracy; however, they fail to realize that there is not a “one-size-fits-all” solution. Free and fair elections may not constitute a successful measure for democracy; they are a necessary yet not sufficient requirement (Quigley 1997, 564-567). It is important that policies aimed at assisting democracies not only help setup the procedural elements of democracy but also help foster substantive democratic elements such as “parties, civic groups, trade unions, think tanks, and the mass media” (Diamond 1992, 25-46, Quigley 1997, 564-567). Thus, these components must be implemented and maintained overtime to provide a stable foundation for democracy to thrive. However, the stability of these is contingent on the stability of a robust economy since the instability of the economy can change decisionmaking. Based on this assumption, it is necessary to promote the economy in order to secure democracy.

Most analysts and policy makers agree that the economy plays a key role in assisting democracy, but how it assists fledgling democracies is hotly contested. For example, researchers debate about whether a robust economy leads to democracy or if the correlation is reversed (Bois & Stokes 2003). However, researchers have found that democracies with unstable economies are at a higher risk of failure than democracies with strong economies. (Carothers 1997, 11-18, Diamond 1992, 25-46). This drives researchers to explore the causes of economic growth in order to sustain democracy.

Unfortunately, many countries lack the physical and political resources necessary for high economic growth. For example, some governments lack an efficient tax collection while others deal with infertile mountainous terrain. Most developing countries turn to international aid. Official Development Aid (ODA) can strengthen political and physical infrastructure that may help stimulate economic development. For example, financial resources can help free government officials from informal dependence on rich interest groups within the country. These officials become accountable to international governments and alliances rather than to black market leaders. ODA can also be used to construct a transportation infrastructure that can allow the free exchange of goods and services throughout the economy.

Despite the benefits of ODA, economic analysis reveals decreasing marginal returns to these investments. It is possible that ODA accumulates human and physical capital, which increases a country’s level of income but not its economic growth over time.

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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), however, has proved to stimulate economic growth and thereby democracy. Rather than governments arbitrarily transferring money to developing countries, private investment accumulates in the most efficient markets in each country. Thus, industries with a comparative advantage and economies of scale will thrive while others will redirect resources into more efficient industries.

In order to best manage these two different types of foreign investment, I argue that Official Development Aid should be refocused towards developing government and public infrastructure. In the subsequent absence of excessive corruption and bribery, Foreign Direct Investment will flow into the economy and help sustain economic growth and maintain the democracy.

OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AID

Countries have historically used ODA to promote the both economic and social welfare of those countries. It is thus concerning that economists such as Lant Pritchett, a World Bank economist, report that development aid does not promote development. Out of the 108 countries that he studied, only eleven had a healthy GDP per capita growth rate. Forty countries had a GDP per capita growth rate of less than one percent and twenty-eight countries had a GDP per capita growth rate of less than .5 percent. Sixteen countries actually had a negative per capita GDP growth rate (Pritchett 1997, 3-17). The report suggests that development aid is not being used effectively to create development. This provides evidence that ODA may not be best fit for all kinds of economic development. In fact, it shows that it has an almost insignificant effect on the GDP per capita growth rate in many countries, and in other countries ODA may actually contribute to a decline in GDP per capita growth rate. There are several reasons why ODA does not sustain economic growth.

ODA may fail to cultivate long-term growth because it refocuses governments' attention on immediate but less important issues while ignoring long term critical issues (Strong 1995, 233-239). This most likely occurs because ODA is given without direction or specific expectations.

First, ODA may cripple a country's long-term growth by redirecting the governments' accountability toward a foreign entity. In the contemporary world, democratic governments develop over long periods of time and establish accountability and trust between the government and society. This can occur as the society learns to trust successful government policies and elects representatives to office. Additionally, the government learns how to manage its budget and create sound development projects that will contribute to the country's growth. Official Development Aid, however, may reduce the government's accountability to citizens because they are no longer dependent on tax revenue to finance projects and thus no longer accountable to taxpayer: the citizens. Without the mutual exchange between society and government, officials are more likely to be influenced by outside interest groups that can also fund the government. (Alesina and Weder 2002, 1126-1126-1137, Knack 2001, 310-329). The newly achieved independence also reduces governments' desire to institute good policies. They often redirect their efforts away from efficient policies and projects and move toward interests that may more but may do little for the economy. Some evidence reveals that ODA "fosters corruption by increasing the size of resources fought over by interest groups and

factions” (Alesina and Weder 2002, 1126-1126-1137). This can lead to inefficient policies and a deficiency in the necessary infrastructure required to attract private capital (Knack 2001, 310-329).

Other problems stem from how ODA is used by governments. Many economists argue that ODA is not effective in creating growth because the recipient government consumes rather than invests the aid in the country. More importantly, this additional disposable income allows the government to spend its original budget more frivolously (Burnside and Dollar 2000, 847-868). Thus, ODA can cause governments to get in bad habits of spending money on projects they don't need but want to complete for less altruistic reasons. For example, many African governments receiving ODA have failed to invest their aid and have mostly inefficiently consumed it. Moreover, Victor Levy reports that the average world growth rate went from 3.7 percent in 1968-73 to 4.1 percent in 1974-80. In contrast, African countries actually experienced a decline, from 3.3 percent in 1968-73 to 3.0 percent in 1974-80 (Levy 1987, 152-156).

Despite the grim results of ODA, some researchers have found that aid can have a positive effect if given under the right conditions (Burnside and Dollar 2000). If a government has a relatively strong rule of law and stable economy, government officials are more likely to invest in effective projects and government reforms. This is likely due to the economy's stable environment which can sustain and expand capital investment. In this situation, ODA may have a positive effect.

Nevertheless, research by William Easterly shows that when Burnside and Dollar's dataset is expanded and their regressions are rerun, the results show no correlation between ODA and growth (Easterly 2003, 23-48). Easterly's findings confound all the recent enthusiasm about the possible gains from ODA and force policy makers to reconsider the usefulness of ODA when creating development strategies.

Some experts have suggested that a country's environment is less important than the conditions connected with the aid. In other words, aid might be effective if connected with various conditions and incentives. However, Robert Cull finds that “country characteristics were more important than loan characteristics” and conditional aid does not increase its effectiveness (Cull 2001, 269-290). Governments promoting good policy environments are already disposed to reform, so conditional loans become a means by which they can (1) “publicly commit to policy measures,” (2) “signal to the private sector that a reform program is credible,” thus encouraging “a quicker response from investors” and (3) cultivate development (Cull 2001, 269-290). This indicates that a country's political infrastructure and economy more importantly determine the effectiveness of development aid.

In spite of overwhelming evidence which reports ODA's ineffectiveness, especially where governments are corrupt, Alberto Alesina and Beatrice Weder report that corrupt governments receive just as much as less-corrupt governments. This suggests that governments with a poor rule of law and unsuccessful policies are just as likely to receive aid as are less corrupt governments with successful policies. (Alesina & Weder 2002, 1126-1137). Although some countries, such as Norway and Australia, give more aid to less corrupt governments, the majority of aid still goes to corrupt governments (Alesina & Weder 2002, 1126-1137).

Official Development Aid, for the most part, fails to act as a catalyst for development. For a few countries already disposed to creating development it can help to

spur development, but for the majority of countries its effects are negligible, and for some countries aid leads to a decline in development. Additionally, sustained amounts of aid can make countries dependent on aid seriously undermining the “quality of governance and public sector institutions by weakening accountability, encouraging rent-seeking and corruption, fomenting conflict over control of aid funds, siphoning off scarce talent from the bureaucracy, and alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies and institutions” (Knack 2001, 310-329). Conditional aid only seems to work at the margins, inducing relatively few countries to reform in order to receive aid. Countries with good policies will most likely already be developed to a certain extent so that each dollar of aid faces diminishing marginal returns.

Regardless of these unfortunate results, there are several constructive ways that donors can try to increase the benefits of aid. Stephen Knack found that highly variable amounts of aid decreases a country’s dependence on aid because the country cannot rely on it from year to year to finance its programs (Knack 2001, 310-329). Additionally, donors can “devote greater efforts to strengthen civil society and its links to government” which will most likely improve government transparency and accountability, which are usually necessary precondition for private investment (Knack 2001, 310-329). Aid can also be targeted to the “start-up of small business” making it less fungible and also helping to promote development by directly creating economic growth and indirectly promoting social development (Knack 2001, 310-329).

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

For most developing countries and fledgling democracies, focusing on creating environments that attract private investment will directly stimulate economic growth and indirectly promote social development. Foreign Direct Investment is different than Official Development Aid because the market decides where financial resources go. Thus, the aid goes to a country’s most productive and efficient industries and is not wasted through corruption as ODA can. Typically, domestic investment is preferred to foreign investment; however, since domestic investors in developing countries often lack the funds, managerial know-how, and technology to create a successful business, governments are likely to welcome Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Governments, then, turn to FDI to act as a catalyst for development within their country and to supplement private domestic investment (Rozental 1957, 277-285).

Do positive externalities that supposedly come from FDI really exist? Most host countries of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from multinational corporations (MNCs) argue that it does. Host countries for MNCs regard FDI as a “significant opportunity for integrating their economies into the global market and promoting their economic development” (Long 2005, 315-336). These countries find that FDI cultivates development through a variety of ways from providing more health coverage than domestic firms to increasing research and development within the country (Erdilek 2005, 108-133, Moss, Ramachandran and Shah 2005, 340-362). For many developing countries, FDI plays a crucial role in development.

Naturally, any research on economic growth must control for a variety of variables that may exogenously or endogenously cause growth. Additionally, studies must control for possible spurious relationships between FDI and growth. It is also hard to determine

whether FDI caused economic growth or if a spurious relationship exists. This complication of data makes it difficult to compare the effectiveness of FDI with ODA.

While it may be hard to track all the causal mechanisms for economic growth, FDI certainly plays a vital role in every country's economy. In developed countries with large economies it is almost impossible to understand how the economy responds to policies, FDI, or domestic investment. However, in developing countries it is possible to find many connections between FDI and economic growth because developing countries usually have smaller economies. Indeed, it is important to separate developing countries from developed countries in order to discover the positive affects of FDI on economic growth (Blonigen and Wang 2005, 221-241).

When useful controls and measures are used and the data is divided into appropriate samples, empirical evidence shows that FDI does, in fact, promote economic growth, which in turn helps spur development in a broader sense. Researchers find that under the right policies and conditions an array of different positive spillovers can come from FDI. These include wage spillovers, production spillovers, technological spillovers, lower prices, higher quality domestic suppliers, and increased research and development. Not only does FDI produce positive spillovers, but for some countries it "may mean the difference between development and stagnation, in others, it may be a precondition of higher living standards" (Rozenal 1957, 277-285).

An important caveat to note in the relationship between FDI and growth is that FDI has a different impact on different types of domestic corporations. Foreign Direct Investment often has a negative short-run effect on domestic competitors. Most research shows that there are few horizontal spillovers, which is why domestic competitors are crowded out in the short-run. However, Foreign Direct Investment does have a positive short-run impact on domestic suppliers (vertical spillovers) who provide MNCs with the necessary inputs for production. In the long-run FDI has a positive affect on both domestic competitors and suppliers and, to some extent, the longer an MNC is in a country the larger the positive impact of FDI will be in the domestic market (Moran, Gramham and Blomstrom 2005, 375-393). Positive externalities from FDI will most likely occur at the local level because of the close knit ties that MNCs form with domestic suppliers which are usually geographically close. The positive externalities may also spillover into other neighboring countries as former employees move and as the MNCs technology slowly diffuses throughout the market, thus increasing the development within whole regions of the world (Gorg and Strobl 2005, 137-155, Lipsey and Sjöholm 2005, 36-41). To understand how FDI effects growth one must first disentangle how FDI affects domestic markets.

One of the most important effects that come from FDI is the competition effect. Greater competition within the country's market provides incentives to pay higher wages to attract workers, invest more in research and development, increase productivity which lowers costs for both domestic suppliers and domestic competition, and increase quality standards for domestic suppliers. According to Guoqiang Long, FDI created competition in China's Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River Delta that helped motivate domestic suppliers and domestic competitors to improve their respective industries, and, as a result, the Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River Delta have become world-class information technology regions (Long 2005, 315-336).

Domestic suppliers immediately feel the effects of Foreign Direct Investment as MNCs demand inputs in order to produce their products. Additionally, downstream suppliers may feel the effect of FDI as MNCs demand packaging services so that they can send their finished products into the market. Many MNCs do, in fact, rely on domestic suppliers for inputs, but how much they rely on domestic suppliers usually depends on the quality of products domestic suppliers can produce (Moran 2005, 283-309). Multinational corporations often will help potential domestic suppliers meet quality requirements, such as the ISO 9000, in order to increase efficiency and profits. Many MNCs will still help domestic suppliers even if it benefits domestic competition by helping domestic suppliers achieve economies of scale. By achieving economies of scale domestic suppliers can produce quality products at a low cost which benefits both MNCs and domestic competition (Moran, Gramham and Blomstrom 2005, 375-393). Examples of this can be found in the electronics sector. For example, QDOS Microcircuits, a Malaysian company was able to expand into the international market and become a supplier to many corporations after Motorola helped improve quality standards, thus increasing demand for their products (Moran 2005, 283-309).

As demand for inputs from domestic suppliers increases the productivity and profitability of the supply sector, the supply sector will grow resulting in increased competition as new firm enter the market. Thus, as a result of Foreign Direct Investment the supply sector is able to grow and encourage economic development.

Wages will also increase as a result of Foreign Direct Investment for three reasons. First, MNCs will enter the market and offer higher wages than the domestic competition in order to attract skilled workers. Second, as the demand for inputs from domestic suppliers increases domestic suppliers will start to demand more skilled laborers which will also increase the wage rate. Third, as domestic suppliers reach economies of scale the price of inputs will drop, the quality of inputs will go up, and profitability will increase which will cause domestic competitors to enter the market resulting in additional demands on the labor market.

Multinational corporations also help countries stay out of recessions and depressions by shifting production from areas of high cost to areas of low cost. As the cost of investing in a particular country decreases due to an economic recession MNCs will weigh production costs in other countries compared to production costs in that country. One of the characteristics of MNCs is their ability to quickly shift production from areas of high cost to areas of low cost. Investments in the country with an economic recession will rise as MNCs invests in that country and demand for labor and capital will increase. Multinational corporations can also help to decrease the severity of a recession or depression within a country that it is invested. In depressions the costs of investing for foreign firms dramatically decreases, which then increases the desire of foreign firms to invest in that country (Rozental 1957, 277-285). The increased investment then stimulates the economy and lifts it back out of the recession. Additionally, in a recession subsidies of a foreign firm that want to invest can gain access to credit through the foreign firm while domestic firms are unable to gain access from domestic banks (Blalock and Gertler 2005, 73-104).

Multinationals corporations must train new workers. These workers pick up technological and managerial know-how. When these workers leave they start up their own companies or domestic competitors pick them up by offering higher salaries.

Additionally, MNCs will help domestic suppliers take advantage of the MNC's technological and managerial know-how so that the domestic suppliers will efficiently produce quality products. Domestic competitors are then able to pick up technological and managerial know-how from domestic suppliers as well. Over time, then, MNCs' technological and managerial know-how is slowly diffused throughout the market (Krause 1972, 93-103).

In order to stay ahead of the competition, MNCs and domestic competitors will invest in research and development (R&D) (Krause 1972, 93-103). Usually MNCs locate R&D centers in developed countries where there is a large skilled worker pool, but as intellectual property rights, favorable investment policies, infrastructure and the number of skilled workers increases in developing countries MNCs will shift R&D to areas of low cost (Erdilek 2005, 108-133). However, countries that choose to continue to force MNCs to participate in joint ventures or that have weak intellectual property laws will find that MNCs will not invest in R&D or use the most technologically advanced production techniques within the country (Krause 1972, 93-103).

Some countries have valid concerns that Foreign Direct Investment will crowd out domestic competition, resulting in a loss of economic development. In the short-run it appears that it is true that domestic competitors are crowded out of the market. Multinational corporations usually have advanced technology and better managerial knowledge than domestic competitors allowing them to produce better products at a lower cost. Additionally, MNCs may overwhelm domestic suppliers with orders so that domestic competitors are unable to get the necessary inputs for production. However, in the long-run domestic competitors will enter the market as domestic suppliers are able to reach economies of scale and thereby produce quality inputs at a low price, thus cutting the cost of production (Blonigen and Wang 2005, 221-241). Additionally, as technological and managerial experience diffuses throughout the market, domestic competitors will be able to capitalize on the MNC's know-how.

It is necessary to note, though, that FDI has the largest positive effect in open markets. Countries with distorted economies will fail to initiate robust economic growth through Foreign Direct Investment (Lawrence 2005, 368-373). In fact, when there are market distortions FDI tends to have a negative affect on the host country's economy (Moran, Gramham and Blomstrom 2005, 375-393). Governments and MNC overcompensate in a way that will count out any positive benefit. It is necessary for countries to open up their markets to MNCs in order to initiate economic development. The incentive to integrate into the international market is great because of the many potential benefits that come from FDI, including the transfer of technological and managerial knowledge (Feinberg and Keane 2005, 245-277). Multinational corporations are also increasingly demanding to be allowed to operate wholly owned facilities, so countries that refuse to open up their markets to the demands of MNCs will find that they remain undeveloped. Indeed, those countries that have forced MNCs to invest in joint ventures and share technology in order to spur development have failed to see any economic improvements (Moran 2005, 283-309). The consequences of this are quite profound and are part of the reason why MNCs are gaining considerable power in the international system. MNCs will continue to gain more power as countries begin to institute liberal economic policies in order to integrate their economies into the international market.

In pursuit of integration into the international market and economic efficiency, states must let multinational corporations freely mobilize and deploy resources “according to the most efficient pattern” (Ball 1968, 163-170). States must, then, adopt liberal trade practices and open up their borders in order to broaden their economic horizons. However, some countries are catering too much to the needs and wants of MNCs. These countries not only open up their markets to MNC investment, but they also give out tax breaks, subsidies and free land in order to encourage MNCs to invest in their country (Moran 2005, 283-309). The power that this gives MNCs is tremendous. As a result, states have power *de jure*, while MNCs are gaining *de facto* power.

Multinational corporations gain their power over states from their ability to efficiently operate, coordinate, and manage transactions between states. In the name of efficiency MNCs can and will shift production from states with high costs to states with low costs. States, then, should be concerned with the power that MNCs have because of their ability to determine employment and, ultimately, the prosperity of the state (Ball 1968, 163-170). After all, the only thing more alarming to a state than the presence of a MNC is its absence (Sampson 1973, 288).

Additionally, MNCs political action allows them to minimize the government’s ability to regulate MNCs. For example, states create property rights for individuals and groups in order to protect parties from injuring each other’s property. Individuals and groups (including foreign and domestic firms) constantly vie for more protection and freer access to resources. Successful firms are then able to manipulate legislation, raising the “transaction costs of others” which allows them to “exploit the ensuing rents” (Boddewyn 1988, 341-363).

The rise of the MNC has also created, in effect, an international organization that can have an immense effect on not only the economy, but on a state’s government as well. It is always interesting to note, for example, that fifty-one of the world’s hundred largest economic entities are corporations and not countries, or that “the 500 largest corporations account for 70 percent of world trade” (Kaplan 1997, 55-80). Corporations not only have the political power to influence states, but also the economic clout to devastatingly affect a state’s economy should the state try to oppose a multinational corporation. It is not surprising, then, that states feel unable to formulate effective economic strategies or to plan for the future (Walters 1972, 127-138).

Despite the erosion of state power by multinational corporations, and the fact that they can act independently of states, states still have some power over MNCs. After all, states still have the right to give legitimacy and to take it away. It is therefore necessary that states remind corporations of this power, forcing MNCs to constantly stand on hostile ground.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The evidence suggests that while ODA spurs economic growth in stable political and economic environments, it mostly contributes to economic stagnation and government corruption. On the other hand, FDI has been most effective in stimulating economic growth in developing countries. However, FDI also can have negative effects if operating in an environment with protectionist policies. In this situation, few MNCs are allowed to invest in the country however they will institute inefficient practices which will

hamper the state's development. MNCs may also lobby and manipulate the government to keep the protectionist measures in place so that they can reap the profits from a distorted market. For example, though Chrysler used incredibly outdated and inefficient practices in Mexico, it fought to keep the protectionist policies in place "in order to preserve what its managers described as a 'cash cow'" (Moran 2005, 283-309). Additionally, Hewlett-Packard, Compaq, Apple, and other high-tech foreign investors fought to keep Mexico's protectionist policies in place. Mexico's protectionist policies kept competitors out of the market allowing the MNCs to sell two- to three-years-old computer technology in the local market at prices "130-170 percent of the external price" (Moran 2005, 283-309). As previously stated, MNCs are profit maximizing entities. However, MNCs don't always maximize profits by using the most technologically advanced equipment.

It is important to note, though, that MNCs' investments look for more than only inexpensive labor (Moran 2005, 283-309). While MNCs want to maximize profits, they are not motivated to exploit every country's resources and legislation. FDI is usually only motivated by first, resource-seeking MNCs that want access to either natural resources or human capital; second, market-seeking MNCs that want access to larger markets; and third, efficiency-seeking MNCs that believe that by networking businesses across national boundaries they can lower the total cost of producing a product (Stopford 1998-1999, 12-24). An MNC's investment strategy is much more complex than simply trying to exploit a country's resources and legislation, especially considering that MNCs must secure and maintain their legitimacy within a country.

It is important, then, that developing democracies not only attract foreign FDI, but also institute good policies that will create an environment in which FDI can be used to foster development. ODA could be used to help developing democracies create such environments and mitigate the negative externalities that come from FDI. Well planned projects could help strengthen government institutions, increase transparency and accountability, and develop the necessary infrastructure that investors look for when deciding where to locate. Additionally, ODA could be aimed at creating an educated workforce so that technological spillovers can occur within that country.

Some researchers worry that the growing reliance on FDI will make developing countries unable to create effective programs to protect themselves (Tanzi 2001, 78-79). These researchers argue that states will be unable to institute social safety nets because they will be unable to tax FDI. States will be unable to tax FDI because states have to compete for investment. States that impose taxes or other similar measures will find that they are passed over by MNCs because MNCs are sensitive to tax incentives. Additionally, some countries give away free land as well as give subsidies to MNCs that invest in their countries, which further reduces the amount of money available for governments to allocate to social safety nets. MNCs also evade taxes through international trade between subsidiaries. Through international trade between subsidiaries, MNCs are able to transfer profits from high-tax countries to low-tax countries, thus frustrating states' attempts to tax MNCs (Tanzi 2001, 78-79). ODA could fill this funding deficiency, allowing countries to reduce taxes in order to attract FDI while at the same time create social safety nets to protect citizens that will be negatively affect by FDI.

ODA aimed at the projects and institutions previously mentioned will most likely spur development by directly helping countries grow economically and indirectly promoting social development. As the economy grows and social environment develops citizens will become more interested in government because the government impacts their lives. As citizens explore their new found freedoms and enjoy their economic success they will seek to keep the status quo by insuring that the right institutions are in place within the government. As the citizens in the country become more actively involved in the government the, fledgling democracy will transition from a procedural democracy to a healthy, substantive democracy.

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RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND POLITICAL INTEREST

MELANIE WALTHER

INTRODUCTION

While driving through any American community, it is common to pass billboards preaching salvation, signs posting church meeting times, synagogues, stain-glassed windows, and other symbols of the country's religious life. Religion is a vibrant component of local communities and a prevalent part of American society. Compared to other developed nations, the United States retains an unusually religious citizenry. Over eight-two percent of Americans identify with religion and around two thirds attend church (Wald 2003, 11). Although religion is not formally entrenched in the U.S. government, religion is deeply rooted in the country's social structure and as a result it has great potential to shape American political attitudes, specifically political interest. The psychological and sociological forces inherent in religious organizations offer several routes by which political interest can be stimulated and fostered. In buildings of worship, people gather together and interact in ways that have natural consequences on their levels of political interest.

This study seeks to understand how religiosity affects engagement in politics. The social aspect of religion can only influence people who are actively involved in religious organizations, therefore being physically and emotionally committed to religion is expected to increase political interest. Due to the pluralistic nature of religion in the United States, great variation exists in religious organizations and practice. While this diversity of religious tradition may cause the level of political interest to differ by tradition, higher levels of religious commitment should increase political interest regardless of tradition by escalating social awareness and political ability. In addition, as religious bodies are often organized on a local scale, increasing religious commitment should have a larger impact on political interest in local rather than national affairs. Therefore, higher levels of religious commitment should increase political interest, especially at the local level.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

There are many routes by which religious organizations endow committed members with greater interest in local politics. First, religious institutions promote political interest by providing members with civic skills that are easily converted to political activity and political interest. Committed members learn how to organize and communicate as they

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participate in various activities sponsored by their church (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995, 273). For example, active members will often teach classes, conduct meetings, or organize service projects sponsored by their church. All of these activities teach the participant how to effectively express their ideas and translate them into action.

Communication and organizational skills facilitate political activity because they are easily drawn upon by the individual when placed in political situations. When individuals feel they have the ability to become involved in political processes, they are also more inclined to be interested in the political issues. The civic skills resulting from religious involvement enable greater political interest by making politics more approachable. Since religious membership and participation within religious organizations is not based on educational or economic standards, religious organizations are egalitarian sources of these political resources (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995, 275). Therefore, the equal distribution of political resources by religious organizations provides all members who choose to become actively involved with greater mental ability to engage in politics and enables greater political interest.

Religious organizations also increase political interest by providing a safe forum for discussing local issues. Members of a congregation tend to develop similar worldviews as they interact with each other. Because members exhibiting strong religious commitment experience more frequent interpersonal interactions with other members, high religious commitment results in greater conformity to the group's worldview. Wald, Owen, and Hill find that the collective outlook of a church has greater political significance on individuals' views than their worldviews (1988, 545). As members reinforce each other's views, a friendly environment in which political ideas and issues can be discussed is created and political interest can be magnified. The tight social networks resulting between those members with high levels of religious commitment supply efficient communications networks that stimulate discussion and issue-specific political interest if consciously activated (Campbell 2005, 155). Therefore, greater commitment not only solidifies a group's mindset but also increases opportunities for discussion of issues that kindle political interest.

The idea that religious commitment promotes political interest is partially supported by a study on civic engagement using data from the *American Citizen Participation Study*. In this study, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady find that increased religious attendance promotes greater political interest (1995, 435-436). While religious attendance measures some of an individual's likelihood to be influenced by religious organizations, religious commitment provides a stronger measure of religion's impact on political interest. Commitment refers to the extent an individual actively participates and holds the beliefs espoused by the religious tradition (Kohut et al. 2000, 14). In measuring religion's impact on political behaviors, Kohut et al. discover members who are more committed exhibit distinctly different political behaviors than members with lower commitment levels (2000, 35). Committed members are more ideologically cohesive and more likely to participate in politics. Higher religious commitment produces greater political commitment by magnifying the social interactions and political resources obtained through organized membership which should stimulate political interest.

Through the analysis presented later in this paper, I improve and expand upon the study produced by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady. Rather than just examine religious

attendance, I analyze the relationship between religious commitment and political interest is examined. Also, I explore the effect of the local nature of religious organizations by comparing the impact of religious commitment on national versus local political interest.

In early America, religious bodies and communities were often closely intertwined (Stout 1996, 114). Churches provided both the social and religious nucleus for many towns and held a significant influence within their respective communities. As society grew and modernized, communities became increasingly complex and impersonal (Stout 1996, 116). Now, communities are essentially complex organizations of interlocking institutions (Stout 1996, 118). Although religious organizations' role in communities has declined, most religions continue to function primarily as local institutions. Congregations are generally organized by neighborhood boundaries. In addition, the basic functions of churches are often deeply tied to the community in which they reside. For example, churches often provide communities with supporting functions such as hospitals and shelters. Geographically and functionally, churches are local institutions.

As a result of the local nature of religions, religious organizations have great potential to influence local political matters and behaviors. A number of studies reveal the importance of congregations as a source of political socialization (Gilbert 1993; Jelen 1992; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1990). Individuals who are active church members are more likely to be aware of community opportunities and needs as a result of attending services and socializing with other members (Wuthnow 1999, 334). Discussions between committed church members are likely to center around local issues. Therefore, it is expected that high religious commitment has a disproportionate impact on political interest in local politics. Citizens who are religiously committed will have more access to discussions of local politics and higher probabilities of being interested in the affairs of their communities than individuals not active in religious organizations.

Like most attitudes, political interest is determined by an intricate combination of individual characteristics and environmental conditions. Because of its inherent complexity, several factors other than religious commitment consistently emerge as major forces influencing political interest. To isolate the relationship between religious commitment and political interest, these other variables influencing political interest must be accounted for. Through survey analysis, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady find political interest stems largely from socioeconomic factors (1995, 494). Higher economic and educational resources stimulate a citizen's interest in political matters by providing political resources that enable exposure to political ideas and processes. In contrast, those with low family income and low education express a psychological detachment through lower intensities of political interest (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 526-527).

These divisions along lines of education and income suggest that the ability to physically and mentally participate in politics plays a large role in shaping psychological receptivity to politics. While political interest is also influenced by family socialization settings (level of parental interest), parental interest can be traced back to parental education, income, and political participation levels (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 442-443). Although educational and financial resources promote greater exposure to political ideas and higher interest, participation in social organizations, specifically

religious organizations, also provide exposure to political ideas and consequently stimulate political interest (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 494).

Participation in social organizations reaps a host of political rewards. According to Putnam, involvement in social organizations produces social capital which kindles trust, political engagement, and collective political interest (1995, 664-665). Greater political interest and participation is often attributed to organizational membership for several reasons. First, social organizations create social networks that provide forums in which social issues can be discussed (McClurg 2003, 449). Second, organizations subsidize the costs of political information by providing other incentives and often promote political involvement (Leighley 1996, 447). Group participation also provides members with political resources such as public speaking, organizational, or letter-writing skills (Brady, Verba, Schlozman 1995, 271). On the logical basis that social interactions within a voluntary organization promote political behaviors, social interaction within local religious groups should also encourage interest in local politics.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

To measure religious commitment's relationship to political interest on the local and national levels, an ordered logit regression model was applied to the survey data from the 1990 *American Citizen Participation Study*. Conducted by Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry E. Brady, and Norman Nie, the study gathered a wide range of information on political activities, values, and personal characteristics for 2,517 individuals over the age of eighteen using in-person interviews. Data collection relied on an advanced clustered and stratified sampling method which increases the likelihood the sample values are representative of the total population values.

Political interest was measured by asking respondents, in two separate questions, to indicate if they were (1) not interested, (2) slightly interested, (3) somewhat interested, or (4) very interested in local and national politics (see Appendix A for exact question wording). The broad nature of the political interest questions proves more valuable than

Table 1 – National and Local Political Interest Levels

Interest Level	National Politics (Percent %)	Local Politics (Percent %)
Not	7.74	10.8
Slightly	16.55	22
Somewhat	37.88	38.06
Very	38.33	29.14

questions asking issue-specific interest levels because they provide a psychological indicator of an individual's general receptivity to politics. If interest was measured according to topic, other factors of issue salience and relevancy of the issue would obscure the respondent's predilection or distaste for political matters as a whole.

When the overall responses of local and national political interest are compared, we see that individuals are more likely to be interested in national rather than local politics. While most respondents tend to cluster in the middle categories (slightly and somewhat interested) for both local and national politics, the difference between local and national political interest levels becomes very apparent in the extremities of interest levels. Respondents were more likely to indicate they were not at all interested in local politics and less likely to indicate a high level of interest. Because of the difference in local and national interest levels, when analyzing the impact of religious commitment on interest, the differences between commitment levels within the local and national political interest questions must first be computed to allow comparison between national and local political interest results.

Measuring religious commitment was more complicated as it relies not only on individual involvement in a congregation, but also on how important religion is to the individual. Members who are defined as highly committed are both physically and mentally invested in the religion. Using Kohut's breakdown of religious activity by belief, belonging, and behavior, an additive index ranging from zero to four was created that focused on the belief and behavior facets of religious activity (Kohut 2000, 12). The index increases in value when the respondent categorized religion as important, attended religious services weekly, served on a committee, or participated in the official organization of a church in the past five years. Table 2 presents a distribution of this index. Of the respondents, over half (61 percent) scored one or less on the index and only 12 percent qualified as being very committed.

Table 2 – Religious Commitment Index (4=high)

Commitment Level	Frequency	Percent %	Cum %
0	961	38.18	38.18
1	587	23.32	61.5
2	362	14.38	75.88
3	295	11.72	87.6
4	312	12.4	100
Total	2517	100	100.00

Several variables were added to the model to control for other known influences on interest levels. Socioeconomic variations were measured by questions asking about the respondents' education level and income level (see Appendix A for exact question wording). To control for parents' level of political interest, respondents were asked about

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the level of political discussion in their home when they were sixteen years old. Finally, age was included as younger people are generally less interested in politics. In this sample, the average respondent was 41 years old, had an income between \$20,000 and \$24,999, received 13 to 14 years of education, and sometimes discussed politics in the home when a teenager.

The models in this study specifically examine how religious commitment, income, educational level, age, and level of parental interest influence interest in national politics and interest in local politics.¹ The two hypotheses propose that (1) those respondents with higher levels of religious commitment will have a higher propensity of being very interested in both national and local politics and (2) religious commitment will have a greater impact on interest in local politics than on interest in national politics. In other words, Hypothesis 1 states that religious commitment positively impacts the probabilities of being interested in politics. An individual who displays greater commitment to his or her religion should also report higher interest in national and local politics compared to an individual not committed to religion. Hypothesis 2 anticipates that religious commitment has more influence on interest in local politics than in national politics due to religion's local structure. The difference in reported interest between individuals committed and individual not committed to religion should be more dramatic for reported interest in local politics versus interest in national politics. If there is no change in reported interest levels when religious commitment changes, Hypothesis 1 will fail, as the null hypothesis of no relationship would not be rejected. Also, if the change in interest between high and low religious commitment levels is similar for reported interest in both local and national politics, Hypothesis 2 will fail to have support as its null hypothesis of no relationship will also not be rejected.²

¹ *The estimated model can be formally written as:*

$$\begin{aligned} natint &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 com + \beta_2 owninc + \beta_3 edgrade + \beta_4 dischome + \beta_5 age + u \\ locint &= \beta_6 + \beta_7 com + \beta_8 owninc + \beta_9 edgrade + \beta_{10} dischome + \beta_{11} age + u \end{aligned}$$

Where:

<i>natint</i>	Interest in national politics/affairs (not interested = 1, very interested = 4)
<i>locint</i>	Interest in local community politics (not interested = 1, very interested = 4)
<i>com</i>	Index of a respondent's religious commitment (low commitment = 0, high commitment = 4)
<i>owninc</i>	Respondent's total income for 1989
<i>edgrade</i>	Highest grade of regular school completed
<i>dischome</i>	How frequently politics were discussed at home when respondent was 16 (1 = Never, 2 = Sometimes, 3 = frequently)
<i>age</i>	Age of respondent

² *Hypothesis 1 can be formally written as:*

$$H_0: \beta_0 = 0 \text{ and } \beta_7 = 0$$

$$H_1: \beta_1 > 0 \text{ and } \beta_7 > 0$$

The ordered logit regression is used to analyze the data in this study due to the ordinal nature of the dependent variables, national and local political interest. Although the categories of political interest can be ranked, the distances between “not interested”, “slightly interested”, “somewhat interested”, and “very interested” are unknown and not necessarily equal at every level. Using the ordinal regression model (ORM), the uncertainty of scale is taken into account, and the probability that the dependent variable will take on a particular value at specified values of the independent variables can be calculated.

Table 3 presents the ordered logit models with interest in national politics and interest in local politics as the dependent variables. When political interest, religious commitment, and the control variables were tested using the ordered logit model, all of the relationships were statistically significant. All of the tested independent variables have a positive relationship with the dependent variable in addition to being statistically significant. As each independent variable increases, the level of political interest is also likely to increase. The statistically significant results and positive value of the coefficient on religious commitment in the national and local interest regressions allow the null hypothesis of Hypothesis1 to be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis. The significant positive results suggest that being more religiously committed increases an individual’s tendency to be interested in both national and local politics.

However, the magnitude of this relationship cannot be immediately derived from the regression coefficients because of the model’s nonlinear form. In probability models, the size of the change in the outcome’s probability for a given change in the independent variable depends on the levels of the other independent variables. Therefore, to obtain a

H_0 : There is no relationship between religious commitment and political interest

H_1 : Religious commitment causes greater interest in local and national politics

Hypothesis 2 can be formally written as:

$$H_0: P(\text{locint}=4|\text{com}=4) - P(\text{locint}=4|\text{com}=0) = P(\text{natint}=4|\text{com}=4) - P(\text{natint}=4|\text{com}=0)$$

$$H_a: P(\text{locint}=4|\text{com}=4) - P(\text{locint}=4|\text{com}=0) > P(\text{natint}=4|\text{com}=4) - P(\text{natint}=4|\text{com}=0)$$

H_0 : The probability of being very interesting in local politics given an individual who is very religiously committed **minus** the probability of being very interested in local politics given an individual who is not religiously committed **is equal to** the probability of being very interesting in local politics given an individual who is very religiously committed **minus** the probability of being very interested in local politics given an individual who is not religiously committed.

H_1 : The probability of being very interesting in local politics given an individual who is very religiously committed **minus** the probability of being very interested in local politics given an individual who is not religiously committed **is greater than** the probability of being very interesting in local politics given an individual who is very religiously committed **minus** the probability of being very interested in local politics given an individual who is not religiously committed.

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better understanding of how religious commitment affects political interest, all other independent variables were held constant at their average values and the predicted probabilities were calculated for each interest level as religious commitment varies.

Table 3 – Ordered Logit Estimates of Interest in National and Local Politics

Interest in National Politics	
Variable	Coefficient
Religious Commitment Index	0.081*
Income Level	0.076**
Amount of Political Discussion at home when 16 years old	0.198**
Age of Respondent	0.019**

Interest in Local Politics	
Variable	Coefficient
Religious Commitment Index	0.197**
Income Level	0.061**
Amount of Political Discussion at home when 16 years old	0.137**
Age of Respondent	0.036**



Pseudo R-squared: 0.09

number of observations:
1608

**Significant at the 1% level or lower;


*Significant at the 5% level

Table 4 shows these predicted probabilities of local and national interest for each value of commitment. Because the probabilities of being interested in politics decline in every religious commitment category except for very committed, these data add further support for Hypothesis 1. When individuals are deeply immersed in their religious organizations, they have a greater probability of being interested in politics.

Figure 1**Figure 2**

The changes are visually represented in Figures 1 and 2 as the very interested probabilities increase as commitment increases. The predicted probabilities of Table 4 also help support the claims of Hypothesis 2—that religious commitment has a stronger impact on local political interest. The change in the probability of being very interested is much more dramatic in local politics than in national politics. When the very committed probabilities of local and national interest are juxtaposed in Figure 3, the differing impact of commitment becomes apparent.

Figure 3



There is only a 0.076 change in probability of being very interested in national politics between a very religiously committed and non-committed respondent, while the change in probability in terms of interest in local politics is 0.1898. The differences between the local and national interest probabilities allows the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 2 to be rejected in favor of the hypothesis that the magnitude of religious commitment's impact on being very interested is greater in local politics than in national politics. The gap between religiously committed and non-committed individuals is much greater at the local level. Becoming involved in religious organizations increases people's likelihood of being interested in the affairs and politics of their communities. According to these data, religious commitment not only increases political interest, but its influence is stronger in local politics.

That the impact of religion on political interest varies between levels of government is exciting because religion's impact on local political behaviors has received little scholarly attention. Although the structure of this study cannot calculate the exact statistical significance of the difference between the impact religious commitment has on

local and national political interest, it does offer strong support that religion has a stronger influence on local political behaviors. While this study indicates that religious commitment stimulates political interest, further research of the impact of religion on other political behaviors at both the national and local levels should be conducted. Insight into the relationship between religion and local political behaviors will not only increase our understanding of political behavior but could also significantly alter how religion is used as an explanatory variable in the study of political behavior.

CONCLUSION

Although the political effects of different religions' doctrinal foundations are difficult to measure, the social and organizational aspects of religious groups contain several political implications. In addition to being sources of doctrine and places of worship, churches are locally organized social bodies. Compared to many other social organizations, churches open their doors to a wider range of socioeconomic backgrounds. Both the CEO and the high school drop out are invited to participate fully in church activities. While the CEO has access to many other resources, the skills gained from church activity have high rewards for the high school drop out. The egalitarian and social nature of religious organizations makes churches a key potential source of political socialization, especially in local politics.

The results of this study reveal how involvement in religious organizations impacts members' probability of being interested in politics. The social and local organizations of churches provide members with greater political skills, more chances for political discussions, and increased exposure to community affairs. Therefore, when people are deeply involved in their religions, there is an increased probability they will be interested in politics. Religious commitment also has the additional influence of increasing interest in local politics, more so than in national politics. Because members within a church often share a common local identity, interpersonal interactions occurring from religious involvement tend to increase political interest, especially in local matters.

Religion is often passed over in studies of national political behaviors and events because its pluralistic and fragmented nature makes it hard to measure consistently. The results of this study imply that perhaps religion is less important as a national explanatory tool because it is fundamentally a local organization. There is a need for further analysis of the local dimension of religion in political behaviors and events. It may be that the true explanatory power of religion lies on the local rather than the national level.

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APPENDIX A

EXACT SURVEY QUESTION WORDING

POLITICAL INTEREST

1.1 locint

Thinking about your local community, how interested are you in local community politics and local community affairs?

1. Not Interested
2. Slightly Interested
3. Somewhat Interested
4. Very Interested

1.2 natint

How interested are you in national politics and national affairs?

1. Not Interested
2. Slightly Interested
3. Somewhat Interested
4. Very Interested

RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT INDEX

2.1 rlimp

How important is religion in your life?

1. Not at all important
2. Somewhat important
3. Very important

2.2 rlattend

Now I would like to ask you a few questions about your religious activity. How often do you attend religious services?

1. Never
2. Less than once a year
3. About twice a year
4. Several times a year
5. About once a month
6. 2-3 times a month
7. Nearly every week
8. Every week
9. More than once a week

2.3 cs1yr

Aside from attending services, in the past twelve months have you been an active member of your (church/synagogue) – I mean, have you served on a committee, given time for special projects, or helped organize meetings?

1. No
2. Yes

2.4 csoff5

In the past five years, have you served on a board or held an official position in your (church/synagogue)?

1. No
2. Yes

CONTROL VARIABLES

3.1 owninc

In which of these groups did your own total earnings from your occupation fall last year—1989—before taxes, that is. Just tell me the letter.

1. UNDER \$1,000
2. \$1,000-2,499
3. \$2,500-4,999
4. \$5,000-9,999
5. \$10,000-14,999
6. \$15,000 -19,999
7. \$20,000-24,999
8. \$25,000-29,999
9. \$30,000-34,999
10. \$35,000-39,999
11. \$40,000-49,999
12. \$50,000-59,999
13. \$60,000-74,999
14. \$75,000-99,999
15. \$100,000-124,999
17. \$125,000-149,999
18. \$150,000-199,999
19. \$200,000 AND OVER

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3.2 edgrade

What is the highest grade of regular school that you have completed and gotten credit for?
If necessary say: By regular school we mean a school which can be counted toward an elementary or high school diploma or a college or university degree.

0. 0 YEARS
1. 1ST GRADE
2. 2ND GRADE
3. 3RD GRADE
4. 4TH GRADE
5. 5TH GRADE
6. 6TH GRADE
7. 7TH GRADE
8. 8TH GRADE
9. 9TH GRADE
10. 10TH GRADE
11. 11TH GRADE
12. 12TH GRADE
13. 1ST YEAR OF COLLEGE
14. 2ND YEAR OF COLLEGE
15. 3RD YEAR OF COLLEGE
16. 4TH YEAR OF COLLEGE
17. 5TH/HIGHER YEAR COLL
18. HIGHER
19. HIGHER

3.3. age

Value converted from the variable:

yearborn

In what year were you born?

3.4. dischome

At the time you were sixteen years old, how frequent were political discussions at home?
Were they frequent, did they happen sometimes, or almost never?

1. Almost never
2. Sometimes
3. Frequently

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Table 4 – Predicted Values of Political Interest for Changing Values of Religiosity

	Not Interested natint=1	Not Interested locint=1	Slightly Interested natint=2	Slightly Interested locint=2	Somewhat Interested natint=3	Somewhat interested locint=3	Very Interested natint=4	Very Interested locint=4
0 (lowest)	0.0431	0.0852	0.1674	0.2533	0.4506	0.4549	0.3388	0.2065
1	0.0399	0.0711	0.1575	0.2248	0.4454	0.4634	0.3572	0.2407
2	0.0369	0.0591	0.148	0.1975	0.4391	0.4649	0.376	0.2785
3	0.0341	0.0491	0.1388	0.1718	0.4318	0.4594	0.3953	0.3197
4 (highest)	0.0316	0.0407	0.1301	0.1482	0.4235	0.4472	0.4148	0.3963

THE EMERGENCE OF WOMEN'S SOCIAL MOVEMENTS UNDER AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: STUDIES OF BRAZIL, ARGENTINA, AND CHILE

ANNE SIDWELL, ERIC HAFEN, AND LAURIE EVANS

INTRODUCTION

In the 1960 and 1970s, several Latin American countries experienced dramatic political shifts from democracy to a type of military-dictatorship often called bureaucratic-authoritarianism. These authoritarian regimes instituted a counter-revolution that aimed to stabilize their volatile economies and redirect their nations away from the emerging and popularizing trend towards Marxist or socialist policies. Despite the regimes' extensive success in suppressing political and social movements, women's movements became surprisingly strong during the authoritarian governments of the 1970s and 80s. In this paper, we will demonstrate how new political opportunities, the ability to mobilize within their communities, and the shared identity of mothers enabled women to emerge as a true social movement under conditions that inhibited most other forms of political activity. To convey our explanation to this political puzzle, we will first describe why the emergence of these women's movements was truly surprising given the political conditions. Second, we will explain how three existing explanations, which initially appear unlinked with each other, together fit within the broader context of social movement theory. Finally, we will test our theory through case studies of Argentina, Chile, and Brazil.

This paper makes at least two contributions to the literature on Latin American women's movements and social movements as a whole. First, it takes the existing and seemingly disjointed literature on the appearance of women's movements under authoritarian regimes and applies social movement theory to case studies for a more complete explanation. Second, this paper employs the techniques of McAdam et. al. to create a synthesis between the three branches of social movement theory to create an even more comprehensive explanation to the puzzle of women's movements under authoritarian regimes.

PRESENTATION OF THE PUZZLE

The authoritarian regimes that emerged in many Latin American countries during the 1960s and 1970s have been widely studied and greatly criticized for their use of force and coercion. Guillermo O'Donnell, one of the most frequently cited researchers of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in Latin America, proposed that the authoritarian regimes had two main goals: first, they sought economic normalization through liberalization reforms, and second, they hoped to restore order to their discontented populace (1988,

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88-89). O'Donnell also claimed that the success of a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime was rooted in its ability to exclude and deactivate the popular sector (1973, 100). To accomplish this purpose, regimes often exercised extreme practices of coercion and suppression of various political and social organizations.

The Argentine bureaucratic-authoritarian regime led by General Jorge Rafael Videla that overthrew the 1976 government serves as a prime example of the regime-type that O'Donnell discussed. Videla implemented tactics like shutting down Congress, dismissing opposing politicians from leadership positions, completely eliminating the General Confederation of Labor, and even taking over sports and charitable organizations (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 99). Similar repressive tactics were used by the various military dictators in Brazil between 1964 and 1985, as well as under the Pinochet regime in Chile beginning in 1973. These authoritarian regimes succeeded in silencing dissent by limiting social activism and political organizations. However, women's movements surprisingly thrived despite the suppressive tactics of the authoritarian regimes.

Chile, Argentina, and Brazil provide examples of successful women's movements under authoritarian regimes. In Argentina, due to its initial economic success, the authoritarian regime gained legitimacy and power that enabled it to stifle unions, leftist movements, and all other groups it felt were contrary to its cause (Anderson 1984, 155-157). However, one group emerged during the initial success of the government—Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo. Determined and fearless, these mothers met every Thursday in front of the Presidential Palace in Buenos Aires and protested the actions of the military regime. These women were the first to publicly oppose the regime. Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo showed Argentines, as well as the world, the atrocities committed by the military regime. They received national and international attention as they mourned for their lost descendents. The human rights movement that women started eventually forced the military to submit to elections and made military leaders accountable for their inhumane actions (Green 1991, 149-150).

In Chile, the role of women has evolved as different leaders have taken varying stances on the role that women should play. As early as the 1950s, political parties and leaders encouraged mothers' centers, but the first displays of political involvement occurred in 1971 when Chilean women banged pots and pans to symbolize their unhappiness with Allende's economic policies. These same women were the first to protest against Pinochet despite his efforts to employ traditional women's roles in order to discourage women's political involvement. Specifically, women became involved with the Days of Protest in 1983. In spite of Pinochet's brutal response, each month from May through September women held demonstrations, which manifested their maternal and community roles in Chilean society (Noonan 1995, 100). Since the women's groups that fought against Pinochet were more united than other political groups, their demonstrations were influential in overthrowing this authoritarian regime when no one else could (Safa 1990, 364).

Brazil also saw the appearance of women's movements and organizations under military authoritarianism. Women's community organizations took a political stance against such domestic issues as the rising cost of living, day care, infrastructure necessities, and other issues that directly penetrated women's typical role in Brazilian society. While

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initially acting only on the local level, women's organizations eventually gained power on the national level and even became one of the driving forces of opposition to the authoritarian regime (Alvarez 1991). The 1975 celebration of International Women's Day, one of the first public gatherings that Brazil experienced since the military take-over, is an example of the surprising levels of mobilization that women's movements had under Brazilian dictators. During this demonstration, thousands of women took to the streets to denounce the authoritarian regime and speak out about women's issues (Alvarez 1991, 79). Brazilian women's successful protesting greatly contrasts with the failed attempts at mobilizing that groups like labor unions experienced under the same political environment. For example, the populist labor movements that President João Goulart had supported were completely deactivated by the new authoritarian regime, and even in 1968 when they began to reorganize, these labor movements did not have nearly the success that the women's movements experienced at the same time (de Almeida and Lowy 1976).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Considering the history of women's social movements in Latin America, one may question how women were able to mobilize under authoritarian regimes. Scholars like Alvarez (1990, 1991), Kaplan (2004), Malin (1994), and Noonan (1995) have offered three distinct explanations for this puzzle. The first emphasizes the political space that authoritarian regimes inadvertently created for women's movements. The second theory focuses on the important role the community based women's organizations played in initiating mobilization for women. The final theory stresses that the women's movements under these authoritarian regimes differed from other forms of organization because they used their maternal instinct as a platform for mobilization.

While each of the above mentioned theories addresses an important component of the puzzle, we believe that they lack both a strong theoretical basis and consensus. To establish a united theory, each of the above mentioned explanations must be analyzed under the broader context of classical social movement theory. It is their lack of connection to social movement theory that causes the disunity between these existing explanations.

While social movement theory itself has also been fragmented in the past, in their recent analysis of this theory, McAdam et. al. established a synthesis between the three main approaches—structuralist, rational choice, and cultural (1997). Specifically, they apply their synthesized theory to the US civil rights movement and show that the weakening of elite alliances with the simultaneous growth of community-level and national black organizations and changing cultural views on race led to the rise of the civil rights movement. In their explanation of this social movement, they emphasize the importance of creating an "intersection of the three broad sets of factors [structure, rational choice, and culture...and showing] how the effects were mutually reinforced at each stage of the civil rights cycle" (McAdam et. al. 1997, 163).

While this technique described by McAdam et. al. has become widely accepted as a more complete approach to explaining social movements, it has never been applied to Latin American women's movements that emerged under authoritarian regimes. We will

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show that each of the above explanations fits within one of the three approaches to social movement theory. Additionally, we will use the current scholarship on social movement theory to establish connections between the three existing theories to develop a stronger and more comprehensive theory on the emergence of women's movements under Latin American dictatorships.

Structuralist Approach

The structuralist approach to social movement theory emphasizes the necessary conditions within society that either allow or prevent the emergence of social movements. Often associated with a class-based analysis, structuralism looks at political institutions and how well those institutions represent the various segments of society. Structuralists predict that when there is a large body of discontents, social movements will likely arise.

Furthermore, the structural approach claims that the concept of political opportunity is a key determinant of the emergence of a social movement. According to this idea of political opportunity, "movements [...] are set in motion by changes in institutional rules, political alignments, or alliance structures that grant even more leverage to aggravated groups with which to press their claims" (McAdam et. al. 1997, 153). In other words, it is the institutions of a political regime that determine a social movement's success. Those institutions either promote or inhibit the opportunities for people to unite under their cause.

A clearly structuralist approach to understanding the emergence of women's movements under the authoritarian regimes in Latin America analyzes the political space that women found under those regimes that was not present under previous regimes. In contrast with most other political organizations and movements that were repressed by the new authoritarian institutions, women's movements found a unique space under which they could unite. The regime created this space for women by pushing the leftist organizations out of the political spectrum. Leftist movements typically look down on women's organizations because the left seeks a unified working class with no divisions or distinctions between the members (Alvarez 1990, 70). Once the authoritarian regime successfully disenfranchised the left, women could organize purely as women and use the political space created to advance their own unique agendas. Thus, in their pursuit of reducing political opportunity for the left, the authoritarian regimes unknowingly increased political opportunity for women's movements.

Additionally, women's movements responded better to the new authoritarian regimes than did other forms of political organization because women's movements were inherently less political. The rules of the authoritarian regimes were established to suppress organizations that had strong political agendas. Thus, those countries under authoritarian regimes saw a decrease in labor union power, fewer political parties, and fewer otherwise politically active bodies (de Almeida and Lowy 1976, 103). However, because women's movements promoted less political agendas such as better health, education, and justice for their lost family members, the authoritarian regimes did not see them as dangerous and actually created more space for women to unite (Waylan 1994). Under previous regimes, like that of Brazil's populist president João Goulart, politically active movements like the labor movement took precedence over women's movements.

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Once those political organizations were demobilized, women's organizations became some of the only groups that could thrive under authoritarian regimes.

In summary, by analyzing the structural conditions under which women's movements emerged in Latin America, it is clear how these women's movements fit into the broader context of social movement theory. The rules and institutions of authoritarian regimes created the political opportunity for women by suppressing the left and other types of organizations that were inherently more political. Women's movements found opportunities to organize under the structure of authoritarian regimes while most other groups lost political opportunity.

Rational Choice Approach

From a rational choice perspective, mobilization under authoritarian regimes is difficult and rare. The rational choice theory requires incentives to outweigh costs in order for the rational person to mobilize. Under authoritarian regimes, mobilizing has tremendous costs; often people risk their lives or social status in order to mobilize. Furthermore, even if people consider the benefits to outweigh the costs, their participation may not have a significant effect on the outcome, so they are persuaded to let everyone else take the risks. This action is commonly known as free-riding, which is central to the collective action problem under rational choice theory (Olson 1965).

Latin American women, however, mobilized effectively because they organized on the community level. This community based approach helped women mobilize in two different ways. First, they reduced the cost of mobilization because the authoritarian regimes focused their repression on large, privately created movements. Furthermore, women reduced collective action problems because some governments had already shown support for them by establishing community-based organizations. The governments felt much more comfortable with these smaller groups (Noonan 1995, 93). Latin American authoritarian regimes avoided collective action problems by concentrating on labor unions and opposing national parties. These community organizations avoided many of the mobilization costs that larger movements faced.

The second way women's community-based approach helped women mobilize effectively was by eliminating free riders. Free-riding occurs when a person decides not to contribute because his or her contribution is small enough that failure to contribute would go unnoticed and would not affect the outcome. Even if potential participants believe in the cause, they do not act because the utility is so small. Women's strong communities reduced free-riding because they were small enough to notice lack of participation, and leaders could monitor and sanction non-participants. Because these women's groups were community-based, every contribution was noticed and important.

In summary, women successfully overcame the collective action problem because their movements were community-based. At this less observable level, women's groups faced less oppression from the government, and they were more capable of dealing with free riders because of the small size of their community organizations.

Cultural Approach

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Culturists understand the value of national tradition and the gravity of social norms in society (McAdam et. al. 1997, 156). The cultural factors of social movements detail the difficulty of mobilization by explaining the influence that cultural norms have on the creation of a movement. Social movement theory explains that for a movement to attract a large and powerful support base, that movement must appeal to societal norms, create a cultural frame under which participants mobilize, and unite participants under a common sense of identity and meaning.

Latin American gender roles serve as a foundation for many norms. These gender roles have traditionally been strictly defined with the common ideologies and beliefs of *marianismo* and *machismo*. In Latin America, women have been idealized through the concept of *marianismo* for living a higher moral standard (Noonan 1995, 98). Authoritarian leaders used *marianismo* to emphasize the true role of the woman as domestic, self-sacrificing, and humble. The strong identity of femininity and the respect granted to a woman through *marianismo* gave Latin American women a specific role through which she contributed to society. While *marianismo* emphasized the submissive, caring nature of a woman, *machismo* depicted the man as strong and the representative leader of the family. Ironically however, *machismo* created the frame for women to act because men were naturally seen as aggressors, but no one expected the meek woman to use her traditional maternal role as a source of power. These ideational concepts, in conjunction with a strong cultural standard of a mother, caused women to act based on their maternal nature. When authoritarian governments promoted traditional roles, they simultaneously created a maternal collective action frame (Noonan 1995, 91).

The prevailing norm of a mother as caretaker of her family also influenced social movements in Latin America. Women took care of their families, their finances, and their communities. They dealt with the loss of children and husbands, social well-being and health issues, and economic policies that directly impacted the way that their families functioned. Thus, when women saw the authoritarian regimes harming their families and communities, they felt it was imperative to respond. Social movements inherently face the obstacle of framing their issue so that people feel compelled to support it. However, Latin American women overcame this obstacle by framing their issues around their essential role as mothers and caretakers, thus creating the cultural frame that legitimized their action.

Latin American women shared a strong identity as well as a strong sense of meaning. This combination resulted in a successful social movement because "social movements were both carriers of meanings and makers of meaning" (McAdam et. al. 1997, 149). Mothers carried their meaning in naming the government as the source of their affliction. Latin American women created a meaning in explicitly defining their grievances and acting to reconcile the injustice as they mobilized collectively as mothers. Along with a collective meaning, the powerful identity of Latin American women also came from their incredible will. The core of their society was eroding. The culturist theory contends that the participators can *will* their cause into action (McAdam et. al. 1997, 154). A deeply rooted maternal will catalyzed social movements against authoritarian regimes.

Synthesis

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Structural, rational choice, cultural theories each explain one necessary element of the puzzle. However, each of these theories lacks full predictive power because none explains all of the necessary conditions together under one theory. Specifically, the structural approach to understanding why women's movements emerged under repressive regimes focuses on the impact of rules and institutions. However, it does not account for what initially causes people to unite, such as a sense of collective identity and a shared sense of meaning. It also fails to show how people overcome the collective action problem in order to unite for their cause. Similarly, rational choice and cultural theory explain some necessary aspects of the puzzle, but individually do not provide a sufficient explanation. Thus, separately these theories do not fully explain the emergence of women's movements; however, collectively they reveal the full picture of the conditions that enabled women to gain influence under authoritarian regimes and emerge as a true social movement.

Our theory, therefore, is based on the confluence of the structural, rational choice, and cultural components of traditional social movement theory. It first explains how each of these three factors individually reveal certain necessary conditions for the emergence of a women's movement—finding political space and opportunity, overcoming the collective action problem, and framing the issues so as to appeal to a broad support base. However, our theory goes beyond analyzing the three components of social movement theory separately and shows that these components interacted and reinforced each other to create an environment conducive for women's movements to appear.

From this theory we derive several hypotheses that we will test in our cases studies of Argentina, Chile, and Brazil. First, we expect to see that by deactivating many of the formerly politically active organizations and seeing women as less political, the authoritarian regimes will inadvertently create space for women to emerge on the political scene. Additionally, we hypothesize that organizational structures at the community level will facilitate mobilization of women's movements. Also, we predict that where we see a strong cultural basis of the traditional female role, we will also see women's movements materialize. Last, we expect to find that the aforementioned hypotheses will reinforce each other and together more fully explain the necessary conditions for the emergence of women's movements in Latin America.

CASE STUDIES IN ARGENTINA, CHILE, AND BRAZIL

Argentina

In 1976 General Videla and his military overtook the Argentine government. Military coups in the past had not lasted long in Argentina, so General Videla was determined to set up a powerful authoritarian government that could eradicate any kind of resistance. The military had authority to arrest anyone who posed a threat to the regime; the result was a powerful united authoritarian government that abducted thousands of citizens who tried to challenge the regimes authority (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 98-100). However in 1977, fourteen mothers united and became the first movement to publicly oppose this ruthless regime; these brave mothers were known as Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Kaplan 2004

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104). *A combination of cultural, structural, and rational choice approaches explains the success of these mothers against the authoritarian regime. These mothers succeeded because of a strong organizational base (rational choice), lack of regulations against women's organizations (structural), and legitimacy through their assigned roles as mothers (cultural).*

A rational choice theory explains why a less powerful group of women mobilized when other groups could not. The authoritarian regime in Argentina successfully eliminated the General Confederation of Labor, terrorist groups, and supporters of the Peronist parties (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 100), yet the regime failed to stop a community based group of women. Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo reduced collective action problems by forming on a community level. The authoritarian regime focused their assaults on larger groups that appeared more dangerous and easier to find. By forming on the community level, Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo could meet secretly in churches and avoid harassment from the government (Kaplan 2004 111). Mothers also eliminated free-riding because the organization was so small (it began with only fourteen mothers), and even as they grew, each mother felt responsible to represent their own lost loved ones. The responsibility to represent one's child provided a selective incentive for each mother, and the weight of this incentive, while difficult to measure, does further explain mothers' benefits.

While this theory explains advantages the community-based organization had, it fails as a complete rational choice theory. A rational choice theory demands that the benefits exceed costs, yet the overall benefits are marginal compared to the costs. Many women were abducted, killed, and harassed by the authoritarian regime (Kaplan 2004 110). Their weekly marches around La Plaza initially caused more sorrow than publicity, and the government stayed in power through years of protesting. Furthermore, their main objective was to demonstrate for their children— something that never happened (Malin 1994, 189). Therefore, while rational choice theory shows that mothers had an advantage by forming at the community level, it does not explain why these women sacrificed so much when personal benefits were so small. Structural and cultural approaches help us understand the rest of this puzzle.

General Videla created a structural opportunity for women in Argentina. Videla enjoyed support from the middle class and proclaimed to stand for high morals; their slogan stated "morality, uprightness, and efficiency." They justified suppression of leftist movements by claiming to align with the "Western and Christian world" (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 98); this repression created political space for women to oppose the regime. Women used the same political ideology (morality and uprightness) that the regime used to suppress the opposition in order to support women's protests. These mothers proclaimed only to be fulfilling their roles as mothers. This declaration created a political gap for women because the government felt pressured to support, or at least not suppress, the moral and Christian virtues they set. Furthermore, women widened this political gap by not allowing men to protest with them. Argentine men did not believe women could make a political difference, so the government gave them more political space than men to protest (Malin 1994, 203). This structural gap gave women the opportunity to emerge when others could not.

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However, this theory becomes much stronger when we combine it with the cultural norms established in Argentina. This structural theory assumes Western and Latin American norms. Norms are not naturally associated with a structural theory but instead with a cultural theory. Mothers in Argentina have a cultural obligation to care for their families; Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo used this cultural norm for motivation and legitimacy in their quest to oppose the authoritarian regime. The Catholic Church greatly influenced Argentina's culture; the church taught women to love their children and to be responsible for their families. When an estimated thirty-thousand people disappeared, many mothers shared a deep loss and a cultural obligation to stand up for their children. This theory best explains women's motivation to mobilize. The strong connection that existed between mothers and children in Argentina persuaded them to act selflessly and defend all children in the face of strong opposition (Malin 1994, 189). Women also used their culturally assigned roles as mothers to legitimize themselves as victims and not as political radicals (Green 1991, 149). They took extreme precautions to obey cultural norms and avoid any association with politics (Kaplan 2004 115). They used symbols like pictures and the Catholic cross to remind everyone they only wanted to know what happened to their children, and fulfill their cultural rights as mothers (Kaplan 2004 116). While cultural theory is strengthened by rational choice and structural explanations, the cultural lens is the strongest because it explains women's legitimacy, motivation, and protection.

In sum, we conclude that rational choice helps us understand why community groups gave women an organizational advantage over larger organizations. Structural theory explains a political opportunity that women seized, and cultural theory explains the motivation and legitimacy behind Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo. While rational choice is not strong enough to stand on its own, it does give insights to advantages women had over larger organizations. Structural and cultural theories show that each one cannot stand on its own; however, they support each other and become stronger by coming together. All of this strengthens our theory that three lenses (rational choice, structural, and cultural) explain much more than one lens, and by connecting them, we can deepen our understanding of women's success against the authoritarian regimes of Latin America.

Chile

When General Pinochet overthrew Allende's government in 1973, he suppressed activists who had previously been effective under Allende. However, Pinochet could not suppress the women's movement, which actually gained strength under his regime. The Chilean women's social movement came into being based on three combined factors: pre-established organizations, political opportunity, and cultural conditions.

Chilean women had previously established organizations that created an arena in which they could meet and plan, exemplifying the rational choice lens of social movement theory. As leaders varied, different women's organizations developed in Chile. As early as the 1950s, political parties like the Christian Democrats had expanded mothers groups. In 1954, women established a private organization designed to help the poor called *Ropero del Pueblo* (Noonan 1995, 93). Since women were mainly responsible for voting in

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Alessandri in 1958, when Eduardo Frei came to power in 1964, he began a program designed to put down women's movements (Noonan 1995, 93). *Promocion Popular*, Frei's program, created mothers centers, art clubs, and local councils. These local councils promoted the image of a woman as motherly, willing to sacrifice, apolitical, and very patriotic (Noonan 1995, 93). By 1968, over 400,000 women were involved in 8,500 mother's centers (Noonan 1995, 93). Despite Frei's objective, these various examples of mother centers created a forum where women could discuss their complaints and ideas.

As a precursor to the women's movement against Pinochet, women created even more organizations under Allende. One of the first strong displays of political involvement occurred in 1971 when Chilean women banged pots and pans to symbolize their unhappiness with the economic policies of Allende. Many women felt disgusted by the path to communism and soon after this event formed *El Poder Femenino* (Noonan 1995, 95). Women then united to participate in activities such as throwing chicken feed at soldiers, placing nails on highways, and making stink bombs for shops that refused to strike.

Since these women had previously established organizations, they became some of the first to counter the Pinochet regime, and they actively participated in the Days of Protest (Noonan 1995, 95). At the same time, they benefited from the organization of the Catholic Church. The making of *arpilleras* exemplifies the utility of the Church's role in their protest (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 134). Without these organizations already in place, the social movement would have been difficult to initiate. By uniting and organizing in already established institutions, women overcame the collective action problem, which exemplifies the rational choice aspect of social movement theory.

The rational choice explanation of foundational organizations from preexisting institutions did not catalyze the women's protest in Chile alone. Another large factor was the availability of political opportunity. When the Pinochet regime came into power, it directed its oppressive tactics toward one main group-- organized labor (Remmer 1980, 282). Specifically, the authoritarian regime began to pass legislation directly to oppress the working class. Decree Laws number 32 and 930 declared that an employer could dismiss a worker on the grounds of leadership or organizing strikes (Remmer 1980, 287). With organized labor under siege, women had more access to the limited political space. This occurrence underscores the idea of social movement theory, which claims that when social classes are unable to act, it creates political opportunity. In this case, it created space for women. The erosion of the left, due to Pinochet's intolerance for dissent, opened political space for women's activity to emerge (Noonan 1995, 101). Previously, leftist regimes had wanted a homogenous bourgeois and not a divisive women's movement, but women's movements did not violate the ideology of Pinochet's authoritarianism (Noonan 1995, 90). Thus, with the left contained and an ideological difference, women had more space to act.

Although structure and rational choice explain part of the movement's beginnings, culture plays an integral role in explaining mobilization. Authoritarianism victimized men and made women invisible. The political invisibility of women, due to the cultural condition of *machismo*, allowed women to come to the forefront as political activists. Within three weeks of Pinochet's coup women formed the Association of Democratic Women in order to help those who Pinochet had already imprisoned (Noonan 1995, 96).

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Since men were the focus of Pinochet's military, women had the capability to perform the necessary measures of this group covertly. Later, in 1974, this same group of women formed The Chilean Association of the Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared (Noonan 1995, 96). The circumstances allowed women to create groups that men could not because of the military's reluctance to address women. These women's groups emerged because Chilean culture emphasized the actions of men as important and did not perceive women as a threat.

Leaders made decisions based on the cultural norms of Chile. Culturally, women had a passive, meek, and apolitical image. Both Pinochet and the female activists based their actions on the same arguments: the mother and family serve as foundations to Chilean society. Pinochet defined the family as the "core" of Chilean society in his socioeconomic reforms for 1981-1989 (Noonan 1995, 97). Although, both parties fully agreed on the foundation of the family and even used the same discourse, they employed similar arguments to achieve different ends. Pinochet used his promotion of the traditional role to silence women, but at the same time women promoted their traditional role to legitimize their voice. Women who sacrificed for their families had been a traditional Chilean ideology that had been promoted for quite sometime, but unknowingly, in the case of Pinochet, women adapted his encouragement of the traditional Chilean mother's role to best fit their cause.

Pinochet had little in common with Allende, but both leaders implemented and supported women's groups because of the strong cultural role of motherhood in Chile. However, their purpose in promoting these groups was to keep women apolitical. Allende founded the National Secretariat for Women, and Pinochet's wife ran the program during her husband's regime (Noonan 1995, 98). The bonds of motherhood played such a strong role in Chilean society that these leaders felt obligated to support women in their traditional role.

Cultural norms and the willingness of the people to abide by them played a large role in mobilization of women in Chile. Here, cultural theory served as a necessary precondition that was realized by the existence of both structural and rational choice conditions. Each component of social movement theory explains part of the necessary conditions that assisted Chilean women in their social movement. Collectively, the three lenses provide a more complete explanation of how women mobilized to become a true social movement.

Brazil

In 1964, Brazil experienced a counter-revolution as the populist presidency of João Goulart was overthrown by a military coup that instigated a bureaucratic-authoritarian government that remained in power until the mid-1980s. Under this authoritarian regime Brazil saw the suppression of student movements and labor unions and the elimination of elections and leftist political parties. However, like both Argentina and Chile, Brazil also saw the surprising emergence of women's movements under the repressive tactics of the authoritarian regimes. Women's movements in Brazil emerged due to a connection between cultural, structural, and rational choice conditions that promote social movement

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formation.

One unique feature of the Brazilian military take-over that influenced women's ability to gain legitimacy was the new authoritarian regime's use of the traditional image of a woman as a symbol of its conservative ideology. The military used the notion of "Family, God, and Order" to arouse support for their takeover in 1964 (Alvarez 1990, 8). Under this motto, the leaders of the new regime appealed to traditional views of women's societal roles and encouraged women to participate in its effort to gain power and mobilize support.

However, the authoritarian regime's initial support of women's involvement in political movements would eventually backfire on them. Under their "Family, God, and Order" movement, the regime inadvertently strengthened the common sense of identity and meaning of women as the protectors of basic human rights and promoters of improved standard of living for their families. Therefore, when the poorest segment of Brazilian society saw a decrease in standard of living during the 1970s, women within this segment of society felt that the authoritarian regime was now preventing them from fulfilling their basic role, and they began to organize under this common sense of identity (Alves 1985, 149). Thus, the authoritarian regime created the cultural frame between women that eventually prompted them to organize against the regime.

However, this sense of cultural unity between women does not fully explain how women's movements became as significant as they did under the Brazilian authoritarian regimes. Women were also better able to organize because the regime's suppression of large political organizations moved political activity to the community level. Thus, already united with the common purpose of improving their families' standard of living, Brazilian women were better able to mobilize as their communities became the arena for organization. In the 1960s and 1970s working-class women increasingly began to join community-based organizations like community health groups, neighborhood soup kitchens, and other associations aimed at improving living conditions for the members of the lowest segment of society (Alvarez 1990, 38). Especially strong in the "industrial triangle" of Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, and São Paulo, the community groups based their issues on local concerns such as the improvement of schools, day-care, sewage systems, and transportation. Because women felt that these local issues were their primary concern, the majority of the members of these groups were women (Caldeira 1987, 77). Thus, the collective action problem for women's organization was reduced because the community-based groups were more women-oriented, organized into smaller, more manageable groups, and the authoritarian regimes had less control over them.

While the above explanation of how community-based organizations facilitated mobilization clearly fits under the rational choice component of our theory, there is a cultural connection that further explains why women successfully organized at the community level. Women initially felt the need to organize because of the sense of meaning that they shared as protectors of their families' standard of living. When the authoritarian regimes pushed organization to the community, women were better able to take advantage of this new framework of organization than men because of the common identity they shared as protectors of their families' basic needs. By working together to promote their basic needs, their common sense of identity was reinforced as they mobilized within the community-based groups (Alvarez 1990, 39). Clearly the rational choice and

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cultural explanation for the emergence of women's movements in Brazil reinforce each other.

A structuralist explanation for the strength of the women's movement in Brazil is first seen by noting how the Brazilian authoritarian regime's suppression of the left opened the door for women's movements to act in the political scene. One of the regimes clearest actions of suppression against the left was the creation of the Institutional Act No. 5 (AI-5) in 1968. This act gave the president the power to shut-down congress and control opposition through any necessary means. In doing so, leftist parties like the Brazilian Workers Party were completely disenfranchised as were all other forms of leftist organization (Alvarez 1990, 73). The elimination of leftist movements in the political mainstream opened the space for Brazilian women to promote women's issues that they could not promote under leftist regimes. As one Brazilian leftist guerilla member testified, "the reigning theory (of the left) was that men and women were the same" (Costa 1980, 248). Thus, when the left had power, women were discouraged from promoting their issues. However, once the left was eliminated, many of the women who were formerly leftist activists became leaders of the Brazilian women's movement (Alvarez 1990, 70). These women then took advantage of the political space created by the absence of the left to push their own agendas.

While the above structuralist approach explains how women brought their movement into the national sphere of influence, there is a key connection between structural and cultural theory that further explains how women obtained political opportunity. Because women were already given some sense of legitimacy under the "Family, God, and Order" theme of the authoritarian regime, they were able to use this cultural appeal when they began to mobilize on a more national level. The authoritarian regime had already created the political space and opportunity that women needed when the regime used the traditional identity of a woman as one of its symbols. Because the authoritarian regime had encouraged women to speak out against the former populist leader, it had already opened the door for women to use their maternal frame for protest. Thus, in this sense the political space already existed for women. When women emerged on the political scene to speak out against the authoritarian regime, that regime could not rightly deny the Brazilian women the space that they had already given them. Thus, we see how culture interacted with structure to further create the political opportunity that women needed to establish a true social movement.

Initial evidence of women succeeding in using their increased political opportunity is seen in the 1975 celebration of International Women's day, which was one of the first public demonstrations permitted by the authoritarian regime. This demonstration is often considered the spark that led to the creation of many other politically active women's groups. As another example, the Feminine Amnesty Movement, which began in the mid 1970s, was allowed to organize while similar male groups were unsuccessful in mobilizing (Alvarez 1990, 79). By 1978 several female-headed organizations had gained powerful political influence: the Mothers' Commission in Defense of Human Rights, the Movement for Christian Renovation, and the Cost of Living Movement (Alvarez 1990, 113).

The Cost of Living Movement (MCV), an example of the success of Brazilian women's organizations, was organized in August of 1977 and began with around seven

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hundred participants. By March of 1978, however, the MCV launched a nationwide campaign with tens of thousands of mostly female participants. These women gathered a petition of 1.25 million signatures that they gave to President Geisel as a way to speak out against the high costs of living that many Brazilians were experiencing. In 1979 the MCV continued in its demonstrations and organized five nationwide protests (Alvarez 1990, 99). The MCV serves as just one example of the amazing influence that the mobilized women had under the repressive authoritarian regimes that managed to prohibit nearly all other forms of political mobilization. Members of the MCV clearly began with the cultural connection as women whose responsibility it was to improve their families' standards of living. The movement began small and was initiated on a community level, but it eventually entered the national scene and was able to successfully present its agendas to the authoritarian government.

In summary, the success of the women's movement under the authoritarian regimes in Brazil is best explained by first, understanding the common sense of identity and framing process that the authoritarian regime initially promoted for women. Second, these now united women were able to overcome the collective action problem through the strength that the authoritarian regimes inadvertently gave to community-based organization. Finally, these community-based, female-dominated organizations were able to gain national influence because of the structural changes that the authoritarian dictatorship created that gave women the political space and opportunity necessary to instigate a full-scale social movement.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that examining these movements through a more comprehensive theoretical framework creates a stronger explanation of how women created a powerful movement under regimes that successfully inhibited most other political organizations. Without the analysis of women's movements through the lenses of social movement theory, one could not accurately apply the theories that explain women's movements beyond these isolated incidents. Because we have taken that step, our theory links women's movements in Latin America to social movements in general.

Although understanding the implications of each of the three lenses—structural, rational choice, and cultural—is vital to explain the mobilization of women's movements, we find that cultural theory explains the preconditions that catalyzed the unification of women as a social movement. Cultural theory also explains the shared sense of identity that the Latin American women had that initially motivated them to act as a unified body. Once unified under the cultural frame of motherhood, women were able to take advantage of the ease of mobilization at the community level and the political space that the authoritarian regimes created. Taken together, the lenses of social movement theory connect the three previously disunited explanations of these women's movements and explain that women were able to unite while no other group could because the regimes inadvertently created the necessary conditions for women to unite as a true social movement.

Although we have come to a more conclusive explanation of Latin American women's

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movements, some limitations to our theory exist. First, while social movement theory helps us understand the importance of each of its lenses in explaining the puzzle, our findings do not produce the synthesis that McAdam et. al. ambitiously claims. Furthermore, by choosing three case studies that all experienced significant women's movements during authoritarian regimes, we limit the external validity of our results. Further testing of this theory requires applying it in a country where a women's movement did not arise to verify the necessary conditions we established. Despite these limitations, because we have shown that these women's movements can be explained through social movement theory, we have contributed to social movement literature. We encourage future researchers to analyze other seemingly unique movements through this more comprehensive framework to show how they fit within the broader context of social movement theory.

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THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE:

THE ROLE OF CHRISTIAN NATURAL LAW IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE PAST AND PRESENT

BRENT TAYLOR

In 2002 the California based Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools was unconstitutional. The Court declared, “The Pledge, as currently codified, is an impermissible government endorsement of religion” (Newdow 2002, 20). The dramatic ruling, the ensuing debate, and the eventual reversal by the US Supreme Court brought one of America’s most divisive issues again to the political forefront: the separation of church and state. The court room is the primary battleground for this divisive debate, as opponents and proponents file suits and countersuits. The current judicial paradigm for this controversial topic is the 1947 *Everson v. Board of Education* case, where the Supreme Court declared, “The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state” (Everson 1947, 18). The ‘wall of separation’ paradigm has—since its popularization in 1947—become the dominant jurisprudential approach to church and state questions in the United States. This paper uses judicial evidence to argue that although the ‘wall of separation’ metaphor is the current judicial interpretation, this interpretation is a fairly recent creation—one which the Founding Fathers did not author and would not recognize.

The author acknowledges the burden of proof required to substantiate such a dramatic claim, because as Carl Sagan famously remarked, “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.” As such, this paper uses direct citations from multiple pre-*Everson* US and state Supreme Court cases to demonstrate that the American Founders created no clear ‘wall of separation,’ but rather that the Founders built a government and courts based on a legal system that this paper terms “Christian natural law.” Sir William Blackstone—arguably the thinker who most influenced the American Founders—was also the major proponent of the Christian natural law system. The influence of Blackstone and Christian natural law is clearly evident in pre-*Everson* American jurisprudence, but the Court’s ruling in *Everson* has dramatically changed the course of American church and state law by erecting a ‘wall of separation’ unintended by the Founders.

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NATURAL LAW

Thinkers from Plato and Aristotle to Aquinas and Locke have elucidated different principles of what is loosely called the natural law position. While their views of natural law vary greatly, they all agree on what is generally considered a fundamental principle of natural law: “the claim that there is a necessary connection between law and morality” (White & Patterson 1999, 4). Proponents of natural law also generally hold that these moral principles “are universal” (White & Patterson 1999, 4).

Early philosophers who proposed natural law arguments generally credited “reason” with the disclosure or discovery of natural law principles, rather than a Supreme Being or metaphysical force. For example, Cicero asserted, “True law is right reason in agreement with nature” (Bix 1985, 224). Classical Christian thinkers like Augustine, Aquinas, and Gratian, however, developed natural law theories that were deeply rooted in Christian theology. In *Decretum*, Gratian’s influential medieval work of jurisprudence, he asserts, “Natural law (*ius*) is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel by which each is commanded to do to another what he want done to himself and forbidden to do to another what he does not want done to himself” (Tierney 1997, 59). The scriptures from the Old and New Testaments (the Law and the Gospel, respectively) form the basis for Gratian’s natural law theory; in short, he bases his jurisprudence on the Biblical “Golden Rule” of doing good to one another.

Like Gratian, Aquinas also based his philosophy of natural law on Christian principles. Aquinas created a hierarchy of laws which are, listed in descending order of perfection and importance: eternal law, natural law, divine law, and human law. Eternal law is fully known only to God, but every other form of law, “is a kind of reflection and participation of the eternal law” (Steinberger 2000, 520). Aquinas blends Christianity and classical, rational thought by asserting that divine law is revealed by God to man, yet natural law is discovered by reason. Aquinas explains that the, “participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law” (Steinberger 2000, 512). In summary, natural laws are based upon God’s eternal laws, but they are discovered by human reason, and humans are expected in turn to use reason to create human laws based upon the natural laws.

The influence of this fusion of Classical and Christian thought upon Western culture can hardly be overestimated. This blending of reason and revealed Christianity introduced by the medieval canonists and later perfected by Locke and Blackstone would form the basis of English (and by extension, American) common law and jurisprudence.

Sir William Blackstone, an Eighteenth Century English jurist, built upon the foundation of previous natural law thinkers and advanced a system that this paper terms “Christian natural law.” Belief in a “Supreme Being,” who, “formed the universe,” and “established certain laws” (White & Patterson 1999, 27) is the foundation of Blackstone’s Christian natural law. Based upon this strong belief in a Supreme Being, Blackstone held that nothing in the universe or nature is “left to chance,” but that instead everything is “preformed in a wondrous involuntary manner, and guided by unerring rules laid down by the great Creator” (White & Patterson 1999, 28).

Blackstone built his legal theory upon this belief in a Supreme Creator by stating, “[the] will of [the] maker is called the law of nature,” and by identifying these natural laws as “the eternal immutable laws of good and evil (White & Patterson 1999, 28).” The

meaning and purpose of these natural laws are not readily apparent, however, and hence God “gave [man] also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of these laws” (White & Patterson 1999). Thus, man is able to discover the natural laws by reason, which is a gift from the Creator.

In addition to natural law, Blackstone gives great importance to divine law, which is not discovered by reason, but rather by “immediate and direct revelation” (White & Patterson 1999, 30). This divine law is “to be found only in the holy scriptures” (White & Patterson 1999, 30) and is given by God to guide men spiritually on earth.

Blackstone explains, “Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws” (White & Patterson 1999, 30). Thus, both direct revelation and human reason have a place in his Christian natural law theory. Humans are to use revealed divine law along with the reasoned understanding of natural law to create just human laws. These laws should be based upon the following general principles: “That [man] should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due” (White & Patterson 1999, 28-29). Importantly, Blackstone states that human laws should never “be suffered to contradict” either divine or natural law, because human laws “are only declaratory of, and act in subordination to, the former” (White & Patterson 1999, 30).

In Blackstone’s system, law is supreme. Law is not merely “counsel” or “persuasion,” but it is a, “matter of injunction . . . a command directed to us” (White & Patterson 1999, 32). The rule of law is to be respected and obeyed, particularly since human law derives from divine law. A far-sighted Blackstone also suggested the manner by which laws should be interpreted, “The fairest and rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable” (White & Patterson 1999, 34-35). Although Blackstone’s theory allows for legal interpretation, he warns against giving judges too much judicial discretion, “which would make every judge a legislator, and introduce the most infinite confusion” (White & Patterson 1999, 36). Not only would giving judges too much interpretive power create confusion, it might also “destroy all law, and leave the decision of every question entirely in the breast of the judge” (White & Patterson 1999, 36).

Blackstone summarizes his “golden-rule” Christian natural law system by explaining that it is the “excellent rule of gospel-morality, of ‘doing to others, as we would they should do unto ourselves’” (White & Patterson 1999, 36). His theory provides a foundation for law in the Christian religion and also a practical method for interpreting and making laws, by referring to the intentions of the legislators. His theory of Christian natural law differs from Greco-Roman natural law, in that Blackstone’s uses as a foundation the Christian religion and the Judeo-Christian Scriptures. This theory of Christian natural law was deeply influential on the American Founders.

The influence of Blackstone and of Christian natural law upon the American Founding Fathers was statistically quantified in an important study conducted by Dr. Donald Lutz from the University of Houston. In the most comprehensive study of its kind, Lutz reviewed 15,000 published political writings (speeches, articles, pamphlets, etc.) from the Founding Era of the American Republic (defined as 1760-1805) and then analyzed the cited sources for each statement in the writings. The purpose of the study was to document and quantify the relative influence of different European writers on

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American political thought by tracing how many statements printed during the founding era were based upon their writings. After ten years of research Lutz concluded his study with two unexpected results.

First, the study showed that the Bible was actually the most cited source by far in Founding Era political writings. Second, Blackstone was the second most cited individual thinker during the entire Founding Era, and he was by far the most cited thinker during the time the Constitution was actually being written, ratified, and implemented. Both of these findings give support to the assertion that the Christian natural law championed by Blackstone and others had significant influence upon the Founding Fathers and upon the foundations of American Jurisprudence.

Lutz's careful review of thousands of documents showed that the Bible alone accounted for an astounding 34 percent of citations from Founding Era writings (Lutz 1984, 192). Lutz characterized this finding as "somewhat surprising," (Lutz 1984, 192) and explained that it was important, "to note the prominence of biblical sources for American political thought, since [the Bible] was highly influential in our political tradition" (Lutz 1984, 192). Table 1 is a reproduction from Lutz's study showing the relative number of citations attributed to thinkers of various political categories. The table shows the absolute dominance of Biblical citations vis-à-vis citations from any other source or category.

Table 1 - Distribution of Citations by Decade

	1760s	1770s	1780s	1790s	1800-05	% of Total Number
Bible	24	44	34	29	38	34
Enlightenment	32	18	24	21	16	22
Whig	10	20	19	17	15	18
Common Law	12	4	9	14	20	11
Classical	8	11	10	11	2	9
Peers	6	2	3	6	5	4
Other	8	1	1	2	2	2
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: Lutz, Donald. "The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought." *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, No. 1. (Mar., 1984), 192, table 1.

Besides finding that the Bible was actually the most often cited source in Founding Era writings, Lutz also found Blackstone was the second most cited individual author overall, and the most cited author during the Constitutional Era. While thinkers such as Locke and Montesquieu were more often cited during the Revolutionary period, Blackstone is by far the most prominently cited thinker during the Constitutional period (1790-1805) when the actual details of the new Constitution, government, and courts were being worked out. Table 2 is a reproduction from Lutz's study and illustrates

Blackstone's dominance in this later period of the Founding Era, as indicated by the fact that he is cited more than twice as often as any other individual thinker during that period.

Table 2 - Most Cited Individual Thinker by Decade

	1760s	1770s	1780s	1790s	1800-05	% of Total Number
Montesquieu	8	7	14	4	1	8.3
Blackstone	1	3	7	11	15	7.9
Locke	11	7	1	1	1	2.9
Hume	1	1	1	6	5	2.7
Plutarch	1	3	1	2	0	1.5
Beccaria	0	1	3	0	0	1.5
Trenchard & Gordon	1	1	3	0	0	1.4
Delolme	0	0	3	1	0	1.4
Pufendorf	4	0	1	0	5	1.3
Coke	5	0	1	2	4	1.3
Cicero	1	1	1	2	1	1.2
Hobbes	0	1	1	0	0	1.0
	33	25	37	29	32	32.4
Others	67	75	63	71	68	67.6
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100.0%

William Blackstone and his theory of Christian natural law were a dominant influence upon the Founders. Boorstin stated, "In the history of American institutions, no other book—except the Bible—has played so great a role as Blackstone's *Commentaries of the Laws of England*." (Boorstin 1958, iii). The popularity of Blackstone in early American Jurisprudence and political writings support this paper's claim that his Christian natural law system deeply influenced the Founders.

This influence of Christian natural law upon federal and state governments is witnessed by the dominance of Biblical and Blackstone citations in Founding Era political writings. It is also clearly evident in numerous court cases involving the actual implementation and administration of the law. The following are a few of many cases which could be cited as examples.¹

PEOPLE V. RUGGLES, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, 1811

In this case the defendant was charged with blasphemy "of and concerning the Christian religion, and of and concerning Jesus Christ" (Ruggles 1811, 1), for having spoken of Jesus Christ profanely. He was found guilty by the trial court and sentenced to three months in prison and ordered to pay a fine of \$500. The Supreme Court of New York heard the case on appeal. The defendant's lawyer argued that given the lack of an established church in the United States and in New York, "it was to be inferred that Christianity did not make a part of the common law of this State" (Ruggles 1811, 2). Hence, a man should be allowed "to declare his opinions" (Ruggles 1811, 2) about

¹ For list of other cases which could be cited as examples see footnote #6 on p. 23.

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Christianity, even if some would consider the opinions to be blasphemous. Furthermore, the defendant argued, America freely allowed the worship of Judaism and Islam, and hence Christianity should not be entitled to any special privilege under the law.

Chief Justice James Kent² delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. Citing Blackstone he rejected the defendant's arguments, and ruled that such blasphemous words uttered "with a wicked and malicious disposition" did indeed constitute, "an offense at common law" (Ruggles 1811, 6). The Court noted that previous courts had held that "Christianity was parcel of the law" and to allow the brazen ridicule of Christianity would be unwise, for "whatever strikes at the root of Christianity tends manifestly to the dissolution of civil government" (Ruggles 1811, 6).

Because of the blending of Christian natural law and US law it was commonly held that Christianity was part of the law, and that to allow an attack upon Christianity was tantamount to allowing an attack upon the law. This, of course, would lead to the "dissolution" of civil government, as respect for the law was broken down. The jurisprudential influence of Christian natural law was clearly evident here, as the Court noted, "The very idea of jurisprudence . . . embraced the religion of the country" (Ruggles 1811, 8).

In addition to ruling that Christianity was part of the common law, the Court also declared that non-Christian religions were not entitled to the same protections:

Nor are we bound, by any expressions in the constitution, as some have strangely supposed, either not to punish at all, or to punish indiscriminately the like attacks upon the religion of Mahomet [Mohamed] or of the Grand Lama; and for this plain reason, that the case assumes that we are a Christian people, and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted [sic] upon Christianity, and not upon the doctrines or worship of those imposters. (Ruggles 1811, 8-9).

According to the Court, the US and New York Constitutions protected Christianity because the country was built upon Christianity and not upon other religious "imposters." While such a statement would shock most modern Americans, it clearly demonstrates the influence of Christian natural law in early American jurisprudence and substantiates the claim that the Founders created no wall of separation between church and state. Early courts held that Christianity was actually part of the law and was entitled to protection as such, because it was the very basis for the law.

UPDEGRAPH V. COMMONWEALTH, SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1834

Updegraph was also a case of blasphemy; the defendant was charged with blasphemy against "the Christian Religion and the Scriptures of Truth" for having, "unlawfully, wickedly, and premeditatedly, despitefully and blasphemously" said "that the Holy Scriptures were a mere fable" (Updegraph 1824, 1). The trial court found the defendant guilty and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania heard the case on appeal.

² Kent is sometimes referred to as one of the "Fathers of American Jurisprudence. He published the well known and well respected four volume *Commentaries on American Law*.

The defendant argued that the Constitution of the United States forbade the establishment of religion, and did not protect Christianity from persons merely speaking their opinions “in a discussion” (Updegraph 1824, 3). In rejecting the defendant’s assertions, the unanimous Court noted that the defendant, like defendants in similar cases, made the misguided assertion “that Christianity never was received as part of the common law of this Christian land; [or] that if it was, it was virtually repealed by the constitution of the United States” (Updegraph 1824, 13). The Court explained that this bold line of thinking (i.e., that Christianity was not part of the law) “has often been explored,” but “it is a barren soil, upon which no flower ever blossomed” (Updegraph 1824). The Court declared, “The plaintiff in error has totally failed to support his grand objection to this indictment, for Christianity is part of the common law” (Updegraph 1824, 36). In fact, the court countered, “Christianity, general Christianity, is, and always has been, a part of the common law of Pennsylvania” (Updegraph 1824, 14-15).

The Court was careful to note that everyone was entitled to believe in whatever religion they desired; in fact, the Court noted that the state of Pennsylvania was remarkably tolerant in religious matters “with the exception of disqualification for office of all who did not profess faith in Jesus Christ” (Updegraph 1824, 24)³. The Court also provided a detailed history and description of the role and importance of Christianity in the law. In this decision almost fifty years after the ratification of the US Constitution and the Bill of Rights, a unanimous Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that Christianity was part of the law, even the very basis for the law, and that as such it was afforded special protection from blasphemy.

This historical analysis of Christianity’s role is particularly important for the purposes of this paper, which seeks to demonstrate that Christian natural law was once the standard of adjudication, not the ‘wall of separation.’ Speaking again of religious toleration, the Court explained, “No preference is given by law to any particular religious persuasion. Protection is given to all by our laws” (Updegraph 1824, 36). Notwithstanding this toleration, the Court declares, “It is *only* the malicious reviler of Christianity who is punished” (Updegraph 1824, 36). Again the court underscores the relation between Christianity and the law, thus requiring the special protection under the law of Christianity.

To the modern American, this ruling that only blasphemy of the Christian religion was prohibited may seem patently unfair. However, the Court explained why:

No society can tolerate a willful and despiteful attempt to subvert its religion . . . a general, malicious, and deliberate intent to overthrow Christianity, general Christianity. This is the line of indication, where crime commences, and the offence becomes the subject of penal visitation. (Updegraph 1824, 31).

The Court declared that an attack upon America’s religion was in essence an attack upon its laws, and said that no society could be expected tolerate such an act. A citizen

³ Laws requiring a belief in Christianity or a Supreme Being and an after-life to hold office were commonplace in many other states also even long after the passage of the US Constitution and of the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment which supposedly created the ‘wall of separation.’

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was allowed to believe whatever religion he/she saw fit to believe in; the belief crossed the “line of indication” and became criminal, however, if the citizen blasphemed Christianity, which the Court declared was “certainly the religion of the country” and “part of the common law of this state” (Updegraph 1824, 32-33). It is interesting to note that the court spoke of “general” Christianity, as the Court was not choosing any specific denomination within Christianity to be favored. This allowance of “general” Christianity into the application of law was the original interpretation of the Church/state relationship in American Jurisprudence. The Founders intended that Americans would be free to practice the religion of their choice, but that general, non-denominational Christian principles were expected and understood to be the foundation for the law.

The Court continued by explaining that Christianity was fundamentally necessary for the rule of law in America: “It is impossible to administer the laws without taking the religion which the defendant in error has scoffed at, that Scripture which he had reviled, as their basis” (Updegraph 1824, 33). The Court clearly declared that Christianity and the Holy Scriptures were the basis for the laws; in fact, the Court ruled, “the great body of the laws [is] an incorporation of the common law doctrine of Christianity” (Updegraph 1824, 24). Here the Court clearly delineates the blending of Christianity and the law—which is the basis for the Christian natural law this paper seeks to prove was a foundation in early American Jurisprudence.

The Court also declared that “religion and morality” were the “foundations of all governments” (Updegraph 1824, 33) and explained that “Without these restraints no free government could long exist” (Updegraph 1824, 33). The Court revealed strong Christian natural law leanings, because it held that the nation’s laws were indeed founded upon and even dependant upon Christianity. The Founders and the early jurists who interpreted their laws believed that the rule of law depended upon each citizen’s ability to lead a moral life and obey the laws. As Christianity was the almost universal religion of the country and believed to be part of the law of the land, it was natural to assume that this type of moral life could best be brought about by adherence to Christian principles.

This assumption was the fulfillment of Blackstone’s vision of the Divine Law and Natural Law operating together for a happy society. Americans overwhelmingly believed Christianity and the Bible to be the source of the Divine Law; thus, the Court held that to allow open blasphemy against Christianity would “weaken the bonds by which society is held together” (Updegraph 1824, 38). This case, adjudicated nearly fifty years after the passage of the US Constitution and the Bill of Rights clearly shows the dominance of Christian natural law thinking in pre-*Everson* American Jurisprudence.

COMMONWEALTH V. KNEELAND, SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1838

Kneeland is another blasphemy case and will only be treated briefly to show that the enforcement of the blasphemy laws occurred in many states and also to show that the press was not exempted from these laws. In this case the defendant, Kneeland, was charged with blasphemy, for, “reproaching Jesus Christ and the Holy Ghost,” because he published that the “whole story” concerning Jesus Christ was “a fable and a fiction” (Kneeland 1838, 1-2). On appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, he asserted the familiar argument that the law against blasphemy was invalid, because of a supposed

separation of church and state. He also claimed “that the liberty of the press” allowed a person to publish “whatever he pleases, from bad or good motives” (Kneeland 1838, 48).

Like other courts who heard similar arguments, the Court summarily rejected Kneeland’s assertions and upheld his sentence of “sixty days’ imprisonment” (Kneeland 1838, 77). The Court quoted from Blackstone to demonstrate the importance of blasphemy laws and used reasoning similar to the previous cases. However, the Court also noted that such laws had been “repeatedly enforced” and that “many prosecutions and convictions” resulted (Kneeland 1838, 21). According to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts blasphemy of God or of Christianity was taken very seriously and the laws were regularly enforced; this case shows that nearly fifty years after the passage of the Bill of Rights a person could still be sentenced to sixty days in jail for blasphemy against Jesus Christ because Christianity was tied so closely to the law.

SHOVER V. STATE, SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS, 1850

George Shover was charged with “Sabbath-breaking” for having “unlawfully kep[t] open his grocery” on a Sunday (Shover 1850, 1). Sunday laws or “blue laws” were once very common throughout the United States. Shover was convicted by the trial court and sentenced. He appealed his conviction to the Arkansas Supreme Court asserting that “the act upon which the indictment was based was unconstitutional” (2) because it violated the separation of church and state found in Arkansas’ Declaration of Rights.

The Court summarily rejected Shover’s assertion and Chief Justice Johnson declared in a unanimous opinion that Sunday and Christianity were protected by law:

Sunday or the Sabbath is properly and emphatically called the Lord's day, and is one amongst the first and most sacred institutions of the Christian religion. This system of religion *is recognized as constituting a part and parcel of the common law*, and as such all of the institutions growing out of it, or, in any way connected to with it . . . are entitled to the most profound respect, and *can rightfully claim the protection of the law making power of the State*. (Shover 1850, 6; emphasis added).

Christianity was again ruled by another unanimous State Supreme Court to be part of the law, and hence entitled to state protection. The Court also explained why the action of Sabbath-breaking was criminalized:

The act of keeping open a grocery on Sunday is not, in itself, innocent or even indifferent, but it is, on the contrary, highly vicious and demoralizing in its tendency, as it amounts to a general invitation to the community to enter and indulge in the intoxicating cup, thereby shocking their sense of propriety and common decency, and bringing into utter contempt the sacred and venerable institution of the Sabbath. It is not simply the act of keeping open a grocery, but the keeping of it open on Sunday, that forms . . . the offence. (Shover 1850, 264).

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Although the state allowed the freedom of worship, the enforcement of Sunday laws was considered completely constitutional. The Court ruled that allowing a grocery to remain open would have a “deleterious effects upon the body politic,” (Shover 1850, 263) because the morals of the community would be assaulted. The Christian natural law position of allowing the government to enforce Christian morals—even upon the unwilling or non-believing—is clearly evident here. Also apparent is the Christian natural law blending of natural and divine law (i.e., the Sacred Sabbath), into human law (i.e., Sabbath laws/blue laws). The Court ruled nearly sixty years after the passage of the Bill of Rights that the binding together of Christianity and the law allowed for the protection of the Sabbath.

THURSTON V. WHITNEY, SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1848.

In a previous trial Thurston had been convicted based on the testimony of an acknowledged atheist. He appealed to the Supreme Court alleging that the testimony of an atheist was not admissible in court and a unanimous Court ruled in Thurston’s favor. After citing numerous precedents, the Court declared, “all authorities agree, that an atheist, who disbelieves in the existence of a God, who is ‘the rewarder of truth and avenger of falsehood,’ cannot be permitted to testify” (Thurston 1848, 11-12). It was held that an atheist did not believe that, “perjury will surely be punished by some supreme power;” (Thurston 1848, 7) and hence, an oath would be, “ineffectual to bind his conscience to speak the truth” (Thurston 1848, 6). The testimony of an atheist was inadmissible, because the Court stated that he did not believe that he would be held accountable before God for his testimony. The Court closed with these powerful words, “We are therefore *very clearly* of the opinion, that the [atheist] witness was incompetent, and ought not to have been allowed to testify” (Thurston 1848, 13; emphasis added). Here again a unanimous state Supreme Court rules based on the blending of Christianity and the law.

UNITED STATES V. MILLER, U.S. DISTRICT COURT (WASHINGTON, D.C.), 1916

This case also involved a witness who did not believe in a “God who rewards truth and avenges falsehood” (Miller 1916, 1). The witness’ testimony was challenged, and the US Court sustained the challenge. The Court ruled, “Under the common-law rule a person who does not believe in a God who is the rewarder of truth and the avenger of falsehood cannot be permitted to testify” (Miller 1916, 1-2). Importantly, the Court also officially recognized the sources of the common-law: “The common law consists of those principles, maxims, usages, and rules founded on reason, natural justice, and an enlightened public policy” (Miller 1916, 4). Here the court recognized both reason and “natural justice” as contributors to common-law—both are foundational principles in Christian natural law. Additionally, the Court ruled more than one hundred years after the passage of the Bill of Rights that the testimony of an atheist could be challenged because the atheist did not believe in God.

WILKERSON V. ROME, SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA, 1922

This case involved a lawsuit challenging the City of Rome's law requiring the daily reading of the King James Bible in every public school. The law required:

Some portion of the King James Version of the Bible, of either the Old or New Testaments, to be read and prayer offered to God in the hearing of the Pupils of the Public Schools of the City of Rome daily. (Wilkerson 1922, 1).

The reading and prayer were to be done, "without comment," (Wilkerson 1922, 2) and an, "exemption from attendance" (2) would be granted to any student upon parental request.

A suit was filed, alleging that the law violated the separation of church and state and that, "readings and offering of prayers . . . is prohibited by the law in public schools" (Ibid., 4). It was also argued that the law would "aid the Protestant sect of the Christian Church" while undermining the, "Roman Catholic" or "Jewish faith" (Wilkerson 1922, 5).

The Georgia Supreme Court heard the case on appeal and summarily rejected the plaintiff's arguments and ruled that the reading and prayer, "offered in the hearing of the pupils daily during the regular session of school, is not in conflict with [the religious freedom] paragraphs of the constitution of Georgia" (Wilkerson 1922, 7). The Court first cited other states and cities with similar Bible reading laws. Then Justice Hines, writing for the 5-2 majority, made an important distinction between providing religious freedom to all while still maintaining Christianity as part of the law.

The Court explained that the passages of the Georgia Constitution guaranteeing religious freedom for all people were created so that "all might enjoy an unrestricted liberty in their religion" (Wilkerson 1922, 16). However, the passages were not to be construed so as to allow a "war upon the Bible and its use in common [public] schools" (Wilkerson 1922, 15). In fact, the Court noted, "Those who drafted and adopted our constitution could never have intended it [the Georgia Religious Freedom Act] to meet such narrow and sectarian views" (Wilkerson 1922, 15). The Court summarized the movement for the separation of church and state in these terms:

[T]his was not a movement for the separation of the State from Christianity, but specifically a separation of Church and State. Christianity entered into the whole warp and woof of our governmental fabric. (Wilkerson 1922, 16).

The Court also quotes from Daniel Webster's famous church and state speech to support their claim that the separation of church and states does not mean that Christianity and the state are separated:

All, all proclaim that Christianity, general, tolerant Christianity, Christianity independent of sects and parties, that Christianity to which the sword and fagot are unknown, general, tolerant Christianity, is the law of the land. (Wilkerson 1922, 15-16).

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Like other courts faced with a religious freedom claim, this Court again declared that notwithstanding religious freedom acts, Christianity was indeed part of the law of the land—the Christian natural law blending of human and divine law is again evident. No one specific Christian denomination was to be favored, but no wall between Christianity and the state was ever erected.

Following Blackstone's principles of judicial interpretation, the Court repeatedly sought to discover and explain the motives of the founders, writing, "From an examination of all of them [religious freedom laws] and of their origin, we think it clearly appears that the framers of our constitutions have never intended to declare the policy of this State to be unreligious or unchristian" (Wilkerson 1922, 24). The court ruled that Christianity was to be a part of the policy of the state, and as such, state activities could be Christian in nature.

To support their claim that the founders never intended to separate Christianity from the State, the Court cited numerous legal precedents (including some that this paper has treated) in order to clearly establish that the founders and early justices clearly understood that the principle of religious freedom and the conception of general Christianity as part of the law of the land could operate in harmony. This idea was a major tenant of the Christian natural law endorsed by the founders. No particular religious belief or sect was to be forced on anyone; however, it was clearly understood that Christianity was the foundation for human law. The use of this Christian natural law approach as a guide in adjudication was commonplace and constitutional in America for many years after the passage of the Bill of Rights. The 1947 US Supreme Court ruling in *Everson*, however, radically altered the judicial paradigm.

Everson v. Board of Education, US Supreme Court, 1947

The shift from Christian natural law as a basis for American Jurisprudence to the contemporary jurisprudential paradigm of 'wall of separation' occurred most dramatically in *Everson*. In this case a divided US Supreme Court ruled in a 5-4 decision that, "The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach" (Everson 1947, 18). The separation language of *Everson* contrasts sharply with the Christian natural law language of earlier court decisions as cited above. This ruling introduced a new paradigm, because the 'wall of separation' metaphor quickly became popular with separation proponents. While *Everson* signaled the major paradigm shift, in some senses the shift had been occurring gradually for decades.

As the nation became more pluralistic, religiously-based laws were inevitably relaxed. For example, state laws requiring a belief in Christianity to hold office (commonplace at the Founding) had all been eliminated or replaced with laws requiring the belief in a Supreme Being⁴. However, the basic belief that America was a Christian

⁴ Even these non-denominational laws were invalidated, however, in 1961 by the US Supreme Court; see *Torcaso v. Watkins*. The Court used *Everson's* "separation" language to support the invalidation.

nation and that America's laws are based upon Christianity was upheld by the US Supreme Court as recently as 1892 and 1931⁵.

The Court in *Everson*, however, rapidly accelerated the change that had been gradually occurring, and public religion and public Christianity are now favorite targets for atheists, the ACLU, and other interest groups. For example, long-time nativity or crèche scenes, once constitutional and popular in almost every community, have been outlawed, or made to become non-religious in nature. Crosses have been driven from war memorials, displays of the Ten Commandments have been moved, and actions once considered crimes against natural law or Christianity (blasphemy, sodomy, birth control etc.) have been decriminalized⁶. Clearly, the shift has been away from the Christian natural law blending of the human and the divine, and towards a separation of church and state, or a separation of the human from the divine.

Significant disagreement exists over the 'wall of separation' between church and state, which according to *Everson* was created by the First Amendment. For example, the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist has ridiculed the 'wall of separation' phrase, calling it a "misleading metaphor" (Wallace 1985, 93). This phrase is attributed to a letter by Thomas Jefferson and, ironically, was first used judicially to *support* the enforcement of Christian community standards against polygamy⁷, not to support a separation of church and state. Also ironically, *Reynolds* was the *only* judicial precedent cited by the Court in *Everson* to support its 'wall of separation' claim—even though the Court in *Reynolds* denied the separation of church and state claimed by the Mormon plaintiff as the Court enforced Christian standards against polygamy.

The late Chief Justice Rehnquist also explained that using Jefferson's 'wall of separation' metaphor is irrelevant because he was in France when the Constitution and Bill of Rights were written:

It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years. Thomas Jefferson was of course in France at the time the constitutional Amendments known as the Bill of Rights were passed by Congress and ratified by the States. His letter to the Danbury Baptist Association [that included the 'wall of separation phrase'] was a short note of courtesy, written 14 years after the Amendments were passed by Congress. He would seem to any detached observer as a less than ideal source of

⁵ See *Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States* (1892), and *Macintosh v. United States* (1931)

⁶ Blasphemy laws were invalidated in 1970, see *Maryland v. West*; sodomy laws were invalidated in 2003, see *Lawrence v. Texas*; Birth-control laws were invalidated in 1963, see *Grizwald v. Connecticut*.

⁷ See *Reynolds v. United States* (1897). In this case a Mormon plaintiff argued that he should be allowed to practice polygamy because the US separated church and state. The Court rejected his arguments and declared that the state had the right to enforce Christian standards even against non-believing persons.

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contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. (Wallace 1985, 92).

Blackstone's system of Christian natural law—the basis for the American jurisprudential system—calls for judges to examine the motives and objectives of the framers of a law in order to understand the true intent of a law. Using this standard, Thomas Jefferson is clearly not the person to consult concerning the intentions of the First Amendment as he was not even present in the US when the Amendment was written. Notwithstanding this obvious conclusion, the courts have completely ignored the objections stated above by the late Chief Justice and have used Jefferson's phrase⁸ as if it were part of the Bill of Rights or of the Constitution itself. In fact, Justice Gallagher from the New York State Supreme Court stated—almost prophetically—in 1958:

Much has been written in recent years . . . to 'a wall of separation between church and State' . . . [It] has received so much attention that one would almost think at times that it is to be found somewhere in our Constitution. (Baer 1958, 237).

Ironically, Justice Gallagher's statement nearly fifty years ago is fulfilled; many Americans *do* believe that the phrase "separation of church and state" is actually found in the US Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. This, however, is completely incorrect, as the only mention of religion is found in the First Amendment which simply states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" (U.S. Constitution, Amendment 1).

In addition to not being found in the Constitution or Bill of Rights, the over reliance on the 'wall of separation' metaphor ignores the intentions of the Founders who drafted the Amendment. The late Chief Justice Rehnquist offered this scathing analysis of the "wall" metaphor and its impact on jurisprudence:

But the greatest injury of the "wall" notion is its mischievous diversion of judges from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights. The "crucible of litigation," is well adapted to adjudicating factual disputes on the basis of testimony presented in court, but no amount of repetition of historical errors in judicial opinions can make the errors true. The "wall of separation between church and State" is a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned. (Wallace 1985, 107).

Rehnquist asserts that the metaphor is undermining the concept of judicial review—the idea that the intentions of a law's founders must be examined. The courts constantly cite as precedent a single phrase, from a single letter written by Thomas Jefferson, instead of examining what the actual authors of the Amendment said. As quoted above, Rehnquist explains that Jefferson was not even a participant in creating the Bill of Rights,

⁸ There are also valid arguments—outside the scope of this paper—that conclude Jefferson's statement is taken out of context.

and his comments fourteen years after the fact are certainly not the best source to discover the First Amendment authors' intentions. Instead of examining previous court cases for illumination, the Supreme Court uses Jefferson's metaphor—which Rehnquist calls a “misleading metaphor—” as precedent to separate Christianity from the state. Rehnquist also notes that the Court is relying on historical and factual errors and that hence the entire ‘wall of separation’ paradigm is invalid and should be abandoned.

The late Chief Justice's analysis of the ‘wall of separation’ is both legally convincing and exhaustively documented. As demonstrated in this paper, the notion that the Founders intended to create a ‘wall’ between church and state is patently ridiculous. If they did, early American judges certainly did not understand this, because the judges constantly ruled in favor of the blending of divine and human law. Christian natural law was deeply influential in America's Founding and in pre-*Everson* adjudication. Multiple rulings—almost all unanimous—by state supreme courts cited in this paper have demonstrated these facts, and numerous other cases could also be cited.⁹

Certainly, Christian natural law has shortcomings. For example, with an increasingly pluralistic society it is difficult to agree on moral truths. Also, certain religions might find their beliefs trampled by the majority's morals; for example, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and polygamy in the late 1800's.

However, these difficulties do not signify that the US needs to continue to abandon all laws based on Christian natural law, as some seem to think necessary. The application of general Christian principles and morals can be successfully accomplished without loss of individual rights. All religions can be respected, while still allowing general Christian principles to have a prominent role in American public life. The Founders and early justices clearly agreed. America's Founders and pre-*Everson* jurists regularly drew on Christian natural law principles to blend human law with general Christian principles.

Prior to *Everson* the highest courts in the land regularly declared this to be a Christian nation, and regularly declared the laws to be based upon and even dependent upon Christianity. Surely the *Everson* ‘wall of separation’ interpretation of the First Amendment is a far cry from the Christian natural law foundation the Founding Fathers laid and pre-*Everson* jurists protected. The author joins with the late Chief Justice Rehnquist in asserting that the *Everson* interpretation defies 150 years of previous American jurisprudence, and should be reexamined and abandoned for a return to Christian natural law in jurisprudence and for a return of general Christian principles to American public life.

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⁹ For example, *John M'Creery's Lessee V. Allender* (1799), *Runkel v. Winemiller* (1799), *The Commonwealth v. Sharpless* (1815), *Davis v. Beason* (1889), *Murphey v. Ramsey* (1885), *City of Charleston v. S.A. Benjamin* (1846), *Lindenmuller v. The People* (1860), *Commonwealth v. Nesbit* (1859) or any of the precedent cases that each of these cases cite.

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